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Introduction
The twentieth century could be called the Great Age of Consumer
Branding. Companies competed fiercely for customers, choosing unique
names and images in order to generate life-long loyalty. Their efforts were
so successful that by 2000 Americans were more likely to recognize leading
corporate logos than the names of their political representatives. On the
other hand, most Americans probably did not know much about the people
or institutions that drove the reconstruction of reality around consumer
satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Most, for example, would recognize CocaCola, IBM, Life Savers, Canada Dry, Gillette, Ritz-Carlton Hotels, or
Vick’s Vapo Rub; but few could identify the individuals who created and
built those brands. This concept is especially true for the financial backers
of products and services; specifically the banks and bankers who helped raise
the essential capital and then provided long-term support for emerging
companies and their products. What was their work? What were their
values and purposes?
This book is about one such person, Eugene W. Stetson. Although
once one of the more powerful financial figures in the United States,
memories of Stetson currently rest among the other anonymous business
leaders who did nothing less than construct the modern world. At various
times during the early and mid-twentieth century Stetson was connected to
many companies that are familiar to contemporary consumers, including all
of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. During the 1940s, Stetson
presided over the Guaranty Trust Company of New York as president and
chairman, having begun his career at the bank in 1916. When Stetson was
president, Guaranty operated as the largest trust company in the world.
This book seeks to explain some of the characteristics of the great corporate
trends of the twentieth century by describing and evaluating Stetson’s
experiences as a banker in the United States and abroad.
The task is complicated by the traditions of business biography. Too
often such works have been reduced to overly simplistic tales of good or
evil. The American capitalist is either munificent benefactor or Robber
Baron. This study tries to avoid these extremes by considering the broader
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context and focusing on key influences and beliefs that shaped Stetson’s
career: his upbringing in the post-Reconstruction South; his attitudes
toward business and the larger community; his beliefs about the purposes of
wealth and wealth-getting; and, most importantly, his ideas and practices in
developing profitable relationships with bankers and businessmen. Focusing
on these influences and beliefs identifies new aspects regarding the nature of
banking and business practice in the first half of the twentieth century, the
period during which the American economy became globally dominant.
Stetson’s life was a piece of this vastly important history, and his biography
sheds light on its meaning and character.
This study is also an examination of institutions, particularly in
banking. American banking history has been approached from many
perspectives. There are written accounts of individual institutions, the
experience of particular regions, the role of state and federal governments,
the impact of international banking, and the relationship between money
and banking. Banking history’s diverse authors include professional
historians, economists, journalists, and bankers. They have applied a wide
variety of methodologies, from econometrics to oral history. One of the
more challenging needs of banking history is a better understanding of its
human element. It is useful to consider not only the internal operations of a
particular bank and the external economic and political forces operating on
that bank, but also the lives of bankers and their clients. To write a
worthwhile business biography of a banker requires attention to economic,
social, and political trends as well as to the myriad complexities of
interpreting the subject and the other individuals in his or her life. Studies
that consider these operations can counterbalance the inevitability
sometimes implied in other kinds of scholarship. A biography has the
potential to humanize the field, helping to show the impact that individuals
did and could make in the development of banking practice.1

1

A discussion of trends in banking history, with a select bibliography, is Larry
Schweikart, “U.S. Commercial Banking: A Historiographical Survey,” Business
History Review 65 (Autumn 1991): 606–61. Broad surveys of American commercial
and investment banking history are Paul Trescott, Financing American Enterprise:
The Story of Commercial Banking (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); and Vincent
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Particular attention is paid here to the practice of “relationship
banking.” Although a large literature exists on relationship banking in
current practice, there has been few efforts focus on the details of
relationship banking in the first half of the twentieth century. Most
scholarly writing about relationship banking considers advantages and
disadvantages as compared to banking strategies focused on one-time
services and increased transactional volume. Relationship banking in the
early and mid-twentieth century reflected the core meaning of both banking
and business, not simply the selling of bank services. Relationship banking
measured success by the cultivation and delivery of multiple continuing
services to a particular client over the long run, such as personal service to
individual clients in the commercial banking context. The perspective of a
commercial relationship banker—such as Stetson—was shaped by a desire
to obtain, maintain, and expand the banking services provided to a
corporate client over a long period of time. This kind of banking enterprise
depended largely on such intangible human factors as personality and
communication.2
Carosso, Investment Banking in America: A History (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1970).
2
A survey of literature on relationship banking is Arnoud W. A. Boot,
“Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?”, Journal of Financial Intermediation 9
(2000): 7–25. Other examples of the extensive writing on contemporary issues in
relationship banking are Mark S. Mizruchi and Linda Brewster Stearns, “Getting
Deals Done: The Use of Social Networks in Bank Decision-Making,” American
Sociological Review 66 (2001): 647–71; Allen N. Berger and Gregory F. Udell, “The
Future of Relationship Lending,” in The Future of Banking, ed. Benton E. Gup
(Westport, CT and London: Quorum Books, 2003); Dwight S. Ritter, Relationship
Banking: Cross-Selling the Bank’s Products and Services to Meet Your Customer’s Every
Need (Chicago and Cambridge: Bankers Publishing Co. & Probus Publishing Co.,
1993) (Bankers are salespeople who should establish relationships with customers to
cross-sell banking services); Dimitris N. Chorafas, The Commercial Banking
Handbook: Strategic Planning for Growth and Survival in the New Decade (London:
MacMillan Press Ltd., 1999) 163 (“The relationship banker is the consultant
assigned to a specific project, and the way he acts can make or break the customer
contact.”); Michael T. Jacobs, Short-Term America: The Causes and Cures of Our
Business Myopia (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1991) 143–70 (Arguing
that the demise of relationship banking is bad and is connected to unnecessary
government regulation.); Arnoud W. A. Boot and Anjan V. Thakor, “Can
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The challenge for the historian who wants to describe banker-client
relationships is that they usually occurred in a context where confidentiality
and unrecorded conversations were the norm. Although frequently hidden,
such relationships were at the center of both banking and American
business. During Stetson’s life experts recognized that establishing and
nurturing such relationships was essential. Luther Harr and W. Carlton
Harris, finance professors at the Wharton School, wrote in 1936 that
among bankers, “Good mixers and joiners are advantageous, as their wide
acquaintanceship may lead to extensive additions to deposit and borrowing
accounts.” Harr and Harris encouraged bank officers to “recognize and
greet the bulk of their depositors and clients.” Bank directors, as well,
should be selected in part on the basis of their potential to generate new
clients. H. Parker Willis, John M. Chapman, and Ralph West, faculty
members at the Columbia University Business School, wrote in 1934 that
bankers must understand in detail the financial standing and financial
requirements of their clients. But aggressive promotion was also necessary
to generate desirable business through general advertising and direct
contact with clients by bank officers.3
In 1926 G. Prather Knapp wrote a remarkable book entitled, How
Banks Increase Their Business. This volume laid bare the fact that modern
banking was a selling game. Knapp presented strategies already in place at
prominent banks, complete with photographs, for marketing a range of
bank services. He suggested that bank managers should be aware of the
needs of special groups: immigrants, women, children, and business. For

Relationship Banking Survive Competition?”, Journal of Finance 55 (April 2000):
678–713; and Bruce W. Morgan, “Demystifying Relationship Banking,” Journal of
Retail Banking 15 (Winter 1993–1994): 9–20 (“Relationship banking means
understanding how to create and preserve those customer interactions that will
serve to maximize the institution’s net asset value.”).
3
Luther Harr and W. Carlton Harris, Banking Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1936) 55–304; H. Parker Willis, John M. Chapman, and Ralph
West, Contemporary Banking (New York: Harper & Bros., 1934) 481–98. See also
William H. Kniffin, The Businessman and His Bank (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1930)
3–4, which emphasizes banks’ active search for customers; and Robert G. Rodkey,
Sound Policies for Bank Management (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1944) 7, which
stresses the need for better public relations.
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Knapp, when it came to attracting customers no detail was too insignificant.
He implored bank managers to “Make the tellers smile.” Strategies also
advised that the architecture and decoration of the bank’s interior, its
advertising policy, and even well-timed speeches by executives could woo
clients. Gimmicks, such as one bank’s installation of a radio so that curious
visitors could hear Calvin Coolidge’s presidential inauguration, were
desirable because they brought in potential customers from the street.
Knapp’s superman banker was the fellow who could both sell a service and
understand what the service was all about. In his experience, often the
bright financiers could not sell and the salesmen were not effective in
operating accounts. At the top of the bank hierarchy should be men attuned
to the needs of large commercial clients. Only bank executives, however,
were likely to operate successfully within the requisite “business and social
spheres” to pull in such business. Ultimately, according to Knapp, banking
was a personal service with class and cultural components, and the sooner
bank officials recognized this, the better for their profits.4
Stetson’s career provides a unique vantage from which to evaluate the
practice of relationship banking because Stetson fit the mold of Knapp’s
“Super Banker.” By describing the career of Stetson and his bank, the
meaning of “relationship” in mid-twentieth century relationship banking
can be explored. The values of banking and business can be addressed.
These tasks are challenging, because Stetson’s relationships were complex
and evolving; moreover, they were affected by institutional concerns,
government actions, and by outsiders to the relationship, including other
banks, corporations, and individuals.5
Stetson is an especially good subject for this sort of study because he
held the highest leadership positions at Guaranty Trust, an important bank.

4

G. Prather Knapp, How Banks Increase Their Revenue (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1926) 37, 169.
5
Examples of historical studies of banking relationships include Naomi R.
Lamoreaux, Insider Lending: Banks, Personal Connections, and Economic Development in
Industrial New England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) and
Caroline Fohlin, “Relationship Banking, Liquidity, and Investment in the German
Industrialization,” Journal of Finance 53 (October 2000): 1737–1758 (Finding limited
benefits of relationship banking in Germany for industrial investment, 1903–1913.).
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More significantly, he excelled at developing relationships with corporate
clients. Stetson grew up in Georgia during the 1880s and 1890s and began
his banking career there just after the turn of the century. He helped
establish a national bank in Macon in 1907, eventually becoming its
president. He was active in projects to improve Macon’s infrastructure, to
organize its businessmen, and to cast off the economic limitations of the
Old South. Far-off Wall Street noticed his efforts, and in 1916 he was hired
as a vice president with Guaranty, a behemoth on lower Broadway
operating within J. P. Morgan & Co.’s expansive orbit.
Over the next thirty years, through two world wars and the Great
Depression, Stetson rose in the estimation of the Morgan partners, other
officers of Guaranty, and Guaranty’s blue chip corporate clients. He was
appointed to Guaranty’s board in 1928, elected the bank’s president in
1941, and chairman of its board in 1944. Stetson was instrumental in the
merger of Guaranty in the late 1950s with J. P. Morgan and was a member
of the new Morgan Guaranty board at the time of his death in July 1959.
This laundry list of accomplishments is useful, but it does not address
what Stetson did as a banker and why it mattered, which is the critical
question for this study. Stetson’s real achievement was to cultivate and
sustain effective banking relationships with officers and directors in his bank
as well as with corporate clients. His achievements resulted from a
combination of skills, including financial knowledge, social vigor, and a
willingness to take the corporate client’s perspective. These skills may not
appear to be dramatic traits, but they determined who received money from
his bank and who did not. Considering that the distribution of economic
benefits, capital, is among the most basic issues in economic, political, and
social history and analysis, “mere” personal relationships cannot be taken
lightly.
Unfortunately, although Stetson’s career is well suited to provide
insight into mid-twentieth century banking, the materials available to
explore his actions are incomplete. I made extensive efforts to find the
history of Stetson and his bank’s key clients. All the usual sources, including
private manuscripts, corporate records, government records (including legal
records, which are sometimes ignored by banking historians), oral history,
and contemporary publications, were scoured for information. One
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especially imposing difficulty was the lack of much previous study of
Guaranty Trust, which existed from 1864 to 1959.
Although between 1910 and 1959 Guaranty was a global leader in
commercial and international banking, banking historians have not spent
much time with it. The bank tends to get swallowed up by the larger
Morgan presence. In the published literature, it is mentioned—and then
only briefly—in the context of Morgan influence after 1910 and the merger
with Morgan in the 1950s. As a result, much spadework was necessary to
provide context for Stetson’s work. I did not intend to write Guaranty’s
history, but I had to provide an outline of such a history in order to address
the central task of the project. Given the study’s orientation, that outline is
concerned primarily with the operations of the bank, its relation with J. P.
Morgan & Co., and its corporate clientele. Frankly, I doubt a sophisticated
financial history of this important bank could now be written, given the
extensive destruction of documents from its past.
A second research problem concerned Stetson himself. A biographer,
even one focused on a portion of the subject’s life, such as his or her
business activities, needs a solid body of facts to construct a reasonable
portrait. Yet Stetson did not leave a large amount of information about his
business activities or views. Most notably, there are some speeches, a few
articles he wrote, a limited number of letters, some fascinating accounts of
his relationships with Cuban sugar companies, and a wonderful set of
testimony he provided in a lawsuit against the Illinois Central. This is
enough to capture the basic story, but it leaves many gaps and unanswerable
questions. Stetson was primarily a man of action, not novel ideas. Yet the
record of most of his actions has been lost.
As a result, my strategy was to relate the events in Stetson’s career that
I could document, focusing on his relationships within and outside the
bank. This necessarily includes a good bit of contextual information about
the careers of the many companies with which he was intimately involved.
Despite the limitations of the sources, there is enough to show Stetson and
Guaranty’s views of bankers’ responsibilities, including the role of a banker
as corporate director. There is also information about J. P. Morgan & Co.’s
connection with the Guaranty, as well as good evidence of Stetson’s many
personal relationships, especially with Ernest and Robert Woodruff of
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Coca-Cola, Thomas Lamont of J. P. Morgan, Thomas Watson Sr. of IBM,
and Averell Harriman, the heir of railroad tycoon E. H. Harriman.
What emerges is the picture of an individual, Gene Stetson, and of
business institutions addressing rapid and profound changes in the
American economy: global war, new financing techniques and challenges,
the increased value of advertising and trademarks, the growth of economic
regulation by the federal government, internationalization of markets,
devastating depression, shifts in technology, and shareholder pressures.
When Stetson left Georgia for New York in 1916 the Federal Reserve
System was new and equity markets were hugely underdeveloped. The
United States was financially a second-rate nation, automobiles were not
considered a reliable means of long distance transportation, and there was
no federal regulation of securities issues. Four decades later the banking and
economic world had changed in unimagined ways. By the late 1950s, the
fact that J. P. Morgan was an incorporated entity that needed cash from
Guaranty in order to prosper demonstrated that the banking world had
indeed been transformed. Altogether, Stetson’s experiences provide a
unique perspective on the relationship between elite bankers and corporate
clients in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Men like Stetson
built the modern business and financial world, in the process creating the
institutions and values that continue to shape economic life as well as the
American nation as a whole.

1
Surroundings
In July 1959, hefty stacks of papers from the big merger covered Gene
Stetson’s desk at the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company. Just a few months
earlier Stetson had helped engineer a union between the Guaranty Trust
and the much smaller but more prestigious J. P. Morgan & Co. This union
was perhaps the most important of the large bank mergers of the late 1950s
and early 1960s, and could be considered one of the key banking deals of
the century. Although by summer the bargain was officially done, the hard
work of integrating the two great banks remained. Stetson, a veteran of
almost sixty years in banking, planned to be a key part of the effort to
achieve that goal, but death intervened and he was never to see the merger’s
fruitful results.1
Just after Stetson’s passing, the solemnity of his former office was
abruptly disturbed by the distinctive ring of the elevator. Out burst one of
Stetson’s sons, Charlie, who had dropped in to inspect his father’s desk.
Chosen by his father to manage the estate, Charlie brushed passed the
secretary guarding the office, charged into Gene’s office, and started rifling
through papers. Naturally, the giant trust company had expected that it
would be the senior Stetson’s executor. Although Stetson’s bank achieved
much of its wealth through the management of estates, Gene Stetson
apparently thought the bank’s services would be too expensive.2 He was
fully aware of the substantial fees Guaranty charged for its elite services.
As Charlie sifted, the secretary had more on her mind than Stetson’s
heirs. She thought, “Some of those papers deal with merger negotiations;
I’m not sure he should be seeing them.” Mrs. Lillian Otlowski of the trust
department, Stetson’s personal assistant for family business, was summoned.
1

Lillian Otlowski, Over the Walls of Wall Street with Mrs. O (New Smyrna Beach
FL: Luthers’ Publishing, 2000) 27.
2
Ibid., 26–28.
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Otlowski immediately called a bank lawyer, John Early. Early calmly
replied, “Thanks, Mrs. O. I’ll be right down to pay him a visit.” Charlie’s
stay ended promptly. The banker’s son actually had a benign objective, far
removed from any desire to discover secrets of the merger. As he stated,
“About the only time I was in this office was when the old man called me in
to bawl the hell out of me. I wanted to see how it felt to be in his chair.”3

Introducing Eugene W. Stetson
The anecdote hints at Stetson’s power and influence, even in death; yet
it also suggests how deeply his personality and business career affected the
lives of those around him, including his family. For the student of business
and banking, however, there are larger and more important questions about
Stetson’s life. How did he rise from rather moderate circumstances in the
failed South after the Civil War to be a top dealmaker in the tightlycontrolled world of Wall Street? What skills, beliefs, and outside
institutions, persons, and forces shaped Stetson’s life and in turn shaped the
kind of banking practices that Stetson followed and developed? What
precisely was the role of a corporate banker in the middle decades of the
twentieth century? As a young man Stetson did not possess what many
people running Wall Street during his era had: family connections or
personal capital. On the other hand, when Stetson came to New York from
Georgia in 1916, he brought a gentlemanly southern charm, intelligence,
ambition, faith in the power of banking, and a tough and disciplined focus.
The last, implied by Charlie Stetson’s desire to sit in his dad’s chair,
imposed substantial expectations on others. Gene Stetson was serious and
demanding, and he expected similar efforts from colleagues and family
members. When disappointed, he tended to anger and did not hesitate to
show his feelings. Although he had a robust sense of humor, he was unlikely
to laugh at himself. Al Gordon, former chairman of Kidder, Peabody &
Co., also a legend on Wall Street, once served with Stetson as a corporate
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director. He recalled: “Stetson was great to work with. But I would never
work for him.”4
Even as a boy Gene Stetson wanted to reach a high level of success. Of
course bountiful ambition is present in some individuals in every age and in
every profession. If this aspiration was the only significance of Stetson’s life
his story could be very briefly told. One simply concludes that he was the
sort of rational maximizer of self-interest economists so love. But selfinterest does not have uniform meaning. What is really significant about
Stetson, and any other important corporate leader, is precisely how he
envisioned the purpose of his labor in the context of both his business
interests and ultimately the whole of society. Contrary to the belief that
businessmen produce social wealth without intending to, many business
leaders, including Stetson, act in large part based on the assumption that
what they do should benefit society broadly.
Ultimately, Stetson’s vision of his life and career offered a particular
understanding of the relationship between banking, business, and the
general well-being of society. Like all visions, Stetson’s had strengths and
weaknesses. He was neither an intellectual nor a theorist contemplating
abstractions. Instead, business, not art, music, or some other force, was his
interest and passion. Nonetheless, he saw banking as a means to a larger
goal—not simply wealth or wealth creation, but a better, more meaningful
life for Americans generally. Perhaps money was a measure of man in
Stetson’s eyes, but this was primarily because it could be constructive in
some larger sense.
This study of Stetson’s business experience seeks to portray the details
of this vision and how Stetson sought to implement it. The topic is
important not just because some of the individuals involved were among the
most influential persons in American business and banking history. Rather,
it matters on a larger scale because Stetson embodied many of the
assumptions and values about business, politics, and economy that
4
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triumphed during his life and have dominated American economics and
society since then. In short, Stetson helped shape mainstream business. He
is among America’s winners and thus his life helps to shed light on what it
meant to achieve power and success in the twentieth century.
Gene Stetson’s career included many substantial banking accomplishments. Given their number and diversity, Stetson himself would probably
not identify one undertaking as clearly preeminent. It was against his nature
to collect trophies, as opposed to concentrating on doing one’s duty in all
events in the best possible manner.5 A historian, however, might ask
whether his key achievement was orchestrating the merger of the Guaranty
Trust Company with J. P. Morgan. Or, perhaps it was serving as a key
negotiator in the buyout of Coca-Cola, the largest business sale in the
history of the South before 1920. There are other possibilities. Was it
keeping the Illinois Central Railroad from going bankrupt during the
Depression? What about helping to establish the giant Southern Company
electric utility in the 1940s and 1950s, a project expressly intended to help
his native region? Or, was it being among the men who made Guaranty
Trust one of America’s leading banks from the 1920s through the 1940s?
Ultimately, the individual works are best understood as part of a pattern of
behavior, with deeper meaning for Stetson and for American business and
banking.
In summarizing Stetson’s accomplishments, one can begin with the
last, the Morgan merger, as it represents the culmination of many strands in
his long banking career. In 1958, Stetson initiated the merger of his own
Guaranty Trust Company with the venerable J. P. Morgan & Co. At the
time, Stetson was in his late seventies—a retired chairman and former
president of Guaranty. Despite retirement, he maintained an office at the
bank and showed up nearly every work day. Top-level personnel needs,
according to Stetson, drove the need for a deal. Prior to the merger Stetson
told insiders that his replacement as chairman lacked the essential spark to
keep the Guaranty on top. This deal was the last of hundreds of transactions
for which Stetson served as the man in the background who inspired the
action, persevered through the details, and carried it to conclusion. For his

5
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efforts in the Morgan merger he received a $1 million investment banking
fee years before mergers and acquisition departments were established at
investment banking firms on Wall Street.6
The merger with Morgan provided a complex, yet fitting end to a career that began at the dawn of twentieth century, an entirely different era of
American finance. When Stetson first entered Georgia banking in 1901, the
gold standard reigned and national banks issued their own circulating
banknotes. Deposit insurance was nonexistent. When banks failed, which
they did at an alarming rate, depositors were left holding the proverbial
empty bag. Only in the 1930s, long after Stetson came to New York, did the
federal government mandate a national deposit insurance program. Stetson,
incidentally, along with most other executives at New York’s top
commercial banks, thought insurance was a bad idea because it supposedly
protected the faulty management of bad bankers through a tax on honest
bankers.
In 1901 the world’s financial center resided in London. Stetson was a
member of the first generation of American bankers who could claim global
supremacy in finance. During World War I, when the center of capital
shifted to New York, he was a vice president at Guaranty, an institution
already well-positioned as a leader in international banking. After the war,
when publicly traded security markets boomed, commercial banks started to
arrange public offerings. By arranging public offerings, security markets
challenged a role formerly dominated by private banks, such as J. P.
Morgan. Stetson was part of this trend as well; he acted as a leader in one of
more significant initial public offerings in American finance—that of the
Coca-Cola Company. From his position at Guaranty Stetson participated in
all the subsequent great events of banking history in the middle decades of
the century: the collapse of the 1930s, the challenges of financing global war
in the 1940s, and the consolidations and readjustments of the 1950s.
Throughout these decades Stetson’s connection to the Coca-Cola
Company best reflected his role as advisor to corporations, especially as a
director. When Stetson died, he was the longest standing member of the
company’s board of directors, having served longer than even company

6
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president Robert Woodruff. Of course, the Coca-Cola story is well known.
The drink is the most successful consumer product ever made. In the early
twenty-first century, over one billion Cokes are sold each year, and CocaCola owns the single most recognized, and most valuable, brand name in
the world, estimated at more than $65 billion in 2006. The Coca-Cola
Company has paid dividends yearly since 1893 and during that time has
increased dividends over forty times.7
In July and August 1919 Stetson helped put the financing together so
that Atlanta’s Trust Company of Georgia, a firm one-tenth the size of
Coca-Cola and headed by Ernest Woodruff, along with a group of New
York banks, could acquire control of Coca-Cola. There were several
worrisome points that could have killed the deal. Among these problems
was that a federal court had ruled the company’s prized trademark invalid.
While that question was on appeal in the Supreme Court, Stetson helped
bring the public offering to a successful conclusion. The concept of giving
significant value to a “brand” was a new feature to financing in those days,
contrary to the time-honored means of valuing a business by “hard” assets,
such as real estate or inventory. Stetson, Woodruff, and the New York
banks valued the company at $25 to $30 million although its hard assets
were only worth $5 million. They rightly saw the bulk of Coca-Cola’s value
in its trademark.
The Coke transaction revealed much about Stetson’s salesmanship. He
loved business challenges, particularly difficult situations with difficult
people. In 1919 Asa Candler’s family owned Coca-Cola. The Candlers had
been looking for a buyer for several years as Asa’s children wanted money,
not the business. At that time Atlanta was a small city and in Atlanta it was
well-known that Asa Candler despised Ernest Woodruff. So the Candlers
were not likely to sell the company to Woodruff or his bank, the Trust
Company of Georgia. Stetson had the challenge to overcome this barrier.
As part of the deal, the Candlers were led to believe that the purchase offer
derived from New Yorkers. This could not have been surprising because
7
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southerners in 1919 were not likely to be able to come up with more than
$20 million for a soft drink company. As a key negotiator for the purchase,
Stetson traveled to Atlanta and met with the Candlers to represent the
“New York interests” who were supposedly buying the company. Of course,
he did nothing to suggest to the Candlers that among the New York buyers
were the hated Woodruff and his bank.
This aspect of the deal reflected another dimension of Stetson’s business career: his interest in southern economic development. Despite the
disdain for Woodruff, would not even Asa Candler be surprised by the
benefits to Atlanta and Georgia that have resulted from the fact that the
company did not move to New York? In 2006, the Robert Woodruff
Foundation owned $1.8 billion of Coca-Cola stock, from whose dividends
the Foundation gave away approximately $100 million, primarily for
cultural activities in Georgia. As a direct result of Coca-Cola’s success,
Emory University is among the best endowed universities in America. This,
of course, is only some of the wealth that has been created by and
distributed to employees and shareholders through Coca-Cola in Atlanta.
Stetson’s banking continues to make a permanent mark in his native
Georgia.8
Appropriately, this is where the story should begin, in the South where
Stetson grew up. Although he lived in the New York area from 1916 until
his death forty-three years later, Stetson frequently returned to Georgia and
was always recharged after visits home. He considered himself a loyal
southerner. Born in 1881, just four years after the last federal troops
departed from the Reconstruction South, he was profoundly shaped by the
contrast between his region’s great potential human capital and its
deficiency of financial capital. He was also deeply influenced by
contemporary beliefs about how to remedy these problems. To explain
Stetson’s business career, one must start with the place where his
personality and habits were formed.

8
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After the Civil War
Stetson grew up in central Georgia during the 1880s and 1890s, in the
economically depressed environment of the post-Civil War South. This
South, including his hometown of Macon, Georgia, reeled from the effects
of the Civil War. Battles had been fought and men killed within a few miles
of where Stetson played as a boy. Particularly devastating to the area was
Sherman’s “March to the Sea,” from Atlanta to Savannah, from which
Macon only narrowly escaped.9
Before the war, the value of human property in the region, some four
million slaves, exceeded $1 billion. This value was more than all of the
southern capital in industry, banks, and railroads. Therefore, the abolition
of slavery destroyed an entire economic system, rendering worthless the
investments in human property that had accumulated since colonial times.
One historian estimates that the shock caused the South to lose thirty
percent of its total wealth and fifty percent of its land value. Further, over
130,000 Southern soldiers died in the War. The economic effect of this loss
of life was great, considering especially that the white and black population
in 1860 numbered only about ten million. In addition, by one estimate, as
many as 50,000 civilians may have perished. At the end of the war southern
income was less than thirty percent of the North’s average.10
The end of slavery ruined the plantation system but it did not destroy
the strong demand for its most valuable crop, cotton. Short staple, or
“upland” cotton, grows almost anywhere in the Deep South, including in
the area of central Georgia where Stetson lived as a boy and a young man.
During the 1790s Eli Whitney’s cotton gin resolved short staple’s key
limitation, a sticky fiber from which it is difficult to remove seeds.
Throughout the nineteenth century cotton was labor intensive to cultivate
9
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and harvest. Yet the crop flourished because of nearly insatiable demand
from the textile manufacturers of Europe, New England, and eventually the
South itself. Cotton became an American crop whose production exploited
some of the best resources of the nation.11
In addition to ruining slave-based agriculture, the Civil War brought
destruction to Georgia’s other economic institutions. Both Confederate and
Union soldiers seized or destroyed large amounts of property in their path.
Government borrowing to finance the war produced spectacular inflation
that ruined banking and finance and made even the necessities of life
inaccessible. The state’s education system, including its colleges, essentially
ceased to function. Railroads, the key to agricultural markets, which had
been highly developed in 1860, suffered from neglect and intentional
destruction.12
The subsequent Reconstruction period, from 1865 to 1877, failed to
resolve the pressing racial, political, or economic issues raised by the end of
slavery and the collapse of the slave-based economy. One statistic
summarizes the experience: in 1880, the year before Stetson’s birth, the
South had been unable to raise per capita output back to its 1860 level.
Most of the blame for this rests with reactionary white southern leadership.
The federal Congress passed a sweeping series of laws, including the act
establishing the Freeman’s Bureau, technically called the Bureau of
Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, which addressed some of the
changes effected by war. Soon the country saw the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, which ended slavery and
sought to guarantee the freed slaves certain civil rights, including voting
rights. Such laws could have revolutionized the role of the federal
government in economic and racial matters and dramatically improved the
operation of markets. For a brief period, southern state governments,
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including in Georgia, were controlled by leaders anxious to transform life in
the region.13
Most southern whites, however, and especially those with land, wanted
to return to a system as close to slavery as possible. Committed to the
continued subjugation of black people, they formed terrorist organizations
such as the Ku Klux Klan that targeted blacks and white Republican
supporters of Reconstruction. Ultimately, through force, fraud, and
intimidation, they regained power state-by-state, including in Georgia,
during the 1870s. The key to this revived white power was as much
economic as political. The end of Reconstruction not only meant that the
uniformed Yankees would go home; it also meant white southerners
regained control of the both the land and the black labor that were needed
to produce cotton and other crops for market.14
The economic system that emerged from Reconstruction was grossly
inefficient. In general, the best land remained controlled by wealthier
whites. Given the labor-intense nature of cotton production and the refusal
of newly freed blacks to work in slave-like gangs for wages, a system of
renting and sharecropping emerged. Many poorer blacks and whites grew
cash crops on shares, paying landlords with a portion of the crop. If they
had their own mules or equipment, perhaps they might rent for money, an
arrangement that held out a hope for greater profit and independence. Of
course, all market-based agriculture needs credit to get a crop planted and
to tide a farmer over during the growing season. In the South, banking and
credit, both in a primitive state after the war, devolved to merchants, many
of whom were also larger landowners. These landowners provided advances
to renters and sharecroppers, but at extremely high rates, often exceeding
fifty per cent per year. The system produced a self-defeating cycle of debt
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and excessive dependence on cash crops, particularly cotton. This was a
recipe for social and economic poverty.15
Not all Southerners, however, were willing to accept the low standard
of living imposed by this system. By the 1880s, a strong movement had
emerged to effectively refashion the South in a northern image through
industrialization. Industrialization did not mean racial equality, as the best
jobs would be reserved for whites. Nonetheless, railroad expansion and
textile manufacturing were perhaps the most prominent early examples of
this thinking. A leading voice in the call for a “New South” was Henry W.
Grady of the Atlanta Constitution. Grady broadcast his views with religious
fervor. Predictably, the movement centered in the new and growing cities of
the piedmont, such as Atlanta, Birmingham, Charlotte, and Durham.
Unfortunately, lacking capital, the South turned to northern, and especially
New York, sources of money. Railroads in particular were dominated by
northern investors, who naturally reaped any dividends and made key
decisions about their operation. Much investment was forthcoming, but the
larger price was to produce a kind of regional colonialism that did not
always serve the interests of southerners.16

American Finance
The economic and social plight of the South is only one piece of the
larger world into which Stetson was born. To be sure, he grew up in a
Georgia characterized by inefficient agriculture, the triumph of white
supremacy, a slowly emerging colonial industrialization, and the lingering
disabilities of war. Yet, he was also born at the very beginning of modern
American finance, which included the rise of modern investment and
commercial banking. Not long before Stetson was a toddler in Macon, Jay
15

Foner, Reconstruction, 399–409; Hughes and Cain, American Economic History,
273–80; Harold D. Woodman, New South—New Law: The Legal Foundations of
Credit and Labor Relations in the Postbellum Agricultural South (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1995).
16
C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877–1913 (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 1951) 107–58, 291–320; Harold E. Davis, Henry
Grady’s New South: Atlanta, A Brave and Beautiful City (Tuscaloosa: University of
Alabama Press, 1990).

20

Relationship Banker

Cooke became the first American to raise significant capital from
Americans, not Europeans, to finance American economic activity.17
Traditionally, nineteenth century American railroads and industry
were financed by raising money from Europe, primarily Britain. During the
Civil War, however, financier Jay Cooke of Philadelphia found a way to tap
the mass of individual savers in the United States by using the new
technology of the telegraph and door-to-door sales. Cooke placed war
securities through aggressive salesmanship and advertising. He sold more
than $350 million of these securities, an astronomical sum at the time.
Cooke also supported prices in the secondary securities market. After the
war Jay Cooke & Co. continued to open channels for raising money on a
national basis from individuals. Once again, Cooke used advertising and
individual salesmen to sell securities.18
A corollary to growing American investment was the rise of relationship banking, particularly through private banking partnerships. In the absence of extensive government regulation prohibiting such activities, leading
private bankers became personally active in client companies, joining their
corporate boards and finance committees. These bankers routinely provided
inside and outside financial advice and services. Such potentially long-term
relationships became very profitable and prized as companies began to
choose selected banking firms as their “principal bankers”—meaning that
the banking firms did not have to compete with other bankers for the
client’s business.19
The large capital needs of railroads drove the early evolution of
American finance. Railroads demanded a steady stream of capital, but the
financial practices that developed around them created an environment with
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few rules. The enormous databases, credit ratings, and information that
bankers can call up in the twenty-first century at a moment’s notice did not
exist. As a result, bankers relied on personal relationships and personal
knowledge of companies. Of course, benefits flowed to and from the
railroads and their bankers. The railroads gained prestige as well as advice
and services from the bankers, including the endorsement of supporting
banks. In turn, bankers received big fees for securities distribution,
including registrations and transfers.20
According to finance historian Samuel L. Hayes III, a few private
banks, created along the lines of the British and European continental merchant banks, led the way in American finance. Private banks provided their
own capital based on wealthy partners in the firm and formed syndicates of
smaller banking houses that distributed securities. In the last half of the
nineteenth century, the securities of choice were mostly bonds paying three
to five percent after the lead firm or firms pocketed a management fee of
one and one-half percent. Among the outstanding private banks were J. P.
Morgan & Co., Drexel & Co., and Kuhn Loeb and Co., led by Jacob Schiff.
The revolutionary change produced by these institutions is well
summarized in an example by historians Jonathan Hughes and Louis P.
Cain:
In the late 1860s, [Andrew] Carnegie, then a Pennsylvania
Railroad official, had gone to London to raise money. It could not be
done in the United States. In 1900, when Carnegie decided to sell
out, he wrote his price, more than $400 million, on a piece of paper,
and handed it to his boy-wonder executive, Charles Schwab, who
delivered it to Pierpont Morgan. Schwab reported that Morgan
merely glanced at the paper and said, “I’ll take it.” The result was the
biggest industrial merger to date, United States Steel, which had twothirds of the industry’s ingot capacity, $550 million of common stock,
$550 million of preferred stock, and $304 million in bonds. The
20
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American capital market, by then centered in Wall Street, had come
into its own with investment bankers like Morgan filling the pilot
role. It all happened in a single lifetime, in the business career of a
single person, such as Carnegie or Morgan.21

The rise of private investment banks took place in a larger
environment of growing complexity, wealth, and sophistication of financial
institutions. Commercial banks and insurance companies, in particular,
experienced steady development. Outstanding commercial banks in this
period included National City Bank, the forerunner of Citigroup, Chase
National Bank, First National Bank of Boston, eventually part of Bank of
America, and, especially after 1910, Stetson’s Guaranty Trust Company of
New York. J. P. Morgan, of course, was linked to many of these and other
financial companies, a factor that led to the industry’s concentration in New
York.22
On the one hand, Gene Stetson was born to the legacy of a failed
economic system rooted in slavery, white supremacy, the disaster of Civil
War, and inefficient cash crop agriculture. Yet, at this same moment the
American industrial economy and its financial structures were undergoing
21
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spectacular change, including in the South. Stetson’s generation of southerners was the inheritor of both the Klan and its political consequences as
well as to new visions of wealth and industry. Georgia’s Henry Grady, Jay
Cooke, and other financial kings such as Jay Gould and J. P. Morgan were
creating a foundation in thought and finance upon which Stetson would
build his own ideas and career. Stetson’s task was to take selectively from
these different influences and apply them to the larger forces of change in
American business and banking in the twentieth century.

2
Preparing for Wall Street
Eugene William Stetson was born on 5 December 1881, in Hawkinsville,
Georgia, a town on the Ocmulgee River in the south central part of the
state. His father, James D. Stetson, worked as a cashier at the Hawkinsville
Bank and Trust Company. The family was typically southern in some ways
and, yet, decidedly unique in others. James had grown up in Milledgeville,
attended Oglethorpe University, and served as an officer in the Confederate
army. Eugene’s mother, Eugenia Sophia Pate, called the Hawkinsville area
home, where her father, also a former Confederate officer, was a farmer and
merchant. Certainly it was ordinary for children of Gene’s generation to
grow up in a small town or rural environment, to parents who had lived in
the region since birth. On the other hand, his parents were plainly well
above average in terms of education and community standing. Not many
boys in middle Georgia had a father who had attended college and was not
earning a living by manual labor.1
Gene remained in Hawkinsville until he was about ten years old when
the family moved to nearby Macon after his father took a position in
another bank. There he attended a public school and then Gordon Institute,
in Barnesville, named for Confederate General John B. Gordon. Stetson
finished his studies at Gordon in 1897, the year he turned sixteen. The
amount of time Stetson was able to stay in school was indeed a great luxury.
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As late as the 1930s, the average white Georgian had less than six years of
formal education.2
The family held high expectations for their children, including young
Gene. He sensed this and was eager to take advantage of his chances. After
all, it was the Victorian era, and in the South that meant a certain level of
seriousness and a sharp sense of responsibility. Boys, such as Stetson, had
great reverence for Robert E. Lee’s admonition that “Duty is the most
sublime word in our language.” In fact, Lee was Stetson’s lifelong hero.
This partly explains his deep sense of personal loyalty to friends and family
as well as a strong work ethic. Early on, Gene determined to do well. At the
tender age of nine, young Stetson gave his father, then working in Macon
preparing to start a new banking job with a national bank, the very sober
advice to “Do right and fear not.” At fourteen, the future banker wrote
letters home praising standard virtues such as loyalty—more evidence of the
impact of values represented by solid and manly figures such as General
Lee. He spoke disparagingly of dishonorable traits he disliked, such as
tattle-telling.3
Although many of his youthful letters were formal and even business
like, they also expressed deep affection. From Gordon he wrote his father
that “of course, I am very homesick and want to come home, but intend to
study hard and make something of myself.” Much of Stetson’s ethic can be
explained by his religious upbringing, which had a lasting impact. His father
was a Baptist deacon and Scripture was required learning. As a teenager
Stetson wrote his father, “I received your exceedingly loving letter and was
glad that we have pleased you. You know what the Bible says, ‘A wise son
maketh a glad father.’ I have tried to work and have been rewarded as will
anyone when they believe.”4
Yet there was also something very worldly about his efforts. The future
Wall Streeter reported he was “keeping an account in my little book of how
much I get from home. I will be as economical as I can.” In 1895 Stetson

2

Bond, Stetson, 4–11.
Ibid., 4–11; Charles P. Stetson, interview by L. Kenneth Hammond, 24 March
1982, Jack Tarver Library, Special Collections Mercer University, Macon, Georgia.
4
Bond, Stetson, 6–10.
3

26

Relationship Banker

successfully saved, borrowed, and amassed fifty dollars, a huge sum for a
boy, especially in the midst of the greatest national depression in American
history, to go on a church-sponsored trip to Washington, Baltimore, and
New York. There he set eyes on Central Park and the almost new Brooklyn
Bridge. The trip ignited a permanent fascination with railroads, travel, and
perhaps most importantly, New York City.5
After Gordon, Stetson received another big opportunity. In 1897, he
entered Mercer University, a Baptist school established in the 1830s in
Penfield, Georgia, and moved to Macon in 1871. From his home on
College Street, Stetson could walk the few blocks to the small campus. In
the 1890s Mercer’s curriculum and environment was similar to that of other
American colleges. Most of the coursework was required, as the almost 200
male, white, and largely Baptist students moved lockstep through a liberal
arts curriculum that featured Greek, Latin, mathematics, literature, history,
and science. Traditionally, the close-knit school aimed to prepare men for
the ministry, teaching, or other learned professions. Although some
economics classes were offered, mere commerce, which would become
Stetson’s life work, was not yet given academic attention. On the other
hand, schools like Mercer—perhaps recognizing that many students would
become preachers and lawyers—encouraged oratory, sponsoring formal
debating societies. Stetson, however, disliked this sort of performance and
even applied for an exemption from public speaking duties.6
Although the course of study did not direct anyone to high finance,
Mercer offered other valuable opportunities. Perhaps most importantly,
Stetson discovered abilities to lead others, especially on money matters.
Sports were popular during Stetson’s student days and proved a useful
vehicle for fun and learning. In 1899, Stetson probably attended the football
game in Macon when Mercer was crushed by Coach John Heisman’s
famous Auburn squad. Stetson especially loved baseball, and although he
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did not make the university team he gladly became its manager. In an era
before scholarships, professional staff, and athletic “departments,” this work
required making travel arrangements and raising money to pay the team’s
expenses. Stetson’s aggressive approach included persuading his father to
guarantee payment while he set about raising money. The young
businessman quickly erased the chronic debt of the school’s association
responsible for athletics and kept it in a surplus. As a contemporary
newspaper reported: “Stetson did things on a flourishing scale: there was
nothing too big for him to tackle and as a result the people of Macon had
the best college baseball team here that season the old town had ever had
before. He gave his men the best there was. The best hotel service in every
city was at their disposal.” This early effort made impressions and friends
that lasted a lifetime.7
At Mercer Stetson was determined to succeed, but not as a scholar. He
was socially popular, and considered an underachiever academically and
happy-go-lucky. As he wrote a few years after leaving college, in his
“sophomore year at Mercer I conceived the idea of having a good time
rather than studying, and now I find that when I want to study that it is
harder for me to do so than it would have been should I have taken the full
advantage during my college course.” So, in addition to managing the
baseball team, he joined the Phi Delta Theta fraternity. The handsome
Stetson was interested in girls from the neighboring women’s school,
Wesleyan College, attended by his sister and located distractingly close, just
a few blocks from Mercer.8
Stetson’s life changed abruptly in the spring of 1901, his senior year.
First, tragedy struck in March when his father succumbed to Bright’s
disease, a kidney ailment, and died. Second, he quit Mercer. In the 1940s
Stetson recalled that there was a “row with the math professor” which
caused his departure. He was naturally sensitive about the episode and
during his life gave inconsistent accounts of the experience. In 1956, for
example, he wrote that he “took an elective course, in my junior and senior
years, in order to help rehabilitate Mercer athletics,” and that was the
reason he did not graduate; however, a dispute seems a more likely reason.
7
8
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In February 1901 the faculty expressed concerns when Stetson proposed
taking the baseball team to the University of Alabama, and in April it
allowed a student to drop Latin because of class absences related to baseball.
All this is evidence of tension between Stetson and the administration. More
important, a clash developed over a planned game between the University
of South Carolina and Mercer, and in May the South Carolina school
demanded $75 that it may have been promised for expenses by Stetson. The
matter was resolved, but not without cost. Perhaps overreacting from these
events and realizing that at any rate his college days were practically over,
Stetson left Mercer without a degree.9
The behavior is noteworthy because he later made persistence under
adversity a hallmark of his business practice. His departure from Mercer
may have contributed to this persistence. After 1901, moreover, he had a
need and desire to be on his own financially. With a deceased father, the
lazy days of dependence were gone for good. Although the family was better
off than most, it was not wealthy. Equally important was that Stetson had
no intention of using such a petty dispute to cut deeper ties, so his departure
was not intended to leave a permanent scar. He soon made amends with the
math professor, who later joined the faculty at Columbia University when
Stetson was in New York. More revealing, Stetson became a loyal Mercer
alumnus, regularly attending reunions, sponsoring trips with old baseball
buddies, and providing substantial financial support. He always admired
Pinckney D. Pollock, Mercer’s president during his senior year. Despite the
fact that he did not graduate he considered himself a full member of the
Class of 1901. Ultimately, for Stetson the meaning of Mercer went beyond
books or baseball. The experience was about relationships and an early
appreciation for the fact that institutions and leaders can enrich and change
lives.10
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Learning Banking
With college behind him, Stetson started his first full-time job as a
teller and debt collector at the American National Bank in Macon. This
bank was the same bank where his father had been vice president and where
he had worked in the summers during college. The choice of banking as a
profession seemed inevitable, perhaps too inevitable, given that the job
seemed entirely explained by family connections. Stetson had wide interests,
but from the beginning he rejected life as a preacher, a doctor, a lawyer, or a
teacher, the careers chosen by most other Mercer students and educated
young men in the Georgia of his day.11
Actually, going into banking was a kind of political statement. In the
South agriculture was still king, at least culturally. For many, especially the
rural majority, banking, bankers, and even corporations in general
represented the evil and corrupt ways of urban life. The banking profession
was also burdened by unhealthy overtones of Yankee imperialism. Bankers
did not wear overalls, they did not get their hands dirty and most important
to the man who worked in the field or the factory, they did not produce
anything tangible. Suspicion and, in some cases, hatred was directed at
national banks, precisely the kind of institution where Stetson began
banking. The Populist Party, which was very popular in Georgia in the
1890s, supported the abolition of national banks. Georgia’s loudest
Populist, Tom Watson, opposed the Democrats’ nominee for vice president
in 1896 in large part because he was a national banker. To the Populists
bankers manipulated the money supply to farmers’ detriment through their
support of a gold standard and privately issued bank notes. Banks were also
associated with Jews, still the object of intense bigotry in both Georgia and
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the United States. While Stetson was a banker in Macon a wild mob
lynched Leo Frank in Marietta, one of the most notorious examples of antiSemitism in American history. So by choosing banking Stetson was taking
sides, allying himself with a particular vision, one that was not even
respectable in parts of rural Georgia.12
After three years of learning about banking in Macon, Stetson was
recruited by the Exchange Bank, later Exchange National Bank, in
Fitzgerald, Georgia, to the higher position of cashier. This position paid
more than the Macon job. At the time, Stetson’s supervisor from the
American National Bank praised the young banker for having been
“exceedingly accurate in all of his work and honest and straight in all of his
transactions.” Further, Stetson’s “father helped to organize the American
National Bank and was its managing Officer up to the time of his death. We
believe the Son has inherited much of the business sagacity and
conservatism for which his Father was famous.” The choice of the word
“conservatism” is revealing. In a small town Georgia bank with slender
resources and no deposit insurance to protect customers, perceived caution
in guarding bank assets was essential.13
Although Stetson’s new title of “cashier” seems menial, in fact it
denoted the role of treasurer or senior operating officer. As cashier, Stetson
was in charge of ensuring that the bank’s assets matched its liabilities. This
meant deposits were sufficient to fund the loans extended towards local
businesses. If the deposits were in surplus, then they were reinvested in a
security with the best return. The cashier also oversaw the mechanical side
of paying and receiving money, which required security and proper
documentation. The cashier held a critically important job in a small
Georgia bank, just subordinate to the general manager. A cashier had to
know and practice the nuts and bolts of banking.
12

On Populism, see Barton C. Shaw, The Wool-Hat Boys: Georgia’s Populist Party
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984), on Watson, C. Vann
Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel (New York: Macmillan, 1938), and on
Frank, Leonard Dinnerstein, The Leo Frank Case (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1997).
13
Bond, Stetson, 23–24. The Exchange bank became a national bank in May
1906. Like many other Georgia small town operations, it closed during the 1930s
Depression. Hickman and Oakes, Standard Catalog, 155–56.

Preparing for Wall Street

31

Stetson’s willingness to take a new job says something about his
growing ambition. As the son of a former bank officer living in his
hometown, he had plenty of connections and was well-placed to find a
foothold on the local economic ladder of Macon. Yet, he left and took the
Fitzgerald job. In an important sense the decision represented Stetson
breaking out of his father’s mold, a move that would be repeated on an even
larger scale when he moved to New York twelve years later.
Fitzgerald was a small, isolated place located approximately seventyfive miles southeast of Macon. Naturally the new cashier in town missed his
family, friends, and particularly his fiancée, Josephine Moulton Shaw. But
the young couple wrote often and frequent letters bound them closer.
Josephine encouraged and consoled Stetson: “You are miserable, I know. It
is going to be hard for you. There are many struggles before you. Would
that God would grant that I could help you bear them…. Write me
everything—don’t forget—that may help. You are brave and strong, dear
and must conquer.” Six months of loneliness was apparently enough, and in
December 1904, Stetson showed he was ready for a higher level of
independence and adulthood. Now 23, he married Josephine in her parents’
home and they set up a household in Fitzgerald.14
Fitzgerald influenced Stetson’s views about economics and banking. An
unusual town with about 5,000 residents, it was incorporated only a few
years before Stetson’s arrival, partly by immigrant Union soldiers. In 1895,
Northern veterans formed a company and acquired 50,000 acres of Georgia
wiregrass. Creating Fitzgerald on this property from scratch, they named
the town’s streets after Union and Confederate generals and christened the
local hotel the “Lee-Grant.” Fitzgerald was a “new” town as far as Georgia
was concerned and, more important, not unduly unhampered by the ideals
of the Old South. The drive for profit, especially in lumber and cotton,
shaped the local economy. Fitzgerald had three banks, was a cotton
shipping center, and resided at the junction of two branches of the Atlantic
Coast Line Railway. In Fitzgerald, Stetson could easily see that the railroad
and cash crops from the land were keys to economic development.

14
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Fitzgerald was also where Stetson learned the core of banking practice—the
creation of money through lending and through banker’s acceptances.15
In Fitzgerald Stetson witnessed the bank-lending process in its most
basic form. If a farmer went to the local bank to borrow money to buy
necessities for the upcoming planting and growing season, he left behind a
note with the bank that would be redeemed, with interest, after the harvest.
When the farmer bought seed, fertilizer, and equipment from a local
merchant some of this money could find its way back into the bank. The
bank “reserved” some of each deposit, retaining it at the bank, but then it
was free to lend out the remainder to other borrowers. For example, some
of a loan to a farmer could be returned to the bank in the form of a deposit
from a merchant, and, after the reserve process, the bank lent a portion of it
to another borrower, who in turn spent it on goods whose sellers deposited
some of the money in the bank, whereupon after the reserve process, the
bank loaned out another sum against the reserves. This cycle of relending
the same money over and over again, albeit in ever-smaller amounts, was
the core source of profit for the Fitzgerald bank.16 On one hot South
Georgia afternoon, Stetson experienced this process directly. He liked to
tell this story:
One day, when the sun was doing its best, and Mr. Stetson’s
collar was down like a dish rag, he stood around the bank mopping
his brow and whewing and cussing the weather. Finally, the elderly
gentleman who owned the bank got tired of his complaining and
called him over.
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“Listen here, young man,” he said. “We have got a drawer full of
notes here that will be due this fall. Every time the sun shines down
like this, one of these notes becomes money. It means that the
cotton is growing and the farmers will be able to pay us. The
weather is what they need. Every time you get disgusted with hot
weather in the middle of summer, just figure out how much those
notes would be worth without it.”
Mr. Stetson said the hot weather has never bothered him since,
and he never “whews” any more.17
In addition to straight loans, Stetson also learned how to finance trade
outside Fitzgerald through letters of credit. In an ordinary business
transaction, the seller did not know the buyer and could not trust him to
make payment after the goods were shipped, and the buyer did not know
the seller and could not trust him to make the shipment of the goods in the
amount and quality specified in their agreement. The letter of credit placed
two banks as the middlemen between a commercial buyer of goods and the
seller of the goods in another location. 18
If one bank knew the buyer and another bank knew the seller, and the
banks knew each other, then the connection between the two banks was a
“correspondent” relationship. The buyer’s bank issued a letter of credit to
the seller to be paid at the seller’s bank, and once the seller’s bank verified
that the shipment was in order, it paid the seller. The seller’s bank was
counting on the buyer’s bank to reimburse it for its payment to the seller.
This process sped up the seller getting his payment and relieved the buyer
of having to pay for goods that were still in transit or in a warehouse. Once
the buyer received the goods and sold them, he had the funds to repay the
bank that issued the letter of credit on his behalf. In Fitzgerald, Stetson
learned how this important practice worked.19
17
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Stetson also learned how to build a bank’s assets. For businesses other
than banks, assets consisted of such things as cash, marketable securities,
raw materials, inventory, and plant and equipment. Liabilities were accounts
payable, loans, and other debt. Whatever money was left over was equity, or
the owners’ capital. However, it was exactly the reverse on a bank balance
sheet. Assets, for example, consisted of loans. Aside from the bank’s own
cash and marketable securities representing its saved earnings, deposits
belonged to other parties and were a liability, money that had to be paid
back to someone else. To a bank, loans were not liabilities, but were rather
assets or money that borrowers were expected to return with interest.20
While at the Exchange National Bank, Stetson was a key part of the
lending effort that more than doubled the bank’s assets from $223,000 in
1905 to $485,000 in 1906, making it the largest bank in town. Doubling the
bank’s assets meant that the bank basically had twice as many loans. If the
loans were of high quality, meaning the borrowers were going to repay the
money, earnings could potentially double. To increase lending so much the
Fitzgerald bank had to have increased deposits by a lot, since fractional
reserve banking allowed the bank to use the same money more than once.
This meant in addition to making loans, Stetson and the rest of the bank’s
staff had to bring in more deposits through effective salesmanship, and
apparently they did just that.21

Opportunities
The valuable experiences gained in Fitzgerald gave Stetson the
confidence to seek a broader field of operation. In 1907, at the age of 25, he
returned to Macon as cashier of a new bank, the Citizens National. Of
course, as with any new venture, this move was risky and the timing seemed
especially bad. In 1906 and 1907, three Macon banks failed. Nationally, in
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1907, there had been a severe panic on Wall Street. The collapse in share
prices was so great that even the New York Stock Exchange was temporarily
insolvent. In the absence of any government-controlled central bank, the
elderly J. Pierpont Morgan organized infusions of private capital to prevent
further damage. Even after the worst of the crisis was over, when Stetson
returned to Macon from Fitzgerald the American economy still lagged.22
Nonetheless, an optimistic Stetson looked toward a brighter future. He
and a group of other prominent Maconites joined together in September
1907 to raise the initial capital of $250,000 to start Citizens National. By
November the Macon Telegraph reported that half the subscribed capital was
already deposited and the rest would be contributed within a month.
Stetson’s large ambition is suggested by the bank’s first major transaction,
the purchase of $50,000 in United States bonds for the Panama Canal
construction. Faith in “Progress,” whether in far-off Latin America or at
home in Georgia, was contagious, and Stetson caught the disease and
planned to make the most of it.23
In a more profound sense the hopeful banking venture suggests how
Stetson’s hometown, with 40,000 residents in 1910, was being transformed
from its agricultural and Confederate past into a New South community.
Stetson counted himself among the outstanding cheerleaders for this sort of
economic and social change. The directors of his bank were not nostalgic
for the Old South, at least as long as money was to be made in more
modern ways. They included cotton mill officers, the local Coca-Cola
bottler, the president of a brick company, and two other men who
forthrightly identified their profession as “Capitalist.” Stetson’s glad
acceptance of the booster role showed that even in his mid-twenties he
already believed banking was not just accounts and balances. Banking was
about people and the successful integration of capital, industry, and public
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policy. As he understood it, this kind of cooperation was the wave of the
future. He exuberantly told the press, “[E]verybody will be welcome and
well treated at the Citizens and we want the little fellows as well as the big
ones.”24
Similarly, Stetson placed no geographical limitations, no time-worn
distinctions between North and South, on Citizens’ prospects. Establishing
contacts with larger banks outside the region was essential to create
correspondent banking relationships as well as to get first-hand information
on economic conditions in the national economy. Stetson believed a smalltown bank needed big-town banks to help it make credit and pricing
decisions. When a local customer was selling to an out-of-town buyer, the
buyer was probably using credit from his own bank. It was prudent for the
seller’s banker to know the buyer’s banker and to get assurances that the
buyer was good for the transaction and that the out-of-town bank stood
behind its customer. These mutually beneficial relationships, as Stetson had
learned in Fitzgerald, were a key part of modern banking.
In January 1908, prior to Citizens’ opening, Stetson took his first
business trip to New York to make just these sorts of correspondent
banking arrangements. According to a news article, he reported that after
the recent panic, “things are normal again…and that business is resuming
on a lively scale everywhere.” Such hopeful statements became a Stetson
trademark. When Citizens officially opened on 31 January 1908, he was
quoted as saying: “Well, you see, the prospects are excellent for good
deposits right from the start. By the end of business tomorrow, I hope to see
deposited about one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for we have been
told that a number of substantial deposits would be placed with us on the
first day. The assurances that have been received from the people of the city
and the surrounding territory are calculated to make the stockholders feel
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mighty good.” Six months later, a newspaper noted “Cashier Eugene W.
Stetson, who is working so hard to make the bank a great success, is well
pleased over the showing made as are the other officers and directors.” After
another trip to New York later in 1908 Stetson told Macon newspapers that
“Business conditions are improving everywhere and things look good in the
East.” The young banker knew that perceptions and confidence counted for
much in banking.25
In fact, the new bank and its cashier did make progress. In February
1909 Stetson returned to New York, increasing his circle of bank
acquaintances and getting the latest national outlook. By June, total
resources at the Citizens National Bank exceeded $1.4 million. In October,
Stetson even proposed the creation of another institution, a savings bank:
“Mr. Eugene Stetson of the Citizens National Bank wants to encourage the
savings of the working class and thinks that there is no better way than to do
this than to place a bank as near to their doors as possible.… There are a
number of the best mechanics of the city living in this section of the city,
[and] not a few of them among them own homes.” In December, 1909,
Stetson led his first banking merger. A group of Citizens shareholders
bought the local Central Georgia Bank.26
Sensing they had something good on their hands, the Citizens board
elevated Stetson from cashier to bank president in 1910, just before his
thirtieth birthday. According to a prideful Macon News, “Mr. Stetson is
probably the youngest bank president in the United States.” His
enthusiasm, spirit of salesmanship, and public awareness, which attracted
both confidence and deposits, cast him as a model commercial banker.27
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The New South
The larger significance of these achievements is how Stetson, in the
decade after leaving Mercer, absorbed, developed, and acted within an
emerging ideology that linked banking, community, and modern forms of
economic growth. Despite the earlier exhortations to take up this sort of
work by Henry Grady, between 1900 and 1910 the New South ideal was
still a somewhat new social and economic ideal in middle Georgia. Much of
the region was part of the Creek frontier as late as the 1820s, and for
decades thereafter it developed within the bounds set by the rural
slavocracy. By contrast, Stetson embraced and promoted the New South
concept with religious ebullience.
To Stetson the New South meant economic and social transformation
using northern examples of prosperity: railroads, industry, commercial
agriculture, urban pride and development, salesmanship, and growthgenerating capital. The sources of this vision were complex: the family’s
banking background (and not agriculture), his time in the Yankeeinfluenced town of Fitzgerald, reading the popular and business press (the
local Macon Telegraph specialized in Grady-like optimistic boosterism), and
simply the hopes of a new generation seeking wealth and liberated from the
need to defend slavery. Stetson was fully aware of class differences and
conflict. He knew of progressive efforts to improve working conditions in
industry and certainly read of organized labor efforts in the United States
and Europe. Still, he always thought tying everyone to capitalism and its
inevitable profits was the best answer to conflict. Also, as a white
Southerner at the height of Jim Crow, Stetson accepted the racial status
quo. A contemporary biographer reported that Stetson was an
“Independent Democrat”—the racial context would have made it difficult
for a white banker to affiliate with Lincoln’s party in Macon. Yet, he also
assumed a New South would lift the living standards of all southerners,
black and white. More revealing, it was said that Stetson was “one of that
stirring group of young Georgians who believe that the State is and has
been suffering from too much political action and that the people should
devote themselves to the development of manufacturing and farming
interests.” Stetson’s vision assumed the effects of a New South would be
dramatic: it would lead to urbanizing a rural region, bring the masses into a
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money economy, and destroy the discredited institutions of the Old
South.28
A good demonstration of Stetson’s early economic faith was his
eagerness to sit on local boards of directors and invest in corporate stock.
From the perspective of the twenty-first century, an appreciation of the
corporation as a relatively new business device in Stetson’s Georgia is
difficult. In fact, the corporation represented a wholly new model for
economic order. Stetson understood this. Early in his banking career he
became a director or part owner of a small railroad, in the Hawkinsville
Bank and Trust Company, the Merchants and Mechanics Bank, the Macon
Railway and Light Company, and in the Continental Trust Company,
which performed trustee services for individuals, corporations, and
executors.29
The best example of Stetson’s initial corporate experiences began in
1910, when he was elected director of the Bibb Manufacturing Company,
an important Macon textile operation. Stetson took a long term view of
corporate leadership, and he remained associated with Bibb in some form,
including as a director and a member of its executive committee, from 1910
until the early 1950s. During most of these years the dominant figure in the
company was William D. Anderson, who served as its president from 1919
to 1947.30
Bibb Manufacturing was a perfect example of the kind of business that
reflected and reinforced Stetson’s faith in industry as a transforming force.
Emerging from the ashes of the Civil War, Bibb Manufacturing was the
product of an early wave of Southern capitalists who seized the business
28

Northen, ed., Men of Mark in Georgia, 299. On the possibilities and limitations
of the New South ideal in Georgia, see Numan V. Bartley, The Creation of Modern
Georgia (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1983) 83–87. It is doubtful, however,
that Stetson was interested in the variety of full-blown “Yankeefication” that has
overtaken his home region since the 1960s—even though he contributed mightily to
its causes. On this theme, see Richard N. Current, Northernizing the South (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1983) 83–117.
29
Bond, Stetson, 40–42; Northen, ed., Men of Mark, 298.
30
Mary P. Whitlock, “Bibb Manufacturing Company and Payne City, Georgia:
An Historical Perspective, 1876–1986” (Specialist in Education thesis, Georgia
College and State University, 1986) 47–58.

40

Relationship Banker

opportunity presented by the availability of cotton and underemployed
labor. Georgia businessmen, led by H. M. Comer of Savannah and J. F.
Hanson of Macon, incorporated the company in 1876 and constructed its
first textile mill in Macon. Over the next thirty years, slow but persistent
expansion turned it into a powerhouse, one of the largest cotton
manufacturers in the South. When Stetson joined its board, Bibb
Manufacturing already operated three mills in Macon, one in Columbus,
and two others (in Porterdale and Reynolds, Georgia). In its early years the
company focused on the production of yarns and twine.31
Bibb had much in common with other Southern textile mills of the
early to mid-twentieth century. Over the decades it gradually shifted from
simpler products, such as cotton thread and twine, to more complex and
finished products, such as bed sheets. Bibb maintained paternalistic and
whites-only mill “villages,” where workers and their families lived, and it
took a staunchly anti-union position. When Stetson was a young banker in
Macon, the company employed child labor, as famously documented by
photographer Lewis Hine. Some of its communities, including Payne City,
were incorporated as self-contained municipalities. At its height Bibb’s
Macon villages included five regular schools, nineteen vocational schools,
six churches, six free medical clinics, one hospital, forty-nine social clubs,
numerous athletic teams, two gymnasiums, and four auditoriums. Anderson
believed the company’s “duty and responsibility to the people who work for
us in shop and factory do not end when these employees walk out of the
mill gates at the end of their tour of duty, or when they receive their weekly
pay check.” Because the workers had “a lot of spare time,” Anderson’s
company assumed an interest in seeing that “this spare time is employed in
31
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such a way that the comfort, health, and happiness of the workers and their
families will show an improvement and development making for better
citizenship, better educational facilities for their children, and a fine type of
recreation.”32
By the 1930s Bibb Manufacturing was a publicly traded corporation
with national and international business. With headquarters still in Macon,
the corporation also maintained offices in New York; Chicago;
Philadelphia; Greensboro, North Carolina; and Akron, the latter a
consequence of its production of tire material. The company manufactured
more than seventy-five million pounds of textile products annually. In the
early 1950s, Bibb employed over 7,200 persons with an annual payroll of
more than $14 million.33
Stetson was proud of the fact that Bibb Manufacturing was the most
successful business to emerge out of his hometown and that he was closely
connected to its operation. Bibb Manufacturing represented the kind of
hope, change, and progress he believed was possible when finance and
industry worked together. Stetson also had a long and confidential
relationship with Anderson, Bibb Manufacturing’s politically conservative
president who ruled the board of directors. For example, he worked with
Anderson on the Southern Business Committee, a group of executives that
held meetings and discussed common problems in the late 1940s. For many
years after he moved to New York Stetson scheduled trips to Georgia
around Bibb Manufacturing’s board meetings.34
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Stetson’s broader vision, energy, and purpose were also on display in
Macon’s business and civic groups. Some of these were traditional Southern
institutions, such as the Methodist church, the local militia, and social clubs,
while others were business-related, specifically new kinds of organizations
meant to solidify a profession or advance the community’s economic cause.
As a young man, Stetson won election as president of both the Georgia
Bankers’ Association and the Macon Chamber of Commerce. As Chamber
of Commerce president he erased the organization’s debt in one year.
Stetson was also vice president of the Georgia Chamber of Commerce and a
member of the executive council of the American Bankers Association. In
May 1909, he was elected vice president from Georgia to the American
Bankers Association. Stetson was also a member of and treasurer to the Bibb
County board of education. He was active in raising money for charities and
was a leader in arranging for the construction of a new passenger train
station in Macon, an impressive structure completed in 1916. He supported
improved public utilities and promoted his city’s Georgia State Fair. He
even lobbied, unsuccessfully, for the removal of the state capital from
Atlanta to Macon.35
A major promotional device of the day was the “booster train,” on
which businessmen, trying to drum up sales, traveled through the
countryside and advertised what their city had to offer. Both Cincinnati and
Nashville, for example, sponsored heavily-advertised booster trains.
Cincinnati’s effort included one hundred businessmen who traveled to
thirty-seven cities in five days. Nashville sent out eight booster trains with
more than eight hundred business leaders. Not to be out done, Stetson
organized a booster train for the Macon Chamber of Commerce in
September 1912. The train carried about one hundred businessmen from
Macon to Columbus and Albany, Georgia, as well as to other nearby
towns.36
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Before the Federal Reserve
The character of Stetson’s early career—banker, board member, New
South devotee and promoter—suggests that he never envisioned banking
work as limited to a wholly private sphere. Banks and bankers always had
substantial public responsibilities. Stetson’s perspective was partly
influenced by the broad legal powers available to banks, especially national
banks such as Citizens. A most important example of this power was that in
the absence of a central bank or Federal Reserve, even small national banks,
including Citizens, printed their own circulating notes. Citizens issued
more than $1.7 million in notes during its brief existence between 1908 and
1916. This circulation included roughly 211,000 notes in denominations of
five, ten, and twenty dollars. The sources of money, such as these kinds of
notes, had a long and contentious history in America. In the 1890s, for
example, Georgia’s Populists considered the idea of privately owned banks
issuing their own circulating notes as primitive, inefficient, and a usurpation
of the public interest in the money supply. The political failure of the
Populist Party, however, did not end the contest over the money supply.
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, adopted during the midst of Stetson’s
presidency of Citizens National, finally ended the era of national bank
notes.37
Controversy over central banking existed from the very beginning of
the nation’s history. Throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries there was vigorous and near constant debate about a central bank
and the closely related issues of money and currency. Under President
George Washington, a famous disagreement between Alexander Hamilton
(who favored a bank) and Thomas Jefferson (who opposed it) shaped
national politics. Hamilton’s commercial interests won the first round, and
37
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the Bank of the United States, with the government as part owner, was
established in 1791. But Jefferson’s agrarians had their day, allowing the
charter of Hamilton’s bank to expire twenty years later. Congress created a
second bank in 1816, but President Andrew Jackson, who loathed it as an
exercise of unconstitutional federal power and as a treacherous eastern
monopoly, saw to it that the bank disappeared in the 1830s. No new central
bank would be approved by Congress for the rest of the century. Only the
National Bank Act, passed during the trials of the Civil War, and a
hodgepodge of often contradictory currency laws concerning federal
coinage of silver and gold, provided slender organization to the national
currency in the late nineteenth century. Congress formally adopted a gold
standard in 1900.38
How can one explain the intensity and persistence of the money and
banking debate? The contest was so heated partly because it involved
nothing less than choices about the nation’s fundamental values. Many
Americans distrusted a central bank’s power. The idea smacked of special
financial privilege, something political leaders, including Jefferson and
Jackson, detested. From this perspective no real American wanted to give
power to same kind of self-appointed elite allowed to run European central
banks, especially the Bank of England. A central bank put the national
economy in the hands of non-producers, “money-changers” who made a
living by sharp practices. In the absence of central banking, state-chartered
banks, which were presumably more democratic, remained somewhat
acceptable to this view. A general anti-banking perspective especially
targeted at national banks was alive and well when Stetson practiced
banking in Georgia.39
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By the 1890s, however, various forces built up momentum for more
centralized control of the national money supply. An important moment
was the presidential election of 1896, which pitted Democrat William
Jennings Bryan of Nebraska, who favored an inflationary unlimited silver
coinage, against Republican William McKinley, who supported gold. This
dramatic “Battle of the Standards” focused public attention on money and
financial issues. After the election, which McKinley won, there was an
increasing movement to replace the existing chaotic banking system with
something resembling a central bank. The movement picked up steam after
the 1907 panic. This time, bankers, academics, and politicians, not radical
farmers, rallied to the cause. Henry Davison and his J. P. Morgan firm
supported centralized banking. Paul Warburg of the investment bank Kuhn,
Loeb, published papers and promoted the idea of a central bank. Among the
key arguments for a central bank was that it could create greater elasticity in
the money supply by allowing for more flexibility in the issuance of legal
tender notes. This sort of flexibility, as shown by the 1907 panic, was clearly
lacking under current arrangements.40
In 1913 Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act and it was duly
signed by President Woodrow Wilson. The Act, although a revolutionary
exercise of government power, did not threaten Wall Street. The New York
City branch of the Federal Reserve, the “Fed,” acquired special influence.
Leaders in the new Federal Reserve were well-connected by family or
business ties to established investment banks and to the J. P. Morgan firm.
The sponsoring Republican of an early version of the law was Senator
Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, a friend of J. Pierpont Morgan and an inlaw of John D. Rockefeller. The first president of the important New York
branch was Benjamin Strong, formerly a vice president of Bankers Trust, a
Morgan-controlled institution. The five-member Washington-based Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve included a partner with Kuhn, Loeb
(Paul Warburg); Frederic A. Delano, former president of the Rockefellercontrolled Wabash Railway and uncle of Franklin Delano Roosevelt;
William P. G. Harding, an Alabama banker whose wife’s family’s
manufacturing company had board members with both Morgan and
40

Michael Kazin, A Godly Hero: The Life of William Jennings Bryan (New York:
Knopf, 2006) 45–79; Wicker, Great Debate, 22–69.

46

Relationship Banker

Rockefeller interests; and an economist, Adolph C. Miller, whose wife was a
Sprague, a Chicago business family associated with Morgan.41
Just as New South thinking influenced Stetson, so did the dramatic
financial events of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. To a
young student, bank officer, and bank president, shifts in national bank
powers and the creation of the Federal Reserve would have been of intense
interest and impact. Although only fifteen at the time of the 1896 election,
with a banker father it seems likely that the debate between Bryan and
McKinley over currency was staple fare at the Stetson dinner-table. In
Macon and in Fitzgerald, including during the 1907 panic, Stetson worked
at national banks. His clients were individuals and businesses caught in the
uncertainties of currency fluctuation. After 1907 he regularly traveled to
New York and was an active member of both the Georgia and American
Bankers Association, the latter of which was a strong proponent of a central
bank. Ambitious young bankers were attuned to the drama and significance
of the Federal Reserve and the tremendous influence of J. P. Morgan and
New York banking. America was becoming a financial powerhouse, and
New York was its center. The increasing centralization of American
banking naturally affected Stetson’s interests and ideas. The creation of the
Federal Reserve, and the expanding New York and Morgan-focused
financial world, had a gravity-like pull on Stetson, calling him to even larger
aspirations.42
Stetson turned thirty-two during the month the Federal Reserve was
created. He had already developed a particular understanding of the world
around him and had begun to implement a personal vision linked to the
ideals of the New South. He displayed a buoyant optimism based on the
prospects of growth. More specifically, he viewed finance, railroads, textiles, and efficient agriculture as the proper foundation for a community’s
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wealth and greatness. But because of his religious and Victorian upbringing
Stetson believed a community was measured by more than money. Business
leaders should recognize the dignity of work and support public and private
institutions that would advance growth. A corporation, such as a bank, had
an obligation and a purpose that exceeded returns to shareholders. All of
these ideas are reflected in Stetson’s banking practice, his membership in
civic organizations, and his commitment to Macon. At the same time,
Stetson was not in favor of political change in the status of blacks, who
made up more than half of middle Georgia’s population, or in radical
redistributions of wealth. Altogether, Stetson represented well the
“informed” values of his generation, which meant his beliefs were not
particularly original. Instead, it was his enthusiasm, energy, and skill in
carrying them forward that distinguished him from his peers.43
It is hard not to imagine that Stetson had his sights aimed high from
the very beginning. As a young man he trained to acquire technical banking
skills. This brought him to the attention of important men in the
modernizing world of Georgia business, and it would soon result in
Stetson’s recruitment to the center of the American banking universe. New
York’s increasingly powerful banks were interested in having banking
relationships around the country and they often hired small-town bankers
to achieve this goal. Employment at one of the private banking firms, such
as Morgan, would have been impossible for Stetson. Such firms were
partnerships that required an inside social track and a large sum of capital,
which he did not have. Luckily, there were eligible substitutes, and by 1916
Stetson had prepared himself well for one of them, the Guaranty Trust
Company of New York.
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Guaranty Banking
In 1915, Citizens Bank celebrated its eighth anniversary. On the occasion
the Macon Telegraph expressed high praise for its young president: “Mr.
Stetson has invested the Citizens National Bank with a degree of
personality. He has made it conspicuously a young man’s establishment….
Safe and conservative are some of his distinguishing characteristics, but he
also combines with these traits a happy measure of progressive spirit.” The
combination of “young” and “safe,” “conservative” and “progressive,” as
well as the linking of Stetson to the “personality” of the bank, expressed a
very appealing image. Stetson and his bank were young, but conservative.
They were safe, but progressive. Was not this the essence of the New
South? As it turned out, many of the nation’s leading banks, based in New
York, valued just such attributes. One of those banks was the Guaranty
Trust Company of New York, with which Citizens National maintained a
correspondent banking relationship.1
About this time, through a friend of his at Guaranty, Stetson met
Charles H. Sabin in New York, who had recently become Guaranty’s
president. Stetson hinted to Sabin that he was in the job market. Sabin, a
dynamic leader, was intensely interested in international finance and not
hidebound to the standard ways of banking. He was more than willing to
delegate substantial authority to key assistants. During the first three
months of Sabin’s presidency, the assets of Guaranty grew by almost onethird, to more than $350 million. Total foreign transactions in 1915
exceeded $6 billion, the equivalent in 2007 of almost $130 billion. These
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values put Guaranty among the largest and most internationally-focused
banks in the United States.2
Sabin perceived that continued growth required the addition of new
banking officers, at least some of whom with extensive experience outside
New York. These men would be “go getters,” bringing in business and
expanding the financial expertise of the firm. At the end of 1911, Guaranty
had eighteen officers, with four vice presidents. Five years later, the bank
had forty-three officers, including thirteen vice presidents. Guaranty
showed an especially strong interest in increasing its role in cotton
financing, which naturally required knowledge of the American South. A
relatively young, sales-oriented southern banker, such as Stetson, with
experience ranging from agriculture to railroads and textiles represented an
attractive acquisition.3
Impressed by their initial meeting, Sabin recruited Stetson to work at
Guaranty Trust in 1916. Stetson later said this was not his first opportunity
in the city. But he turned down an earlier job, telling the banker, “You
would not be happy with me, sir. You and I do not see banking in the same
light. You would be making a mistake if you took me on, and I would be
making a mistake if I came.” The substance of not seeing banking “in the
same light” is unclear, but the recollection implies that Stetson did see eyeto-eye with Sabin. On 25 September 1916, Sabin sent Stetson a formal offer
for a vice-presidency at $18,000 a year. This was the chance Stetson wanted,
a very big step up from his first position as a teller and debt collector at his
father’s bank fifteen years earlier. The title of vice president meant he
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would be one of a very few senior officers, and his salary was the stunning
equivalent of about $350,000 in 2007 dollars. He accepted immediately.4
It may be that Stetson was partly influenced to start a new life because
of family tragedy. In 1912, his beloved wife Josephine developed scarlet
fever and died, leaving him with the care of two small children. Only eight
years after their wedding and first household in Fitzgerald, the event
naturally had a profound effect. The loss prompted Stetson to join his
deceased wife’s Episcopal church and to move out of the home he had
shared with Josephine and their children. In 1915 Stetson married Iola
Lamar Wise, a Macon native. They had just celebrated the birth of their
first child when Stetson received the Guaranty offer. Together, perhaps, the
Guaranty offer signaled that the time was right to start a new life.5
After accepting the job, Stetson oversaw the voluntary liquidation of
Citizens National Bank. Shareholders received $150 for the shares they
purchased for $100 eight and a half years earlier, in addition to having
received regular six percent dividends. Celebrating, the directors resolved
that Stetson was “an associate and leader of rare ability and of unswerving
integrity, whose power to weigh large business problems accurately has ever
been matched by his keen and discriminating moral judgment.” They
congratulated “the Guaranty Trust Company upon securing a man who
brings to it these gifts of mind and heart which are destined to make him
conspicuous among men who ‘do things,’ no matter where he may go.”6

Guaranty Trust
One of the leading American banks of the twentieth century, Guaranty
Trust has received only limited attention from banking historians. Yet, from
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its beginning the bank had big plans. On 13 April 1864, only a few weeks
before Union General Ulysses S. Grant commenced his assault on Robert
E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in the Wilderness campaign, the New
York state legislature chartered a new corporate entity, the New York
Guaranty and Indemnity Company. Given the powers they bestowed, bank
charters were a matter of public concern, and Guaranty’s was no exception.
The New York Herald was suspicious that its creation might be “a big
swindle.” The reason for this criticism is unknown, other than the normal
corruption associated with the New York legislature at the time, but
Guaranty won the support of Democratic Governor Horatio Seymour, a
future presidential candidate, and that apparently was sufficient for the
charter’s success. The bank’s legal authority was unusually broad:
[The bank was authorized to] guaranty the payment, punctual
performance, and collection of promissory notes, bills of exchange,
contracts, bonds, accounts, claims, rents, annuities, mortgages,
evidences of debt, and certificates of property or value, and the titles
to property real or personal, upon such terms as may be established
by the Board of Directors of said company; to receive upon storage,
deposit, or otherwise, merchandise, bullion, specie, plate, stocks,
bonds, promissory notes, certificates and evidences of debt, contracts
or other properties, and to take the management, custody and charge
of real and personal estate and property, and to advance money
securities, and credits upon any property, real or personal, on such
terms as may be established by the Directors.
After receiving the coveted charter, Guaranty opened its first office in
Manhattan, on lower Broadway near the stock exchange.7
Because the company’s legal power included the right to “receive upon
storage, deposit, or otherwise” a wide range of items, including
“merchandise,” its directors could approve loans secured by goods in
warehouses, a significant and previously limited source of financing for
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domestic and foreign trade. The original shareholders of Guaranty,
capitalized with 1,000 shares at $100,000, included New York bankers and
merchants, both of whom knew the need for warehouse receipts. The
company raced into this business, charging seven percent on the receipts,
the maximum allowed by law. An opportunity for further expansion
presented itself when the New York legislature in 1871 amended the
company’s charter to allow it to “accept and execute any trust created by
mortgage made by any railroad or other corporation, to secure its bonds or
other obligations…[by] appointing such Company trustee, and to act as
trustee.” However, full exploitation of the corporate trust business,
especially for railroads, a variety of work not then legally available to most
other banks, would not take place for some years.8
Despite this auspicious beginning, by the mid–1870s Guaranty had
difficulty competing with other banks for loan business and its assets
dwindled to an office building at 52 Broadway and some real estate on Long
Island. The directors decided to abandon the warehouse receipts trade. John
Jacob Astor, one of the wealthiest men in the United States, bought
Guaranty’s Broadway office for $1,000,000 in 1883, a notable real estate
transaction for the time. During the next eight years, the company existed
merely to collect rents on its Long Island property and distribute the
proceeds as dividends. Guaranty’s sole part-time employee kept a desk at 52
Broadway in order to present, in formal hand-delivered fashion, the semiannual dividends.9
Guaranty, however, was soon rescued from this near-death experience.
In 1891 men connected to Guaranty and another New York corporation,
the Mutual Life Insurance Company, perceived the special opportunities
presented by Guaranty’s broad charter. Mutual Life, of course, was not just
any insurer. In the early 1890s it was the largest insurance company in the
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world. Samuel Babcock, George Griswold Haven, and Richard McCurdy
(the latter its president) led Guaranty’s rejuvenation. They quickly increased
the bank’s capital to $2,000,000. They elected a new board which reflected
the high expectations of the operation. Among the directors were Oliver
Harriman, Frederick W. Vanderbilt, Augustus D. Juilliard, William C.
Whitney, and Robert Goelet, all wealthy and prominent New Yorkers.
From the beginning, Mutual planned to use the broad lending authority
permitted by Guaranty’s charter to develop new business, including in the
potentially lucrative field of lending on Mutual’s life insurance policies. The
first official transactions under new leadership were the purchase of
$1,000,000 in United States bonds and $500,000 in New York City bonds.10
Guaranty was thus reborn as a significant commercial institution. In its
new incarnation the bank invested assets in government bonds, railroad
securities, and demand loans. Venturing into the trust business for the first
time, Guaranty became a trustee for mortgage bonds of the Galveston City
Railroad. Adding the powerful New York banker George F. Baker to the
board augmented its already formidable personal and business connections.
At the beginning of 1892 the company possessed about $3.7 million in
assets. The next year this increased to more than $14 million. The company
even hired an agent in London to handle the financing of grain shipments,
an innovative international venture for an American commercial bank.11
During the next fifteen years Guaranty experienced substantial growth
despite the national economic crises of the 1890s and 1907. Many banking
institutions in New York collapsed during the panic of 1893, at the time the
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most severe downturn in the nation’s history. Guaranty, however,
continued to pay dividends. An increasing amount of this prosperity derived
from trust business, most of which was linked to railroads. Two important
examples of the company’s trust activities were the reorganization of the
Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad in 1895 and the consolidation of
the Edison General Electric and Thompson-Houston Electric into the
General Electric Company in 1894. Guaranty thereby placed itself at the
forefront in the institutional restructuring of American business. Guaranty
also built check, deposit, and certificate of deposit services. By the
beginning of 1896, assets neared $16 million, a four-fold increase in just
four years. Guaranty’s clients were important persons, representatives of
burgeoning railroad companies, industries, and utilities. Its expanding
services, particularly trust services, resulted in 1896 in a name change to the
Guaranty Trust Company of New York.12
The bank’s eagerness to accommodate the corporate customers who
were transforming American life led the directors to open the first fullfledged branch of an American bank on London’s Lombard Street in 1897.
Federal law then prohibited national banks from creating foreign branches,
but the state-chartered Guaranty faced no such barrier. In New York, the
company opened an Exchange Department, with two employees, to
facilitate international financing. The path-breaking work of that
department, a tiny toehold serving American capitalism in Europe, was later
described by one of the two employees:
At first, business consisted entirely of buying cotton and grain bills
on London, and selling our own demand against them. I did all the
clerical work, drew drafts, made entries, and wrote the letters
forwarding the bills. We soon opened a mark account with the
Dresdner Bank in Hamburg, and a franc account with the Credit
Lyonnais in Paris. The business we did on other countries was
handled through our London account. There was no trading in
exchange at that time. The “Book-keeping Division” of the Foreign
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Department consisted of a ledger and a remittance register, for which
I was responsible.
Guaranty expanded its international operations to the Far East after
American victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898 gave the United
States possession of the Philippines. Guaranty astutely followed the flag,
opening a branch in Manila, where it was appointed depositary for the new
American-dominated Philippines government.13
Dramatic new challenges, however, soon threatened Guaranty. In
1905, future Republican presidential candidate and United States Supreme
Court Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes led an investigation of fraud and
corruption in the New York insurance business. Hughes’s work uncovered
outrageous salaries to executives, bribery of public officials, and sweeping
malfeasance of policyholder funds. The investigation produced a series of
state laws requiring insurance companies to divest themselves of
investments in other corporations. Mutual Life owned enormous blocks of
stock in more than fifteen banks and trust companies, including Guaranty,
and under the new laws Mutual had to sell this stock.14
As part of Mutual’s compliance with the regulations, Edward H.
Harriman, the famous railroad tycoon who controlled the Union Pacific
and Illinois Central Railroads, bought half the shares in Guaranty owned by
Mutual and thus obtained a controlling interest in the bank. In 1911, the
remainder of Mutual’s Guaranty stock was sold to the by-then deceased
Harriman’s estate.15
The bank also confronted the economic crisis of 1907, which focused
on New York’s trust companies. According to one historian, in October of
that year “country and small-town bankers withdrew their [deposits in New
York banks], city bankers called in their loans to meet demand, and the
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credit structure collapsed like a house of cards.” Fortunately for Guaranty,
its officers perceived potential problems before the downturn, successfully
calling in loans and strengthening cash reserves. Many other trust
companies, by contrast, despite low cash reserves, had invested heavily in
speculative ventures and issued risky loans on stocks and bonds. Ultimately,
J. Pierpont Morgan led a coalition of financial interests that propped up the
tottering system, and Guaranty participated in these efforts. Although the
bank’s assets fell dramatically during the episode, by mid–1909 they had
rebounded to an all time high of more than $84 million.16
Divestiture by Mutual Life, Harriman’s entry, and the 1907 crisis
provided a basis for even greater expansion. The most important force in
these changes was J. Pierpont Morgan and his firm, which made Guaranty
the largest trust bank in the world. The Morgan intrusion, perhaps better
described as an anointment, was part of a grand scheme to consolidate New
York banking. The crux of the Morgan plan was to obtain control of
Guaranty and enlarge it through mergers. One early Guaranty merger was
with Morton Trust, headed by Levi P. Morton, a former vice president of
the United States and governor of New York. Another merger was with
Morton’s Fifth Avenue Trust. Henry P. Davison, a Morgan partner,
arranged this deal through purchases of the holdings of Morton, Thomas
Fortune Ryan, the William C. Whitney estate, and Mutual Life. As a result,
Levi Morton became chairman of Guaranty’s board and Ryan, one of the
wealthiest men in the United States, became a Guaranty director. Further
suggesting the tight interrelationships among the “consolidating”
leadership, Morton Trust’s office had been in the same Mutual Life
building on Nassau Street occupied by Guaranty. The mergers left Morgan,
George Baker of the First National Bank, and James Stillman of the
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National City Bank as the controlling figures of American commercial
banking.17
The mergers also produced several years of spectacular, profitable
growth. In 1910 Guaranty possessed assets of more than $150 million. The
directors that year declared a dividend of thirty-two percent; by 1912 the
dividend was thirty-eight percent. The blossoming company began
construction of a large building at Liberty and Broadway on a parcel
purchased from Mutual Life. In 1912, Guaranty absorbed another trust, the
Standard Trust Company, which raised its assets to almost $250 million. By
this time the board of directors included such financial luminaries as
George F. Baker, Henry P. Davison, James B. Duke, Daniel Guggenheim,
Thomas W. Lamont, Thomas F. Ryan, Harry Payne Whitney, and Albert
H. Wiggin. Morgan and other prominent New York banks dominated.
Lamont, chairman of Guaranty’s executive committee, and Davison were
Morgan partners. The Guggenheim family had close relations with the
Morgan interests for a long time, Baker was with First National Bank, and
Wiggin was associated with Chase. The dominance of private and national
bankers reflected the desire of those banks, which were legally prohibited
from trust activities, to have control of a leading state-chartered trust.18
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After 1912 a particularly important component of Guaranty’s
escalating growth was railroad financing. In 1913 Alexander J. Hemphill,
originally a railroad executive, became Guaranty’s president. The railroad
focus was symbolized by a special display case installed in the directors’
room, which featured large maps of the lines. No other industry received
this kind of attention. The railroad business involved the bank as financial
agents, in securities transactions, as depositary, and included placement of
bank officers on railroad boards. By 1917 Guaranty held more than $30
million in deposits just from railroads; but transportation was only part of
the ongoing growth. Anticipating the great boom in public equity sales
during the 1920s, in which Stetson would play an important part, Guaranty
also expanded its work to include the distribution of securities, which
required hiring salesmen. It increased its operations in foreign exchange and
international business.19
Although political and legal developments had always been important
to Guaranty, in 1913 two new laws deeply impacted and enhanced its
operations. First, in 1913 Congress approved a federal income tax. Rather
than harming the bank, the expertise required for handling income tax
issues for the wealthy provided a considerable amount of new business.
Second, as already described, Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act in
1913, which created a new centralized structure for banking. The law
allowed banks to borrow money from new regional Federal Reserve Banks
in order to meet quickly changing needs, thereby supplying flexibility to the
money supply. The Act had direct benefits for Guaranty. Although it did
not become a Reserve member until 1917, the Reserve System encouraged
the development of a market for “acceptances,” time drafts or bills of
exchange, as investments. Guaranty quickly became a national leader in this
kind of commercial paper.20
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Another transforming development was the outbreak of World War I,
in August 1914. Before the war the United States was a debtor nation.
American railroads and other industries, for example, traditionally depended
on capital from Europe. This gave enormous power to English banks and
relegated New York bankers, however powerful they appeared to average
citizens, to second-class status. The diplomatic and military stupidity of
European leaders, however, caused a shift in the world’s financial capital
during the long years of war. Guaranty, with already established foreign
interests and solid connections with other American institutions interested
in overseas opportunities, was primed to benefit from the growth in
American power.21
Guaranty’s aggressive actions before April 1917, when the United
States declared war on Germany, illustrated the enormous opportunities
provided by global conflict. These opportunities undoubtedly helped create
the need for new officers, such as Stetson, whom the bank hired during this
period. Between 1914 and 1917 Guaranty sold bank services to Americans
in Europe, propped up gold supplies, and financed huge amounts of grain
and cotton shipped to Britain and France. In 1914, Great Britain closed its
banks for four days and declared a moratorium on debt payments for three
months. In contrast, Guaranty’s London office never closed and paid gold
on letters of credit—it ignored the moratorium. Britain and France
expected continued payment for securities debts in gold, and Guaranty and
other New York banks ensured that a loan due in early 1915 met that
expectation. Guaranty also facilitated the transfer of American products to
Britain, particularly grain and cotton. The company participated in the
Cotton Loan Fund under the direction of the Federal Reserve Board. The
Fund generated confidence in the international market for cotton and
improved money supply problems in the southern United States. Guaranty
financed the purchase of American cotton by the French government and
French and British companies, even establishing special cotton offices in
Liverpool and Havre. Between 1913 and 1925 the bank financed more
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cotton exports than any other American bank, an amount that exceeded
more than half the entire exported crop of the United States.22
Guaranty’s intense international activity resulted in part from the
global perspective of Charles Sabin and his Morgan backers. Soon after
Sabin’s appointment as president, Guaranty participated in the largest
private loan ever made to a foreign government. Europe was running out of
money, and looked to Americans for cash. Under the direction of J. P.
Morgan & Co., Guaranty joined in a massive $500 million loan to Britain
and France. Soon other international loans, to Italy and Canada, followed.
Technically, the United States was still neutral, but Guaranty’s actions
made it clear which power the New York banks supported. In addition,
Guaranty made loans to American industries, such as Remington Arms and
Bethlehem Steel, which produced products for the Allied effort. In effect,
the bank loaned money to Britain and France, who used money to buy
goods from American companies, while the American companies expanded
using money from American banks, including Guaranty. The potential
profits from this multiplying business caused the price of a share of
Guaranty stock to soar to more than $600 by 1916.23
For Gene Stetson, the great significance of Guaranty’s distinguished
history was that by 1916, when he came to New York, Guaranty was one of
the leading financial institutions in the world. Starting with a favorable
charter and a niche business in warehouse receipts, it nearly expired in the
1880s. Yet, the possibilities offered by the charter interested Mutual Life’s
savvy leaders. The insurance giant’s takeover of Guaranty in 1891 and the
linking of Guaranty after 1905 to trust and international business, as well as
to elite sponsors from the heights of New York banking, especially J. P.
Morgan, renewed a moribund operation. Divestment by Mutual in 1911, a
series of mergers in 1910 and 1912, and an enormous expansion of
international operations helped by connections to the most prominent New
York individuals and banks, including the Harriman family and J. P.
Morgan & Co., set the stage for Guaranty’s spectacular growth during the
First World War. These developments, as well as the company’s special
22
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interest in cotton and railroads, two businesses with which Stetson was
already familiar, helped make Stetson an attractive candidate for Sabin and
the Morgan colossus.

The Right Place at the Right Time
As an informed banker who had made numerous trips to New York,
Stetson would have known much of this history. He was certainly aware that
Guaranty offered a fantastic opportunity for an ambitious and young, but
seasoned, banker such as himself. In the early twentieth century, there were
just a handful of major “deal doers” on Wall Street and they were
concentrated in several private banks, the most prominent of which was J. P.
Morgan & Co., which had only a few partners. Stetson would have been
aware that as an outsider the only way to get to the top of finance was to
join one of the rising commercial banks. Guaranty had massive capital,
relationships with private banks and wealthy clients, and could meet the
rapidly increasing need of American industry for loans and especially
investment underwriting. As a result, a large, global bank like Guaranty,
which also had the decided advantage of intimate relations with the true
insiders of Wall Street, including Morgan, was a perfect match for Stetson.
The New South was very much at home in lower Manhattan.24
Charles Sabin’s career provided precedent for the outsiders’ path to
banking prominence, so Stetson probably looked to Sabin as a model.
Sabin, like Stetson, began at a small regional bank before moving to New
York, where he made an outstanding record. Sabin, like Stetson, had strong
leadership skills and solid social ability. They even shared a life-long love
for baseball. In fact, Sabin was offered his first job at an Albany, New York,
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bank because he agreed to pitch for the bank’s baseball team. Each man had
a penchant for unusual deals and foreign adventures. In 1916, a prominent
national publication described Sabin as “independent” and “progressive,” a
man making a mark on Wall Street in the aftermath of J. Pierpont Morgan’s
death. Stetson had consistently been described in similar terms on the
smaller stage of Macon. Sabin, like Stetson, was also interested in the
relationship between business and community, including charities.25
Stetson had the excellent fortune to arrive in New York at the exact
time that the mantle of world financial power was shifting from London to
Wall Street. He started his new job in November 1916, in the midst of
Guaranty’s massive lending to Allied nations and just two years after Britain
entered a period of financial desperation, effectively ending Britain’s
dominance of international finance. Europe’s need for cotton, and
Guaranty’s leadership in cotton financing, was Stetson’s special dooropener. An expert in financing the cotton trade from his Georgia banking
days, he was positioned to help expand Guaranty’s cotton business by leaps
and bounds. In fact, it may be that this was the most important factor in
Sabin’s decision to hire Stetson.
Stetson had worked at Guaranty for less than six months when the
United States declared war against Germany in April 1917, and he
undoubtedly played an important role in the bank’s wartime efforts. The
end of neutrality placed Wilson’s government at the forefront of war
finance, but it also created new and essential tasks for the bank. In fact,
Guaranty’s war-related work transformed its operations. Between June 1917
and June 1919, bank resources grew spectacularly, from $600 million to
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more than $820 million, with outstanding loans increasing by more than
twenty percent. Much of this growth was the result of Guaranty’s heavy
involvement with the government’s Liberty Loan program. President Sabin
belonged to the Liberty Loan Committee for New York and even marched
in a Liberty Loan Parade beside J. P. Morgan Jr.26
When the first Liberty Loan, for $2 billion, was issued in May 1917,
Guaranty helped sell the bonds. Joining other financial institutions and
large employers, it subscribed its own name to $25 million. Guaranty also
authorized officers to invest trust funds in the loan. In the second Liberty
Loan, the bank placed more than $110 million with the public, the largest
single subscription in the United States. After the fifth and final loan in
1919, the company’s total wartime placements exceeded $500 million, or
roughly $6 billion in 2007 dollars.27
Marketing, of course, was a big part of these sales. Guaranty erected
huge red, white, and blue posters at its Broadway office that urged passersby
to purchase bonds. Branches stayed open past regular hours and Guaranty
employees, each of whom purchased at least one bond, went “door-to-door”
in the area around Wall Street to sell bonds. Guaranty operated a bond
booth on the steps of the recently completed New York Public Library on
Fifth Avenue, which produced at least one revealing display of financial
patriotism:
A very small girl emerged from the crowd that surrounded [the]
Liberty Loan Booth at Forty-second Street and Fifth Avenue. She
26
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carried a pasteboard box tightly clasped in her hands. Attracting the
attention of a Guaranty Trust Company salesman stationed at the
booth, she dumped the contents of her box on the counter. Slowly
and accurately she counted the pennies, nickels, dimes, and quarters
that she had hoarded in her “safety deposit” box since last Christmas.
The total was $49. Her mother contributed an extra dollar, and the
child became the possessor of a Liberty Bond.

It is no wonder that when King Albert of Belgium rode down Broadway in a
1919 parade he saluted Guaranty as he passed.28
War affected the bank in other ways. More than five hundred
employees went into government service, including four of the fourteen vice
presidents. Altogether, about seventy-five percent of the work force had to
be replaced. One vice president, Lewis Franklin, became director of the
War Loan Organization in the Treasury Department. In the fall of 1917,
when Guaranty joined the Federal Reserve System, President Sabin
explained the bank’s membership on the grounds that, given the emergency,
national finances had to be conserved and yet responsive to demand.
Concentration in the Federal Reserve, accordingly, was an appropriate way
to achieve this goal. Sabin also realized that membership allowed the bank
to discount some acceptances at a better rate and to rediscount commercial
paper and bills of exchange to a larger amount. Another impact of the war
was that in early 1918 the federal government took over operation of the
nation’s railroads, many of which were Guaranty customers. As part of this
process, the government ordered removal of more than $30 million in
railroad company deposits from Guaranty.29
Seeing itself as an adjunct of the military effort, Guaranty plunged
headlong into Europe itself, creating a banking flank on the Western Front.
The bank opened new facilities in London near the American Embassy, the
Army and Navy headquarters, and the Red Cross. Similar expansion
occurred in Paris, where the emphasis was on service to soldiers. The bank
even constructed a special railroad car to shuttle money, including soldiers’
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pay, from Paris to the environs of the trenches. Painted military gray,
Guaranty’s field operation had windows where men-in-arms could cash
checks and buy Liberty Bonds, all within hearing distance of German guns.
At one point Guaranty maintained approximately 10,000 accounts of
American soldiers in France.30

Failure: The Mercantile Bank Crisis
Stetson’s arrival at Guaranty is also illuminated by events after the
November 1918 armistice. Peace confronted the bank with new challenges.
The transition turned out badly, even threatening to destroy the ambitious
Guaranty and thus Stetson’s career. Victorious in war, Stetson’s boss Sabin
actually became a noteworthy casualty of the peace. Not fully perceiving the
risks, Sabin wrote a January 1919 report to shareholders that summarized
the situation with too much optimism:
The outlook for the year 1919 seems to be on the whole
encouraging, although many problems must obviously be faced. The
readjustments of business from war to peace conditions will in many
instances be difficult, and your Company, to some extent, must share
in these difficulties. An easier money market may operate to reduce
interest rates, and deflation of credit may reduce the demand. In spite
of the relatively sound position which this country finds itself at the
close of the war, we shall be affected to some degree by conditions
throughout the world. Only by the most intelligent cooperation all
along the line shall we be able to avail ourselves of the advantages
offered in foreign markets.
Sabin’s reference to expanding foreign investments was revealing, if
misguided. To Guaranty’s leadership it seemed the demand for American
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goods and American financing was nearly unlimited, and the bank planned
to look to foreign transactions for success.31
As early as 1915, Guaranty obtained a large interest, with investing
partnerships J. & W. Seligman & Co. and Brown Brothers & Co., in the
Mercantile Bank of the Americas, which had subsidiaries in Peru,
Nicaragua, Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, and Cuba. The purpose of the
bank was “to assist in the development of trade between the Republics of
this hemisphere.” This meant financing agriculture, exporters of coffee,
sugar, and cocoa, and assisting in the sale of the products. For example, in
Cuba, a subsidiary, the Banco Mercantil Americano de Cuba, financed sugar
to market. Guaranty also invested heavily in the Asia Banking Corporation,
with headquarters in Shanghai. In Europe, the company opened an office in
Brussels to compliment the London and Paris operations. It initiated an
agreement with the new Polish government that helped facilitate credit in
the United States. Guaranty also entered into an alliance with Banca
Italiana di Sconto in Italy and in 1920 opened an office in Constantinople,
signaling the potential importance of the Middle East to American business.
In the early 1920s the sun never set on Guaranty’s empire, as
representatives of the bank also operated in Scandinavia, India, and
Australia.32
One overseas operation which illustrates the bank’s intense search for
accounts involved the soon-to-be formed Soviet Union. The Bolshevik
revolution of 1917 necessitated unusually imaginative banking, even for
Guaranty. Simply put, the new communist government needed the
assistance of capitalist financiers for foreign transactions. In 1920 three
ships carrying gold owned by the revolutionary Soviet government left
31
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Russia bound for Guaranty Trust. Importing gold, however, presented legal
problems because the United States did not officially recognize the Soviet
government, which of course assumed power in a bloodbath of murder, civil
war, and confiscation of property. When the gold arrived, Guaranty turned
it over to the Treasury Department for sale, but the government refused to
pay the $7 million selling price. Eventually Guaranty convinced officials
that the gold was not of Bolshevik origin but had actually been produced by
melting French and Belgian coins. The Treasury then paid for the gold, the
money was credited to a Russian account at Guaranty, and Comrade Lenin
became a loyal customer of the J. P. Morgan-controlled bank. By mid–1920
the bank was Lenin’s agent in the United States. Soon thereafter Secretary
of Commerce Herbert Hoover, not exactly a Marxist sympathizer,
promoted Guaranty’s idea of a formal exchange relationship with the New
State Bank at Moscow. Hoover wanted a more “rational” approach to
Bolshevik business transactions in the United States, particularly if Russian
money was used to purchase American goods. Guaranty also helped
establish the first Soviet international bank in Moscow and a Guaranty
employee was hired as head of its foreign department.33
Unfortunately, in 1921 the foreign boom burst. Guaranty was most
affected by troubles in Latin America, especially a spectacular collapse in
the price of sugar, from 22 to 3.5 cents per pound, but other tropical
products faced steep price declines as well. The resulting pressures on the
Latin America-based Mercantile Bank of the Americas, forty percent of
33
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which was owned by Guaranty, led to the Mercantile Bank’s failure.
Guaranty’s enormous losses, up to more than $40 million, caused one
observer to admit that “Guaranty’s credit structure, while it did not actually
fail, was strained to the breaking point.” Overextensions in foreign banking
ended one era in the bank’s history, the great expansion of 1910 to 1921,
and began another, a period of retrenchment and slow renewal that ended
favorably in 1929 in a merger with the National Bank of Commerce.34
The most important long-term effect of the crisis of the early 1920s,
which would have a profound affect on Gene Stetson’s career, was the
shifting of Guaranty’s leadership even more firmly in the direction of
influence and control by J. P. Morgan & Co. At the time of Mercantile
Bank debacle, the key link between Morgan and Guaranty was Thomas W.
Lamont, a Morgan partner. Lamont was a consummate relationship banker
who became an important role-model for Stetson. Beginning the 1910s, as a
member of Guaranty’s board of directors and as chairman of its executive
committee, Lamont participated in a wide range of Guaranty activities,
including cotton financing, the selection of potential directors, war finance,
steering corporate business to the bank, and the decision to become a
member of the Federal Reserve. He lobbied politicians on behalf of the
bank, writing one United States Senator to let him “drop in and let me have
a word with you about the Guaranty Trust Company.” Lewis Franklin
sought Lamont’s approval when he resigned as a Guaranty vice president in
1918 in order to take a position in the Treasury Department.35
34
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Lamont was well aware of the risks and opportunities of international
trade. Even before the collapse of the Mercantile Bank, he feared extensive
liabilities, which primarily consisted of loans to tropical planters. He knew
Sabin was chairman of the board of Mercantile. He was familiar with
Guaranty’s efforts to expand its influence overseas after the war, in part
because these efforts occasionally conflicted with the interests of J. P.
Morgan. Morgan, in fact, assumed the position of global clearinghouse with
Guaranty, often seeking to grant or deny it rights to develop international
business. Sabin, for example, in response to a complaint from J. P. (“Jack”)
Morgan Jr. about competition with Morgan regarding French loans, wrote
Lamont,
We have previously negotiated, as you undoubtedly remember,
the largest commercial credit for France. Brown Brothers also
arranged a credit, as did Bonbright and the Bankers Trust Company.
We, therefore, cannot feel that we are infringing upon your territory,
or Brown Brothers’ territory, or anybody else’s territory in such
negotiations…. The matter has all been threshed out with Mr.
Morgan—and I believe to his entire satisfaction.
As early as November 1920, Lamont expressed pessimism to Sabin about
the overall economic situation, counseling that Guaranty should “do only
such business as may be necessary until the situation clears up.”36
Within weeks of that warning the Mercantile Bank’s difficulties
threatened Guaranty itself with collapse. At Lamont’s urging, an “advocacy
committee” was formed. There were efforts to call up bank stock. Sabin,

Crane, 18 October 1917; L. B. Franklin to Thomas Lamont, 16 March 1918,
Thomas W. Lamont Collections Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard
Business School, Boston, Massachusetts. On Lamont generally, see Edward M.
Lamont, The Ambassador from Wall Street: The Story of Thomas W. Lamont, J. P.
Morgan’s Chief Executive (Lanham MD: Madison Books, 1994).
36
“Mercantile Bank of the Americas [1918]”; Charles H. Sabin to Thomas W.
Lamont, 22 April 1919; Thomas W. Lamont to Charles H. Sabin, 9 May 1919, 5
November 1920, Thomas W. Lamont Collection.

70

Relationship Banker

however, still failed to appreciate the gravity of the threat. His annual letter
to the shareholders, issued in December 1920, contained only vague hints of
the deepening crisis. He admitted deposits decreased from 1919 to 1920, yet
the current difficulty was merely “a reflection of the natural reaction and
the general readjustment of business which is in progress.” In short, there
was no need to worry: “Our large gold reserve, our sound financial
situation, our tremendous crops, our improved transportation and industrial
conditions, our foreign markets and our great natural resources all underlie
the business situation and give promises of future prosperity and
progress.”37
More willing to see the danger, Lamont and his partners opted to
exercise the Morgan muscle. In May 1921, they formed a syndicate of
eighteen banks, including Guaranty, to advance $35 million to the failing
Mercantile Bank, with the eventual goal of liquidation. Leading
stockholders of the Mercantile Bank, including Guaranty, raised another
$20 million to encourage hesitant bankers to participate. Fear of a Guaranty
failure, including the potential for personal liability of Guaranty directors if
it did fail, was a key motive for syndicate participation. But even these
moves were not enough. By the end of the summer Lamont, Jack Morgan,
and Morgan partner Edward Stettinius stepped in more forcefully. In
September Guaranty’s board reduced the dividend to three percent,
charged off all losses, and established extraordinary reserves of more than
$15 million. Although these actions seemed drastic—to cut dividends
implied bad management—they were preferable to an immanent bank run.
According to the board, the measures covered “any losses that may be
sustained from banking operations in Central and South America, where the
shrinkage in the value of customers’ loans, due to the unprecedented fall in
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the price of commodities and the fluctuation in exchange, has been
excessive.”38
The source of all this activity was a raw exercise of power by Morgan’s
partners. Lamont wrote a Guaranty director that “we at No. 23 [Wall
Street, the location of Morgan’s offices] have conferred almost constantly
about the Guaranty situation.” This discussion led to a restructuring of
Guaranty’s leadership. The tainted Sabin was bumped up to chairman of
the board, while William C. (“Bill”) Potter assumed the presidency.
Stettinius and George Whitney, two Morgan partners, were added to
Guaranty’s board and executive committee. Their job would be to keep a
close eye on the company, as the Morgan men believed some of the blame
for the financial mess rested on current board members who had not been
properly overseeing bank operations. In addition to Jack Morgan, who gave
his seal of approval, Lamont consulted Harry Payne Whitney, Thomas F.
Ryan, and Daniel Guggenheim. Lamont developed the plan while Sabin
was out of New York and presented it to him when he returned. He did so
on 30 September 1921, in a polite, but firm letter: “We have all had some
severe lessons, and these make it imperative for us all to rally together and
to see that the Guaranty Trust Company—both as to interior management
and in the eyes of the public—occupies an impregnable position and moves
forward to increasing success.” Sabin was not left to doubt that the Morgan
firm, including Morgan himself, was behind the move.39
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The new leadership, particularly Potter and Lamont, immediately
began to restore faith. Potter was a good choice. Born in Chicago and
trained as a mining engineer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
as a young man he worked in mines in the West and in central and South
America, partly for the Guggenheims. He came to Guaranty in 1912 after a
brief presidency with the Intercontinental Rubber Company. For his part,
Lamont took the lead in generating positive publicity. He forthrightly
confronted lingering concerns in the banking community. A letter he wrote
Frank B. Anderson of the Bank of California suggested the degree of lost
confidence caused by the Latin American collapse and the detailed repair
work needed:
A sheaf of gossip comes to us, probably just as inaccurate as all
gossip is, to the effect that your criticism of the Guaranty Trust
Company and of its officers, etc., has been very severe….
The way that we [Morgan] look at the situation is this: The
whole country, including the banking institutions, ran into a period
of great inflation and when the bubble broke almost all of them had
to suffer severe losses. The Guaranty Trust Company was the
biggest trust company in the country and its operations were on a
correspondingly large scale. We think that it outgrew its
organization and in that way began, after a time, to lack the detailed
personal supervision which you, of all men, know is so necessary to
the proper conduct of a large institution. Moreover, as we see it, the
Guaranty Trust Company was anxious to respond generously to the
appeals made from Washington that American institutions should
take their place in furnishing ample credit facilities to the foreign
markets of the world, especially those of South and Central America.
It was this last desire on the part of the officers of the Guaranty
Trust Company that led them into the investment in the Mercantile
Bank of the Americas, which [performed] badly owing to the terrific
commodity losses in cocoa, coffee, rubber and other products
indigenous to the countries served. As a matter of fact, with the
improvement in Central American exchange, the situation is not
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nearly as bad as it was, but nevertheless there was no doubt plenty to
criticize in the way of lack of complete organization and foresight.
At the same time, neither Sabin nor any of his associate officers in
the Guaranty Trust Company could ever be accused of anything but
the best of good faith, and if one had been obliged to analyze their
transactions day by day, I doubt whether his judgment would have
been anything like as severe as his judgment is likely to be after the
event.
In any event, the Guaranty Trust Company is now in a position
that is sound and its earnings good. It was because of our faith in the
situation and our strong desire to assist it and to make it better that
we encouraged two more of the members of our firm, Ed Stettinius
and George Whitney to go on the Executive Committee. Thus you
see we are very closely identified with the institution and are anxious
that good friends like you should do everything to help us. Please,
therefore, when the subject comes up again, do your best, not simply
for the Guaranty Trust, but for your friends in this firm by
explaining that the storm is completely over and the situation sound
and the outlook excellent.40
Despite Lamont’s support, the turnaround was slow and expensive. In
1922, there were false rumors that Guaranty’s European offices would be
closed. The Constantinople outpost, despite strong encouragement from
Secretary of Commerce Hoover to keep it open, did become a casualty.
Lamont, ever the booster, told the bank’s representative in Paris that he
should convey to one skeptical customer “that we are one family and that
the Guaranty has had and would, according to our present ideas, continue
to have a place in the Morgan-Baring Group.” Eventually the Guaranty
board voted to pay off losses to banks that participated in the 1921 syndicate
in order to improve its credit and good will. Of course, Morgan was one of
40
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the banks to receive payment. Guaranty’s assets showed a steady decline
through the mid-twenties. Peaking at about $960 million in 1919, they fell
to $890 million in February 1921 and $540 million by the end of 1921, a
catastrophic loss. In 1923 assets had climbed back to $620 million, but they
remained under $750 million as late as 1927.41

Lessons
Guaranty’s experiences from 1916 through the Mercantile crisis had a
powerful effect on Stetson’s career. Dramatic events involving no less than
the reshaping of world finance meant that Stetson had to hit the ground
running. In moving from Macon to Manhattan he stepped from the simpler
world of New South boosterism to the highest levels of an evolving
international scene in which American banks had acquired new and farreaching powers. Equally important, in Guaranty’s case, both during and
after World War I its banking practice was fundamentally linked to the
Morgan partnership. In order to survive and succeed, Stetson needed to
retain the positive lessons of his youth while adapting quickly to the
aggressive values of demanding Wall Street sponsors. A Guaranty job came
with rare and valuable connections, resources, and opportunities. But it also
41
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carried the burdens of acting under the intense pressures of global financial
power and responsibility.
Stetson’s role in the Mercantile crisis was limited but significant. He
belonged to the Latin American bank’s board of directors. And, according
to the New York Times, he was the “guiding mind” in the decision to close
the subsidiary Banco Mercantile Americano de Cuba, working with
Morganites Martin Egan and Dwight Morrow. As a result, he joined in the
Morgan-sponsored clean-up and avoided any blame associated with Sabin.
More broadly, the Mercantile failure imparted some valuable lessons. First,
it signaled the absolute necessity of paying attention to Lamont and
working with the Morgan firm. Perhaps Sabin’s reputed “independence”
had carried too high a price. During the 1920s, failure in Morgan’s eyes
meant the end of any ambitions to a higher place. This, apparently, was a
key part of the quid pro quo of Stetson’s Guaranty opportunity. Stetson also
must have perceived the need for extreme caution in international banking.
The rewards were assumed to be great, but so were the risks. Finally, the
Mercantile episode seems to have enhanced Stetson’s sense of the long and
sometimes lonely preparation and monitoring necessary to make effective
financial decisions. Sabin may have lost that edge, and Stetson apparently
promised himself that if he ever failed it would not be for lack of effort.42

42
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New York
Stetson, of course, knew that despite the Mercantile Bank mess, Guaranty
had a lot going for it. Its potential as a commercial bank was always
enormous. An important reflection of this fact was the bank’s carefully
chosen culture and physical presence. Guaranty tried to impress well-heeled
clients with a temple-like dignity. Within its offices, solemnity was imposed
on employee and visitor alike; loud talking was expressly prohibited.
According to written rules, employees could not “work without their coats
in any place visible to the public, except in the summer time, and then only
under rules prescribed by the Chief Clerk.” No detail was too small. A clear
line of power and status separated officers and other employees, just as an
even clearer line distinguished the bank’s elite clients from the average
citizen.1
The Guaranty building where Stetson came to work had only recently
opened, in 1913, at 140 Broadway. Adjacent to Wall Street and other
leading financial institutions, the building’s gray New England granite
exterior carried forward the dignity theme, exuding confidence and stability.
The main floor featured a massive banking room, roughly one hundred feet
on one side and one hundred and thirty-five feet on the other, with
towering Corinthian columns rising four stories. The room held teller
stations where ordinary customer business was transacted. Marble from
France made up the walls and columns, and marble also covered the floor,
which incorporated mosaics copied from originals in The Vatican and
Pompeii. Massive doors to the street contained carvings of Greek coins,
suggesting ancient origins and lasting dependability, and three huge
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chandeliers of bronze and glass hung from a blue and gold ceiling.2
Even less public spaces gave an impression of wealth and security. In
the basement a polished steel vault held millions in securities and cash. The
Directors’ Room, as well as the President’s Office, perched above the main
entrance, facing Broadway. According to an impressed company historian,
the executive area was “designed to carry out the effect of strength,
simplicity, and space while the detail both in ornament and in furnishing,
shows the same restraint in color and the same exquisite workmanship that
one would expect to find in a beautiful private home.”3
The working culture of Guaranty showed there was substance beneath
the sophisticated image. After World War I an important contributor to
revived growth was the company’s venture into the underwriting and
marketing of debt and equity securities. Guaranty had been active in
securities since the early years of the century, but the real development of
the business did not occur until after 1915, when a young man named
Harold Stanley arrived. Before 1920, operating within the Bond
Department, Stanley’s securities group participated in international, federal,
state, and municipal government issues, as well as offerings of public
utilities, industrials, and railroads. Hopes for further expansion resulted in
the formation of the Guaranty Company of New York in 1920, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Guaranty Trust. The Guaranty Company responded
aggressively to the new retail market for equity securities by opening
twenty-seven offices throughout the United States. Stanley led the
Guaranty Company from 1921 to 1928.4
During the 1920s Guaranty purchased, distributed, and marketed
original issues of securities. As a full-fledged investment bank, it
participated in selling syndicates for securities and handled government
issues. The company provided information to investors, but did not express
opinions on stocks or on trends in the market. The investment policy was
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that “every customer on its books shall have a carefully studied financial
plan, shall own none but sound investments, and that these investments
shall be wisely diversified as to type and maturities, and possess yields as
high as is consonant with safety of principal.” Investor information was
based on the work of in-house analysts and statisticians, who used
Guaranty’s extensive financial library. Clients could also receive special
reports on foreign investments.5
Another important characteristic of Guaranty during this period was
the incredibly sophisticated scope and customer-oriented focus of its
activities. Guaranty and its officers, including Stetson, were expected to be
models of commercial relationship banking. Attention to detail and the
development of long-term customers were hallmarks. This work included
an impressive array of domestic, foreign, fiduciary, and securities banking.
Domestically, Guaranty organized services geographically, following the
boundaries of the branches of the Federal Reserve. Officers such as Stetson
received regional territories to oversee. The bank offered checking and
deposit accounts and paid interest on those accounts. However, the bank
specialized in service to business: “Beginning with the organization of a
corporation, and at each later stage in its existence, this Company can aid in
the safe and expeditious transaction of every phase of present-day business.”
The bank handled notes, bond coupons, and commercial paper across the
United States. It employed shipping experts skilled in dealing with bills-oflading for goods entering New York. Funds could be transferred by
telegraph. Clients obtained information about the creditworthiness of other
individuals and businesses. The bank made secured and unsecured loans,
utilizing a wide range of devices, including stocks and bonds as collateral,
drafts drawn on foreign countries, and staple commodities as collateral.
Guaranty developed an extensive business assisting other banks, facilitated
by membership in the Federal Reserve System and the New York Clearing
House Association. The trust company would collect credit instruments,
5
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deal in acceptances, act as an agent for other banks in numerous kinds of
transactions, serve as a trustee, deal in securities, accept deposit accounts,
issue letters of credit, and even provide meeting, library, and secretarial
services for visiting bankers.6
Guaranty also offered specialized international banking through its five
overseas offices and correspondent banks throughout the world. The bank
aimed to provide American-level banking services abroad. Individuals
maintained accounts in the Guaranty’s foreign offices and obtained letters
of credit and travelers’ checks. For businesses, the bank could collect bills
drawn on foreign customers in dollars or foreign currencies. Loans,
especially on commodities, were arranged, facilitating the shipment of
goods across national boundaries. The company provided services regarding
foreign exchange rates and transactions and the purchase and sale of gold
and silver. It issued commercial letters of credit as a means of financing
imports and exports. In addition, the bank acted as an agent in the United
States for foreign governments and corporations.7
The largest work was trust business, which in the 1920s employed
more than 600 persons. Individuals, including trustees and executors under
wills, received trust services, from probate to payment of taxes. The bank
managed insurance proceeds, real estate, cash, and securities as trust
property. Guaranty advertised its conservative approach to trust
management: “Constant and close watch is kept over the investments, and
no effort is spared in safeguarding such funds.” Guaranty also performed
trustee duties for corporations, serving as fiduciary for public utilities,
railroads, and mining corporations. It issued mortgage bonds, collateral
trust bonds, convertible bonds, debenture bonds, notes, and income bonds.
The bank was escrow and transfer agent on complex matters, paid coupons
and mature bonds, and prepared and paid federal income taxes for
corporations. Guaranty provided similar services to state and local
governments.8
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The bank engaged in an enormous variety of other tasks, making its
New York offices a city unto itself. At its Fifth Avenue branch, Guaranty
maintained a vault with 16,000 safety deposit boxes. Ninety feet long, forty
feet wide, and two stories tall, the vault possessed walls of solid concrete,
heavy steel bars, and a lining of armor steel. Its entrance door weighed more
than 70,000 pounds and locked with twenty-four bolts. Daily mail poured
into the bank in enormous quantities that required a sophisticated postal
service. More than 130,000 pieces a month arrived from outside the United
States. Employees prepared over 7,000 letters to foreign addresses each day.
The company employed fifteen persons whose only job was to translate and
compose documents in twenty-seven languages. Forty messengers, a corps
of fifty-six security officers, signature checkers, and printers carried out
other essential tasks. Eighteen telephone operators manned the largest
switchboard of any bank in the world, handling more than 12,000 calls each
working day. The company also published sophisticated information about
income taxes and international trade. Guaranty employees wrote and
distributed The Guaranty Survey, a monthly devoted to analyses of financial
developments around the world, and The Guaranty News, which contained
information for employees and customers. Guaranty held a large library of
20,000 volumes, including books on banking and finance, more than 400
periodicals, and its own collection of data on the nation’s most important
corporations.9
Altogether, Guaranty employed more than 3,000 persons. The
company offered unusual working conditions, including an above average
scale of wages. Employees could become students in the Educational
Department, which featured lectures on banking topics, including
investments. The Guaranty Club, with its own rooms, sponsored social,
athletic, and educational activities. The Club administered a “thrift fund”

9
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composed of employee investments. This reflected the company’s desire to
have employees “who have the peace of mind and self-respect that result
from savings.” The bank provided free annual physical examinations and a
resident physician and nurse gave free medical care at the fully equipped
hospital in the main office. The company owned a “Country House”
outside the city for persons recovering from illness. Another benefit was a
pension system, inaugurated in 1914. The main office even housed a
restaurant, which, contrary to the claims of economists, gave free lunches to
all employees and dinner and breakfast to employees working after hours.
Employees could visit the company store, which sold meat, butter, eggs,
flour, canned goods, tobacco, and fruit at less than market prices.10
The Guaranty expected a lot in exchange for these benefits, enacting
detailed rules prohibiting such things as crowding or pushing in halls and
elevators and encouraging employees to keep expenses to a minimum.
Workers were told to examine wastepaper baskets at the end of each day to
ensure nothing important was thrown away. The last employee leaving each
department was supposed to turn out overhead lights. And, there was a
mandated distinction between different levels of staff. Officers had their
own eating areas, and the directors’ room was strictly off limits to
employees.11

Early Relationships
Stetson became a key participant in this complex work immediately
upon his arrival in New York, quickly adapting to and learning Guaranty’s
relationship banking culture. From the beginning, his efforts tackled both
domestic and international finance. On the international side, Guaranty
proudly offered “its facilities to bankers, manufacturers and merchants, and
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invite[d] them to consult the officers of its Foreign Department regarding
the most economical and practical methods of financing the foreign
business that is resulting from the new position of the United States among
the nations of the world.” Guaranty plainly intended to use this “new
position,” and its bankers such as Stetson, to oil the American investing
machine around the globe.12
An early example of Stetson’s international work involved The Asia
Banking Corporation. Asia Banking promoted itself as “An American Bank
for Trade with the Orient.” Although its headquarters was just down the
street from Guaranty on lower Broadway, the company operated through
branches in Shanghai, Peking, Hong Kong, Canton, and Manila. Asia
Banking sought the business of Asian merchants, manufacturers, importers,
and exporters. The bank dealt in bills of exchange, issued letters of credit,
compiled credit ratings, financed international shipments, and provided
economic information to clients. In the early 1920s it was owned and
managed by a consortium of American banks, including Guaranty, Bankers
Trust, National Shawmut, the National Bank of Commerce in Seattle, and
the ill-fated Mercantile Bank of the Americas. At the end of the first year of
its operation, assets totaled more than $42 million.13
In effect, the Asia bank was Guaranty’s eastern front. Of the eighteen
board members in 1920, five were Guaranty officers, including Sabin and
Stetson. Guaranty owned a much larger share of ownership than any other
entity. Given that some board members lived on the west coast and
meetings were held in New York, Guaranty clearly controlled the
operation. For example, at the 6 January 1920, weekly board meeting, held
at Guaranty’s offices, four of the eight directors present were Guaranty
officers. Sabin, as president of Asia Banking, presided. On 13 January 1920
four of the five directors present, including Stetson, were Guaranty officers.
12
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In 1920 the board received frequent reports of assets and liabilities,
including information about transactions from the Asia branches such as
acceptances held, futures contracts, and outstanding loans. The loans appear
to have been primarily to American businesses operating in China. The
board rendered decisions about the staff of the bank and significant
transactions, especially credit extension. In March 1920, the board assigned
Stetson the task of investigating whether a trust receipt line of $500,000
should be extended to a dealer in leather hides.14
Another example of Stetson’s international work was the trip he made
to Europe with Harold Stanley in mid–1920. The men spent two months
evaluating the prospects of European recovery after the war. Stetson
traveled to the defeated Germany and Austria as well as to the new nation of
Czechoslovakia. He found considerable unease and uncertainty. A perennial
optimist himself, he “did not meet any optimists in Germany.” Similarly,
Austria was “crushed,” and “there is little semblance of industrial or
productive activity.” In Czechoslovakia matters were better, but Stetson
recognized it was early in the nation’s history “and that the making of a
nation is a long process.” The contrast between Stetson’s reservations and
Stanley’s glowing reports about economic conditions in Britain, France, and
Belgium reflected the chasm between East and West that soon produced an
even greater cataclysm than the Great War.15
Stetson had his own miniature version of the Mercantile Bank crisis in
1921, thanks to his directorship in another bank that sought foreign trade.
After World War I, Guaranty obtained an interest in Italian Discount and
Trust, a New York institution founded in 1918. Stetson was made chairman
of the board of this small bank. Unfortunately for him and for depositors, in
December 1921 Italian Discount had difficulties related to the failure of a
bank in Italy. Depositors in New York made a panicked run on Italian
14
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Discount, and the police had to be called to maintain order. Guaranty’s
president, Bill Potter, told the press that at the time of the run Guaranty
had already sold its interest in Italian Discount to an Italian bank, and the
bank reopened successfully in early 1922. The incident did not indicate any
failures on Guaranty’s part, but as with the Mercantile bank fiasco it again
signaled to Stetson the risks of international banking.16
Stetson was also associated with various Guaranty operations in cotton.
Clearly, the bank was interested in taking advantage of Stetson’s Georgia
experiences with cotton production and manufacturing. Guaranty always
viewed cotton, accurately, as a global commodity. The bank was deeply
interested in facilitating trade through more efficient financing at all levels
of production and it expected officers such as Stetson to carry forward the
work. Guaranty sponsored the Textile Banking Company, for which
Stetson became a director at its founding in 1919. At his death, forty years
later, he was Textile’s chairman. Guaranty also invested in Independent
Warehouses, Inc. Stetson not only sat on its board, he became the
company’s president in the 1920s. Guaranty, and Stetson, believed the
absence of good warehouses was a major deficiency in marketing cotton.
The independent warehouse system, constructed at ports of entry and at key
places in the southern United States, enhanced the credit system by
allowing storage of cotton for market and the issue of negotiable warehouse
receipts. Textile manufacturers were unwilling to tie up their own capital in
warehouse construction and storage.17

Stetson and Harriman
Social connections and alliances with wealth were particularly
important in New York elite banking. This is a key reason why the status,
organization, and history of Guaranty were so important to Stetson’s
opportunities. Guaranty possessed both the capital and the personal
16
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connections a talented banker needed to further cultivate business
relationships. One especially revealing example of the early opportunities
presented by Guaranty’s connections was Stetson’s association with the
Barnsdall Corporation. Barnsdall, formed in 1919, included Stetson on its
initial board. The corporation originally consisted of the assets of the estate
of oil baron Theodore N. Barnsdall. It was a complex group of oil and
mining operations scattered across the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
Oil, coal, zinc, gas, and gold were all part of the Barnsdall empire. At the
end of 1919, assets of the companies exceeded $24 million. Stetson served
on Barnsdall’s executive committee from 1919 to 1921 and, then, again
from 1927 to 1930. Despite radical price shifts among its commodities, the
1920s were quite profitable, and its assets grew to more than $75 million by
1928.18
Stetson’s work with Barnsdall was most important, however, because it
was his first significant opportunity to work with W. Averell Harriman and
a cast of other important financiers. The relation between the late E. H.
Harriman, Averell’s father, and Guaranty has already been noted: before
1912, the elder Harriman and his estate bought a huge chunk of Guaranty’s
stock when Mutual Insurance was forced to divest its interest in the bank. In
1919, when Stetson went on the Barnsdall board, Averell Harriman was still
a young man, only a few years out of Yale. Thanks to a princely inheritance,
he was already one of the wealthiest men in America. Harriman’s
involvement with Barnsdall expanded through the presence of George H.
Walker, president of Harriman’s securities firm, on the Barnsdall board.
Walker became the grandfather and great-grandfather, respectively, of two
subsequent American presidents, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush.
18

Barnsdall Corporation, Annual Report (New York: Barnsdall Corporation,
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Walker and Stetson served on the Barnsdall executive committee together.
Further, Barnsdall’s president was Matthew C. Brush. Brush was also
president of Georgian Manganese, a Harriman mining company operating
in the Soviet Union. Brush would later serve with Stetson as fellow
directors of W. A. Harriman Securities, another Harriman investment
firm.19
Stetson’s work with Harriman interests increased during the 1920s, a
clear sign of Harriman’s growing trust. In addition to Barnsdall, Stetson was
on the board of W. A. Harriman & Co., an investment company largely
supported by Harriman’s substantial fortune. This venture had merged with
Morton & Co., another New York investment firm, in 1920. Morton was
partially owned by Guaranty, so Stetson went on the W. A. Harriman
board, along with Guaranty’s Harold Stanley, in order to represent
Guaranty’s interest. When Guaranty sold its stake in W. A. Harriman &
19
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Co. in 1922, this function was no longer necessary, and Stetson left the
Harriman board.20
Although many of the details of Stetson’s contributions to this complex
assortment of companies are unclear, there is no doubt that he made a very
favorable impression on Harriman, especially in the areas of investment
advice and corporate management. Stetson’s successes led to a better
documented opportunity, when Harriman jumped into the fledging airplane
business. In 1929 Harriman created an ambitious holding company,
Aviation Corporation. The corporation planned to pioneer passenger and
freight services in the United States and included some of the early leaders
of commercial flight, such as the Embry-Riddle Company, Louis Piper, and
Fairchild Aircraft Corporation. Stetson became one of Aviation’s initial
directors, as did his friends Robert Woodruff of Coca-Cola and Robert
Lehman of Lehman Brothers. Harriman handpicked Stetson for the job, a
sure demonstration of his confidence. In quick order Aviation acquired
thirty-three operating companies. This was truly the exciting, if not-soprofitable, dawn of an industry. Aviation faced hiring untested executives,
purchasing vast amounts of property, and dealing with the government over
potentially lucrative mail routes. It also had the misfortune of beginning
simultaneously with a national depression. Although one of its airlines in
1931 offered a then-speedy thirty-six hour flight from Atlanta to Los
Angeles, with only nine stops, the enormous cost of $147.15 (one-way)
deterred all but the wealthiest of travelers.21
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Stetson’s most important job with Aviation was as a member of its
finance committee. Originally, Aviation was well-off from a cash standpoint
and the board sought to invest the cash in various securities through a
subsidiary, Aviation Shares Corporation, of which Stetson was also a
director. Stetson apparently received an invitation to join the finance
committee because of his enthusiasm for the business as well as for his
financial expertise. The committee’s work involved decisions on
investments, mostly publicly traded stocks. Many small meetings were held
involving only Harriman, Robert Lehman, and Stetson. This was heady
business, but the record of those meetings shows that Stetson was often
willing to disagree with Lehman and Harriman about investment policy.
The board sometimes discussed investments in other companies for which
Stetson was a director, such as Coca-Cola.22
Eventually, shrinking revenues and not-so-unusual losses in the early
1930s took a toll on Harriman and Stetson’s hopes for Aviation. Then, a
dispute over the acquisition of North American Aviation, Eastern Air
Transport, and Sperry Gyroscope destroyed unity on the board and led to
the exit of both Harriman and Stetson. The protagonist was E. L. Cord, a
flamboyant Indiana industrialist interested in cars and airplanes. Cord, who
manufactured the famous Duesenberg Model J automobile, bought a large
amount of Aviation stock during 1932. Cord complained about
management and investment policy, prompting one board member, not
Stetson, to condemn Cord’s “pugnacity, selfishness, and…strong tendency
to the use of vulgar profanity.” In the end, Harriman recognized that Cord
had the upper hand in terms of shares and agreed to reorganize the
company in late 1932. Stetson also disliked Cord and resigned. He wrote
Harriman, “It is, of course, my purpose to fully cooperate with you in the
settlement,” and he would certainly “continue to pull for [the company’s]
permanent success.” Within months Harriman himself could not stand the
drift of affairs and exited. He apparently planned his own version of a last
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laugh on Cord, dumping his large block of Aviation stock on the market at
his departure, with a predictable effect on its price.23
Stetson also enjoyed a relationship with W. A. Harriman Securities, an
investment trust formed in the 1920s. Stetson was elected to its board and
finance committee in March 1929 and remained through the 1930s. As with
Aviation, the job was primarily to recommend investments. At one
committee meeting Stetson “spoke at length,” endorsing a purchase of
Coca-Cola common stock. Later, he was asked by the committee for a
special report on American Cyanamid. Given Stetson and his bank’s
connection with much of the publicly traded market, conflicts of interest
were likely, but as yet unpoliced by federal regulation. Particularly
significant was that the position required repeated contact with Harriman,
Matthew Brush, and George H. Walker. W. A. Harriman Securities was
decidedly an elite fund. Although possessed of over $11 million in assets in
1931, it had less than seventy-five shareholders, one of whom was Stetson’s
wife Iola.24
The adventures with Harriman, Lehman, Cord, Walker, and Brush
placed Stetson in powerful company almost from the beginning of his
Guaranty career. The value of these relationships was further enhanced in
1930 when Harriman’s core investment business, W. A. Harriman & Co.,
merged with Brown Brothers, a venerable private banking partnership that
traced its origins to 1825. Both companies focused on foreign investment,
but the merger addressed complementary needs. According to Brown
23
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partner Robert Lovett, Harriman had plenty of capital but not much
business, while Brown had plenty of business but not enough capital.
Another young banker who joined the Harriman firm in 1926 and later
became a partner at the new Brown Brothers made essentially the same
observation. He was Prescott Bush, son-in-law of George H. Walker,
Stetson’s fellow director in Barnsdall. In the early 1930s Brown Brothers,
Harriman possessed more than $55 million in resources and provided
corporate and industrial financing, commercial letters of credit, foreign
exchange, and investment advice.25
Stetson enjoyed an excellent relationship with Brown Brothers,
Harriman and its partners. In 1939 the firm’s Robert Lovett wrote
Harriman that Stetson had successfully lobbied for federal legislation,
probably with Stetson’s friend United States Senator Walter F. George of
Georgia, that allowed Harriman to continue to serve on Guaranty’s board
for another year. According to Lovett, “We are all indebted to [Stetson] and
know he would greatly appreciate some word from you.” Knight Wooley,
another partner, told Harriman that World War II inflation necessitated
higher pay and that “In this respect, we and other New York banks have
followed along the general plan established by Gene Stetson in the
Guaranty Trust Co.” By this time Stetson’s son, Eugene Jr. had taken a
position with Brown Brothers, Harriman. The links among these men
persisted. In the early 1950s, when Prescott Bush decided to run for the
United States Senate from Connecticut, Stetson was a supporter and hosted
a campaign gathering for Bush at the Stetson home.26
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Stetson and Watson
Another long-lasting relationship Stetson commenced soon after
arriving at Guaranty was with Thomas J. Watson Sr., president of the
Computing-Tabulating-Recording Company (CTR), the predecessor of
International Business Machines (IBM). In 1916 CTR was already a
Guaranty customer. In fact, Watson’s son later told the story that his father
had requested a loan of $40,000 for research and development from
Guaranty, apparently prior to Stetson’s arrival. The bank responded that
CTR already owed $4 million and that a new loan was unjustified. Watson
answered boldly: “Balance sheets reveal the past. This loan is for the
future.” Although this is the sort of debtor’s reply a banker could laugh off,
Watson, the great salesman, got the loan. His son later remarked that it was
an important break in the company’s history. One of Stetson’s first accounts
after coming to Guaranty was with Watson’s fledgling CTR, and as with
Harriman and his businesses, he did not mishandle the opportunity.27
Stetson’s typical banking practice, followed in Watson’s case, was not
to view Watson as merely a client with occasional financial needs. Instead,
he tried mightily to combine ongoing business and social relations.
Beginning in the late 1920s, when IBM was still a relatively small operation,
Stetson invited Watson to be his guest at formal dinners in New York, a
practice that continued into the 1940s. He also faithfully sent Watson
Christmas notes. Stetson encouraged Watson to use his brother, James D.
Stetson, as a securities broker. He even managed to get Watson, a New
Yorker by birth, to serve on the committee seeking to preserve Stratford,
the Virginia birthplace of Confederate General Robert E. Lee. Stetson
passed along information about local real estate to Watson and invited him
to play golf with Guaranty executives.28
27
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Watson appreciated the attentions of a fellow salesman. In 1938 he
invited Stetson and other Guaranty executives to the dedication of IBM’s
new World Center Building in Manhattan. He wrote Stetson that “had it
not been for the cooperation of the Guaranty Trust Company in [the] early
days [of IBM], we would never have been able to carry on at the rate of
development which we have enjoyed.” He remembered “very well my first
contact with [Stetson] when you came to the Guaranty, and it has been a
great satisfaction to me, personally, to note your steady progress and I
congratulate you on the well-earned recognition which you have
received.”29
The friendship thrived throughout both men’s careers. In early 1942,
Watson told Stetson that “it has always been most gratifying to do business
with you, and, as an old friend, I want you know how proud I am to be
associated with you now in your new capacity as President of the Guaranty
Trust…. [N]o man could be better qualified for the position than you are.”
The next year, Watson wrote that “among my greatest pleasures during this
past year were the many occasions on which I have had the opportunity of
being with you…. I warmly congratulate you on the outstanding manner in
which you are handling the great responsibility which rests on your
shoulders, and you know that you will always have my full cooperation.”
Similar kind words followed when Stetson was elected Guaranty chairman
in 1944. Watson, famous for his attention to friendly details, even
forwarded a message from a former member of his executive staff who met
one of Stetson’s sons while on a Navy ship. The correspondence continued
until Watson’s death in 1956.30
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Stetson may have been influential in encouraging IBM to enter into
the voting machine business. In his typical way of introducing one client to
another with the goal of both fellowship and profit, he encouraged Watson
to become, with him, a board member of the Automatic Registering
Machine Company and the Automatic Voting Machine Company, both
Guaranty clients. The companies were headquartered in Jamestown, New
York, near IBM’s headquarters. They designed and manufactured
mechanical voting devices and were early leaders in the field. Stetson also
knew about Automatic Voting Machine because Guaranty served as the
company’s transfer agent.31
Compared to many of Stetson’s other clients, Automatic Voting
Machine was small, possessing less than $2 million in assets in late 1929,
about a third of which was directly related to production facilities.
Automatic Voting Machine claimed twelve million voters used its products
in the 1944 elections. To a forward-looking banker and entrepreneur, this
signaled a largely untapped market, considering that almost fifty million
votes were cast in the presidential election that year. Watson did not act
immediately, but later his company did get into the voting machine
business.32
Ultimately, the nearly forty-year relationship between Watson and
Stetson was about more than finance. The friendship flourished based on
Stetson’s ability to see the potential in Watson’s business, Stetson’s skill in
cultivating that potential when IBM was in start-up condition, and then
Stetson’s continuing personal commitment to Watson. The strategy and
behavior reflected a pattern repeated many times during Stetson’s career.
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From Georgia to New York
Stetson’s move to New York was perfectly timed to put him in one of
the most exciting places in financial history at just the right moment. The
banking system had been rationalized with the Federal Reserve Act. Thanks
to World War I, America and New York emerged as the center of the
banking world just as Stetson landed on Wall Street. He and his bank
moved head-long into the two most dynamic areas of finance: international
banking and retail securities sales. Moreover, Stetson was fortunate enough
to be hired by an institution that was intimately linked to the center of
financial power, the Morgan firm. This allowed him immediate access to
both the super wealthy, such as Harriman, and up-and-coming
entrepreneurs such as Watson. When his bank needed propping up in the
wake of the Mercantile Bank crisis, none other than Tom Lamont and his
Morgan colleagues were there to supply both cash and optimism.
Stetson was willing and able to make the most of his chance. As
demonstrated by his relations with Harriman and Watson, from the
beginning he fully engaged clients on both a professional and social level,
providing what was perceived as very valuable assistance. This was precisely
the sort of proactive relationship banking in which Morgan and Guaranty
excelled, especially in the competitive banking climate of the 1920s. Stetson
worked hard to sell himself and Guaranty and to provide sound financial
advice that benefited a range of constituencies. However, there was no
better demonstration of Stetson’s ability and potential in his early years with
Guaranty than his leadership in one of the most remarkable public offerings
of the era, the sale and reorganization of Georgia’s Coca-Cola Company.

5
Coca-Cola for Sale
On 22 August 1919, Georgians woke up to dramatic news: “Coca-Cola
BOUGHT BY ATLANTANS,” and “Trust Company of Georgia Gets
National Drink.” It was the first time they learned that local interests were
spearheading the purchase of the Atlanta-based company. A few days after
the headlines, brokers offered more than 400,000 shares of Coca-Cola stock
to the public. The sale opened at 9 a.m. and by 3:45 that afternoon it was
oversubscribed by 140,000 shares. At the time, the multimillion dollar deal
was the largest business transaction in southern history. A southerner in
New York, Guaranty’s Gene Stetson, was one of the men who helped make
the deal happen.1
The Coca-Cola sale was a spectacular opportunity for Stetson to take
advantage of his Georgia connections and to display high level financing
and deal-making skills. The sale had even broader potential. Keeping CocaCola in Georgia was consistent with Stetson’s long-standing vision for a
New South. In fact, the vision advanced an even more dramatic ideal:
creating a truly national, publicly-traded business with headquarters and
majority ownership in his home region. Not surprisingly, there were a
number of major obstacles. The Asa Candler family, which owned CocaCola in 1919, wanted top dollar, and this was not likely to be found among
the southern buyers who were most familiar with the product. In fact, the
Candlers had tried for some years to sell without success. A second problem
was that the buyer’s financial institutional, the Trust Company of Georgia,
was merely the seventh largest bank in Atlanta, still a small city by national
standards. Atlanta counted only about 200,000 persons in 1920, less than
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Louisville, Akron, or Toledo. In essence, Atlanta’s Trust Company hoped
to buy a company ten times its size.2
For Stetson, it all started with an act of chance, a reference from an old
acquaintance. The acquaintance was A. B. Simms, a former officer at
Stetson’s Citizens National Bank in Macon. About the time Stetson
departed for New York, Simms left Macon for the greener pastures of the
Fulton National Bank in Atlanta. Fortuitously, Simms happened to be a
relative by marriage to Ernest Woodruff, the head of the Trust Company of
Georgia. Woodruff and his bank lacked the resources to obtain Coca-Cola,
so he looked to New York to raise the needed capital. Simms knew Stetson
was on the spot in Manhattan and he gave Woodruff an introduction.
Stetson and Woodruff first met in New York in the summer of 1919. That
meeting was the start of one of the most extraordinary deals in American
financial history.3

Rainmaker
In the Coca-Cola deal Stetson acted as the quintessential rainmaker, a
deal-leader who navigates a complex and indirect business journey from
concept to completion. In Stetson’s era the rainmaker ideal was among the
principal expectations of relationship banking as practiced at Guaranty and
at private banks such as J. P. Morgan. The rainmaker was an executive who
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grasped the worth of a business idea and did everything in his power to turn
it into reality. Rainmaking was not simply marketing or getting clients.
Instead, rainmaking involved commitment to the business of the client after
the initiation of the relationship. The process meant strategizing many
moves ahead, anticipating setbacks, criticism, and competition. Rainmaking
meant sharing the vision with the client and, by valuing the customer as a
friend, keeping it on track to succeed. If the customer was a cantankerous or
unlikable person, such as the Trust Company’s Ernest Woodruff, it meant
exercising courtesy and perseverance to move the project forward anyway.4
For Stetson, the rainmaking role required strong powers of persuasion
and an unwavering devotion to removing obstacles. This took sales skills to
overcome the objections of doubters and the risk-averse within the banker’s
own firm, partner banks, and sometimes the clients’ customers. At the same
time, the rainmaker had to be open-minded and flexible, so that if a
roadblock existed, the business plan could be modified. This, in turn,
required even wilier salesmanship, convincing everyone involved that a new
direction must be taken.
As Stetson and other successful relationship bankers of his period
understood it, the rainmaker was a steward of the client’s business, on par
with the client’s chief executive officer. The rainmaker considered the
interests of shareholders, employees, other bankers, consumers, and the
larger community. In Stetson’s mind, this role carried a moral and social
commitment. The idea that a banker should accept a self-imposed duty to
the public welfare seems quaint and naïve, in fact contrary to the patent
fraud, theft, and hardball tactics that marked some banking practice. But,
much as he latched onto the public aspects of the New South ideal, Stetson
believed in the broad obligations of bankers and tried to define his behavior
by this ideal. By the time Stetson came to New York, the era of the celebrity
banker and the dominant private banking firm had waned. Deals were
simply too big and too complex for the older methods of J. Pierpont
4
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Morgan. As a result, gigantic bureaucratic institutions, such as Guaranty,
were the present and the future, and Stetson’s rainmaking, including its
moral component, took place in this context.5
In 1919 Stetson possessed the key technical tools of a bankerrainmaker, but he also possessed imagination. While bankers needed to be
able to evaluate a balance sheet and income statement projections, every
extraordinary business deal took a leap of imagination. In Coca-Cola’s case,
Stetson’s appreciation for the power of the “brand” concept, the real value
of the trademark, as well as his sense of the public’s excitement about the
product, made the difference in obtaining his and Wall Street’s backing.
Coca-Cola, after all, was the first major food product to be traded on the
New York exchange, and it took insight to sense that the drink’s popularity
could be translated into financing by public sale.
The Coca-Cola buyout involved fractious relationships, an element of
family betrayal, cloak-and-dagger secrecy, and long train rides between
Atlanta and New York. The process culminated in a series of dramatic
financial transactions that made personal fortunes and put Stetson’s native
region on the financial map in a new way, setting the stage for a genuinely
southern-based business with national and international markets. It
represented the New South ideal realized.

The Coke Story
According to BusinessWeek, in 2006 Coca-Cola was the most valuable
brand in the world, worth more than $67 billion. This was billions more
than high-tech Microsoft or IBM and more than twice the value of
trademark powerhouses McDonald’s and Toyota. Stetson would probably
be pleased that even the Morgan Stanley and J. P. Morgan brands were far
behind, with each measured at less than a meager $10 billion. The CocaCola achievement represents quite a feat for a company whose core product
was developed more than one hundred years ago from mostly water, sugar,
and caffeine. The key to the drink’s success, however, lies not only in flavor,
but also in precisely the BusinessWeek measure: branding. Partly by design
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and partly by luck, Coca-Cola achieved the first global brand identity in
American sales and marketing.6
From the beginning, the drink’s marketing grabbed the consumer’s
attention. According to an early ad, Coca-Cola was not only “Delicious!”
and “Refreshing!”, it was also a “brain tonic and nerve stimulant.” Of
course, the product’s flavor and alleged health benefits were only part of the
story. The power of the drink really came from the bond that Coca-Cola
forged with consumers. Over time, this bond was cemented by numerous
branding factors, including its price, the wide availability of the product, its
uniformity, the famous logo, the shape of the company’s bottles, and the
colors of ubiquitous advertising posters.7
Even in 1919 the Coca-Cola Company was among the marvels of
business history. Its prized formula was invented by a pharmacist, John
Pemberton. Pemberton grew up in middle Georgia, was a Confederate
soldier wounded in the Civil War, and became a druggist in the river town
of Columbus, Georgia. He moved to Atlanta in 1869, where he mostly
failed as a businessman. Pemberton was a morphine addict. Despite
personal and financial tribulations, his great passion was pharmaceutical
experimentation. In the mid–1880s he developed “Pemberton’s French
Wine Coca,” a potent mixture of coca (from which cocaine is derived), kola
nuts, and grape wine. Consistent with Pemberton’s general run of bad luck,
prohibition briefly went into effect in Atlanta in 1886 and killed French
Wine Coca. The ex-Confederate went back to his laboratory and came up
with a new drink without the alcohol but retaining coca and caffeine. The
first batch was made in a three-legged brass kettle in his backyard.
Pemberton’s partner and bookkeeper, Frank Robinson, suggested the name
Coca-Cola and wrote it out in his excellent penmanship. This became the
symbol now known around the world. Predictably, given Pemberton’s track
record, first-year sales at a local Atlanta pharmacy were a less-thanimpressive fifty dollars, compared to seventy dollars in production costs. Yet
6
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Pemberton and Robinson persisted, and in 1887 Pemberton formally
trademarked the product.8
Like many other innovators, Pemberton did not realize the potential of
his concoction. Financially strapped and physically diminished, he engaged
in a complex set of deals that ultimately transferred ownership of Coca-Cola
to a more sober and businesslike Atlanta druggist, Asa Candler. Candler
incorporated the first version of a Coca-Cola Company and by 1889
claimed sole ownership of the drink and its trademark. He paid about
$2,300 for them.9
Unlike Pemberton, Candler knew how to turn a dollar. He purchased a
share in a drugstore at twenty-six and eventually established his own
operation, Asa G. Candler & Company, in 1886. After buying Coca-Cola,
Candler gave it the sort of push Pemberton could not. He hired salesmen to
cover the territory around Atlanta, pitching Coca-Cola syrup to fountain
operators. At the time, the drink was exclusively a pharmacist’s product,
mixed and sold at drugstores. Among thirsty southerners sales increased
dramatically. In 1889 Candler sold 2,171 gallons of syrup; six years later he
sold 76,244 gallons. Aggressive advertising, new plants in cities across the
nation, and increases in a determined and modern marketing force led to
even more spectacular growth.10
Bottled Coca-Cola became an important part of this success. In 1899,
Candler gave two Chattanooga lawyers, Benjamin Franklin Thomas and
Joseph Brown Whitehead, the right to produce a bottled version of CocaCola using Candler’s syrup. Thomas and Whitehead got what has to be one
of the all-time bargains in American history. They paid one dollar, and in
exchange Candler retained merely the right to cancel the agreement if the
lawyers failed to meet demand. Wrongly, as it turned out, Candler thought
bottling was a bad idea that would never appeal to consumers. More
positively, in exchange for zero investment, from the bottlers he eventually
obtained a nationwide network of Coca-Cola producers and distributors. A
8
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franchise approach, even if unintended, was the perfect solution to the
capital and administrative barriers to Coca-Cola’s rapid expansion in the
early years of the twentieth century.11
In addition to Candler’s unwitting farsightedness on bottling, the
company’s marketing energies were Herculean. Coca-Cola’s spending on
advertising grew from $85,000 in 1900 to over $1 million in 1912. This
meant, according to Mark Pendergrast, that in 1913 “the company
advertised on over one hundred million items, including thermometers,
cardboard cutouts, and metal signs (50,000 each); Japanese fans and
calendars (a million each), 2 million soda fountain trays, 10 million
matchbooks, 20 million blotters, 25 million baseball cards, and innumerable
signs made of cardboard and metal.” Put another way, Coca-Cola produced
100 million items of advertising, one for every man, woman, child, baby—
and quite a few dogs and cats—in the United States.12
Amidst the prosperity, however, there was trouble. Moralists attacked
the drink because of the drug caffeine and because of its connection to
cocaine. The alleged traces of cocaine, which was not then illegal, were
removed in 1902. New Progressive Era government regulations on foods
then produced charges that Coca-Cola was unsafe, largely because of its
caffeine. More challenging from a business standpoint was the host of
copycats offering similar names and tastes, forcing the company to defend
its increasingly valuable trademark in court. Further, federal taxes imposed
significant costs on Asa Candler, who owned almost eighty percent of the
company’s shares and received the lion’s share of escalating profits. Then,
there was the issue of family fatigue. As Candler aged, he was 68 in 1919,
the need for a successor became apparent. Candler attempted, without
overwhelming success, to groom his son Howard for the top job. He hoped
Howard would continue the business and assure its future for the rest of the
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family. Ultimately, however, the best plan seemed to be sale of the company
while providing for Howard’s continued involvement.13

Coke for Sale
Candler began to discuss a sale as early as 1908. He first approached
Samuel Brown, banker and cotton-broker from Albany, Georgia. Brown
was the father-in-law of Harold Hirsch, an Atlanta attorney who eventually
became Coca-Cola’s general counsel. Suggesting the marginal prospects,
Brown hoped to finance a deal through European banks as well as with a
public sale of stock in the South. The bargaining ceased for a time, but
resumed in 1911, when Brown and Candler agreed on a price of $8 million.
Brown, however, was unable to raise the money—a telling indication that
financing a sale in pre-World War I Georgia would be difficult, if not
impossible. In 1916 Candler, now sixty-five, displayed an even greater
willingness to unload Coca-Cola. Early that year he resigned, made his son
Howard president, and notified Brown and Hirsch that the company was
back on the block.14
This time, reflecting increasing profits and the changing state of
American finance, the price was $25 million. The new offer, however, still
aimed to keep the Candler family in control. Family members would receive
$15 million in common stock, while the remaining $10 million of shares
would be sold for $5 million in cash to the underwriters. Hirsch and Brown
hired Max Pam, a Chicago lawyer, to push the deal. Pam brought in the
New York investment bank Kuhn, Loeb & Company. This plan collapsed
when the Candlers balked at including family real estate in the sale. The
failure was soon followed by an arrangement with Bainbridge Colby, a
highly connected New York attorney who later became Woodrow Wilson’s
Secretary of State and law partner. Colby would get a fat fee of $1 million,
13
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to be paid in Coca-Cola shares, if he could make a sale. The Candlers,
however, again backed out.15
Asa Candler and his family were clearly difficult sellers, but the
relatively primitive state of southern finance was also a factor. Asa did not
help matters in late 1917, when he gave practically all of his Coca-Cola
shares to his wife and their five children. Mrs. Candler received sixty-four of
the 500 shares outstanding, while each child received sixty-nine shares. This
led to a formal restructuring in August 1918, when $25 million of new
ownership certificates were divided among the family. The effect of all this
was to fragment ownership and give the Candler children control of CocaCola. Perhaps most important, none of the family, including Howard, the
reluctant company president, felt strongly about continued Candler
ownership. Like many children of entrepreneurs, the kids preferred cash
over the trials of the founder’s business.16
Not surprisingly, personal grievances arising from Candler’s distribution influenced the likelihood of a sale. One relative not overly favored in
the 1917 gift of shares, holding a mere twenty-three shares, was Sam
Candler Dobbs, Asa’s nephew. Dobbs came to Atlanta in 1886 to work for
his uncle. During the following three decades he labored diligently to
develop the Coca-Cola sales force and advertising clout that generated the
company’s success. Although Dobbs’s salary as vice president of sales and
advertising rose to the substantial sum of $15,000 in 1919, he was smart
enough to know this was small potatoes compared to the possibilities
offered by sale. Dobbs’s twenty-three shares were worth $1.15 million if the
company was sold for $25 million. This was more than enough motivation
to become an inside force for sale, and perhaps gain a bit of revenge.17
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The Buyer
Coca-Cola’s next potential buyer represented a more substantial
likelihood of success. Ernest Woodruff (1863–1944), a steel-eyed, bare
knuckles Atlanta banker and businessman was president of the Trust
Company of Georgia, an institution that could be used in important ways to
advance the sale. The son of a Yankee mill owner, he grew up in Columbus,
Georgia, and became president of the Trust Company in 1904. Through
several important merger and underwriting deals, Woodruff dramatically
expanded his Atlanta bank. Woodruff also knew a great deal about CocaCola. He had his eye on it as early as 1907 and later said that owning the
company became his dream. He even made an offer through Samuel Brown
to buy Coca-Cola for $22 million in 1912. According to Woodruff, Brown
took the offer to Asa Candler, without disclosing its source, who declined it.
The deal provided for half payment in preferred stock or bonds, and the
remainder in cash over as much as three years, with interest. Woodruff
discussed financing this proposal with a New Orleans bank as well as with
New York’s Chase National. Candler remembered the deal a bit differently,
recalling later that the initial proposal was for $20 million, and later $22
million. It is not entirely clear why Candler refused the offer; perhaps the
mechanism of delayed payment was unattractive.18
In 1919, things would be different. After the war American finance and
its public securities markets were undergoing revolutionary change.
Moreover, not only had the Candler family’s ownership been redistributed
in 1917, eliminating Asa as the determining factor, this time Woodruff had
seen to it that there was inside support for a sale. The dissatisfied Candler
nephew, Sam Dobbs, just happened to be on the board of directors of
Woodruff’s Trust Company, worked with Woodruff on several business
deals, and was a member of the boards of other Woodruff companies.
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Woodruff described Dobbs as a “close personal friend.” Another Trust
Company board member was Harold Hirsch, Coca-Cola’s lawyer.19
Woodruff enlisted Dobbs’s support for a deal, but carefully. By the
spring of 1919 Dobbs knew Woodruff wanted to arrange a purchase and
that $25 million was a realistic offering price. He met with Woodruff in
early July to discuss the possibilities at a New York hotel. This was a cloakand-dagger move, since both men resided in Atlanta and already knew each
other well. From Woodruff’s vantage, the purpose of meeting in New York
was two-fold: it covered his interest in Coca-Cola from Atlantans and
provided support for the useful suggestion that perhaps New Yorkers were
really behind the deal. Woodruff supposedly told Dobbs that “certain
interests” would like to buy Coca-Cola and asked if he thought it could be
sold. Dobbs later said that he replied, “I thought probably it could; that I
would be willing to sell out, that I would like very much to sell out.”
Woodruff likely offered Dobbs ownership and power in the new company.
Dobbs later denied he was offered the presidency, but Stetson, in 1947,
stated Woodruff promised Dobbs the post. It is likely that Stetson was at
the New York meeting, or at least was already (July 1919) involved in
arranging financing for the sale with Woodruff and knew about its
purpose.20
Returning to Atlanta, Dobbs discussed the proposal with the Candlers,
including Asa and Howard. He did not mention the names of any of the
proposed buyers, including Woodruff: “I simply stated certain financial
interests in New York City would buy Coca-Cola and were anxious to buy
it.” Dobbs’s representations to the Candlers about the buyer were plainly
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and intentionally misleading. Why not simply tell them Woodruff and his
Trust Company were the wizards behind the curtain?21
The short answer is that Asa Candler despised Woodruff. Given
Atlanta’s modest size, it was not hard to know the reputations of leading
businessmen. Woodruff’s reputation was all-too-well-known. Woodruff’s
interests in Atlanta included coal and ice delivery, steel, street railways, and
of course, the Trust Company. Woodruff’s modus operandi did not
recommend him as an executive capable of enlisting the support and
collaboration of subordinates. Woodruff’s methods sometimes irritated and
offended fellow businessmen and the public. He was widely suspected, for
example, of entering and searching a lawyer’s office without permission. All
this goes a long way toward explaining the need for Woodruff’s indirect
offer in 1912 as well as in 1919. It certainly meant Woodruff could not
count the upright Methodist, Asa Chandler, as a friend.22
Woodruff was a big fish in Atlanta, but Atlanta was a mere minnow in
the larger pool of American finance. To be sure, Woodruff had worked with
J. P. Morgan as a Georgia agent in raising funds for World War I loans, and
his Trust Company was among the first state-chartered banks to become a
member of the Federal Reserve. But for all of his experience, bravado, and
success, he was still a provincial pip-squeak when it came to pulling off a
multimillion-dollar purchase. Woodruff was fully aware of his limitations.
Given that his bank’s entire worth was only $2 million, he knew it would
take all of its resources, plus outside assistance, to participate in a $25
million sale.23 This is where Stetson and Guaranty came in.

Selling the Candlers
Woodruff’s timing was ideal. Because of special taxes imposed during
World War I and still in force in 1919, the extremely profitable Coca-Cola
was, according to Woodruff’s later comments, “being murdered [by federal
21
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taxes] and that if there was ever a time the property could be bought it was
then.” Further, as Woodruff put it, during the summer of 1919 the
“Candlers were more disposed to sell than they had ever been, on account
of [a trademark] decision” pending in the federal courts. This lawsuit,
involving a former partner of Pemberton, J. C. Mayfield, and his knock-off
“Koke” product, raised the specter of total annihilation. Mayfield argued
that Coca-Cola had no right to trademark protection because although its
name was connected with cocaine, it did not contain any remnant of the
kola nut. In short, “Coca-Cola” was false and deceptive. A federal appeals
court had actually agreed with Mayfield, and the case was pending in the
United States Supreme Court. If the company lost, all the hard-earned
value of the prize trademark, its most important asset, would evaporate. Yet
Woodruff, a born speculator, viewed this grave risk as an opportunity for a
bargain. The offer’s mechanism was also important. In making his bid,
Woodruff decided to obtain short-term options to buy first instead of
concluding an outright purchase of the company’s shares. This would allow
time to arrange financing and establish the details of control. It would also
advance Woodruff’s desire to keep his name out of the bargaining.24
In July 1919 Woodruff pitched his plan to Stetson and probably to
Stetson’s boss, Charles Sabin. Thanks to Stetson and Sabin’s favorable
response, Guaranty jumped on the bandwagon. As a practical matter, this
meant Guaranty’s name would appear prominently in the written option
agreement, hiding Woodruff’s involvement. The option agreement, in fact,
implied only New York institutions were interested in Coca-Cola by giving
them key roles in the sale. Under the agreement, for example, a restructured
Coca-Cola Company had the right to repurchase any issued preferred stock
by deposits to the trust departments of Guaranty or Chase National Bank.
The $15 million in cash to be paid the sellers “may be deposited to the
24
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respective accounts of the Sellers at the Guaranty Trust Company of New
York.” The president of Coca-Cola, Howard Candler, agreed to deposit
with Guaranty the famous drink formula: “a written statement showing in
detail the process of manufacture of Coca-Cola, which shall include all the
ingredients and quantities thereof, and the entire procedure and method of
manufacture.” The formula would be placed in a sealed envelope and
opened only upon joint agreement of the presidents of Guaranty and Chase.
If the options were exercised, the Candlers would turn over their certificates
to Guaranty, endorsed in blank.25
Woodruff gained additional cover when he employed Robert C.
Alston, a prominent Atlanta attorney, to obtain the options in Alston’s own
name. Alston appeared to the Candlers to be acting for the “New York
interests.” According to Woodruff’s subsequent testimony, “[I]n finally
closing up the business [Alston] represented me but nobody knew it. Mr.
Candler didn’t know it.” In 1925 Asa Candler admitted as much: “I have
never had any negotiations with Mr. Woodruff in my life.” In fact, the
senior Candler was not informed that his family eagerly departed with
Coca-Cola ownership until 26 July 1919. Not one of them asked his
opinion before agreeing to the options. Because less than fifteen persons
owned the Coca-Cola Company in 1919 and because these owners were
family members anxious to sell out and become millionaires, the work of
obtaining options took only a few weeks. By the end of July, Alston had
assigned his ownership in the options to Woodruff’s Trust Company of
Georgia, which had until 28 August 1919 to exercise the option rights. If
exercised, the Candlers would receive $10 million in seven percent
cumulative non-voting preferred shares in a new Coca-Cola Company,
probably to be organized in Delaware, and $15 million in cash. The options
were apparently not sold for a separate price and required the buyers to pay
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any federal taxes up to the date of transfer. Under the options, the Candlers
could participate in management in the new company, but were not given
management rights.26
According to the later testimony of Sam Dobbs, the all-important
efforts to convince the Candlers to sell the options included not just Alston,
but also Gene Stetson. Stetson traveled to Georgia to discuss the sale with
the Candlers, thereby becoming the critical personal link between the New
York banks and the sellers. According to Dobbs, Stetson’s presence during
the negotiations gave credence to the suggestion that “New York interests”
were behind the offer. Of course, as the key suppliers of finance and
banking services, New York interests were in fact involved and necessary.
But Dobbs’s later description of the process was disingenuous at best:
“There was no purpose of any concealment, because while this negotiation
was going on Mr. Stetson, of the Guarantee [sic] Trust Company, came to
Atlanta and was in open negotiations with the stockholders of the CocaCola Company.” While in Georgia, Stetson also met with Hirsch and
Dobbs.27
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Bankers Rule
With options in hand, Woodruff, Stetson, and other New York
bankers hammered out the financing details. Who, exactly, would provide
the $25 million purchase price and how would control over the new CocaCola be distributed? There is strong evidence that these details evolved over
time. Originally, in fact, Woodruff seems to have favored selling the options
for a quick profit. But then the bankers agreed this would fail to make the
most of the opportunity. Their arrangement was formalized on 21 August
in a “Bankers’ Agreement.”28
The Bankers’ Agreement provided that the Trust Company of
Georgia, as trustee, would initially “hold and exercise for the benefit of
others” certain rights of common stock ownership of the new Coca-Cola in
the following proportions: the Trust Company of Georgia (30%); the
Newmont Corporation (10%); the Shermar Investing Corporation (30%);
and Charles Sabin, president of Guaranty Trust (30%). Individuals
connected with Bankers Trust and Chase National controlled Newmont
and Shermar. The Trust Company of Georgia would then form a new
Coca-Cola Corporation in Delaware, issue $10 million in preferred stock to
the Candlers, and issue 500,000 shares of common stock for public sale. Of
these 500,000 shares, 83,000 were reserved for the bankers, in the
proportions mentioned above, at a price of five dollars per share. The
remaining 417,000 shares would be sold through a wholesale common stock
syndicate for thirty-five dollars per share. They would then be resold at
retail for forty dollars per share. Of the $25 million purchase price, $15
million would be raised by public sale, and the remaining $10 million, in the
form of preferred shares, would be retained as a liability of the new CocaCola. The August 1919 prospectus stated that the preferred shares would be
converted to voting shares if the company failed to pay semiannual
dividends. Further, Coca-Cola had the right to retire the preferred shares
from the Candlers at par, plus required dividends. The common shares were
to be deposited with Guaranty, which would act as agent for the trustees of
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a five-year voting trust for the common shares. The trustees of the voting
trust would be Woodruff, Dobbs, and Stetson.29
The agreement was especially friendly to Woodruff, his Trust
Company of Georgia, and its shareholders. On 13 August the Trust
Company board agreed to participate up to $4.5 million in the purchase of
common shares. This was more than twice the entire assets of the bank.
The Trust Company board planned to raise most of this money by asking
its shareholders to deposit $195 for each Trust Company share they owned.
The Trust Company would then allot each shareholder Coca-Cola stock,
not to exceed one share of stock for each share held by the stockholder in
the Trust Company.30
The New York banks, including Guaranty, Chase, and Bankers Trust
and their stand-ins, Shermar and Newmont, shared in the potential
bonanza. Sabin, for the Guaranty, received 24,900 shares, Shermar received
24,900 shares, and Newmont received 8,300 shares at the five dollars per
share price. At a forty-dollar share value, this meant Guaranty, the Trust
29

“Waiver of Jury Trial and Stipulation of Facts,” 16 January 1928, 4–5, Exhibit
3, Trust Co. of Georgia v. J. T. Rose, No. 794, United States District Court for the
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“Trust Company of Georgia Minutes,” 2, 13 August 1919, Harold H. Martin
Papers, Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library, Emory University, Atlanta,
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Company of Georgia, and Shermar stood to benefit about $870,000 each
for their participation. Newmont would gain a little more than $290,000.
To put it another way, Guaranty, the Trust Company of Georgia, and
Shermar each promised to guarantee $4.5 million towards the purchase in
exchange for about $870,000 in fees, paid in common stock. Woodruff and
the New York bankers retained absolute control over the company even
after the public sale through the voting trust.31
On 21 August, the same day of the Bankers’ Agreement, the syndicate
sent a “confidential” letter to approximately 600 bankers and stockbrokers
in the United States and Canada, inviting them to purchase 417,000 shares
of common stock of the new Coca-Cola Company at $35 per share. They
were told that the current owners of the company, the Candlers, would
receive $10 million in non-voting preferred stock, while “All of the
common stock is to be deposited under a Voting Agreement which is to
continue for not less than five years.” Further details of the voting
agreement were not disclosed. The brokers could sell the shares for $40,
with a $1 commission fee. Estimates suggested that, after the sale, these
sellers profited approximately three dollars per share, plus the one-dollar
commission per share. Altogether, the proposal meant the bankers’
syndicate offered to sell voting trust certificates for almost $14.6 million to
pay off the Candlers while giving the purchasers no control over the
business.32
31

“Trust Company of Georgia Minutes,” 2, 13 August 1919, Harold H. Martin
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Despite the absolute lack of power for future shareholders, public
reaction to the sale was extraordinary. This was truly the dawning of mass
interest in shares of American companies. On 22 August, the Trust
Company wrote its shareholders:
As you are probably aware, we, associated with strong New York
interests, will share in the profits to be derived from the acquirement
of the Coca-Cola Co. assets and business. This is a large transaction,
involving a large sum of money, and we have made a large
commitment in connection with the financing of the enterprise. We
made this commitment expecting to offer to our stockholders the
privilege of participating in the profits of the enterprise on the same
basis that the Trust Co. will share in such profits, provided such
stockholders will contribute to the financing of the enterprise in
proportion to the number of shares which they hold in the Trust
Co.33
Although it was not clear from the letter that the shares would be
purchased for the bargain price of five dollars and the recipients were
warned that the money had to be received in just a few days, the response
was overwhelming. The owners of 9,233 shares of Trust Company stock,
more than ninety percent of the shares outstanding, deposited $195 for each
share with the Trust Company, a total of more than $1.8 million in less
than a week. Ernest Woodruff provided $390,000 to personally reserve two
thousand shares, although he owned less than 700 shares in the Trust
Company. Altogether, the bank raised more than $2.1 million from its
shareholders in very short order. A little over a month later, after the deal
was closed, participating shareholders received $190 plus one share of CocaCola stock for every $195 contributed. Trust Company shareholders
purchased 11,233 Coca-Cola shares, while the bank itself retained the
Cases,” 2352–53 (Wardlaw), Appeal Record, Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
Nos. 2650, 2651 (1920), United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
National Archives and Records Administration.
33
Appeal of Ernest Woodruff, 1926 WL 523 (B.T.A. 1926). The opinion in this
federal tax case lists a number of prominent Trust Company shareholders who
participated in the purchase, including W. C. Wardlaw, David Woodward, Edward
H. Inman, and W. C. Bradley.
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remaining 13,677 shares of the total of 24,900 it received from the
syndicate. This was just under five percent of the outstanding shares.34
Trust Company shareholders were not the only bargain hunters, as
other buyers eagerly snapped up the $40 shares. Record books for the sale
of 417,000 shares opened on 26 August. Orders, generally from brokers,
were taken by mail and telegram. The process closed less than seven hours
later with an over-subscription of 143,000 shares. The over-subscription
required a pro rata allotment for purchases of greater than fifty shares. A
huge number, about 250,000 shares, was sold to persons in the Atlanta area.
Some of this may have resulted from Woodruff’s promise to loan money at
six percent to anyone who would buy the stock. The Trust Company of
Georgia itself obtained 70,000 of the $35 shares, while Ernest Woodruff
may have received 20,000. Here the room for immediate profit was not as
great as with the five-dollar shares, but it was still significant. Amazingly,
the sales generated more than $15 million in one day, effectively eliminating
any earlier risk to the banking syndicate. Never before had this much
money been raised so quickly from the public for a company whose primary
asset was a trademark on a food product.35
Undoubtedly Georgia buyers acted on Coca-Cola’s reputation as well
as the rare opportunity to invest in a local business with national potential.
Also, in this era before federal securities regulation, the Atlanta Constitution
vigorously pumped up the stock. Although the newspaper first reported the
deal only a few days earlier, and conceded many details were uncertain, it
glowingly described how the Coca-Cola Company had “developed with
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marvelous rapidity,” even adding a table showing the sensational growth in
syrup gallons sold, from just over 2 million in 1906 to more than 11 million
in 1918. Declaring that demand for Coca-Cola exceeded supply, the paper
noted that based on the first seven months of sales in 1919 of 11 million
gallons, it was expected that Coca-Cola would sell 20 million gallons that
year. Adopting the role of broker and New South community booster, the
Constitution further proclaimed that Coca-Cola consumption was the
highest of any soft drink in the world. Thirsty men, women, and children
drank two hundred and eighty million glasses and bottles in July 1919.
Almost 70,000 soda fountains sold it and over 1,500 bottlers bought CocaCola syrup. The new management even expressed an interest in entering
the international field “in the near future.”36
Individual buyers outside Georgia may also have been influenced by a
short prospectus issued by the bankers. The circular contained a mixture of
accurate, misleading, and incomplete information and was sent to brokers
and published in selected newspapers. The Candler leadership appeared as
the reason for Coca-Cola’s growth, but it was rather falsely promised that
the “present management…will continue and also be interested through the
ownership of a substantial amount of the stock of the Company.” The
prospectus further claimed that “To insure for the Company a continuity of
management” a voting trust agreement had been created, with Dobbs,
Stetson, and Woodruff as trustees. Similarly, reports in the Atlanta
Constitution emphasized that the existing leadership would retain strong
influence, even claiming that there would be no change in the active
management of the company. Of course, the real purpose of the voting trust
was to concentrate power in the men and institutions that were replacing
the Candlers, not to maintain “continuity.” Further, the prospectus said
nothing about the arrangement to sell 83,000 shares at five dollars each to
syndicate members. More accurately, the prospectus held out the promise
of enormous profits, partly because cheap, easily replaced unskilled labor
could produce the drink. The clearest risk, according to the prospectus, was

36
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the pending lawsuit in which a federal appeals court had held that the CocaCola “name, labels and advertising were deceptive.” The prospectus,
however, emphasized that the United States Supreme Court had agreed to
hear Coca-Cola’s appeal and that company lawyers thought the earlier
decision was erroneous.37
On 5 September a new Coca-Cola Company was born as a Delaware
corporation. The leadership reflected the bankers’ triumph. Woodruff,
Stetson, and Dobbs, the voting trustees, selected a new fourteen-person
board that included Woodruff; Stetson; E. V. R. Thayer, president of
Chase; W. C. Bradley, a Woodruff ally from Columbus, Georgia; Thomas
K. Glenn, a Woodruff ally from Atlanta; Merrill Callaway of Guaranty; and
William D’Arcy of St. Louis, a friend of Dobbs and head of Coca-Cola’s
advertising agency. Hirsch, Dobbs, and Howard Candler also went on the
board. Others, particularly William Leggett, president of United Drug
Company of Boston; W. E. McCaw, president of Proctor & Gamble of
Cincinnati; and Robert B. Atkins, president of the Alegre Sugar Co. of
Boston, represented an increased national orientation. The new executive
37
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committee consisted of Stetson, Woodruff, Thayer, Glenn, Bradley, Dobbs,
and Howard Candler. Dobbs, the once unhappy nephew who later claimed
he did not make a deal to become president, became president.38
On 8 September, the directors authorized the issue of the 83,000 fivedollar-shares to Sabin, the Trust Company of Georgia, Shermar, and
Newmont. The next day they allowed the Trust Company, as manager of
the common stock syndicate, to purchase the remaining 417,000 shares for
$35 per share in order to then resell them to the public buyers. Four days
later, the Candlers’ 1918 beneficial trust was terminated and all of the stock
in the old company was issued to the Trust Company of Georgia. Also on
13 September, at what must have been a rather odd meeting of the board of
directors of the old Coca-Cola Company, with Asa Candler nowhere in
sight, the board authorized the sale of all its assets to the new Coca-Cola
Company.39
The final transfers of stock and cash, which took place on 13
September, were complex. They demonstrated the crucial cooperation
between the Trust Company of Georgia and Guaranty. Just over $15
million, derived from the public equity sale, was placed in the account of the
new Coca-Cola Company at Guaranty. Guaranty then “loaned” the Trust
Company of Georgia $10 million, which was then transferred to the new
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Coca-Cola, which in turn transferred to Guaranty $10 million par value
preferred stock of the new Coca-Cola Company. On the new Coca-Cola’s
instructions, Guaranty then transferred $25 million from the account of the
Delaware Coca-Cola corporation to the old Georgia Coca-Cola
corporation, consisting of $15 million in cash and $10 million in seven
percent cumulative preferred shares. Finally, 500,000 shares of common
stock certificates were deposited by the Trust Company of Georgia at
Guaranty, to be held under the terms of the voting trust.40

Making Personal Fortunes
Although notable for its size and scope, which was commented upon at
the time, the sale is especially revealing in showing how bankers at this stage
in Stetson’s career were motivated and rewarded. This included, above all,
Ernest Woodruff. Woodruff sought to generate a large profit for himself
and his bank and, even more remarkably, obtain ownership-like control
over the company without paying much for it. In the end, a small group of
shareholders of the Trust Company of Georgia acquired control of a
business ten times the size of their bank using capital primarily from a
public sale. The key was that there was a substantial public demand for
Coca-Cola shares, even when investors knew their shares would carry no
voting rights. Coca-Cola was sold for $25 million in preferred and common
stock, not one share of which carried any direct voting rights.
Instead, control of the election of directors and all other shareholder
voting rights resided in the three-man voting trust, one of whom was
Woodruff. Because two members of the voting trust constituted a majority,
Woodruff and just one other trustee could leverage the “ownership” further
to exercise power over company affairs. Nonetheless, because two members
of the voting trust would be chosen by Albert Wiggin of Chase and Charles
40
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Sabin of Guaranty, the New York banks initially acted as a counterforce to
Woodruff. Woodruff also acquired an enormous volume of shares, well
over 20,000 at discounted prices. His Trust Company of Georgia, of which
he was the largest shareholder, received more than 80,000 shares, a
significant portion of which was priced at five dollars. Altogether Woodruff
and the Trust Company acquired more than 100,000 of the 500,000
common shares.
The New Yorkers, including Stetson, also did well. The transaction
shows clearly the dynamics and incentives of investment banking as
practiced by Stetson and Guaranty immediately after World War I. Later in
the twentieth century it would be considered a conflict of interest to
structure the transaction directly in the name of bank officers, such as
Sabin, but it was accepted practice in 1919. In effect, Guaranty and Chase
did not really finance the deal—they merely acted as agents through which
preferred individuals, including bank officers, could obtain stock. Under the
Bankers’ Agreement, President Charles Sabin, and not Guaranty, was
entitled to receive 24,900 shares at five dollars a share. In 1919 Sabin was
already quite wealthy.41 It would not have been very difficult for him to pay
the entire $124,500 price for the 24,900 shares, particularly when they were
really worth about $1 million. More likely, however, the shares were sold
and distributed among the various Guaranty personnel that assisted in the
transaction, including Sabin, Stetson, Harold Stanley, and Merrill Callaway.
Also possible was that additional shares were transferred to Guaranty itself
or Guaranty shareholders, much as they were received by Woodruff’s Trust
Company of Georgia. Enormous personal benefits were obtained in
exchange for the banks’ responsibility for thirty percent of the cost of the
exercise of the options.
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Stetson was also a big winner, and not simply because he likely
acquired bargain-priced Coca-Cola stock. Although the surviving records
make it difficult to trace many details of the transaction, Stetson performed
a central role. He was brought into the deal through a mutual Georgia
acquaintance of his and Woodruff’s. He was closely involved in evaluating
Coca-Cola’s value, an essential decision that helped determine the price. He
played a pivotal role in going to Georgia to discuss the deal with the
Candlers, Dobbs, and others, where his Georgia background was used to
good effect. He negotiated with Woodruff, was elected to Coca-Cola’s
executive committee, and was named as one of the three voting trustees.
Stetson worked as the personal representative of bank president Charles
Sabin.
As a result, Stetson played the role of the rainmaking relationship
banker in several crucial areas: a significant amount of money was at stake;
the value of a corporation had to be assessed; a number of financial
institutions were involved; several high profile bankers expected to jointly
oversee the purchase of a company; the bankers expected to participate
personally in the distribution of equity; and the bankers planned to exercise
considerable direct control of the new entity into the indefinite future.
Stetson’s voting trust appointment as well as his election to the executive
committee of the new Coca-Cola board demonstrated that he was not
viewed as simply the facilitator of a one-time financing.
The actions of Chase and the Bankers Trust are less easy to ascertain,
but the outlines are clear enough. Unlike Guaranty, they did not provide
important banking services during the deal. Their role seems to have been
to connect Woodruff with outside investors who would share responsibility
for the purchase price. This action reflected a common practice among
New York banks of spreading risks and rewards among insiders. The
vehicles for their involvement seemed fuzzy. Some documents refer to them
as the Newmont Company and Shermar Investing Corporation. The
records of the Delaware Coca-Cola Company indicated that on 8
September 1919, Newmont received 8,300 shares, but that a “Sherman”
Investing Corporation received 14,900 shares and a “Muslyn” Corporation
received 10,000 shares. At the time, the persons behind “Newmont,”
“Shermar,” and “Muslyn” were mysterious to many participants. Even the
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names of the companies: Shermar and Sherman, Muslyn, Moerline, and
Murlyn, were inconsistently presented in the records. Dobbs and Howard
Candler testified in 1920 that they did not know anything about them. A
Trust Company of Georgia officer remembered vaguely that Newmont’s
offices were located in the Bankers Trust Company and that “Murlyn” and
“Sherman” were “corporations which the Chase officers—some of the
Chase officers are probably interested.”42
Not until years later, during the scandals of the Great Depression, did
it become clear that “Murlyn” and “Shermar” were two secret Canadian
companies formed by Chase president Albert Wiggin and named for his
daughters. In the late 1920s and early 1930s Wiggin used the corporations
for manipulative purposes, profiting $4 million dollars at the time of the
1929 Crash by short-selling Chase stock owned by the corporations. It is
likely that Newmont was associated in a similar way to E. V. R. Thayer of
Bankers Trust, if not used for similarly nefarious ends. After all, both
Thayer and Wiggin had official duties under the voting trust and on the
new board. Much like Woodruff and his Trust Company of Georgia, the
New York underwriters benefited personally with limited risk.43
The Candlers’ part in the sale is more easily evaluated. The price was
deemed adequate. Apparently, that was enough since family members did
not want to run the business. They seemed to believe that the option buyers
represented New York banks and could assume the risks facing the
company. More important, they believed the buyers would be able to come
up with the purchase price. They had no idea that Woodruff, Dobbs,
Hirsch, Alston, and Stetson, all Georgians, would ultimately decide to keep
the company in Atlanta. They mistakenly believed “New York financial
interests” were the real party buying the company. On the other hand, they
42
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probably did not care whether the buyer was a New Yorker or the Devil
himself. There is no evidence the Candlers bothered to inquire too deeply
about who Alston or Stetson really represented, or that Alston or Stetson
misrepresented anything. The fact that Woodruff, Stetson, and the other
bankers secretly engineered the sale is more a testament to the Chandlers’
lack of interest in the buyers, excepting their ability to pay, than it is proof
of Woodruff or anyone else’s ability to deceive.

Coca-Cola and American Finance
The Coca-Cola sale demonstrates many key characteristics of the sort
of investment and commercial banking practiced at Stetson’s Guaranty.
First, it shows that through an imaginative combination of common and
preferred equity, a coalition of Georgia and New York banks could arrange
a major purchase in the economically backward South. Almost sixty years
after the Civil War, the deal symbolized the southern transition into an
urban industrial economy led by two exemplars of the New South ideology:
Woodruff and Stetson. On the other hand, the financing showed the
continuing dependence of southern businessmen on northern capital.
Woodruff thought that both the prestige and cash of New Yorkers was
necessary for the transaction.
Second, the deal showed new investing opportunities in mass produced
and well-branded food and drink products. The early history of American
financing reeked of railroads, steel, mining, and other forms of “heavy”
industry. A sugary drink with minimal labor costs, but with a valuable
trademark, would not have been considered fit for Wall Street’s attention
just a few years earlier.
Third, the deal demonstrated how, given the generous availability of
capital for investment, bank officers could make this sort of financing with
minimum risk and maximum personal gain. The sale displayed the
enormous potential for profit from managing such sales, including the
distribution of highly discounted shares.44 It is not surprising that Guaranty
44

The bankers made considerable profits from the transactions. Woodruff’s
Trust Company of Georgia purchased 24,9000 shares at $5 per share, paying
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eagerly sought this variety of lending and securities transaction after World
War I, especially when the bank could put one of its officers, such as
Stetson, in a continuing role as a voting trustee and director of the new
corporation. Moreover, in an era before federal securities regulation,
personal profit taking could be accomplished without disclosure to the
purchasers of common stock.
Finally, the transaction showed that investors, while eager to find
profitable bargains, depended heavily on personal connections, meaning
trust, to make investment decisions. The public prospectus for the new
Coca-Cola was brief and incomplete, particularly as to plans for the
management of the company. Yet investors, many of them Georgia
residents, swarmed to the opportunity. In turn, this reflected the huge
demand for equity, not debt as in previous decades, as a form of investment,
a fact that would radically alter Wall Street during the “Roaring
Twenties.”45
Because of its importance to American business history, the Coke deal
is also worth considering from the comparative perspective of the twentyfirst century, when corporate sales of enormous size and scope are common.
In any age, complex transactions with difficult parties take patience,

Sabin acquired the same number of shares (24,900) at $5 and thus experienced the
same benefits. Thayer and Bankers Trust, through Newmont, acquired 8,300 of the
$5 shares for $42,500. The value of these shares at $40 was $332,000, for a gain of
just over $290,000, an amount equivalent to about $3.4 million in 2007 dollars.
Chase Wiggin, using the Shermar and Murlyn companies, acquired 24,900 shares at
$5, which had a market value at the IPO of $871,500, for a gain of more than $10.4
million in 2007 dollars. Altogether, the bankers’ gain from the $5 shares was more
than $3.3 million, or just under $35 million in 2007 dollars. Values in 2007 dollars
calculated using Consumer Price Index, “Six Ways to Compare the Relative Value
of a U.S. Dollar Amount,” http://measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare.
45
On the idea that American finance was revolutionized by the exploding public
interest in equity investment after World War I, see Jonathan B. Baskin and Paul J.
Miranti Jr., A History of Corporate Finance (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1997) 127–209.
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creativity, and teamwork. The Coca-Cola sale had more than its share of
complexity. In fact, the deal involved such substantial challenges that it may
not have happened later in the century.
First, later buyouts generally had more substantial tangible or “hard”
assets, such as real estate. In fact, in the nineteenth century the normal
preference of bankers was also for hard assets. They are easier to liquidate
when a company fails. But the Coca-Cola sale took place in an era when J.
P. Morgan and others had already challenged this way of thinking, at least
in such traditional high capital industries as steel.46 The Coke deal expanded
and applied this new approach to valuation to the trademark of a beverage
company, where tangible assets were less than about one tenth of the
purchase price. All of the key players, Woodruff, Stetson, Sabin, the
Candlers, and, ultimately, the public investors, agreed that hard assets were
only a small part of the true value of Coca-Cola.
A second threat was the unsettled state of Coca-Cola’s key intangible
asset. The lack of an ironclad trademark in a market where many upstart
companies were using a version of the Coca-Cola name threatened the
company’s existence. Practically any entrepreneur could try to pass off
something called Coke-Ola, Coo-EE-Ola, Koca-Nola, Toca-Cola or even
Pepsi-Cola, and many did.47 Before the sale a federal court of appeals had
ruled that the Coca-Cola trademark was deceptive, and thus invalid, partly
because it implied ingredients that in fact were no longer in the drink. The
case was pending in the United States Supreme Court at the moment of the
public offering, and was not resolved in the company’s favor until 1920.

46

According to Charles R. Morris, in the late 1890s “Conservative practice
focused on book value: a business was worth no more than its actual investment in
plant, inventory, and other hard assets plus undistributed profits, less liabilities and
depreciation. Carnegie Steel’s book value in 1898 was $49 million, while the coke
company’s was $5 million. Anything more, in the traditional view, was just ‘water,’
an unsecured claim on future success. Normal valuation rules, however, were just
then being turned upside down by Pierpont Morgan’s highly capitalized deals in
steel and other industries.” Carnegie reorganized his steel and coke business for
$320 million, more than five times book value. Charles R. Morris, The Tycoons: How
Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, Jay Gould, and J.P. Morgan Invented the
American Supereconomy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005) 209–15.
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This uncertainty would have been crippling later in the twentieth century
because the company’s value depended almost entirely on the trademark.
A third challenge was that the government price control on sugar, half
the ingredients in the syrup, was about to expire. By 1919, the Coca-Cola
Company was the largest single user of granulated cane sugar in the world,
consuming nearly 100 million pounds a year. For years prior to the sale,
sugar had been cheap, selling for about four to six cents per pound. During
World War I, shortages and demand produced price controls by the
American government, sustaining relatively low prices during the crisis. Of
course sugar was likely to go higher when price controls were lifted. In fact,
the price controls were eliminated in the fall of 1919, the very moment of
the sale. Sugar prices soared in 1920, briefly rising to near twenty-three
cents per pound.48
The fourth problem came from Coca-Cola’s best customers, the
bottlers, who provided forty percent of the company’s revenue.
Unfortunately for the company, in 1919 the bottlers thought they had a
perpetual contract to purchase syrup, the original 1899 contract obtained by
Thomas and Whitehead from Asa Candler, at the rate of about one dollar
per gallon. This kind of fixed cost arrangement, without of course a similar
prospect of fixed expenses for Coca-Cola to produce the syrup, made
continued profitability suspect. Among the earliest tasks of new
management was a more favorable relationship with the bottlers.49
At a later date any of these items could have stopped the transaction
from moving forward. A final modern barrier to the deal is that federal
securities regulation in effect after the early 1930s would have made the sale
even less likely. The securities laws subject underwriters to potential
liability for any material misrepresentations or omissions contained in a
registration statement or prospectus. As a consequence, the insiders’
benefits and other details about Coca-Cola would have been revealed to the
government and the public. The prospectus issued by the underwriters in
48

Allen, Secret Formula, 104–105. On Cuban sugar prices, see Muriel McAvoy,
Sugar Baron: Manuel Rionda and the Fortunes of Pre-Castro Cuba (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2003) 69–70, 75 (3–4 cents, 1909–1914); 101–102 (5–6
cents, 1917); 148 (12–13 cents, 1919); 152 (22.57 cents, 1920).
49
Allen, Secret Formula, 109, 113–14.
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1919, as well as the patent boosterism of the Atlanta press, would fail the
requirements of current law.

Stetson and the Sale
Stetson was certainly aware of the challenges. Yet one factor he never
seemed to worry about was his own relative youth and inexperience. His
confidence depended in large part on the strong backing of Guaranty’s
president, Charles Sabin. This says a great deal about the mutual trust Sabin
and Stetson had developed over the previous three years. In addition, with
Stetson’s direct knowledge of both Atlanta and New York, he was in the
best position of any individual to make critical judgments about the persons
involved. As a native Georgian, Stetson was very familiar with Coca-Cola’s
history: Coca-Cola advertised in his university annual in the 1890s and he
had the Macon bottler on his bank’s board by 1908.
The specific financial devices used in the sale demanded creativity, and
Stetson played a key role in formulating the details. Part of the financing for
the $25 million sale was $10 million preferred stock with a dividend of
seven percent to the Candler sellers. In 1919 this would not have been
viewed as a disguised form of debt or, for that matter, anything particularly
novel. The preferred shares, in fact, became voting shares if semi-annual
dividends were not paid to the Candlers. Similarly, Andrew Carnegie had
received more than $300 million in gold bonds and $93 million in preferred
shares in payment for his Carnegie Company in 1901, almost twenty years
earlier.50
Indeed, the most novel aspects of the Coca-Cola deal were its reliance
on public equity, the southern locale of the issuer, and the nature of the
issuer’s product: a sugary soft drink. The hardest part of the sale was the
$15 million of cash that would have to be raised immediately to pay the
seller. How could that be obtained? The answer was provided by Stetson
and the others’ faith in the overwhelming power of the public offering. The

50
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great equity boom of the 1920s was underway, and Stetson, Guaranty, and
Coca-Cola were among its frontrunners.51
Ernest Woodruff has to be given credit for the essential form of the
deal. Woodruff’s idea, not Stetson or the New Yorkers’, was to phase the
acquisition, starting first with a short-term option to buy the company
rather than an outright purchase. Most likely Woodruff also developed the
idea to structure the sale with common and preferred shares, since this is
essentially what he proposed in 1912, seven years earlier, although then
Woodruff contemplated the explicit use of debt, not preferred shares, as
part of the payment. The $25 million valuation was also already determined
by Woodruff and the Candlers even before the New York bankers got
involved. This was the amount of the ownership certificates issued to the
Candler family in 1918. Yet Woodruff wanted options without the Candler
family knowing that he and his Trust Company were the buyers. Woodruff
knew his Atlanta reputation and he perceived the Candlers would refuse to
sell him their company. Perhaps most importantly, he knew that only New
York could help him come up with the needed backing, and that meant a
New York-supported public offering.
Stetson’s greatest contribution was that he saw Woodruff had both the
creativity and the chutzpah necessary to pull off the deal. At their first
crucial meeting, he could have rejected the scheme as just false ambition by
a small-time provincial, and the idea would have died. From the beginning
Stetson understood the spectacular depth of the opportunity. He believed
$25 million reflected an accurate value, despite the lack of “hard” assets.
Stetson’s willingness to take on the project shows why as early as 1919 he
was a successful rainmaker and relationship banker.
For Stetson, the Coca-Cola sale was a big break that promised well for
his Guaranty career. The deal required solid salesmanship and being able to
maneuver among a host of different interests and personalities, each looking
to maximize its profit. These personalities included some of the biggest
names in twentieth century American business: Sabin, Thayer, Wiggin, and
Ernest Woodruff. Further, the deal necessitated balancing the interest of his
bank and his boss, Sabin, with the need to create a new business that would
51
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have a good chance of success. Finally, it required imagination in the use of
public equity. After the sale Stetson was positioned to convert the goodwill
he developed into a long-term banking relationship with Coca-Cola.

6
Relationship Banking at Coca-Cola
The Coca-Cola sale began a relationship between Stetson, the new
company, and its leaders that lasted for the rest of Stetson’s life. His work
included sitting on the Coca-Cola board; helping with marketing strategies;
arranging financing; restructuring operations; finding acquisition
opportunities; and assisting in carrying all of these tasks to completion. It
also included a long and close social and business friendship with Bob
Woodruff, president of Coca-Cola during most of this time. The experience
exemplified Stetson’s vision of relationship banking and fulfilled his role as
rainmaker for Guaranty.
Rainmaking is a key part of relationship banking, which to Stetson
meant “Know your Customer.” In relationship banking, some transactions
might actually be unprofitable. But by getting a high percentage of the
customer’s business, a relationship-oriented bank in Stetson’s day was in the
best position to make the more profitable transactions, which included
secured loans and the underwriting of new securities. If a bank sought and
attracted well-managed companies in growing industries and built the
appropriate relationships, it secured its own growth. Also, relationship
banking partially insulated a bank from competition. The inside
information about client needs and history inherent in a continuing bankclient relationship gave a bank a semi-monopoly position. When a client
had a choice between taking a commercial bank loan or issuing a bond, the
final choice may have had more to do with which banker the client trusted
to support it in the event of real need. The customer perceived that the
banker put the interest of the customer’s business first and was not just
trying to profit from a deal.1
1

For current views on relationship banking, see Howard Bodenhorn, “ShortTerm Loans and Long-Term Relationships: Relationship Lending In Early
America,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 35 (August 2003): 485–505; Michael
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“Transactional banking” was and is an ideological counterpoint to
relationship banking. Transactional banking means the bank does not know
the customer or its needs and desires—it just wants to make a small amount
from each of the customer’s transactions. As a result, the bank values the
customer according to how many transactions it makes. In transactional
banking, a business that clears a lot of checks is a valuable client. In practice,
of course, financial institutions have used and continue to use both
transactional and relational strategies simultaneously. The precise mix and
emphasis depends on strategic orientation. For Stetson’s Guaranty the
strategic orientation was always relationship banking.2
Good relationship banking, especially the sort practiced by Stetson and
his colleagues at Guaranty, required both broad and specialized knowledge.
To “know your customer” was to understand his business just about as well
as he did, including on such diverse issues as trademarks, competition,
market share, devotion to product development, and promotional style. A
relationship banker identified with the customer beyond his financial needs,
and in many cases became a social friend as well. The closeness of the
relationship could easily lead to abuse otherwise known as “crony
capitalism.” So the relationship banker was given an extra and difficult task,

T. Jacobs, Short-Term America: The Causes and Cures of Our Business Myopia (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1991); and Dwight S. Ritter, Relationship Banking:
Cross-Selling the Bank’s Products and Services to Meet Your Customer’s Every Need
(Chicago and Cambridge: Bankers Publishing Co., Probus Publishing Co., 1993).
For views contemporary to Stetson, see L. H. Langston and Nathan R. Whitney,
Banking Practice: A Textbook for Colleges and Schools of Business Administration (New
York: Ronald Press Co., 1921); and William H. Kniffin, American Banking Practice
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1921).
2
Regarding lending, two recent writers noted that under a transactional
approach “the credit decision and lending terms are based primarily on hard
quantitative information that is gathered around the time that the credit is
originated. Each transaction stands on its own…. In contrast, [with relationship
lending] the credit decision and lending terms are based in significant part on
soft…information that is gathered through continuous contact over time with the
firm, its owners, and other members of the local community.” Allen N. Berger and
Gregory F. Udell, “The Future of Relationship Lending,” in The Future of Banking,
ed. Benton E. Gup (Westport CT and London: Quorum Books, 2003) 212.
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to draw a line between the interest of the bank and client while at the same
time identifying with both.
When Stetson arrived in New York, relationship banking was the
standard, not only at Guaranty, but also among its peer banks on Wall
Street. Stetson and Guaranty operated in an environment in which
institutions sought deep and continuing relationships with good corporate
customers. A practical reason for this strategy was that at least through the
1930s financial market stability could not be taken for granted. In fact,
instability was the norm. Even the best-managed company could find itself
in a severe cash or capital crunch, and having an ongoing bank relationship
would be necessary for survival. Pierpont Morgan, a master of relationship
banking, appointed his banks, including Guaranty, as guardians of their
clients’ interests. As a result, banking clients benefited from relationships in
which bankers met their day-to-day needs and supported them even when
an objective evaluation of their financial condition might indicate that they
did not deserve it.3
From the bankers’ perspective another reason for relationship banking
was the tradition and preeminence of railroad financing. Railroads needed
massive amounts of capital. Yet, in the late nineteenth century, the United
States lacked the institutional infrastructure to provide capital to these
enterprises. Railroad entrepreneurs turned to Europe, where banking firms
like the Rothschilds and Barings were able to tap large investors. A
distinction developed between the financial firms that could commit their
own capital and pools of capital to an undertaking and firms that contracted
to distribute new securities to their network of investors. The emergence of
the middlemen, who bought securities for resale, marked the beginning of
investment banking in the United States. The emerging investment banks
formed a clear hierarchy, with the top firms determined by access to capital,
a reputation for reliability, and an ability to control security prices. Most
relevantly, the structure of this investment business evolved around personal
relationships. Those at the top of the investment bank pecking order
3

See Samuel L. Hayes III, A. Michael Spence, and David Van Praag Marks,
Competition in the Investment Banking Industry (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1983) 11–12; Samuel L. Hayes III and Philip Hubbard, Investment Banking: A
Tale of Three Cities (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1990) 92–93.
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brought in the business and took a cut off the top for organizing syndicates.
However, other firms participated in a transaction to make sure the
securities would be well distributed.4
This basic structure was still in place at the time Stetson came to New
York. A 1913 Congressional investigation, the famous Pujo hearings into
the “money trust,” found that the officers and directors of the top banks,
Morgan, First National, National City, Bankers Trust, and Guaranty Trust,
had wide influence in American business and finance. Officers at those five
banks “had 118 directorships in 34 banks and trust companies, 30
directorships in 10 insurance companies, 105 directorships in 32
transportation companies, 63 directorships in 24 producing and trading
companies, and 25 directorships in 12 utility companies. Thus, this group of
men held 341 directorships in 112 companies having aggregate resources of
$22 billion.” To Congress, the extent of concentration suggested a threat to
both political democracy and economic competition. Of course, the fact
that a favored few had “insider” access was a rather intentional product of
the values and practice of relationship banking. One connection led
invariably to another.5
This last fact helps demonstrate why, above all other reasons, Stetson
practiced the relationship banking model at Guaranty. The process was
successful. Far from being an outdated concept, from Stetson’s vantage it
was supremely modern. Relationship banking was the key that unlocked the
most profitable aspects of the banking business, from commercial lending to
investment securities. As a result, it is not surprising that after the CocaCola deal Stetson was eager to apply the principles of relationship banking
to the reorganized Atlanta soft drink company.

4
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Coca-Cola and Its Bottlers
In 1919 the Coca-Cola Company did not produce the final drink so
desired by its customers. Rather, the company produced syrup, which was
sold to fountain operators and bottlers for mixing and then resale to the
consumer. The fates of the company and the bottlers had been linked ever
since Asa Candler’s 1899 bottling deal with Chattanooga lawyers Thomas
and Whitehead. That relationship was made more complicated by the fact
that the businesses developed by Thomas and Whitehead chose to operate
as “parent bottlers,” middlemen who in turn franchised bottling rights to
the “actual” bottlers, local businesses that actually put Coca-Cola into
bottles for consumption.6
Given the money and power at stake, the dealings between Coca-Cola,
the “parent bottlers,” and the “actual bottlers” have frequently been tense.
One side could not easily dispose of the other. As recently as the late 1990s,
when Coke imposed a 7.6% price hike on bottlers, the bottlers’ complaints
resulted in the ouster of Coca-Cola’s CEO. The first serious dispute
between the company and the bottlers dates to the period just after
Woodruff, Stetson, and the New York banks won control over Coca-Cola. 7
Stetson, Woodruff, and the new owners eventually decided to wage a
determined battle against the parent bottlers. On the surface, the contest
was over the contract price the company could charge the parent bottlers
for syrup and whether the parent bottlers had exclusive rights to the
bottling franchises. The real fight, however, was about the company’s
future: would it remain a coalition of producers or would decisive control of
the drink be returned to the company that created it?
6

On the bottlers from 1899 to 1919, see Frederick Allen III, Secret Formula: How
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Initially, the Woodruff-led bankers had indicated that they wanted a
friendly relationship with the bottlers. On 8 August 1919, just before the
public offering, Harold Hirsch wrote George Hunter, president of the
Coca-Cola Bottling Company, assuring him that “Powerful interests are
taking this proposition [that is, Coca-Cola] over and will make a big go of it,
but the bottlers’ rights will be absolutely protected without any thought of
annulling the same.” Sam Dobbs told Hunter, “There is a deal on whereby
certain interests in The Coca-Cola Company will retire and a
reorganization will take place, and some stock will be offered to the public.”
He asked Hunter to send Stetson a list of all the bottling plants, noting,
“Some of them may want to invest in some of the new stock issue.”8
Yet, in the weeks after the sale, Woodruff complained loudly about the
need to raise the per gallon price of syrup because of rapidly increasing
sugar prices. The parent bottlers agreed to price increases in the latter half
of 1919 and again in early 1920. These “temporary” price changes expired
on 1 March 1920. As it turned out, Woodruff was not satisfied with
marginally higher syrup prices. He and eventually most of the rest of the
new ownership believed the maneuvering over syrup prices presented a
golden opportunity to get rid of the parent bottling companies, the
Whitehead and Thomas entities that had obtained the original bottling
rights from Asa Candler. In Woodruff’s view, the parent bottling companies
were superfluous middlemen and he wanted to deal only with the actual
bottlers.9

8
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Sugar Water and a Contract
As a result, in 1920 Coca-Cola coupled its request for increases in
syrup prices with the threat that the 1899 parent bottler’s contract was
terminable at the will of the company. The parent bottlers called the bluff
by refusing to accept further price increases unless the company agreed
their contract was perpetual. Coca-Cola responded by attempting to
terminate the parent bottlers’ contract and contacted the actual bottlers,
indicating its desire to supply them directly with syrup. On 13 April 1920,
the parent bottlers sued the company in Fulton County Superior Court in
Atlanta, asking the court to hold that their contract with Coca-Cola was
perpetual.10
In the lawsuit the parent bottlers blamed the recent sale to Woodruff
and the New Yorkers for the company’s attempt to terminate the contract.
They played anti-banker and anti-Wall Street sentiment for all it was
worth. The company’s decision to declare the bottling contract an at-will
agreement was portrayed as part of a nefarious plot driven by Wall Street
greed: “Sometime in the summer of 1919 a number of promoters and high
financiers conceived a scheme to get control of the stock of [the]
corporation.” This “scheme” was facilitated by World War I inflation and
“the willingness of the people to speculate in stocks of corporations
capitalized on the basis of earning power,” and not hard assets. Yet the new
corporation never really received anything for its stock sales:
As a part of said scheme and manipulation, the promoters and
high financiers, after being underwritten by some syndicate,
projected said common stock into Wall Street, and proceeded by
divers schemes, well known only to the trade manipulators, to lure
the public to so invest in said stock that they finally succeeded in
unloading it at a profit to themselves and the various trust companies
and others connected with the manipulations to the extent of
approximately five million dollars, this profit costing them nothing
but their cleverness and energy in putting the matter over.

10
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Consistent with this “manipulation,” the attempt to cut off the parent
bottlers resulted from “cupidity and avarice and greed.” Not surprisingly,
Coca-Cola responded that all this was nonsense, or more to the point, was
irrelevant to the narrow legal question of whether the company could
terminate the 1899 contract between the company and the parent bottlers.11
The legal proceedings in Fulton County proved to be a mere
preliminary to the main bout. Nonetheless, they showed the weaknesses and
strengths of both sides’ positions. Initially, the Georgia court issued a
restraining order prohibiting the company from terminating the bottlers’
contract while the case was pending. The order also required the company
to sell syrup to the actual bottlers at $1.72 a gallon with a seven and onehalf cents “rebate” to the parent bottling companies.12
In April and May 1920 the Fulton court listened to a great deal of
testimony relating to the contract from Sam Dobbs, Asa Candler, W. C.
Wardlaw, Harold Hirsch, and Howard Candler. Judge John T. Pendleton
was not overly impressed by the parent bottlers’ argument and informally
indicated he did not think the contract was perpetual. Perhaps he was
influenced by the fact that Robert Alston, the Coca-Cola attorney who had
helped obtain options from the Candlers, brought Judge Pendleton’s
grandson, a young lawyer in Alston’s firm, to the courtroom. At any rate,
fearing defeat, Jack Spalding and John Sibley, attorneys for the parent
bottlers, decided to try again in a friendlier forum. They voluntarily
dismissed their Georgia case on 31 May. Coca-Cola, sensing victory,
promptly terminated the parent bottlers’ contract and told its employees to
stop shipping them syrup. The next day, however, the bottlers filed another
suit, again based on the alleged perpetual nature of the 1899 contract, but
this time in federal district court in Delaware, the domicile of the new
11
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Coca-Cola Company. The bottlers also obtained a restraining order
requiring the company to renew syrup shipments.13
The bottlers’ shift in venue paid off. On 8 November 1920, the
Delaware court issued a ruling in their favor. After concluding that CocaCola had the power to sell exclusive bottling rights, the court tried to
“search for the meaning of the contract from the agreement as a whole,
from all its terms considered together, remembering that in a contract of
many provisions the entire intention of the parties is not expressed by any
single stipulation.” In simple terms, the parent bottlers argued they
acquired exclusive property rights to bottle Coca-Cola in 1899. The
company argued, conversely, that the old agreement conveyed a right only
to purchase syrup at its will. To federal Judge Hugh Morris, the most
telling part of the contract was a provision in which the company expressly
granted the bottlers “the sole and exclusive right to use the name Coca-Cola
and all the trade-marks and designs for labels now owned and controlled
by” the company. He concluded this language meant Coca-Cola
permanently sold the use of its trademarks, the company’s most valuable
asset, to the bottlers. The court issued an injunction prohibiting any
interruption in the flow of syrup, hoping this would be enough to force the
parties to work out a new agreement on their own. Naturally, given the
high stakes, an appeal by Coca-Cola followed.14
By this time, however, it was becoming increasingly clear that a forced
result was in no one’s best interest. A critical factor pushing the parties to
compromise was the improving sugar market. In March 1920, at the
beginning of the fight with the bottlers, the new leadership at Coca-Cola
had become seriously concerned about reduced sugar supplies and rising
prices. It purchased a literal boatload of expensive sugar from the American
Sugar Refining Company, using Guaranty to help finance the deal. Stetson
was directly involved in the purchase and its financing. He had represented

13
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Guaranty for several years in Cuban sugar financing and he knew something
about both sugar markets and Coca-Cola.15
The purchase, however, turned out to be an almost cataclysmic
mistake. Soon after the transaction, the price of sugar plummeted. CocaCola was now stuck with an enormous stock of high-cost sugar that would
take months to consume. A Coca-Cola historian revealed the deep scars of
the decision to buy twenty-cents sugar and its subsequent fall to six cents
per pound by describing it as “the most serious situation ever faced by the
company.” Fresh multi-million dollar loans from Guaranty were necessary,
and the new owners engaged in some fancy accounting to prop up the share
price, which nevertheless fell dramatically. The sugar storm brewed
throughout the legal contest between the bottlers and the company. The
good news was that by early 1921, during the appeal of the Delaware
decision, the stock of expensive sugar rapidly waned and sugar prices
remained low. Under these conditions it became easier to imagine a
compromise that would serve the interests of both the bankers and the
bottlers.16
Internal upheaval within Coca-Cola also helped drive a new strategy.
During 1920, the first full year of operation under the bankers, important
disputes erupted between Dobbs, Woodruff, and the New Yorkers. For
Dobbs and Woodruff, the short-lived honeymoon was over. Dobbs wanted
more money spent on advertising. He complained to board member
William D’Arcy that “Woodruff and Thayer are tearing their hair, howling
for retrenchment, because they want dividends. Stetson in a way is agreeing
with them and of course Bradley always plays up to the New York crowd.”
15
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Dobbs considered Woodruff “ignorant” about advertising. He was also at
odds with Stetson. At one board meeting “Stetson expressed himself as
feeling that I had exceeded my authority in [an advertising] matter, but that
he was unwilling to take the position that in doing so I had acted unwisely
and asked for more facts and figures. That, of course, is always Stetson’s
attitude.”17
In his roles as banker, voting trustee, and director Stetson believed he
should be actively involved in the operation of the company, and this
included marketing. Years later, Stetson stated that directors had an
obligation to require a company’s advertising executive to “state his plan—
where he is going, where he is to start and what he is to do in between, with
plenty of convincing reasons for everything.” This is precisely what he
demanded from D’Arcy and Dobbs in 1920.18
The negative feelings went beyond advertising. Dobbs complained that
Woodruff had a bad habit of “butting-in and interfering” in just about
everything, criticizing the company’s attorneys without foundation, and
getting mad when others disagreed with him. Allegedly, Woodruff called an
all-night meeting where there was an effort to “emasculate and supercede
the Board of Directors” led by Woodruff, Stetson, Thayer, and Bradley.
Dobbs believed some of the other directors were also failures: McCaw of
Procter and Gamble, for example, “will do whatever Stetson tells him to.”
The fission extended to the bottler conflict. Dobbs, unlike Woodruff, did
not want to eliminate the parent bottlers, perhaps because of his longer
history with them. Yet the locus of power was clearly with Woodruff and
the New Yorkers. Board meetings were frequently held at Guaranty in New
York. Dobbs became so disenchanted that he resigned the presidency in
October 1920, in the midst of the bottler lawsuit.19
17
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From the parent bottlers’ perspective, compromise was always the
preferred option. They simply could not survive without the company’s
trademark. They knew their strongest course was to create incentives for
both Coca-Cola and the actual bottlers. In December 1920, H. H. Ward,
one of the attorneys for the bottling companies, wrote co-counsel John
Sibley stating, “we should not, except upon the most weighty grounds, fail
to reach an agreement with our adversaries.” Negotiations gained a renewed
hopefulness toward the end of the year after a very favorable ruling in the
Koke case by the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed the validity
of Coca-Cola’s trademark. No less a jurist that Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
confirmed the company’s rights. In January 1921 Charles Rainwater, for the
parent bottlers, and W. C. Bradley, for Coca-Cola, exchanged detailed
settlement proposals addressing syrup prices. Nonetheless, the bottlers
rejected it as unfair. Fed up with Coca-Cola, they now began to argue that a
legal attack on the validity of the voting trust, the entire governing structure
of Coca-Cola, was in order. In the spring of 1921 negotiations seemed to
have reached a standstill, deadlocking over the syrup price and division of
profits.20

Stetson and Settlement
Lawyers for both sides presented oral arguments to the federal Court
of Appeals in Philadelphia in May 1921. While preparing their brief, the
bottlers had worried about the high quality of the company’s arguments. To
counter, they leaned heavily on District Judge Morris’s reasoning about the
contract, particularly his belief in the unfairness of allowing Coca-Cola to
terminate the contract after the bottlers completed the hard work of
building a national network. In the end, the bottlers did not need to be
overly concerned. Their attorney, John Sibley, recorded his impression of
the oral arguments:
Coca-Cola Executive Committee,” 15 December 1919; 19 January, 15 March 1920
(from court records), Mark Pendergrast Papers.
20
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The indications are certainly very favorable. In fact the Court
almost affirmed Judge Morris’s opinion from the bench. The
presiding justice indicated in emphatic language that he did not see
how it would be possible to construe the Whitehead and Thomas
contract of 1899 in such a way that would give to the Coca-Cola
Company the right to terminate it whenever they pleased so as to
practically destroy the investment of the bottlers. At the close of the
hearing and after court had adjourned, the presiding judge called the
attorneys up before the bar and suggested to them that there was
really nothing between the parties except the question of price and as
the attorneys on both sides had indicated that the one side would be
willing to pay and the other would be willing to accept a price which
would be reasonably profitable to the manufacturer, they ought to try
to get together and agree on a price and save the damage to the
business which would result from the continuance of the litigation.
With this encouragement, Harold Hirsch, for the company, approached
Sibley and indicated he would recommend the appointment of a special
master to determine a price. Hirsch also suggested that because of their past
failures, Bradley and Rainwater should resign as negotiators. Sibley believed
this prospect was “far better” than any court judgment.21
Hirsch returned to Atlanta to a special meeting of the Coca-Cola board
of directors. After more than a year of trying to eliminate the parent
bottlers by litigation, it was now clear that the courts were not going to go
along with the plan. Candler, Bradley, D’Arcy, Dobbs, Hirsch, Woodruff,
Stetson, and Callaway listened to a presentation by Hirsch and resolved to
seek a settlement. The board appointed Stetson, D’Arcy, and Candler to
negotiate with the bottlers. It is clear, however, that Stetson was the point

21
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man. D’Arcy and Candler had little influence with either Woodruff or the
New York bankers.22
Stetson promptly informed the bottlers that “he has been vested with
full authority on behalf of The Coca-Cola Company to negotiate with the
authorized representatives of the bottling companies,” and that he desired a
conference as soon as possible. The bottlers appointed attorney Jack
Spalding to lead their side. In Atlantic City, Stetson, Candler, and Hirsch
appeared for the company, while Spalding, Hunter, Rainwater, and
Crawford Johnson represented the bottlers. Over the next two weeks the
men worked out a settlement, and Stetson and Spalding signed a formal
memorandum of agreement on 18 June 1921.23
The memorandum resolved all key differences. Stetson and Spalding
agreed the contractual relationship would be “perpetual.” They set a price
per gallon for sales from the company to the parent bottlers, to be adjusted
depending the costs of sugar and syrup production. Future sugar prices
would be calculated on a quarterly basis, a practical choice despite the fact
that such prices fluctuated daily. A price for syrup sold by the parent
bottlers to the actual bottlers was also established. Any future disputes
would be arbitrated, and the company got the all-important right to
prosecute and defend all trademark matters without prejudice to the
bottlers.24
On 6 July 1921, the companies signed a new contract incorporating the
terms worked out by Stetson and Spalding. Three weeks later, at a meeting
of Coca-Cola Company directors, the board officially “ratified and
affirmed” the contract. The bottler litigation ended in early October, after
22
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formal judicial recognition of the settlement. In the end, both sides achieved
positive results: the bottlers got the coveted perpetual contract and the
company received a mechanism for profitable syrup sales.25
The bottler litigation of 1920–1921 represents more than an ordinary
moment of turmoil in the history of Coca-Cola. Viewed from the
perspective of the financial reordering that preceded it, it sheds light on the
character of banker control as well as Stetson’s understanding of
relationship banking.
First, the lawsuit demonstrated the aggressiveness of the new board
members, especially Woodruff, Stetson, Bradley, and Thayer, all of whom
were bankers, not soft drink executives. Often meeting in Guaranty’s
building near Wall Street, far from the company’s operations in Georgia,
they took the bold step of trying to throw off the shackles of the old bottler
contract. Unlike Dobbs, they lacked personal reasons for keeping the 1899
agreement in effect. Yet their decision proved to be a mistake. The federal
court repudiated the “at will” legal argument of the company, giving the
bottlers a perpetual contract on a silver platter.
Second, the litigation was simply one of several examples of the
inexperience of the banker-dominated board in dealing with beverage
issues. The decision to buy high-priced sugar nearly destroyed the
company. Competitors, not saddled with expensive sugar, undersold CocaCola. The stock price of the company fell below thirty dollars in 1920, a
loss of more than a fourth of the 1919 sale price.
Third, and more happily for the company, the bottler settlement
showed that the new leadership was willing to learn from its mistakes and
could change directions. When it became clear that they could not force out
the bottling companies, compromise on good terms was possible. That is
what Stetson and Spalding accomplished in 1921.26
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Finally, Stetson’s role as relationship banker during this period was
critical. He acted as a Coca-Cola executive and as a Guaranty vice president.
In fact, the history of Coca-Cola between 1919 and 1921 was fundamentally
shaped by Stetson’s leadership. Because of the power inherent in the voting
trust, of which Stetson was one of three trustees, the line between bank and
client blurred. During the bottler contest Stetson participated actively in
executive committee meetings, as voting trustee, and as key settlement
negotiator. In fact, John Sibley, Coca-Cola’s lawyer, later stated that
Stetson deserved credit as the “architect” of the settlement.27 Stetson also
contributed to the discussion of advertising costs. He addressed such
management details as eliminating the bottlers, maximizing the syrup price,
propping up the stock value, and increasing dividends. Perhaps his
negotiator role is most telling. The leading Atlantans on the board,
Woodruff, Howard Candler, and Bradley, were not good candidates for
achieving compromise with the bottlers, so that job was left to Stetson, the
only person with the proper knowledge and personality. He moved
compromise forward in a way that advanced the interests of both Guaranty
and Coca-Cola.

Ernest Woodruff’s Coup
Not long after the bottler settlement Ernest Woodruff was ready to
once again test his skill at a corporate takeover. This time he wanted to get
rid of the New York bankers, presumably including Stetson. The clock was
running on the five-year voting trust, and it was unclear who would control
the company when the voting trust expired. Woodruff apparently decided
that he and his fellow Atlantans would make a bid for power, in the process
usurping any claims of the New York banks. Perhaps the move could have
been predicted by Woodruff’s indelicate past. But the new ambition
reflected much higher levels of gall than the secretive purchase from the
Candlers.
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The vehicle for Woodruff’s planned coup was Coca-Cola International
Corporation (“International”), a company he organized on 18 November
1922—without telling his now former New York allies. Woodruff
established International as a holding company with 251,000 shares of
common stock. The choice of 251,000 signaled its purpose—to take over
the functions of the voting trust. Of course, 251,000 is just over half of
500,000, the number of outstanding Coca-Cola common shares controlled
by the voting trust. Woodruff’s plan was to exchange one share of
International stock for every share of Coca-Cola stock surrendered to
International. Thus, control of International would mean control of CocaCola. Woodruff and W. C. Bradley, a Woodruff supporter in International,
already held huge chunks of Coca-Cola stock, certainly more than 100,000
shares. In fact, it is likely that Woodruff and the Trust Company of Georgia
together held more than 125,000 shares, or about enough to leverage
control of International. Through rather simple manipulation, Woodruff
and his friends could dominate Coca-Cola, a company they could not have
obtained without Stetson, Guaranty, and the other New York banks.
Woodruff was not a mathematician, but he knew enough about numbers to
know what constituted a majority.28
Woodruff’s maneuvering proceeded under the same shroud of secrecy
that helped the Candler sale. Accordingly, the scheme would be revealed
only when it would be too late for any opposition. That dramatic moment
came just over a week after the formation of International, in November
1922. At a Coca-Cola board meeting Woodruff abruptly announced that
International controlled a majority of Coca-Cola stock. Of course, this did
not in itself alter legal control of the company. Under the voting trust, no
shares of common stock, including those exchanged for International
shares, currently carried any voting rights. However, at the time of the
announcement the voting trustees were Woodruff, Stetson, and Woodruff
ally W. C. Bradley. With the announcement, it was clear that the leaders of
International, Bradley and Woodruff, controlled the voting trust and CocaCola and would be able to maintain this control. Ironically, Guaranty’s
President Sabin had appointed Bradley to replace Dobbs as the third trustee
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when Dobbs resigned from the company. As a result, the ultimate leverage
in Woodruff’s grand leveraging plan was in the form of one person,
Bradley. The deeper effect of International was to settle the question of
what would happen after the dissolution of the voting trust. Woodruff, and
not the New Yorkers, would determine Coca-Cola’s future.29
What was the connection between Stetson and International? CocaCola historian Frederick Allen has written that the New Yorkers were
stunned by the creation of International and that Stetson objected to it.
Stetson did not consider himself a “friend” of Ernest Woodruff. Also, he did
not agree with some of Woodruff’s ideas about Coca-Cola. Yet if
Woodruff’s goal was to eliminate all New York influence, including Stetson
and Guaranty, he failed. Stetson and his bank stayed well-connected to
Coca-Cola long after 1922. In the early 1950s Stetson owned more than
14,000 shares of Coca-Cola stock, a large number of which were
International shares. He began to acquire these in the early 1920s, when
International was created. More important, he was reelected to the CocaCola board for more than thirty-five years after Woodruff’s bid for control.
He was even a member of the Coca-Cola International board in the early
1930s. Unlike other the Manhattan bankers who helped fund the Candler
sale, who were quickly replaced in the 1920s, he remained on the CocaCola executive committee for decades. It seems Stetson was able to convey
to Woodruff that he and his bank—in the early 1920s a major Coca-Cola
creditor—could continue to be useful.30
Ultimately, Woodruff’s scheme seems more a betrayal of the support
the New York banks gave him in 1919 than a grand takeover. It is doubtful
Wall Street would have expected to continue the same leadership role after
the expiration of the voting trust. On the other hand, it is unlikely the New
Yorkers would have given Woodruff control over the company on quite the
same terms. Stetson himself later gave credit where it was due, describing
Ernest Woodruff as the best “trader” he ever knew. Between 1919 and 1922
Woodruff certainly made several good trades in becoming Coca-Cola’s
master.
29
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The most long-lasting result of International, which eventually
provided much of the reason for Stetson’s staying power, was Ernest
Woodruff’s desire to get his son Robert a good job. Robert W. Woodruff
was among the shareholders and directors of the newly-created
International. Already more than thirty years old in 1922, the younger
Woodruff did not enter Coca-Cola history until the board meeting in which
Ernest announced the creation of International. Within a few months, in
March 1923, Ernest managed Robert’s election as Coca-Cola’s president.
Robert turned out to be a much better business associate for Stetson than
Ernest. He was a hard worker and had a penchant for the company’s
greatest needs, salesmanship and promotion, issues Stetson also understood
well. Bob Woodruff and Stetson quickly developed a close business and
personal relationship that lasted for more than four decades.
Stetson’s first years with Coca-Cola provided substantial challenges in
relationship banking. There was the decision to purchase sugar during a
time of escalating prices, an enormous mistake. There was disagreement
among directors as to many policies, including advertising. Of course there
was the long legal battle between the company and the bottlers, with an
eventual settlement of the dispute. In late 1922, Ernest Woodruff’s CocaCola International rearranged the sources of power in the company, leading
to Bob Woodruff’s presidency. Considered together, Stetson’s experiences
with Coca-Cola provide an apt illustration of the meaning of relationship
banking in the years after World War I.

7
Coca-Cola in the Long Run
After the turmoil of the early 1920s, the key force shaping the relationship
between Stetson and both Woodruffs was Coca-Cola’s enormous success.
Profits grew steadily, allowing the company to pay off its debts and
restructure equity. Just before the Depression, Coca-Cola reached a
valuation of more than $240 million, an amazing ten-fold increase from
1919. In 1930, retail sales exceeded $170 million. This produced a net profit
of $13.5 million, compared to net profits of just over $2 million in the early
1920s. Altogether, by the end of the 1920s the product was sold at more
than 120,000 fountains and by more than 800,000 bottler retailers. CocaCola boasted that its name appeared on more than 400 million pages of
magazine and newspaper ads. The cost of producing this liquid gold,
however, stayed small, thanks in part to the cheap labor described in the
1919 sale. As the company explained, “If for any reason [the workers]
should leave their jobs there would be no difficulty in securing a competent
force to start work the next morning.”1
All this profit naturally had a dramatic effect on the company’s
financial structure. During 1925 and 1926 Coca-Cola retired all of the $10
million in preferred stock issued in 1919, effectively ending the Candler
connection. In 1927 the company paid a 100 percent dividend on common
stock and doubled the number of outstanding shares to 1,000,000. In 1928
it issued as a dividend another 1,000,000 shares, designated Class A
cumulative common, to existing shareholders. Of course, International, as
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holder of 251,000 of the common shares of Coca-Cola in 1922, also
benefited from these distributions.2
The implications for the fortunate owners of the original 500,000
shares of common issued in 1919 were clear. Such shares, sold for $40 to
the public investors, had a market value in 1930 of $200 each. The Class A
shares issued in 1928 were worth about $100 each. Put another way, shares
offered at $40 per share, multiplied by subsequent stock distributions, had a
market value of $300 in 1930—a seven and one-half times return in nine
years. As if this was not enough, between 1919 and 1931 Coca-Cola paid
more than $91 million in dividends. Obviously the banking needs of such a
company were considerably different than they had been ten years earlier,
when a slump in sales, the sugar crisis, the trademark lawsuit, and the
bottler litigation portended disaster. The old issues of managing debt and
declining share prices disappeared in a caffeine-laced flood of profits.3
Stetson realized growth did not end a bankers’ job, but actually created
new relationship opportunities. These included assistance in issuing and
registering the kinds of securities just mentioned, a service performed by
Guaranty. Stetson also thought that perhaps the company’s greatest
banking need in the 1920s was merger, a long-time favorite of American
financial advisors. The “bigger is better” approach was long taken by J. P.
Morgan & Co. toward Guaranty itself and by Guaranty towards its other
clients. In any era, the call for “consolidation” and “rationalizing” an
industry went to the core of the banker’s need to minimize uncertainty and
risk. Of course, there was the added benefit of requiring expensive banking
services. Indeed, by the 1920s, the push for mergers was among the leading
characteristics of Wall Street banking, and Stetson’s Guaranty devoted
enormous resources to facilitate corporate reorganizations.4
2
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Stetson and Another Thirst Quencher
In 1925 Stetson, at the urging of company president P. D. Saylor,
became a director of Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., a competitor of CocaCola. One can assume that Canada Dry was fully aware of Stetson’s CocaCola record, because his formal connection to the Georgia company had
been public information for years. Perhaps with thoughts of merger in the
background, no one seemed too concerned about a conflict of interest.
Indeed, the relationship was likely viewed as an asset by Canada Dry. What
banker would be in a better position to provide advice and assistance,
including consolidation, regarding a soft drink business? After his election
to the board a business publication reported that the “notable banker”
Stetson was “at home in [Canada Dry’s] management group.”5
The broader history of Canada Dry helps illuminate Stetson’s work.
Canada Dry, like Coca-Cola, originally emerged from the work of a
pharmacist, John L. McLaughlin. McLaughlin began manufacturing
carbonated water in Toronto, Ontario, in 1890. After several years
experimenting with soft drinks, he marketed “McLaughlin’s Pale Dry
Ginger Ale,” which was soon renamed “Canada Dry Pale Dry Ginger Ale.”
McLaughlin obtained a Canadian trademark in 1907 and sold his drink
widely in eastern and western Canada. In 1919 Canada Dry moved into the
American market, initially to New York City. The company constructed a
plant there in 1922 and organized a local corporate subsidiary. P. D. Saylor
became the American general manager.6
Like Coca-Cola, Canada Dry boomed during Prohibition. Saylor and
J. M. Mathes purchased McLaughlin’s company in the 1920s and reformed
it as Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., a publicly-traded corporation. Terrific
success, despite a pricey twenty-five cents for a twelve-ounce bottle,
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followed an ambitious national marketing campaign. Large new plants
appeared in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles.7
Unlike Coca-Cola, however, the Depression hurt Canada Dry. One
reason was the lack of local bottlers. The low number of bottlers raised
transportation costs and reduced profits. Sales dropped dramatically, forcing
a new and dramatically different strategy. With the end of Prohibition in
1933, that strategy was alcohol. Key brands—including Johnny Walker
Scotch Whiskey—became part of the Canada Dry beverage family. As for
soft drinks, the aggressive solution to the problem of high transportation
costs, which meant shipping product from New York to Miami or from
Chicago to Houston, was to build plants in as many markets as possible.
This evolved into a full-blown franchise system that resembled Coca-Cola’s,
in which the company supplied syrup and technical advice while a local
franchisee owned the bottling facility and produced soft drinks. In 1934,
Canada Dry’s national market share of soft drinks was a respectable six
million cases of the 168 million total.8
As a director from 1925 to 1941 Stetson participated in practically all
of these developments. Only five men served on Canada Dry’s board for the
entire period—Stetson, Saylor, Mathes, Carleton Palmer, and Charles S.
Munson. Palmer was president of E. R. Squibb & Son, while Munson was
an officer with the Air Reduction Company, Inc., which supplied carbon
dioxide for carbonated drinks. In addition to Stetson’s board work,
Guaranty was transfer agent for Canada Dry’s common and preferred stock
into the 1950s. Between 1928 and 1941 Canada Dry’s assets increased
dramatically, from $7.7 million to $16.1 million.9
Perhaps Stetson’s greatest contribution was his role in a 1934
management shake-up, a move caused by the shrinking sales and profits of
the early 1930s. Stetson suggested that the company hire Roy W. Moore, at
the time a Guaranty vice president. Not by coincidence, Moore had been
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brought to Guaranty by Stetson in 1929 and was a Macon, Georgia, native
as well as related to Stetson through Stetson’s first wife. Moore graduated
from Harvard Law School in 1915 and practiced law in Macon during the
1920s. Like Stetson, Moore made a mark as a young man in the smaller
Georgia city and was lured to New York. On Stetson’s recommendation, he
became president of Canada Dry in 1935 and remained head of the
company for the next twenty-five years. Moore expanded the number of
company-owned and franchised bottling plants. He also cut the price of
smaller bottles of Canada Dry products to five cents in order to compete
with Coca-Cola and other drinks. Moore even took the company into the
cola market.10
Because of his connection to both soft drink makers, Stetson was in an
ideal position to promote a merger between Canada Dry and Coca-Cola.
The merger idea seems to have come from Stetson’s old partner in the
Coca-Cola acquisition, Ernest Woodruff. The senior Woodruff came to
New York in May 1928 to discuss it with Stetson. A possible financial
vehicle for the deal was the sale to Canada Dry of the ever useful Coca-Cola
International stock. Ernest’s discussions were apparently begun without the
consent or knowledge of his son Robert, Coca-Cola’s president. Ernest
simply informed Stetson that he and other International holders wanted to
sell out.11
10

Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., Annual Report (New York: Canada Dry Ginger
Ale, Inc., 1934); Moore, Down From Canada, 5–6; Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc.,
Annual Report (New York: Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 1946). Stetson’s presence
continued in the person of his son, Eugene W. Stetson Jr., initially of Brown
Brothers, Harriman & Co., and later of the Chemical Bank. He became a director
in 1942 and remained on the board in the 1950s. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc.
Annual Report (1941); Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., Annual Report (New York:
Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 1950). After a series of ownership changes, in 1986
Cadbury Schweppes acquired Canada Dry. See Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc.,
Annual Report (1934); Moore, Down From Canada, 5–6; Canada Dry Ginger Ale,
Inc., Annual Report (1946); “Canada Dry: Tales of a Wonderful Beverage,”
http://www.brandspeoplelove.com/csab/
Brands/CanadaDry/CanadaDry/tabid/151/Default.aspx.
11
Allen, Secret Formula, 184–87; “Canada Dry,” Fortune (June 1937); “Up From
Pop,” Fortune (August 1931), Mark Pendergrast Papers; New York Times, 10 May
1928.

Coca-Cola in the Long Run

153

Stetson’s position was complex and conflicting, a reflection of the
typical kinds of overlapping interests common in relationship banking. He
was Coca-Cola’s banker at Guaranty, an International shareholder, a
member of Coca-Cola’s seven-person executive committee, a Canada Dry
board member, an advisor to Ernest Woodruff, and a friend of Bob
Woodruff. Stetson was also a director in the Air Reduction Company,
which supplied the carbonation for both Coca-Cola and Canada Dry
products. Although the exact terms of the proposed merger are unclear,
Fortune magazine reported in 1937 that “Coca-Cola [was] cast in what now
seems the fantastic role of mergee,” presumably because of the proposed
sale of International to Canada Dry. In the end, the deal collapsed for
unknown reasons. Perhaps the idea of Coca-Cola producing more than
Coca-Cola was ahead of its time. Or, perhaps Ernest Woodruff was as
difficult a seller as the Candlers. More important for Stetson, the
discussions showed that his network of ties throughout the business world
had unique value.12

Life with Ernest Woodruff
After the failed Canada Dry merger Stetson’s work with Ernest
Woodruff persisted intermittently until Woodruff’s death in 1944. They
discussed financial matters, especially securities transactions. Woodruff
occasionally brought his son Robert into the dialogue. In 1931, for example,
Ernest informed Bob that “Mr. Potter [of Guaranty] and Mr. Stetson are to
let me know tomorrow what amount they will advance on the underwriting”
of an issue of Class A Coca-Cola stock. Several months later, Ernest told
Robert that he had “an interesting talk” with Stetson about the stock. In
June 1931, Stetson sent Ernest a sketch of proposed financing:
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Call 25% of the present outstanding Class “A” $5. stock at
$52.50 per share. This would aggregate in dollars, approximately
$10,000,000.
Give the privilege of exchange to the old stockholder, one new
$2. Class “B” stock callable at 50; have the new Class “B” stock
convertible at any time within twelve months into five year 4%
debentures.
The Coca Cola Company should retain the privilege of giving
extension of conversion privilege into debentures. Have debentures
callable at option of company on ninety days notice at par. Make
debentures mature July 1, 1936.
After transaction is completed, make a survey of same and repeat
according to the then prevailing conditions. Under this plan, there is
no need for any underwriting fee to be paid.

This particular proposal was not adopted. Nonetheless, it demonstrated the
detailed nature of Stetson’s continuing work with the senior Woodruff, as
well as Stetson’s efforts to stress the financial benefits of continuing the
banking relationship with Guaranty.13
Ernest was never an easy client. His imperious manner and suspicious
nature were on full display in another matter involving Coca-Cola stock.
Woodruff aggressively sought to keep company stock among friends by
controlling certain sales. In March 1933, in the midst of the Depression, a
major shareholder was in rather desperate straits, with loans on shares.
Woodruff told Tom Glenn, a Coca-Cola board member, that he did not
want the shareholder to part with the stock at its current low price, and that
the Trust Company of Georgia would cover the shareholder’s loans.
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Woodruff perceived that a large stock sale at low prices might undermine
the confidence of stockholders.14
Woodruff later learned that just after his conversation with Stetson,
Charles Hayden, a New York banker who served on the Coca-Cola board,
placed orders to buy the distressed investor’s 600 shares. Woodruff saw this
as a betrayal by Stetson and Hayden, who supposedly were working
together to take advantage of the low price for the valuable stock and then
saddle his Trust Company with the loan. Woodruff lamented, “God help
the fellow who places any dependence in a cock-eyed man,” referring to
Stetson. He concluded: “This, and other events, make me rather inclined to
favor substituting [two bottling company owners] for Stetson’s as well as
Hayden’s place” on the board of directors. The validity of Woodruff’s
suspicions of unfair dealing is open to question, but the episode shows his
generally low opinion of others and his lingering desire to rid the company
of northeastern financiers.15
Another incident demonstrates Woodruff’s sometimes tense
relationship with Stetson. As a conscientious relationship banker, Stetson
always sent Christmas greetings to valued clients. They were short notes,
mailed under a Guaranty letterhead. On 19 December 1932, he addressed
such a card to Ernest Woodruff. At the time, of course, the nation was in
the depths of a massive economic downturn, waiting anxiously to see what
the newly-elected Franklin Roosevelt would do about the crisis. Stetson’s
flowery note tried to reflect the uncertainty of the moment:
One of the lessons which adversity is forcing upon us is the
essential unity of the human family…. We discover daily the
interrelationships that exist between us all as individuals and peoples.
If, out of this depression, we gain greater understanding, greater
sympathy, a greater sense of responsibility for each other, and a truer
sense of the values in life and all of its associations, we shall not have
suffered in vain…. In this Christmas season above all other we should
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feel that greater unity of spirit which brings us closer in joy or
sorrow, in gain or loss.16
Woodruff, a crusty veteran of countless downturns, corporate warfare,
foreclosures, and financial scraps, could not take such sugary stuff from
Wall Street without a rejoinder: “You know, Gene, there is an old saying—
‘Charity begins at home,’ and I am just wondering if, while you are
broadcasting such Christian doctrine among your friends, you have
overlooked using your good offices with your associates at 140 Broadway, in
an effort to instill in them ‘greater understanding, greater sympathy, a
greater sense of responsibility for each other, and a truer sense of values in
life and all of its associations,’ and I might add, a greater sympathy for their
patrons during these strenuous times.” To keep it friendly, Woodruff added
that Stetson should not take his comments “too seriously,” and to
remember “the pleasure that it has afforded me to value you among my best
and most loyal friends.” He signed it, “Sincerely yours, (still out of debt).”17
The exchange captured the mixture of favorable and unfavorable
feelings that characterized the twenty-five-year-long relationship between
Stetson and Ernest Woodruff. On the favorable side, Stetson and Guaranty
helped Woodruff and his Trust Company of Georgia acquire Coca-Cola in
1919. He continued to act as a financial advisor, banker, and director to the
company for the remainder of Ernest’s life. He respected the elder
Woodruff. On the other hand, Ernest was not interested in being captive to
a Wall Street bank or anyone else. He was never hesitant to forcefully make
that point to Stetson. In 1944, Stetson dutifully attended Ernest’s funeral,
probably with a sense of relief.

Bob Woodruff and White Motor Company
Stetson’s relationship with Bob Woodruff was always friendlier. There
is no evidence the younger Woodruff knew Stetson before Stetson’s
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participation in the 1919 sale, although they both grew up in Georgia.
Stetson was about eight years older than Bob. The two developed a close
business relationship during the mid–1920s, when they began to discuss
business and personal matters frequently. Other than Averell Harriman, no
client had a greater impact on Stetson’s career than Bob Woodruff.
A compelling example of Stetson’s early relationship with the younger
Woodruff was his brief connection with Cleveland’s White Mo-tor
Company. At Bob’s behest, Stetson was elected to the White board in 1929
and served there for just over two years. Guaranty had been the lender of
choice for White during the 1920s, so there was already an existing
connection between Stetson’s bank and the truck maker. More important
was that Woodruff needed a financial ally on the board in troubled times.18
Woodruff commenced his relationship with White in 1912, when he
purchased White trucks for his father’s Atlantic Ice & Coal Company. At
the time, the younger Woodruff was in his early twenties. Walter White,
the company president, was impressed with the deal and offered Woodruff a
sales job. The opportunity deeply affected Woodruff’s life. Coming at the
end of an extended period of youthful drifting, Bob Woodruff emerged as a
hero salesman, convincing both businessmen and the government to buy
White trucks in large numbers. One of the most important of those
businessmen was his father, who eventually purchased thousands for CocaCola. In 1921 Woodruff became a vice president and director with White.
In turn, in 1923 Walter White was elected to the Coca-Cola board. Four
years later, Woodruff joined White’s executive committee. Another
significant personality in the White orbit in the 1920s was Bill Potter,
Charles Sabin’s successor as president of Guaranty. Potter acquired a large
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plantation in South Georgia and White and Woodruff also bought large
tracts of land there.19
In September 1929 Walter White died in an automobile accident, and
the board selected Woodruff as his replacement. Of course, Woodruff was
already quite occupied as president of Coca-Cola, but he was induced to
take the second presidency by loyalty to the company, his substantial stock
holdings in White, and fond memories of his suddenly departed friend.
After a year of seemingly constant travel between Cleveland and Atlanta, in
late 1930 Woodruff helped choose Aston Bean as White’s new president.
Woodruff remained on the board, but only briefly.20
During this period of interrupted leadership and deepening economic
depression Woodruff called Stetson to White’s board. The 1920s had been
good years for the company. In 1928 and 1929 profits neared $3 million,
with assets at more than $50 million. Then, a slide began. In 1930 White
lost $83,000; the next year it lost almost $3 million. Assets tumbled to $43
million. Woodruff and the board, including Stetson, believed a sale was in
order. White had substantial cash left from the heady 1920s, making it an
attractive buy. The board consummated a deal in 1932 to sell White to
Studebaker, to be held as a subsidiary, for cash, notes, and Studebaker
shares. Within a few months Stetson was no longer on White’s board, and
Woodruff had agreed to only a minor and temporary role as a Studebaker
director. This may have been a somewhat happy end to Stetson’s
automotive career, but unfortunately it was not.21
Studebaker quickly developed serious debt problems. It fell into
receivership, a legal process that allows a debtor’s property to be
reorganized without bankruptcy and liquidation, not long after the White
19
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purchase, leaving White’s future uncertain. In July 1933, Studebaker’s
president, Albert Erskine, who had been a strong advocate for the purchase,
shot himself. White managed to stay afloat during these bad times, although
it lost about $11 million between 1932 and 1935. In 1935, Studebaker sold
White. Although continuing to struggle for a time, the company lost
another million dollars between 1936 and 1939; White revived with the
help of wartime government contracts in the early 1940s. Sales in 1935 of
about $20 million grew to more than $156 million in 1943. The
transformation led to a new and profitable era in the company’s history.22
Stetson’s role as a White board member between 1929 and 1932 was
primarily to serve as advisor to Woodruff and facilitator of the Studebaker
sale. When Walter White died, the key shareholders of White Motor were
Woodruff, White’s heirs, and Walter Teagle of Rockefeller’s Standard Oil.
None of these persons was interested in carrying on White’s legacy.
Woodruff continued to trust Stetson and relied on his counsel under such
stressful circumstances. From Stetson’s perspective, this was a relatively
unusual situation. The ethic of relationship banking generally required that
he make long-term commitments to a business when he agreed to serve as a
director. The fact that he did not in this instance signals that the
arrangement was essentially a personal service to Woodruff—the real longterm relationship.
Like many other similar situations in the Depression, such favors often
came with a legal price tag. For Stetson, this included being sued along with
Woodruff and other White directors and officers in both Ohio and New
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York courts by disgruntled White shareholders. Both suits complained
about the sale to Studebaker, particularly the distribution of some 15,000
shares of White treasury stock to White’s executive employees as part of the
deal. They also argued that the sale was unduly favorable to Studebaker.
Because Stetson and Teagle were directors on the committee that decided
who would get the key employee stock, they were named as defendants.23
For Stetson’s banking career, the most important aspect of the lawsuits
was that they revealed the depth of the relationship between Stetson and
Woodruff. Prior to the sale Stetson was consulted on numerous details by
Woodruff, Teagle, and Erskine. Stetson made it clear to Woodruff that he
would not make any decision on the 15,000 shares of treasury stock without
Woodruff’s approval. The correspondence between the men during the sale
negotiations indicated a trust and friendship that went beyond business
transactions. Woodruff, for example, wished Stetson a Merry Christmas
with friendly sarcasm: “You’ve got it coming to you. I’ll bend the elbow
once or twice to you.” Woodruff offered condolences to Stetson when
Charles Sabin died in the fall of 1933. Stetson, for his part, did not hesitate
to ask Woodruff to schedule Coca-Cola directors’ meetings around his trips
to Georgia.24
The White lawsuits tested this relationship. On 20 October 1933,
Woodruff, Stetson, their lawyers, and Teagle’s lawyers met in Washington
for several hours to discuss the plaintiffs’ claims. Stetson was outspoken on a
number of legal and strategic issues. By this time a confirmed Morganite, he
complained about the Depression-era politics of the case: “I think this is a
strike suit and I think the fact that I am connected with [Guaranty] and the
fact that Teagle is Teagle and Standard Oil—they are going to make a
desperate play to put us in a hole.” In response to the plaintiffs’ complaints
about the sale’s fairness, Stetson remarked that some of his colleagues at
Guaranty thought that it was Studebaker, not White, that did not get much
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from it. This philosophy supported his conclusion that White’s
shareholders were the primary beneficiaries of the sale and should not be
complaining.25
The meeting showed how well Stetson and Woodruff worked
together. Woodruff said that Studebaker’s Erskine had initiated merger
discussions. He traveled to New York with Erskine to discuss the possibility
with Stetson as soon as the offer was on the table. Stetson had agreed “it
would be a fine financial and commercial thing for both companies.”
Woodruff and a few others, including Stetson, came up with the terms of
exchange. Before the sale, all of the directors agreed it was a very good
arrangement for White.26
Stetson detailed the reasons for Studebaker’s receivership. Erskine,
contrary to his and others’ advice, made the mistake of thinking he would
get control of White’s cash. Erskine promised his company’s creditors that
with White’s money assets he could pay them in full. Although Studebaker
obtained almost all of White’s shares, the complete integration of the
companies fell through, and thus Studebaker did not absorb White’s cash.
Stetson stated that Guaranty was ready to extend an $8 million letter of
credit to Studebaker if other banks agreed. Without the support of its other
bankers, however, Studebaker was forced into the receivership by its
creditors, and Erskine’s self-inflicted demise followed.27
At the 20 October 1933 meeting, in front of the lawyers and White
executives, Stetson asked Woodruff if despite this unfortunate turn, White
shareholders were better off with the receivership. Woodruff agreed they
were. Woodruff put the problem in the context of the Depression: “When
we consider that everything anybody has done with good intention in the
last four years has turned out wrong, this has not turned out too damned
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wrong. I would say that every one’s intention in this deal was just as wide
open and above board as it is possible for a man’s intention to be.”28
When the discussion turned to the part of the deal that gave a stock
bonus to White’s executive employees, the lawyers pressed Woodruff. He
needed to come up with an explanation as to why the bonus was not really a
bribe to get the support of the officers for the sale. Woodruff had difficulty
confronting the question, so Stetson jumped in with a flattering defense.
Stetson argued the officers’ support was unnecessary. Only the large
shareholders, like Woodruff and Teagle and the directors, mattered. More
bluntly, according to Stetson, “Woodruff can’t answer the question like I
can because in asking him the question he can’t say that his influence
controlled the entire board as against the influence of all the other officers.”
Stetson’s bottom line was that “Mr. Woodruff made the deal and my
confidence in him would always make me feel that any deal that he made
would be an attractive deal because I have been associated with him for 10
or 12 years in another company and that has always been my experience.” In
approving the sale, the rest of White’s leadership had apparently agreed.29
Spurred by Stetson’s remarks, Woodruff defended the bonus as
representative of his management style. Back “in 1925 the people [his father
Ernest, primarily] who ran Coca-Cola paid me very little and we had a good
year. [At a Coca-Cola board meeting] Gene [Stetson] got up and said: We
want to pay Mr. Woodruff $25,000 in appreciation, etc., and pass[ed] a lot
of resolutions and [gave] them to me, and I stood up immediately and said: I
will not accept that unless you vote $75,000 more to be distributed among
the other officers.” By analogy, in White’s situation the White sales
manager was making $15,000 a year while his equal at Studebaker was
making $100,000. Those considerations put it in Woodruff’s mind that the
White employees “ought to have a break.” Stetson added there was no hint
of self-dealing because Woodruff took no fee for making the deal.30

28

Ibid.
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
29

Coca-Cola in the Long Run

163

The day-long meeting demonstrated Stetson’s relationship banking at
work. Woodruff had called his friend Stetson to help provide financial
advice for White. Stetson responded with the kind of knowledge and tact
that had earned Woodruff’s confidence in the first place. In the final
analysis Stetson’s confidence in Woodruff’s ability to run a profitable
business defined the banker’s role. Both men were adept at the personal,
political, legal, and business implications of corporate leadership. This did
not prevent them from making mistakes. But it allowed a sharing of
expertise in complex and ever changing business conditions.
As for the lawsuits, after a lengthy period of legal wrangling both cases
ended without much drama. The parties settled the Ohio proceeding and
the Court of Appeals dismissed the New York case on a procedural point.
Neither Woodruff nor Stetson had to test their conception of the White
sale on the witness stand.31

Friendship
As the years passed the Woodruff-Stetson relationship extended to
include an ever widening range of issues. During the 1930s, Stetson warned
Woodruff that President Franklin Roosevelt’s polices would lead to massive
inflation. He urged Woodruff to buy sugar at the current low prices and
send his cash out of the country, preferably to Canada or Britain. Stetson
also kept up with legislation relevant to Coca-Cola, such as the 1934 JonesCostigan bill, which paid bounties to United States sugar producers and
restricted sugar imports. The men discussed the appointment of a state
judge in Georgia. Stetson frequently saw Woodruff at Coca-Cola board
meetings, although he apparently did not believe his own presence was
always necessary. After missing one meeting, he wrote: “I know you will
forgive me as I have a pretty good record of being with you whenever you
really need me.” Woodruff’s personal money matters were also a frequent
topic of discussion. Woodruff informed Stetson in November 1934 that he
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did not owe Guaranty anything for the first time in years. Still, he thought
he might like to become a borrower again.32
In the 1930s and 1940s Stetson and Woodruff developed a deep
friendship. In 1935 Stetson asked Woodruff for an autographed
photograph, something he requested of only four or five others. Stetson
expressed an interest in buying Coca-Cola bottling facilities for family
members. He invited Woodruff to join the Jekyll Island Club, an elite
group who owned the coastal Georgia island and used it as a winter retreat.
Woodruff accepted but was never an active member. In 1936, Stetson sent
Woodruff a copy of Margaret Mitchell’s new novel, Gone with the Wind,
which he highly recommended. Not known as an avid reader, Woodruff
politely thanked Stetson, adding that it was “very interesting so far, but it’s a
little long—don’t you think”? Three years later, when the novel became a
movie, Stetson asked Woodruff if he could get tickets to the Atlanta
premier. Stetson invited Woodruff to a celebratory dinner for Averell
Harriman in June 1943, and Woodruff attended a dinner in honor of
Stetson in 1942. The two men played the obligatory executive game, golf,
and Stetson was a frequent guest at Woodruff’s Georgia plantation,
Ichuaway, where hunting was the dominant sport. In 1941, Stetson gave
Woodruff advice about establishing a “philanthropic foundation.” Perhaps
the best symbol of the relationship was that Stetson’s birthday was listed in
Woodruff’s appointment book, which contained only about thirty-five
names, including Bobby Jones the golfer, John Sibley and Hughes Spalding,
Coca-Cola attorneys, and his father and wife.33
Still, the core of the relationship was always business—especially CocaCola business. In the 1940s and 1950s Stetson had a habit of sending
32
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Woodruff reports from New York that analyzed the prospects of Coca-Cola
prepared by Harold Stanley, the former Guaranty employee and then
president of Morgan Stanley. On occasion he passed along information
about the competition, including Canada Dry, despite his former
connection to that company. The intertwining of Woodruff, Coca-Cola,
and Stetson’s Guaranty was officially confirmed in 1945, when Woodruff
agreed to become a member of Guaranty’s board. At the time, Stetson was
its chairman. For his part, Woodruff was “very pleased to be a little more
closely associated with [Bill] Potter, Stetson, et al. at the Guaranty Trust
Company.”34
In addition, Coca-Cola owned a large portion of the Air Reduction
Company, for which Stetson was a long-time executive committee member.
The interconnections extended further. Woodruff had a substantial
personal account at Guaranty and Stetson was a board member of the CocaCola Bottling Company of Boston, a company subsidiary. In all these
relations a large part of Stetson’s appeal to Woodruff must have been his
unflagging loyalty. Stetson eagerly took on the role of company advocate at
large. He solicited business for Coca-Cola from his many contacts, such as
railroad companies. He was on the lookout for trademark violations, at one
point warning Woodruff that Jello might introduce a cola-flavored gelatin.
When Coca-Cola lost legal disputes involving competitors Nehi and Pepsi,
an empathetic Stetson told Woodruff they would have to “take it on the
chin.” After he bumped into an attorney for Pepsi in a New York subway he
bothered to send Woodruff a note about their conversation. All this was the
essential stuff of relationship banking.35
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More Opportunities
Three matters in which Stetson took a special interest in the 1940s and
1950s further illustrate the broad scope of his relationship with Coca-Cola.
They include work for the Coca-Cola board of directors, a trademark
dispute against Life Savers, and the company’s hiring of Democratic Party
leader James Farley.
First, Stetson participated in several special projects as a board
member. For example, he was interested in employee compensation,
including benefits. Guaranty was frequently an administrator of pension
plans for client corporations. At various times Stetson was chairman of
Coca-Cola’s salary committee for officers and a member of the committee
on employee retirement insurance. In the late 1940s, moreover, Stetson
joined in discussions about establishing a pension plan at Coca-Cola and
whether Guaranty should be its trustee. Stetson told Bob Woodruff that in
1919, thirty years earlier, in a meeting with Albert Wiggin of Chase and
Ernest Woodruff, that Bob’s father demanded any “perquisites” of the
Coca-Cola sale, presumably including pension administration, should go to
the Trust Company of Georgia. Stetson had agreed. With that memory, he
felt bound thirty years later to support the appointment of the Trust
Company as trustee of Coca-Cola’s pension fund, although it cost Guaranty
substantial business.36
The Life Savers matter is a revealing example of Stetson’s interest in
company affairs beyond finance. By the late 1930s, Coca-Cola was famous
for the aggressive protection of its trademark. Just before World War II,
the company engaged in a climatic legal battle with Pepsi, in which the
courts were asked to decide whether it controlled the word “cola.” While
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that dispute was pending, a disagreement with Life Savers arose when that
company began marketing “Cola Life Savers.”37
Coca-Cola noticed the cola Life Savers advertising campaign and
complained to Life Savers executives. Stetson was brought into the dispute
because he knew Edward Noble, the chairman of Life Savers. Once again
the chain of networks affecting Stetson’s banking was broad, deep, and ever
productive of new business. In the early 1930s, Stetson had been associated
as a director with Drug, Inc., a holding company that included several
drugstore related businesses, including Life Savers.38
On 29 May 1940, Harrison Jones of Coca-Cola met with Noble in
Washington. Jones articulated the company line: Coca-Cola’s value was
based on its hard-earned trademark, and Life Savers was stealing that value.
Noble replied that the issue had already occurred to him, but that there
could not be any customer confusion between “cola” and “Coca-Cola.” A
subsequent meeting with O. T. Kappes, president of Life Savers, turned out
even less successfully. Life Savers was aware of Coca-Cola’s current legal
battle over the ownership of “cola” and it took the position that the courts
would eventually decide “cola” could not be trademarked. Jones tried to
shift his company’s complaint from legal to ethical grounds—“You are
taking a free ride on our goodwill and on our name.” Life Savers did not
agree. Instead, Life Savers executives simply did “not understand why you
Southerners always come up here with all this talk about ‘ethics.’” We “are
in this thing to make money for ourselves and our stockholders. It is not a
question of ‘ethics’ at all; it is a question of making money and doing what
you can to get away with it. It is purely business.” Coca-Cola should sue if it
had a complaint.39
Negotiations continued for months, during which Jones, Stetson, and
Woodruff again appealed to Life Savers. Stetson and Woodruff, in
particular, tried to use their connections with Noble to advantage. To save
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face, and recoup some of the early costs of the product, Noble began
suggesting that his company needed something like $150,000 to settle the
matter. This did not make his inferiors at Life Savers happy. They did not
want to get along with Woodruff. Noble, however, eventually conceded the
obvious. His company was “riding on [Coca-Cola’s] name” and was
intentionally trying to match the Coca-Cola flavor.40
Initially, Woodruff balked at a payoff: “[I]f you quit this thing, which
you ought to do—it ain’t right and you know it ain’t right—then, in my
opinion, it ought, within the next few years, to be worth many times
$150,000 to you.” Woodruff reiterated the ethics theme to Noble, even
getting his friend, former Governor Max Gardner of North Carolina, to let
Noble know he was disappointed in Noble’s business practices. At a lunch
with Stetson, Woodruff, and Noble, Stetson suggested the matter could be
resolved if Coca-Cola refunded Life Savers’ out of pocket expenses in
exchange for dropping the cola candy. Stetson later offered the possibility
that Coca-Cola give a license to Life Savers to produce a “cola” product.
Ever the proponent of consolidation, Stetson also raised the prospect of a
Life Savers-Coca-Cola merger, but this “was discarded by all concerned
with a few facetious observations.” In July 1940, tired of waiting, Coca-Cola
obtained legal advice from John Sibley. According to Sibley, a long-time
trademark warrior, Life Savers had “joined the business chislers.” Not only
had it stolen the word “cola” and the company’s flavor, its advertising
ripped them off by using a red color and showing a glass pouring a very
familiar-looking drink into the shape of a Life Savers.41
The dispute dragged on for two more years. In 1942, Life Savers
agreed to stop making the cola candy if Coca-Cola purchased all materials
related to the product. This was approximately $25,000 worth of labels,
wrappers, caffeine, “essential oils,” phosphoric acid, and extract of coca
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leaves. Stetson played a crucial role in the final negotiations, once again
using his connections to good effect.42
After the settlement a question arose as to whether Stetson should be
compensated for his time. Stetson wrote Sibley that he “should accept
nothing or something substantial and, frankly, I am quite agreeable either
way.” Predictably, perhaps, Woodruff and Sibley decided there would be no
compensation. According to Sibley, originally Stetson “had made it quite
plain…that [he] wanted to render any service [he] could to the Company,
and that the question of compensation was quite secondary.” Sibley further
noted that any payments to a director would be subject to scrutiny, and in
this case not paying a director anything would avoid all possible criticism.
Stetson’s reward consisted of “keen appreciation for the services.”43
Another example of Stetson’s services to Coca-Cola involved the
recruitment of James A. Farley as head of the Coca-Cola Export
Corporation. The export subsidiary managed the company’s overseas
operations. Farley, a New Yorker, was in 1940 perhaps the most politically
connected man in America. He had just finished seven years as Postmaster
General under President Franklin Roosevelt. More importantly, he had
chaired the Democratic National Committee since 1932 and managed both
of FDR’s very successful presidential campaigns. In the late 1930s, when it
was not yet clear that Roosevelt would seek a third term, Farley seriously
considered his own run for the Presidency. A profitable move to the private
sector was also possible. In July 1940 Roosevelt accepted the Democratic
nomination for president for a third time and a disapproving Farley
resigned his office. Farley entered into employment discussions with the
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Willys-Overland Company in Toledo, a manufacturer of Jeeps. He also
considered an ownership stake in the New York Yankees baseball club.44
Coca-Cola, however, made its own bid for Farley’s services. Farley was
an attractive hire because he was well-liked, but also because he was a
nationally known Democrat. These qualities were appealing to the
southerners who ran the company. Even better, he had separated himself
from the more liberal wing of the Democratic Party, which was anathema to
Woodruff. On 5 August 1940, Farley met with Woodruff and Cliff Roberts,
a New York banker who had Coca-Cola interests in South America.
Woodruff gave Farley a lot of advice, including not to sell his name for
immediate advantage, that Willys was not likely to become particularly
successful, and that the Yankees were simply too expensive. Getting quickly
to the point, he offered Farley the job as president of the Export Company
at $50,000 a year.45
According to Woodruff, Farley was needed right away to straighten
some problems with South American franchises. The next day the two met
again and this time Farley had his attorney present, while Woodruff
brought Stetson. Woodruff again made the sales pitch, telling Farley that he
could be a big help in international business. Everyone else chimed in and,
according to Farley, “were most generous in their praise of me.” Within a
few hours the deal was done and Farley joined the Coca-Cola family. The
selection was a hit. Former Governor Max Gardner of North Carolina told
Farley that he heard the announcement by radio with some blue-collar
workers, and they thought it was “a grand thing for the country.”46
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Although Stetson’s role was minor, this was yet another demonstration
of the considerable confidence Woodruff placed in his ability. Bringing
Stetson, a representative of one of the largest banks in the country, to the
Farley meeting confirmed the national and even international status
achieved by Coca-Cola in just over twenty years. And when Woodruff
wanted assurances that Farley would not move quickly to another position if
he left Coca-Cola, Farley promised he had no political ambition except
perhaps to run for President in 1944. Such a goal for a mere employee of
Coca-Cola would have been laughable in 1919, but it seemed entirely
reasonable in 1940.47
In fact, a few months after taking the Coca-Cola job, Farley visited
FDR in the White House. The Second World War was already underway
in Europe and Asia. However, knowing of Farley’s new position, the
President of the United States took the time to suggest that Coca-Cola
might be interested in making a Brazilian drink that combined orange juice
and bark. Farley knew quite well that the company was not going to sell
anything but Coca-Cola, but he listened politely. Almost off-handedly,
Roosevelt then told Farley that Adolf Hitler would be defeated, but that it
would take at least a year. Coca-Cola and Hitler were an improbable
combination for discussion, but the fact that the Georgia soft drink
occupied the attention of an American president in a moment of world crisis
was something John Pemberton or Asa Candler never could have imagined.
Coca-Cola was truly the national drink.48

Closing Acts
Stetson’s career with Coca-Cola ended only with his death in July
1959. He remained a board member through the 1950s, although he
attended fewer meetings as the years passed. Correspondence with
Woodruff, however, continued. They seemed to have discussed the
emerging Civil Rights Movement, as Stetson sent Woodruff a newspaper
clipping describing Abraham Lincoln’s reactionary views on racial equality.
Neither southerner seemed to think much change was likely. More
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positively, a grateful Woodruff sent cases of his drink to Stetson’s office at
Guaranty as well as to Stetson’s house in Greens Farms, Connecticut.49
There was always time for discussions of Coca-Cola ownership, the
topic that brought Stetson and the Woodruffs together in the first place. By
1953 Stetson had placed in trust for his children more than 14,000 shares of
Coca-Cola stock, mostly International. The trust was created in the early
1920s and was due to be distributed in 1954. As part of a readjustment of
the trust, the beneficiaries planned to dispose of 500 shares of International.
In 1953 each share of International could be exchanged for eight shares of
Coca-Cola common. Only a few years earlier there were less than 800
International shareholders in the world, so the planned disposal was a
significant transaction. Stetson wrote Woodruff about the sale as a courtesy,
“to see if you have any suggestions as to where [these shares] should be
placed.” The letter reflected the strength of a relationship that stretched
back over decades. It suggested the potential for financial gain to banker
and client, the critical balance of ownership and control, and the necessity
of trust. It was an appropriate end to a long and successful episode in
relationship banking.50
Stetson’s dealings with Coca-Cola and the Woodruffs provide a useful
case study in twentieth century commercial relationship banking. Stetson
was not simply one of the New York bankers who helped arrange the
purchase from the Candlers, and Guaranty was not just another New York
bank in the sale. For forty years after the deal Stetson and his bank became
a constant source of information, advice, and advocacy for the company and
its leadership. The range of Stetson’s service to Coca-Cola is remarkable:
director; long-time member of the executive committee; director of CocaCola International; provider of advice on the initial purchase and on later
securities issues; negotiator in the initial contract dispute with the bottlers;
facilitator of a possible merger with Canada Dry; lender to Robert
Woodruff; provider of information and connections about political matters;
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director of the White Motor Company; watchdog and negotiator on
trademark matters; recruiter, in the case of James Farley, of executive talent;
personal friend of Robert Woodruff; and all-around promoter and salesman
for Coca-Cola.
The relationship’s long-term impact on the Woodruffs and Stetson’s
home state was also impressive. The Stetson-Woodruff connection was
immeasurably strengthened and shaped by shared Georgia roots. Woodruff
made sure that the fabulous wealth generated by Coca-Cola was not
siphoned off to New York. In 1937, he established the Trebor Foundation
as a philanthropic device. As already noted, Stetson encouraged Woodruff’s
philanthropy, and advised him to set up a charitable foundation. In 1979,
the Woodruff family gave $105 million in Coca-Cola stock to Emory
University, at the time the largest unrestricted gift to an American
university. Trebor was renamed the Robert W. Woodruff Foundation after
Woodruff’s death in 1985, and the foundation focused its charitable efforts
on education, health care, services for children, economic development,
culture, and the environment. In 2007, the Foundation possessed assets in
excess of $2.7 billion and issued almost $100 million in grants.51
Another example of Woodruff’s philanthropy involved land in south
Georgia. In 1929 Woodruff and Walter White of the White Motor
Company assembled tracts of land along the Flint River in southwest
Georgia to create Ichauway Plantation, a 29,060-acre quail-hunting reserve.
This was one of the first and biggest land reserves to be scientifically
managed. Ichauway Plantation was also used to study and treat malaria.
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Later, it became the Emory University Field Station, jointly administered
by the Emory School of Medicine, the United States Public Health Service,
and the United States Geological Survey. After Woodruff’s death, the board
and officers of the Woodruff Foundation established the Joseph W. Jones
Ecological Research Center at Ichauway.52
Stetson drew enormous personal benefits from his connection to CocaCola and the Woodruffs. It was of prime importance to his Guaranty
career, as Coca-Cola needed precisely the kind of services the bank aimed to
provide. Stetson’s participation in the 1919 sale occurred near the
beginning of his employment at the bank, when he was under forty years
old. The sale further enriched his boss, Charles Sabin, and culminated
during the early 1920s, a time when the bank was suffering through the
massive loss occasioned by the Mercantile Bank of the Americas disaster. As
a result, when Thomas Lamont and other Morgan partners assessed
Guaranty in the 1920s, Stetson and his activities with Coca-Cola could not
have escaped their notice. Further, the experience led to other banking
relations, such as directorships with Canada Dry and the Air Reduction
Company. Stetson even tried to bring Coca-Cola and Canada Dry together,
a feat that would have drastically changed the American soft drink
landscape. What mattered most, however, was that he was committed to the
success of Coca-Cola. As a result, Stetson’s attitude and performance
precisely reflected his ideals of relationship banking.
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Cuban Sugar
Gene Stetson enjoyed traveling, especially by train, and trips to Cuba were
among his favorites. Beginning in the 1910s, Stetson visited the island to
oversee Guaranty’s loans in sugar plantations. To get there, he made the
long journey by rail from New York to Miami. Then, he continued his trip
by riding the famous Florida East Coast Railway on to Key West. Finally,
he took the short but often bumpy boat ride to Havana. In the 1930s
Stetson flew a seaplane across the water between Miami and Cuba. Missing
Key West was no great loss—he never liked the rolling waves, which made
him seasick. When Stetson got to Cuba he went on steam locomotives into
the heart of the rural countryside to inspect sugar fields. Perhaps the best
thing about the trips, besides the great hospitality of his Cuban hosts, was
that they could be made in winter, giving welcome escape from
northeastern cold.1
Stetson plunged into the agricultural commodity financing business
almost from the day he stepped through Guaranty’s doors. The essentials of
the work were familiar, because he had loaned money to cotton farmers in
his native South. After 1919, Stetson’s board position at Coca-Cola gave
him further insights into the pricing and distribution of the great Cuban
commodity: sugar.
Guaranty was already in the sugar business before Stetson came to
New York. After 1914, the company’s special interest was the Cuba Cane
Sugar Corporation, among the most important producers on the island.
Guaranty ultimately invested millions in this company and its successors.
The bank’s activity was part of the enormous overseas expansion of
American capital to Latin America before and after World War I. Stetson
1
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got involved when he was assigned the Cuba Cane account, and the job
occupied a good bit of his energies during the 1920s and 1930s. Not
surprisingly, Stetson applied the same kinds of relationship banking
practices that he did in other contexts. But in this case both economics and
politics provided a special test. Ultimately, Cuban sugar proved to be
Stetson’s most frustrating task.

The Cuban Scene
During the 1920s Havana radiated excitement, exuding Caribbean
glamour and sophistication. The four hundred year old city was much more
cosmopolitan than Miami, a frontier town just then digging itself out of a
swamp. Havana had a unique electric railway. The hotels and restaurants
were on par with any in Europe and New York, and they attracted sunseeking tourists from all over the world. Near the city developers created
fancy resorts, such as Irénée DuPont’s Varadero Beach. Celebrities and the
very wealthy came, including such well-known names as Hershey of
chocolate fame, Lindbergh, Astor, Vanderbilt, Harriman, and Will Rogers.
Visitors could enjoy winter warmth, play golf, gamble, and drink rum—the
latter being a major attraction for parched Americans during Prohibition.2
The island featured a diverse mix of ethnicities with a continuing
history of turmoil and war. Cubans maintained Spanish language and
Catholic religious traditions, despite the violent end of Spain’s colonial rule
in the 1890s. Overall, the population was a combination of African and
European peoples, the former having been brought to the country as slaves.
Americans had overwhelmingly supported Cuban independence from Spain.
In 1898 their government used as an excuse for armed intervention the
mysterious explosion of the USS Maine while it was anchored in Havana
harbor. The Spanish-American War helped end Spanish control in Cuba,
but as a practical matter the war also delivered power over the remains of
the Spanish empire into American hands. Although Cuba did not become

2

Rosalie Schwartz, “Invasion of the Tourists,” in The Cuba Reader: History,
Culture, Politics, eds. Aviva Chomsky, Barry Carr, and Pamela Marie Smorkaloff
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003) 244–52.

Cuban Sugar

177

an American possession, the United States reserved the right to interfere,
including with force, in Cuban affairs.3
The history of Spanish colonialism and the proximity of a rising and
powerful neighbor naturally made many Cubans suspicious of the United
States. Most patriotic Cubans did not want to see their country become a de
facto colony or a mere satellite of America. On the other hand, Cuba
needed capital and the Americans had it. And capital always came with
strings attached. In the first decades of the twentieth century, United States
investments in Cuban sugar grew from about $200 million to more than $1
billion. As a result, American interests, led by banks such as Guaranty,
assumed a dominating position in the Cuban economy, a fact much resented
by many Cubans. During his years as a sugar financier Stetson dealt directly
with these tensions. He necessarily confronted the Cuban wariness and
pride, the desire of some Americans to exploit the island’s dependence, and
his own bank’s eagerness for a return on its investments.4
Sugar is among the few commodities, ranking with salt, gold, and
silver, that has captured and held human imagination throughout history.
Sugar was first brought to Europe during the Middle Ages from the Near
East. Christopher Columbus took sugar to the New World from Spain, and
it was planted throughout the West Indies. Sugar quickly became the
linchpin in the molasses-rum-slavery triangle trade that founded many
fortunes in Europe and North America. Cuba became the chief Caribbean
producer after the 1791 Haitian revolution that ended plantation slavery in
that French colony. Slavery was not abolished in Cuba until 1884. By the
1920s Cuba surpassed every country in the world in cane sugar production,
providing almost twenty percent of the global total.5
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Stetson was in a better position than most to understand the social,
political, and economic dynamics of sugar. After all, he came from the
American South, where cotton had played a similar role in the economy and
culture as sugar played in Cuba. As a life-long New South advocate Stetson
knew cotton had an ambiguous history in his native Georgia. The product
produced wealth, but because of its dominance and vulnerability to price
swings it also stunted broader growth and prevented diversification. It
rendered a substantial segment of the workforce unskilled and poorly paid.
On a more technical level, cotton work taught Stetson the intricacies of
financing a commodity using warehouse receipts as well as more
sophisticated funding devices. And he understood that government policy
could have a decisive effect on prosperity or failure, particularly given the
potential for protectionist tariffs.

The Cuban Partner
In Cuba, as elsewhere, the best measure of Stetson’s experience was at
the personal or relationship level. People, not simply large economic or
political forces, were the object of his banking practice. Stetson’s most
important partner and client in Cuban sugar was Manuel Rionda y Pelledo.
Rionda was an outstanding figure in the history of Cuban sugar. He became
a leader in its production and trading and was influential in U.S.-Cuban
economic and political relations for decades. Eventually known as the
“Sugar Baron,” in the early twentieth century Rionda was president of the
prominent global sugar-trading and financing house Czarnikow-Rionda.
The company operated sugar plantations in Cuba, arranged for the
marketing and shipment of sugar from Cuba, and delved deeply into the
politics of the international sugar trade. Rionda’s activities extended over
the incredibly long period from the 1870s to the 1940s.6
Rionda’s family groomed him for leadership. Born in Spain in 1854, he
was brought to Cuba at the age of sixteen. His extended family was already
well-established as sugar growers and merchants and had outposts in Cuba,
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New York, and elsewhere in the United States. In fact, after a brief stop in
Havana, as a young man Rionda was sent to an apprenticeship in Maine.
There he was the guest of the owner of a major sugar refinery. He learned
the nuts and bolts of sugar trade—shipping it from the plantation to
warehouses in Cuba and then to the United States, crushing and refining
sugar, and distributing it to buyers.7
Manuel Rionda also learned about the shifting politics and economics
of sugar. After the American Civil War, increased global competition
threatened Cuban profits. European sugar beet production ballooned from
twenty percent of world sugar production in 1860 to forty-six percent in
1878. In tonnage, by the latter date Europeans bested Cuba by three times.
This growth resulted from government subsidies to growers. Further, when
Cuban slavery was abolished in the 1880s, a key “advantage” of the Cuban
system, forced labor, evaporated. Naturally, the imposition of a new cost of
production changed the economic and social dynamics of Cuban sugar.8
Rionda’s generation of sugar growers had to address these changes. As
for labor, he supported the hacienda system, which had some resemblance
to share-cropping in the post-war American South. The hacienda, however,
placed greater responsibility on plantation owners to provide medical care
and old-age protections in a paternalistic fashion. The transition to even
this modified form of free labor was not easy. In the late 1870s and 1880s
parts of the Rionda business became insolvent. A combination of labor
costs, expensive new machines, and falling sugar prices proved difficult to
overcome.9
Rionda, however, did not give up. He went to New York in the mid–
1880s and became a sugar broker. He was soon well-known in the city and
provided an effective connection between Cuban growers and American
buyers. In 1896, Rionda received the break of his life: an invitation to join
the New York branch of the London sugar brokerage firm, Czarnikow,
McDougall & Co., the largest sugar brokerage in the world. Founder Julius
Caesar Czarnikow knew a good opportunity when he saw one. After the
revolution against Spanish rule in Cuba began in 1895, although there was
7
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much destruction of property, including the burning of sugar fields,
Czarnikow seized the chance to expand. He wagered that conditions in the
European markets would become more favorable to Cuban sugar. To
respond to this opportunity his firm needed someone who knew sugar and
Cuba, and Rionda was that man. In the ensuing years Rionda proved his
worth. On Czarnikow’s death in 1909, the business was reorganized as the
Czarnikow-Rionda Company, with Rionda as its president.10

Enter Guaranty
In the early twentieth century, leading New York banks aggressively
sought investment opportunities overseas, and sugar offered an appealing
prospect. Guaranty entered the Cuban picture in earnest in 1914, when it
agreed to lend Czarnikow-Rionda up to $1 million on the security of sugar
deposited in Cuban warehouses. In return, the bank received a commission
of three-eighths of one percent on the cash drawn. With Guaranty’s money
Rionda aimed to finance Cuban planters directly, “which in our opinion is
far better than if they made direct use of credits on the United States, in
which cases transactions would not have the guarantees of a house like ours
[Czarnikow-Rionda] residing in this country.”11
In 1915, relations between Rionda and Guaranty grew closer with the
creation of the Cuba Cane Sugar Corporation. Guaranty president Sabin
joined the company’s executive committee. Cuba Cane’s purpose, with
Rionda at its head, was the purchase, consolidation, and increased
capitalization of Cuban sugar plantations. Hopefully, this would produce
higher production and efficiency. Other New York investors joined the
project. Chase, National City, J. P. Morgan, and J. & W. Seligman, the last
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represented by brothers Albert and Frederick Strauss, were all interested in
Cuba Cane. Initially, the investment was a winner. The European war
disrupted sugar beet production and prices soared. In its first two years of
operation, while Europe burned, the company made a net profit of more
than $19 million. During the prosperity Cuba Cane owned seventeen sugar
mills, 500,000 acres of land, 500 miles of railroad track, 400 locomotives,
and 2,500 cane cars.12
Stetson became a key figure for Guaranty in financing Cuban sugar. In
1919, for example, Guaranty provided loans to Cuba Cane on informal
security of sugar held in company warehouses in Cuba. This was a typical
financing arrangement, meant to facilitate both efficient production as well
as secure the best market price. Apparently, however, Guaranty feared the
arrangement did not provide enough security, so the bank demanded
additional warehouse receipts plus a substantial fee to be deposited with the
Guaranty-controlled Havana branch of the Mercantile Bank of the
Americas. Rionda complained about the burdensome effect of these
requirements, and Stetson agreed to forget about the warehouse receipts.
This revealed Stetson’s faith in Rionda, as fraud—selling sugar that
supposedly was being held in a warehouse—was a common concern for
lenders. Stetson’s confidence in Rionda’s integrity contributed mightily
toward the development of their business relationship.13
This small episode took place in the midst of growing tension between
Rionda and his financial backers. In 1918, allegedly high expenses in Cuba
reduced profits to $3 million, and the investors, including Guaranty,
National City, Frederick Strauss, and Alfred Jeretski, an attorney with New
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York’s Sullivan and Cromwell firm, became uneasy and suspicious. As a
result, the Cuba Cane board arranged an investigation led by General
George Washington Goethals, the famous chief engineer of the recently
completed Panama Canal. Goethals criticized several aspects of the
company, including accounting practices and operating efficiency. His
investigation led to corporate reorganization. An important figure on the
new Cuba Cane board was Charles Hayden of the Boston investment
banking firm, Hayden, Stone and Company. Cuba Cane rebounded quickly
from this setback, partly because the United States eliminated price controls
on sugar following World War I. Net profits for 1919 exceeded $7 million,
and the bankers watched approvingly as sugar prices rose in early 1920.14
Unfortunately, at this point the bankers’ optimism went too far.
Anticipated high profits produced more large loans to Cuba Cane, including
from Guaranty and National City, based on the mistaken assumption that
high prices would continue. The peak in sugar prices occurred in May 1920,
when it exceeded 22.5 cents a pound. By summer, cane dropped to 17.25
cents. In October it fell to seven cents, with the next harvest only weeks
away. Prices continued their freefall and by the end of 1921 the glut reached
such proportions that one million tons of sugar sat unwanted in Cuban
warehouses. When sugar prices reached about two cents a pound, they had
suffered a ninety percent decline in just a few months. Important sources of
the problem included increased duty-free competition from beet sugar in
the western American states and from cane in the United States possessions
of Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines. For the banks, the Cubans’
inability to sell their sugar meant massive default rates on loans, the failure
of Cuba banks and, as already discussed, the collapse of the Mercantile Bank
of the Americas, which almost dragged Guaranty down with it.15
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During this time Stetson was thoroughly enmeshed in sugar and its
problems and regularly corresponded with Rionda and his associates. For
example, he met with Rionda prior to a Cuban trip in late 1920. Rionda
liked and respected the banker. Rionda thought Stetson had “returned
[from a trip to the plantations] very well impressed with Cuba—he gave me
a very good account of his visit showing not only his enthusiasm but his
great ability and I was very well impressed with him.… [H]e is a young man
that promises well.”16
Stetson made important decisions during the sugar crisis. Near the
beginning of 1921, he learned of the problems some planters were having
selling sugar. Naturally, they needed loans to carry them through. Stetson
indicated he would be interested in extending five to ten million dollars to
Rionda, but only on condition that the security, the sugar in warehouses,
could be looked after by dependable individuals. Stetson’s response
indicated the extremely broad extent of his lending authority for Guaranty
as well as his persistent faith in sugar, even as prices reached their nadir.17
Yet the Cuban situation demanded more than a mere $10 million.
Soon Strauss, Rionda, Stetson, Sabin, and Jeretski put their collective
resources together for an even larger $20 million loan. In the spring of
1921, Jeretski drew up a contract that required protection for the security in
Cuban warehouses and a high twelve percent rate of interest on the loans.
Guaranty, including Stetson personally, worked closely with Strauss, his
Seligman firm, and the investment banking partnership of Brown Brothers
in New York in handling these and other Cuban credit matters.
Nonetheless, the additional effort was still not enough. When the market
price of sugar fell well below the cost of production, the banks’ security
could not carry the debt.18
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Despite the sobering lessons of the 1921 crisis, neither Guaranty, its J.
P. Morgan supporters, nor Stetson gave up on the possibility for profit.
Apparently, the recent record was too promising and it was assumed that
worldwide demand could only increase. They sold off the glut of cheap
sugar as early as the middle of 1922 and sugar prices once again rose to a
respectable level. A Morgan partner expert in overseas ventures, Edward
Stettinius, who was part of the rehabilitation of Guaranty after the
Mercantile Bank collapse and a member of the Guaranty board, traveled to
Cuba in February 1922 to learn more about sugar plantations and the
prospects of the current crop. Stettinius’s visit showed the New York
bankers’ interest in expanding their mortgages on Cuban plantations.19
For most of the 1920s Stetson served as an influential Cuba Cane
board member. He was first elected director in 1923. The position allowed
him to cultivate a more personal relationship with Rionda in much the same
way he became friends with Averell Harriman and Bob Woodruff. Both
Stetson and Rionda appreciated the depth of the recent difficulties. Rionda
wrote Stetson in early 1923 that he hoped “the hard struggles we all had in
the last two years are over.” Stetson traveled to Cuba to look over company
property. But the visits, usually timed to escape dreary New York in
February, were more than business. They allowed Stetson to exercise his
ability to develop meaningful relations with business associates. After one
inspection, Stetson wrote Rionda, “I always enjoy being in your home as
your cordial, generous and sincere hospitality is never exceeded by anyone.”
Rionda asked Stetson to attend a dinner at his home in New Jersey with
Cuban President Gerardo Machado y Morales, and to lunch with Colonel
José Tarafa, the president’s European delegate. Stetson added Rionda to his
list of Christmas note recipients, a meaningful gesture.20
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Of course, friendliness did not change the fact that the relationship was
built around the financial concerns of Rionda’s plantations. Most of the
dialogue concentrated on the hope for profits, and Rionda frequently
discussed plantation operations. He argued for a reduction of the American
tariff on sugar with Stetson, Strauss, Hayden, and other directors, obviously
hoping they would use their political connections to that end. He discussed
the Cuban government’s sugar policies. Rionda circulated information
about production conditions with Stetson and others. In turn, Stetson
consulted with Frederick Strauss and Hayden about the company’s affairs.
Unfortunately, disappointment was a common theme. Sugar languished
behind other opportunities of the decade, as prices remained low.21
Beginning in 1929 and lasting into the mid–1930s, Stetson’s
involvement with the Cuban sugar business reached its peak. This was
partly related to the retirement, departure, or death of some of the other
New Yorkers connected to Cuba Cane, including Sabin, Albert Strauss, and
Jaretski. Just prior to the great global depression, Cuba Cane faced several
threats: a huge bond payment of $25 million, due in January 1930; falling
sugar prices; and constant short-term financing pressures. In the summer of
1929, the company’s directors agreed that the situation was so dire that yet
another corporate reorganization was necessary. For his part, Stetson
signaled that Guaranty would no longer continue to hand over multimillion
dollar loans. He agreed a new start was in order, despite expected wrangling
over the new ownership terms.22
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Sugar and Depression
On 25 July 1929, a six-man Reorganization Committee, chaired by
Charles Hayden and including Rionda and Stetson, informed the company’s
bondholders that poor conditions required drastic steps. The company
could not meet its obligations. If nothing was done, a forced receivership by
creditors was inevitable and with it a long and wasteful legal battle. To
avoid this, the committee proposed to dissolve Cuba Cane and create a new
corporation, with new issues of participating debentures and common stock.
Current debt and equity holders were to exchange their securities and a
voting trust would be created. The bondholders, however, needed to agree
to significant reductions in interest and delayed payments. The
Reorganization Committee held out hope that the process would position
the securities holders to benefit from a hoped-for increase in prices.23
This was delicate work, combining finance and negotiation, but
Stetson enjoyed both the technical and personal aspects. Over the ensuing
months the reorganization consumed much of his time. There were
frequent meetings where important details were considered, such as the
collection of outstanding securities, government relations, and marketing of
securities. Predictably, however, not all securities holders believed Cuba
Cane’s failures resulted from unavoidable conditions, such as low prices.
They blamed management and went to federal court, seeking to derail the
plan. On Christmas Eve, 1929, however, a court held the reorganization
proposal satisfactorily protected creditors and stock holders.24
Under the now court-approved plan New York banks controlled the
new company, renamed Cuban Cane Products. Equitable Trust, Central
23
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Hanover, Chemical Bank, Chase, and Guaranty agreed to provide
financing. The old Cuba Cane, created with such hopefulness in 1915, was
auctioned on 7 February 1930, and purchased by the Reorganization
Committee. Although Rionda retained a large ownership, Hayden, Stetson,
and the other New Yorkers dominated the board. Their concerns naturally
extended to the details of the operation, such as when Stetson inquired at
one Reorganization Committee meeting as to the company’s cash position.
The answer determined the extent of planting in the 1930 season. By the
spring of 1930 the transition was largely complete. Cuban Cane Products
appeared on the New York Stock Exchange and each Reorganization
Committee member, including Stetson, received a payment of $10,000 for
his services.25
Of course, even after refinancing, fending off disgruntled investors, and
creating a new company, 1930 was not the best time to sink money into
sugar. The Republicans’ new high tariff helped reduce sales of Cuban sugar
in the United States by more than fifty percent, or over two million tons,
during next two years. With the onset of the Depression, Stetson, as
Guaranty’s representative for both Cuban Cane Products and Rionda’s
other plantations, was about to get a bigger “belly full” of the risks of
international trade. Throughout this ordeal he usually managed to keep
Rionda’s confidence. They met and corresponded frequently, discussing
both Cuban Cane Products and financing for Rionda’s independent Manati
and Francisco plantations. Unfortunately, however, Cuban Cane Products
lost more than $3 million in its first year. The 1930 crop sold for a horrific
1.3 cents a pound, well below the cost of production.26
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Among the immediate casualties of these developments was Rionda’s
Manatí plantation. In 1931, Manatí’s accumulated debt and lack of
profitability pushed it toward receivership. Rionda naturally opposed this
and tried to convince Stetson that conditions at Manatí were improving. He
offered to put up a personal guarantee if Stetson and his bank approved
another $1 million in loans. In the end, Stetson’s decision in regards to the
likelihood of profit made the choice. From his vantage, the risk was
insurmountable, and Manatí went into receivership.27
Cuban Cane Products met the same fate in April 1932, only two years
after its hopeful creation. The company’s bank loans exceeded $9.5 million,
secured by warehouse sugar, mortgages on plantations, and Cuban
government bonds. The price of sugar collapsed to the amazing level of less
than six-tenths of a penny per pound, an all-time low. At this rate a ton of
raw product was worth about twelve dollars. The receivership, as a result,
was a stop-gap measure to avoid liquidation by the mortgage holders.
Despite limited options, Stetson, Hayden, Rionda, and Guaranty tried to
patch holes in the rapidly sinking ship of Cuban sugar.28
The lack of prospects was so severe that after twenty years on the
island Stetson and Guaranty now looked to a dramatically different
strategy—exit. Stetson’s visit to Cuba in February 1933 was certainly less
happy than his earlier trips. Meeting with Rionda’s associates in Havana,
with uncharacteristic pessimism he admitted New York management “had
failed and was beaten.” Cuban Cane Products still owed the bankers almost
$5 million, and Stetson’s boss, Bill Potter, put full responsibility on Stetson
to resolve the matter. The debt to Guaranty alone was $1.25 million, and
$800,000 had already been written off. Stetson was ready to:
admit he was licked, and call it ‘quits’, and that this would not break
the Guaranty. But…he hated to abandon a thing in which he had so
long been connected with, and that it was always against his nature to
do a thing like this, that he always wanted to go through to the end in
27
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anything which he undertook. [He said] they could write off now the
$450,000 and make a nuisance of himself and create a lot of
difficulties and obstructions, but that this was not the policy of the
Guaranty.29
Under the circumstances Rionda clutched at straws. He hoped the new
Roosevelt administration would lower the tariff on Cuban sugar or even
issue a moratorium on sugar import duties. If only Roosevelt would do that,
Rionda thought, the effect would be “magical.” Otherwise, given the
Cubans’ dependence on sugar, America faced a social and economic
catastrophe on its doorstep.30

Sugar’s Environment
Stetson’s activities in Cuba showed the continuing effect of
government policy on the sugar business. Clients and banks’ strategies were
always challenged by taxes, regulations, and the powers given to banks and
bankers by law. The process of entering into agreements for banking
services, such as loans, depended on concepts of property and contract law
and relied on judicial enforcement. The core legal concept of “security”
defined the legal rights of lenders. An especially pertinent example of the
centrality of government policy was the charter under which Guaranty, a
New York state bank, operated. The charter allowed the bank to engage in
an enormous range of activities, including international banking. In the case
of Cuban sugar, governments’ direct power over foreign trade also played a
critical role.
According to the model of free trade, international competition will
result in efficiencies such as economies of scale that deliver goods and
services at the lowest price and optimal quality. The theory implies that
when two economies can produce the same thing but one has a competitive
advantage, such as climate, the disadvantaged economy should yield the
business to the advantaged economy and specialize where it has its own
competitive advantage. From the historian’s perspective, however, there are
29

“Conference between Stetson, Sample, Fanjul and Jose B. Rionda, Held at
Fanjul’s Office,” 8 February 1933, Braga Brothers Collection.
30
McAvoy, Sugar Baron, 248.

190

Relationship Banker

problems with the model, including the fact the two potential traders may
be hostile or at war with one another. The issue of trade relative to national
defense particularly affects agriculture. Most countries want a certain level
of self-sufficiency in food, and partly as a result farmers often have special
political clout for protection.31
A more fundamental historical problem with the free trade model is
that many businesspeople and political leaders understand that free trade
harms their interests. As one observer put it, free trade “is believed only by
those who will gain an advantage from it.” During much of Stetson’s
business life the Republican Party, which was dominated by manufacturing
interests, strongly opposed free trade. After Reconstruction, the
“protective” tariff was its signature cause. The GOP had a point: the
massive growth of the economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries seemed to support the policy. Did not America transform itself
from debtor to creditor nation and from rural to industrial nation under a
trade policy devoted to protection? Millionaire industrialists and politicians
from Andrew Carnegie to President William McKinley made careers out of
their opposition to free trade. Northern workers usually went along because
they thought the protection ensured jobs. Only rural interests, such as those
represented by southern Democrats, saw tariffs as subsidies to northern
manufacturing, paid for by consumers. But of course they too were
motivated by economic self-interest, not economic theory or altruism.
Southern slaveholders, as exporters of cotton, had usually been strong free
traders. South Carolina created a crisis by threatening to break from the
Union in the 1830s because of high Yankee tariffs. When southerners did
secede in 1860–1861, ascendant Republicans raised import duties before
they freed any slaves.32
Sugar was an important piece of this trade history. By Stetson’s day
import taxes on sugar had long helped shape national economic history. An
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object of the first United States tariff, in 1789, was sugar. Sugar had been
famously taxed in colonial days, in the form of British duties on molasses.
The Molasses Act of 1733, imposing a tax of sixpence per gallon, was widely
disliked and disobeyed. In 1764 Parliament adopted the Sugar Act, which
purported to reduce the old tax but actually stepped up collection efforts.
The King needed money to help pay for the just-concluded French and
Indian War, but Americans shouted “no taxation without representation”
during protests against the new British sugar tax.33
The stream of legislation continued. Between 1789 and Stetson’s
troubles in Cuba Congress passed many laws involving sugar. The general
trend was protectionist or regulatory. In the early 1930s, under Roosevelt’s
sweeping Agricultural Adjustment Act, there was an unprecedented effort to
regulate sugar production, much more direct than earlier attempts.
Congress concluded that market failures in the commodity (including,
paradoxically, Hoover’s reliance on tariffs), supported protections against
competition and new encouragement for domestic production. During
World War II sugar became the object of stringent government-controlled
rationing.34
Yet arguments that tariffs or regulations were the only reason for
problems in Cuban sugar were wrong. As Stetson and other bankers
discovered, Cuban sugar was adversely affected by market competition,
especially after 1920. There were very low production costs in Asia. Several
cane areas within American control, such as the Philippines, Puerto Rico,
Louisiana, and Hawaii, as well as the sugar beet territory in the heartland,
possessed great potential for efficient sugar production. Further, the fact
that in the early 1920s most of the world’s sugar production was protected
by tariffs meant sugar producers all over the world faced barriers. The
Cubans’ special problem was that their production was so great, their
domestic market was small, and they lacked the international clout to force
other markets open. This powerlessness, from an investment standpoint,
contributed to insufficient returns. Every time Cuban growers (and their
33
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bankers) spent money on clearing land and improving capital equipment, a
combination of tariff changes and market forces could make the investment
unable to repay itself. During the 1930s Stetson and his colleagues in Cuban
sugar faced multiple factors that made sugar a losing venture. As Stetson
learned, the tension between markets and regulation contributed to the
complex responsibilities of the relationship banker.35

The Cuban President
The Cuban Cane Products receivership placed many burdens on
Stetson. For the longer term, he still looked for an exit strategy, believing
that the intricacies of a large sugar company could not “be managed by a lot
of American Bankers, [sitting] around a table in New York.” The
immediately pressing need, however, was short-term financing, without
which there might not be a 1933 crop. Stetson proposed extending a new
$900,000 credit, and prior to his trip to Cuba in February 1933 he called a
meeting of the company’s creditors and bluntly dictated terms. Chase was in
for a 5/11 share, Guaranty for 3/11, Central Hanover for 2/11, and the
Bank of Manhattan for 1/11. Thomas Lamont, Morgan’s managing partner,
attended the meeting. All present agreed the banks should accept the
proposed shares of the extension. Yet there was a quid pro quo. In order to
harvest the 1933 crop, “for the sake of the people in the plantations,”
Stetson was willing to endorse additional financial support only if
compromises could be worked out on railroad freight charges, which were
under the control of the Cuban government. As a result, lobbying over
railroad costs became the focus of Stetson’s upcoming Cuban visit.36
Rionda’s nephew, Higinio Fanjul Rionda, president of CzarnikowRionda’s Havana subsidiary, the Cuba Trading Company, expressed respect
for Stetson and his plans. In turn, Stetson trusted Fanjul, who he believed
had good ideas about how to improve the sugar business. Fanjul regretted
the current state of Cuban Cane Products and blamed Charles Hayden for
excessive meddling. Some problems, he thought, could also be traced to
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high administrative expenses. Politics were important as well, including the
need for the Cuban government to reduce railroad freight rates. The
railroad matter was complicated further by the fact that Cuba was in the
midst of a violent revolution spurred by pervasive economic hardship. A
special favor to foreign banks, such as lower railroad rates, would not be
politically popular.37
After arriving in Cuba in February 1933, Stetson was told that special
interests in the notoriously corrupt Cuban bureaucracy had to be assuaged
before the railroad situation could be fixed. Stetson thought otherwise. He
rejected proposals by Fanjul about how to make connections in the
bureaucracy. The only key decision makers, he thought, were Cuba’s
president, Gerardo Machado, and his “right hand man,” Viriato Gutiérrez
Valladon. Stetson felt that only by going to Viriato and Machado would the
railroad problem be addressed. He was aware of the political risks of
altering railroad rates at such a tempestuous time. He also knew that
President Machado was a military dictator who regularly used demonstrations of force and corruption—a regular “Tropical Mussolini.”38
Stetson’s trip culminated when he and Fanjul went to see Viratio.
Viratio recognized the importance of Cuban Cane Products, so obtaining
this “audience” was not difficult for Stetson. According to Fanjul’s
recollections, at the meeting Stetson was in a talkative mood, and began the
discussion by reminiscing about his earlier days in Cuba and criticizing the
American president-elect, Franklin Roosevelt, who “without being well
posted on anything…promised a lot of things to everybody, which…he
would not be able to accomplish.” Stetson then expressed concerns about
the long-term viability of Cuba sugar, including doubts that the tariff would
be much adjusted in the near future and that the Philippines was not likely
to become independent soon. The latter point meant that Filipino sugar
would continue to hold its advantaged position in the American market.
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Stetson compared the dire situation to that facing cotton farmers in his
native Georgia.39
With his listeners warmed up, Stetson launched into a sales pitch for
lower railroad rates. The performance was revealing. Of course, he did not
simply ask for lower rates. Instead, he first told Viriato he had been sent to
Cuba as the representative of all the creditors of Cuban Cane Products:
Chase, Guaranty, Central Hanover, and the Bank of Manhattan. He
informed Viriato about Cuban Cane Product’s debt and the fact that with
the approval of Thomas Lamont, a name well-known in Cuba, the banks
had raised an additional $900,000. He portrayed this as a transitional device
before foreclosure and reorganization, given the poor prospects. Second,
“[H]e had been coming to Cuba for the last sixteen years and that he was a
friend of Cuba and realized that if the Company did not grind [sugar in
1933] a lot of suffering would result to the people around the plantations,
and that although the Guaranty was not a philanthropic institution, he
morally considered himself bound to do something for [the Cuban]
people.”40
Stetson concluded his appeal for lower railroad rates by announcing
that he “wanted to cooperate in anything that would tend to improve the
general condition of Cuba.” Thus, reduced railroad rates were in the
interests of both New York and Cuba, a win-win scenario. Hoping to
overcome any language barrier, Stetson dramatically smacked his fists
together and said the current situation was like two rams butting heads. He
wanted President Machado to pull one of the rams, the higher railroad
rates, away. With his point made, Stetson did not feel the need to plead
further, ending smartly with the appearance of conceding power to the
other side. Respectfully, he was willing to leave the railroad freight matter
to Machado and Viriato. Stetson asked to see the president, but Viriato
indicated that Machado was not then willing to talk about anything. He
promised to discuss the issue with the president the next morning. Stetson’s
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speech was rendered into Spanish, but Viriato seemed to understand the
English version perfectly well.41
The next day Viriato visited the president, as promised, to discuss
railroad rates and Cuban Cane Products. Machado told him he was sorry
not to have seen Stetson. After Viriato conveyed the substance of Stetson’s
remarks, Machado declared that it would be necessary to make some
concessions on railroad freights. He then complained about the behavior of
a Cuban Cane Products manager, Gerard Smith. In particular, Machado
was not pleased with Smith’s criticisms of the government. When Viriato
reported this positive result to Fanjul, he asked Fanjul about the reputation
of Guaranty, Stetson’s bank. Fanjul replied it was as good as National City.
Viriato was not impressed: “I don’t think much of them.” But when Fanjul
reminded Viriato that Morgan backed Guaranty and that Stetson
mentioned Lamont was head of Guaranty’s executive committee, Viriato
abruptly changed his mind. Seeking his own piece of the Morgan empire, he
later offered to deposit $150,000 with Guaranty. Stetson, however, did not
want the money because it would look too much as if a trade had been
made.42
Before leaving Cuba, Stetson told Fanjul that he was hoping for a
“New Deal” for Cuban Cane Products, just as President-elect Roosevelt
was promising a New Deal for the American people. He repeated his hope
that the company could soon be sold to the Riondas, with Guaranty backing. Fanjul informed Stetson of the Cuban president’s favorable decision on
railroad rates and passed along Machado’s disapproval of Smith, Cuban
Cane Products’ manager. Stetson responded that the bankers were also
dissatisfied with Smith and would handle the matter. That afternoon he
departed by plane for Miami.43
Stetson’s political success was not enough to save Cuban Cane Products. As he feared, despite lower railroad rates, conditions did not improve
with the 1933 harvest, and Cuban Cane Products’ mortgage holders began
foreclosure proceedings. The first foreclosure sale, in May 1933, attracted
41
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no bidders at a $16.6 million price. Cuban law required two attempted sales
with a minimum price, but no bidder met the $12 million minimum, or any
other price, at a second attempt in September 1933. Adding insult to injury,
the year’s crop again sold for less than a penny per pound.44
Stetson’s successful lobbying is remarkable partly because it occurred
in a volatile political environment. The business challenge was not simply
that the price of sugar had fallen below a penny a pound. In Cuban politics
the deeper issues were foreign domination and nationalism. Hostility to
foreign ownership, such as the sugar plantations operated by Cuban Cane
Products, became intense in the early 1930s. To many Cubans, American
banks represented forces that unfairly fleeced what labor earned by sweat.
The hostility was also directed at Cubans, such as Rionda’s family, who
worked with foreigners. The new slogan was “Cuba for Cubans,” and the
aim was to “liquidate the colonial structure that has survived in Cuba since
independence.”45
Machado’s government sided with American investors and tried but
failed to hold on to power. In 1930 workers’ wages were reduced or not
paid. Mass protests ensued, with the University of Havana becoming a focal
point. A general strike erupted and President Machado suspended the
Constitution, charging that labor and student uprisings were “following
orders from Moscow.” The hard line did not restore stability or confidence.
After a period of terrorism and murder, in August 1933, less than six
months after Stetson’s appeal to lower railroad rates, Machado resigned the
presidency. He was replaced, briefly, by Carlos Céspedes. In September
1933 an uprising of Army sergeants under the leadership of Fulgencio
Batista took control and installed Ramón Grau San Martín as president.
The new leadership adopted sweeping changes but was not considered
legitimate by the Roosevelt administration. In early 1934 Batista eliminated
the Grau government and began the process of consolidating power, this
time aided by formal recognition from the United States. Batista remained
the dominant force on the island for many years, ruling as dictator for most
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of the period until 1959, when he was forced to flee by Fidel Castro, Che
Guevera, and their revolutionary army.46
For Stetson, the context meant operating in a powder keg filled with
conflicting ideologies, festering hatreds, and selfish ambitions. The banker
was simultaneously a financier and a diplomat. Not surprisingly, Stetson
had little patience for revolutionaries. His interests were investing in the
country and making a profit. As he put it, a banker had moral
responsibilities, but Guaranty was not a “philanthropic institution.”
Although there had once been profits, in the 1930s there was an unending
stream of losses. Stetson sympathized with Cuba’s larger political and social
problems. Nothing would have made him happier than high-priced sugar
and satisfied workers; but the state of the global sugar markets and the
politics of sugar were something neither he nor the Cuban government
could fix by investing in sugar production.
In fact, Stetson had no answer for the country’s dilemmas. He never
seemed troubled by the problem of foreign ownership for Cuban
sovereignty, including his own lobbying. His perspective was that the
investors and the public were in this together, so it was simply a false issue.
Only by cooperating, and taking appropriate risks, could all interests
benefit. It was a typically optimistic, and American, perspective, akin to his
experiences with New South ideas. If American capital left, he assumed,
Cubans would be harmed. For Stetson, the threat to Cuban sovereignty
simply took the analysis back to its starting point: no property rights and
profits for American business, then no investment, no production, no sales,
and no employment for Cubans. Stetson never claimed the system was
without costs or faults. But he also never really questioned whether it
contributed to the kind of disaster and dictatorship faced by Cubans.

Trying to Get Out
Under the traumatic circumstances of the 1930s, Stetson’s plan to back
away from Cuban Cane Products and turn its management over to the
Riondas went nowhere. He made a revised offer to sell to Rionda in August
1933. The deal depended on another financial reorganization, but there
46
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were no realistic means to change ownership and satisfy creditors, there
being no likely purchasers who would meet the existing creditors’ demands.
Certainly the Riondas did not want to be placed in a situation where their
management would be controlled by intrusive American lenders. The only
good news was that both the bankers and Rionda were pleased by the
American government’s refusal to recognize Machado’s replacement, the
radical Grau government.47
Cuban Cane Products’ reorganization finally moved forward in 1934,
after recognition of the Batista-backed government by the Roosevelt
administration. The company’s final foreclosure sale, following more delays
caused by government changes, took place on 30 January 1934. The
mortgage holders, the only bidders, offered just over $4.1 million,
approximately the same amount as Cuban Cane Products’ debt. The new
corporation that emerged from the ashes of Cuban Cane Products was
Compañia Azuncarera Atlántica del Golfo (“Atlántica”). This was a Cuban
entity, named in Spanish to reflect a greater sensitivity to national pride.
The banks arranged for Fanjul and other Rionda associates at the Cuban
Trading Company in Havana to have management authority. The
foreclosed properties were formally transferred to Atlántica in April 1934.48
Stetson’s actions during the sale and transfer reflected an increasing
desire to cut his bank’s losses, get out of sugar management, recover as
much debt as possible, and place a new operation under Cubans he trusted,
the Riondas. Fanjul Rionda was an important supporter. Stetson expressed
his gratitude just after the foreclosure sale, thanking Fanjul for his
exemplary service. Stetson hand-picked Fanjul to act as Atlantica’s
leadership, at least temporarily. John J. Sample, Guaranty’s on-site
representative in Cuba, was frequently in touch with Fanjul and reported
good things about him. Stetson told the elder Manuel Rionda’s nephew,
Manuel E. Rionda, that he believed strongly in the necessity of Cuban
management partly because of the political situation. Simply stated, the
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Rionda family had “access to public officials who will give them a helping
hand in time of need.”49
Unfortunately, legal ambiguities cast doubts over Atlántica’s future.
New American securities laws, in particular, changed the rules of the game.
The 1933 and 1934 securities acts imposed stringent requirements on
public issues of stock, drastically changing the old ways of marketing and
distributing shares and reorganizing debtor companies. For example, under
the new laws, the transfer of ownership from Cuban Cane Products to
Atlántica could not lawfully have any hint of self-dealing. As a result,
Stetson decided that “Guaranty Trust Co. will not under any circumstances
make any profit thru the foreclosure of [Cuban Cane Products,] not
wanting to submit themselves to possible criticism and litigation.”
Moreover, as a director of both Cuban Cane Products and Guaranty,
Stetson wanted to avoid personal liability.50
Stetson also worried about Cuba’s “El Derecho de Tanteo” law, passed
during the Grau presidency. This legislation empowered the Cuban
government to bid on sugar property for sale, such as Cuban Cane
Products. The law threatened the validity of Cuban Cane’s January 1934
foreclosure. Initially, it seemed the government would not challenge the
sale, but Cuban officials reconsidered and filed a suit asking that it be
overturned. Naturally, this outraged the banks, as it put the entire Atlántica
project in limbo. Fanjul, in Havana, lobbied hard for the government to
drop its suit.51
During these unhappy months Fanjul and Stetson continued to rely on
each other’s good will. When Fanjul considered resigning his temporary
position with Atlántica, he remained because he did not want “to offend my
good friend Mr. Stetson.” Nonetheless, if “Stetson continues having
absolute confidence in me, it is necessary that he put his shoulder to the
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wheel, giving m[e] absolute control and direction of the Company.” Fanjul
hoped Stetson would use his power to make him Atlántica’s permanent
president. Fanjul kept Stetson apprised as to conditions on the sugar
plantations. Yet after decades of dealing with troublesome New York
investors, Fanjul and the other Riondas maintained a safe distance from the
bankers, criticized the ineffective use of lawyers, and fretted over what
Charles Hayden would do with his large ownership stake.52
In May 1934 Stetson once again tried to resolve Cuban problems
through lobbying. He traveled to Washington to meet with Sumner Welles,
Assistant Secretary of State and former ambassador to Cuba. Although
Stetson believed the State Department was sympathetic to Atlántica’s efforts
to avoid the Cuban government’s challenge, he learned it would not take
official action. Welles, however, agreed to contact Cuban officials
informally. Stetson’s argument was that the Cuban government’s claim was
having a broadly negative effect. Given its threat to property rights, it
meant no further investment in the island. In addition, more than 100,000
workers depended on Atlántica, and the company’s inability to provide work
would produce destitution, setting off a crisis.53
Despite Stetson’s activity, during the mid–1930s Cuban sugar was only
one of his increasing duties at Guaranty, and the Riondas worried about the
depth of his interest in Atlántica. Stetson did not spend all his days and
nights focusing on sugar, so he was not always fully aware of Fanjul’s
worries. On several occasions Stetson asked that Fanjul simply “keep his
foot on the base,” baseball lingo for waiting patiently for further
developments, when patience was difficult. On 19 May 1934, Fanjul met
with Guaranty’s John Sample. He expressed concern that Stetson was losing
interest in the company. As reported by Manuel E. Rionda, Sample replied
in a manner that showed Stetson’s deep and long-standing support for the
Cuban business:
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[A]fter Mr. [Charles] Sabin’s death [in 1933], Mr. [Palen]
Conway[,] who had been working side by side with Stetson in all of
the Bank’s business, had been made President, and…Mr. [Potter]
had been named Chairman, thus throwing on Mr. Stetson’s
shoulders all the work that previously had been taken care of by
Stetson and Conway.
Mr. Stetson[,] in the winter months, was the last man to leave
the Bank, working sometimes till 9 o’clock at night, and that just
recently he had turned over the details of the Cuban Cane affair to
Mr. [Potter’s] brother, as he (Stetson) had too many things to
handle, but that nevertheless he still, kept in touch with things, just
the same.—[Sample] stated that Stetson for years was the man of
action in all the Board handling Cuban Cane’s affairs,
notwithstanding the fact that the Guaranty Trust had only about
25% interest in the thing, Chase with their 45% being the largest
ones interested with Central Hanover and New York Trust, trailing
along.—That no one representing these others had ever had any
constructive policy to suggest, and that Stetson had always been the
ruling mind.
[Sample] went further to say that [from] all the members of the
Board, [Sample] had only received encouragement from Stetson and
from the New York Trust, and that he never had even a “scratch of
the pen” from any of the others.54
Sample correctly surmised Stetson’s continuing interest in Atlántica. In
fact, not long after Sample’s reassurances to Fanjul, Stetson increased his
efforts on behalf of the company. For example, he was concerned by the fact
that many directors of Atlántica were also its creditors, and these same
directors had voted to issue a mortgage which would supersede the rights of
debenture holders. This raised the possibility of a lawsuit by a debenture
holder against the directors for self-dealing. Stetson told Manuel E. Rionda
that this could be avoided if the debenture holders were first given a chance
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to pay off the bank debt and obtain new securities. He planned to present
this idea to the Atlántica board.55
Stetson’s new work comforted Fanjul. He was “a little more
encouraged by seeing Stetson again taking an active part.—If he is going to
steer the boat, I am with him 100%. –If he confides in me I am sure we will
come out all right, but I must have the Pilot’s wheel, otherwise, let me get
out.” On 28 May 1934, Fanjul told Stetson that nothing pleased him more
than Stetson’s leadership. He reminded Stetson that over the preceding
decades more than $100 million had been spent to build up the company’s
properties, ninety-eight percent of which was American capital. Because of
this commitment he believed a forced purchase by the Cuban government
would be catastrophic.56
In July 1934 Fanjul wrote Stetson that the Cuban government’s suit
challenging the Cuban Cane Products foreclosure sale had finally been
withdrawn. Fanjul exclaimed, “[N]o-body was happier than myself, not only
because I had as much interest as you in the success of this enterprise, but
also because I have carried on my shoulders the worse part of the fight.” He
detailed the intense lobbying over the suit by key parties in Cuba, from
agricultural workers to associates of the Cuban president. Atlantica was
widely disliked because of its foreign ownership. In the future, Fanjul
thought, the company needed the excellent connections with the Cuban
government he could offer. Fanjul further warned Stetson that financing the
next crop had to be forthcoming soon or their efforts would be futile.
Naturally, Stetson was grateful. He was “fully conscious” of Fanjul’s
“splendid cooperation and effectiveness.” The New York banks once again
came forward with additional financing in July 1934.57
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Surprisingly, over the next several months there were signs of
improving business conditions. Under FDR’s Democrats, trade policy
toward Cuba moved in a direction favorable to sugar producers, with a new
treaty providing for dramatically reduced sugar duties on sugar produced
within a U.S.-determined quota. The bargain included reduction or
elimination of duties on American manufactured goods into Cuba.
According to Stetson, Fanjul led a valuable campaign in Cuba in support of
the treaty. Stetson also attended a celebratory dinner for the agreement, as
did Hayden; representatives of Central Hanover; National City; Chase; the
Riondas; and the Cuban Secretary of State, Cosme de la Torriente.58
Even the long-standing receivership was finally wrapped up. In
December 1934 a formal Reorganization Plan was filed in the federal
district court where the Cuban Cane receivership had been pending since
1932. In essence, the plan provided for a new company to acquire the
existing Atlántica securities and issue 700,000 shares of common stock.
Creditors of both Cuban Cane and Atlántica obtained an opportunity to
purchase the stock. In March 1935 Cuban Atlantic Sugar was formed,
holding Atlántica as a subsidiary. Ever hopeful, the elder Manuel Rionda
believed investment in Cuban Atlantic could be profitable.59
This complex process produced meetings between Stetson, Sample,
and the Riondas with the purpose of finding new owners. The context was
the same as it had been for several years: the banks’ “great desire” was to get
out of the sugar business. The problem was that they were still owed about
$7 million and were not going to relinquish control without getting paid.
One solution, suggested by the senior Manuel Rionda, was to sell off the
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various plantations owned by the company, piece by piece, with financing
arrangements that would satisfy the debt. Rionda argued that the managers
and liquidators “should be all Riondas—no outsiders.” Yet at a subsequent
meeting attended by Stetson, Sample, Manuel Rionda, Manuel E. Rionda,
and Fanjul, Stetson indicated that perhaps the whole could be sold to CocaCola or the National Sugar Refining Company, although he preferred the
Riondas because of their past services.60
The senior Manuel, now more than eighty years old, was too seasoned
to take Stetson’s proposal uncritically. He did not think Coca-Coca really
wanted the properties. The action would be foolish for American Sugar to
buy them, because as a refiner it could do better on the international
market. Although there had been improvement, sugar profits were still slim.
He believed, and Stetson conceded, that the current stock price was too
high. Stetson countered by suggesting a new company with $3.5 million
capital, but Rionda rejected the idea, knowing it would come burdened with
the current debt owed the banks. Other owners were discussed: Hayden,
according to Rionda, was “able” but “too overpowering and a bad seller.”
Neither Irénée DuPont nor sugar tycoon Horace Havemeyer seemed
desirable or interested. Ultimately it was the same old conversation. Stetson
wanted his bank to get paid and exit. The Riondas wanted control, but only
under the right terms. And the market for sugar was not promising.61
Late in the spring of 1935 the lack of outside investor interest meant
that Guaranty, along with Hayden, Chase, and the New York Trust, not the
Riondas, became the primary shareholders of the newly formed Cuban
Atlantic. The New Yorkers received securities with a face value of $7
million, with Hayden’s ownership portion the largest. Guaranty retained a
special role, with its John Sample becoming Cuban Atlantic’s new president.
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All this had the effect of keeping Stetson involved in Cuban sugar, despite
his best efforts to get out.62
Continued ownership carried further legal burdens. Complaints raised
in the protracted Cuban Cane Products receivership attracted the attention
of the new federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In July
1935, the Commission, led by future Supreme Court justices William O.
Douglas and Abe Fortas, launched an investigation that focused on selfdealing by insiders, the New York banks, in the 1930s Cuban sugar
company reorganizations. The government sought information from
Stetson, Hayden, Manuel Rionda, and Earle Bailie of J. & W. Seligman,
and scheduled hearings for August 1935. Although Stetson initially argued
that certain privileged communications with attorneys should not be
released to the government, he and the others later presented evidence and
cooperated with the SEC.63
The proceeding fit the pattern of other Depression-era securities
investigations. It was largely a contest among owners of corporate interests,
with the government flexing its new regulatory muscles and seemingly
representing the financial losers. Essentially, the government focused on
complaints as to which capitalists managed to get paid first from the
inadequate remaining assets of the failing sugar company. In August 1935,
Manuel Rionda provided oral testimony to Fortas. Fortas concentrated on
the capital structure of the company and asked probing questions about the
issue of common and preferred stock. Rionda testified that at the original
financing of Cuba Cane, in 1915, he was given 30,000 shares of common
stock for services to the company. Naturally, as a regulator Fortas was
interested in whether any of the shares were then sold to the public, which
of course they were, as Cuba Cane was listed on the New York Stock
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Exchange. Most interesting to Fortas was that J. & W. Seligman received
470,000 shares of Cuba Cane common based on their agreement to
underwrite the $50 million subscription.64
In the end the investigation produced hundreds of pages of testimony
and documents but little else. The reorganization of Cuban Cane Products
into Atlantica was not overturned and no wrongdoing was prosecuted. The
worst part of the process, from Guaranty’s perspective, was the publicity.
Newspapers fed a Depression-stunned public lurid facts. These included the
revelation that the protective committees for the creditors were actually
headed by the banks and their lawyers, posing a clear conflict of interest.
The reorganization’s “administrative” costs surpassed $1 million, which
included more than $200,000 in fees to the banks and their lawyers. At the
time of the SEC investigation, unemployment still exceeded fifteen percent
and the average income of an employed worker was just over $1,500 a year.
Moreover, insiders, including a millionaire DuPont, received discounted
stock prices. Of course the banks explained all this as reasonable business
practice and not at all profitable. Hayden told the Commission he lost
$600,000. Stetson did not provide testimony at the New York hearings, but
he did travel to Washington to represent Guaranty before the SEC.65

Stetson and Sugar
Several years after the SEC investigation, and following more than
twenty years of turmoil, Guaranty’s business relationship with the Riondas
and Cuban sugar came to an end. By 1941 the bank had finally managed to
unload its stake in Cuban Atlantic. Ironically, Guaranty’s departure
coincided with the huge demand for sugar created by World War II. When
Guaranty exited, Cuban Atlantic was primarily owned by Chase and the
Charles Hayden Foundation; Hayden himself died in 1937. The Riondas’
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role had been reduced to the kind of warehousing and related
documentation and governmental services typically provided by CzarnikowRionda and the Cuban Trading Company.66
As a gesture of thanks, Stetson had helped the Riondas continue this
limited function. In early 1936 Cuban Atlantic considered conducting its
own warehouse operations, thereby replacing Fanjul’s Cuban Trading
Company. Fanjul asked Stetson to intervene and help maintain the historic
relationship. The banker called a meeting of the Cuban Atlantic board and
conveyed Fanjul’s concerns. He reminded the directors of the Riondas’
loyal service, and he did not “want to see [them] declared or counted out.”
The Board, in response, agreed to hear Fanjul’s side on the warehousing
issue. Stetson recognized Fanjul’s “good sportsmanship” and conveyed his
“deep sense of appreciation of our friendship.” In a letter to Stetson, Fanjul
outlined his current service to the company, which included warehousing,
shipping sugar, and dealing with the Cuba government and its export rules.
Stetson turned the letter over to Cuban Atlantic’s president, John Sample,
and told Fanjul he hoped a satisfactory conclusion could be reached. If not,
he would take it up again with the directors. In quick order Sample
concluded that Fanjul’s assistance would still be useful, and the longstanding business relationship continued.67
Thereafter, Stetson’s dealings with the Riondas steadily declined.
Their last business included the sale of Guaranty’s shares in Cuban Atlantic,
introductions to other bankers, and the financial reorganization of one of
Manuel Rionda’s plantations. With the withdrawal of Guaranty, correspondence between Stetson and Rionda became limited to Stetson’s annual
Christmas cards. Rionda always replied to these in a manner that expressed
his “sincere friendship and that of all my associates.” In his final letter to
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Stetson, in late 1942, he nostalgically recalled the “good old days when we
traveled together over the Island.”68
Stetson’s long interaction with Cuban sugar is a rich source of
information about Guaranty, the practice of international banking in the
1920s and 1930s, and Stetson’s performance as a relationship banker.
Stetson originally received the account in the boom times just after World
War I. High prices in the 1910s allowed sugar to be highly profitable and
Stetson’s bank naturally saw it as a sound investment. But after a few years
of success the risks became unmanageable. By the late 1920s and through
the 1930s Stetson’s job became one of limiting losses and developing a
coherent exit strategy. This meant reorganizing corporate structures,
pacifying creditors, lobbying government officials, and issuing new forms of
equity and debt. The bank profited only by collecting reorganization fees
and attempting to maintain its position as a preferred creditor.
Stetson performed these diverse tasks with the same attention to client
relationships he showed in happier contexts. He brought his usual
friendliness and respect for clients to the table. He genuinely liked and
admired the Riondas. He was also sensitive to many of the cultural and
political conditions of conducting foreign business. Especially noteworthy
was his conclusion that under prevailing conditions American capitalists
could not effectively run Cuban sugar plantations from New York. In
addition, the job required intense lobbying, visits to Havana and
Washington, and appreciation for the details of sugar production. The
Depression in the United States and persistent revolution in Cuba
unleashed a radically changing regulatory structure that had to be
considered. In the Cuban sugar business there were never easy answers or
permanent solutions.
The experience did not shake Stetson’s faith in the benefits of
international investment, but he recognized failure when he saw it. As he
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concluded in 1933, here was a problem that was simply too large for mere
capital to fix. Indeed, as many scholars have argued, investment in sugar by
Americans had a host of undesirable economic consequences, especially
over-reliance on the sweet crop. Stetson was plainly aware of this kind of
effect from the history of cotton in Georgia. Maybe this is why he tried for
so long to fix the Cuban problems and achieve some level of success. It
might also explain why in the end he was determined to get away from
Cuban sugar and move on to more promising tasks.
International banking, with its exotic travel and high-level appeals to
the Cuban president, was exhilarating. But the experience was
disappointing, and replete with massive losses. It shows Stetson in a longterm losing situation. The constant reorganizing, court proceedings, and
need for new investors required a particular kind of banking. Obviously
even a perennial optimist such as Stetson was more than casually aware that
the American business system produced failure along with success. After all,
by the time his relations with Cuban sugar ended Stetson had seen southern
poverty, experienced the 1907 panic, survived the demise of the Mercantile
Bank in the early 1920s, and witnessed the near total collapse of the
American economy in the Depression. But Cuba must have been especially
frustrating, because it offered the special case of a luxurious island with a
population eager to work, but no clear path that would enrich both Cubans
and American investors. There is no record of Stetson’s reaction to Fidel
Castro’s triumphant march into Havana in 1959. In that moment it may
have seemed to him that the failure of sugar was not merely unfortunate,
but a contributor to the worst possible result for the island and its people.

9
Stetson and the Depression
Gene Stetson had the fortune, or misfortune, of being a banker during the
1930s, one of the most dramatic decades in American banking history.
When Stetson started in banking, big time investment was still controlled
by a handful of private bankers. The money supply was linked to gold and
influenced by issues of banking notes by national banks. By the 1920s the
wave of the future seemed to be large banking institutions, such as
Guaranty, which provided an expansive mix of commercial and investment
services for corporate clients. As a Guaranty vice president, Stetson
contributed to the great boom of ever larger banks. This included the
unprecedented growth of American banking power overseas during and
after World War I. The contributions also included a key role in financing
new kinds of national industry. Stetson’s actions for Coca-Cola and Cuban
sugar reflected the opportunities for corporate relationship banking in the
new American century.
Then came the 1929 Crash. Whether Stetson was in his office on
lower Broadway on the more frenetic days of trading, or whether he
happened to wander to nearby Wall Street to witness the chaos of Black
Tuesday, 29 October 1929, when a massive sell off sent prices plummeting,
is unknown. His response to the nadir of the market in July 1932, when the
Dow industrial average dropped to about eleven percent of its 1929 level, is
also not recorded. But it is clear that these events and the public reaction to
them had a deep effect. His son Charlie, a boy at the time, remembered that
his father’s “demeanor” changed sharply in the early 1930s. Depression did
not mean poverty for the Stetson family, but the finance world, in fact, had
been turned upside down, and Stetson felt the shock waves of the
convulsion.1
1
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Banking, including banking at Guaranty, was never the same after the
Crash. Historians disagree sharply about the causes of the Depression. They
also disagree about what its remedies should have been. Stetson’s life is
helpful in this regard because it shows that the views of a banker on the
Wall Street scene cannot be easily stereotyped. Stetson’s reaction to the
Depression, partly because he and his colleagues lacked the information that
comes with several decades of hind-sight, does not fit neatly into any
package. The Depression tested the foundations of his beliefs, including his
optimism, and it stretched his banking skills, demanding all of his personal
and professional resources.
Some of the Depression-era changes resulted from a substantial
amount of new federal regulation on banking practice. The meaning of
more government in itself can easily be misinterpreted. Banking has always
been the subject of government regulation—and has in fact benefited from
much of that law and regulation. Every American political tradition since
Hamilton and Jefferson has recognized that banking is not like most
businesses. Banking is too important. Inherently it has always had a public
function and impact in a way that, say, furniture, textiles, or Coca-Cola do
not. As a result, Stetson was necessarily interested in political developments
and how they affected finance.2
After moving to New York he became a Republican, a choice that
would have been unacceptable among his fellow native whites in middle
Georgia. The Republican Party was, after all, the party of abolition,
Lincoln, the Union Army, and Reconstruction, not subjects likely to be
viewed positively by the son of a Confederate officer. The Georgia GOP,
between 1902 and 1916, when Stetson would have voted there, was weak
even by Southern standards and had essentially disintegrated in 1908 after
Democrats rammed through a literacy test and property qualifications for
voters with the help of fraud, intimidation, and murder in order to
disenfranchise blacks, the source of most Republican votes. The Democratic
monopoly was such that Republicans in the Peach State did not elect a
detailed account of the market’s Crash in the fall of 1929 is Maury Klein, Rainbow’s
End: The Crash of 1929 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) 190–252.
2
A summary of some of these changes is Benjamin J. Klebaner, American
Commercial Banking (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990) 138–48.
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governor until 2002, almost one hundred years later. When Stetson was a
young banker in Macon, the lack of political competition meant that
perhaps eighty percent of Georgia’s voters, white and black, did not even
bother to cast ballots.3
Perhaps this miserable legacy, along with his natural aversion to public
speaking, helps explain why Stetson had little interest in political office. He
had no desire to be a “public figure.” His direct political activities were few
and minor. Many years after he left Georgia, for example, Stetson agreed to
become a member of the Republican Finance Committee in his home
district in suburban Connecticut. On the other hand, Republicanism was
certainly the perspective of choice among Wall Street bankers. In the late
1930s and 1940s Stetson even visited former President Herbert Hoover on
several occasions. Perhaps most revealing, he corresponded with and
strongly supported Wendell Willkie in the presidential race of 1940 against
Franklin Roosevelt, and was “keenly disappointed” in Willkie’s defeat.4
All this was important, but not so as to show a strong passion for either
laissez-faire economics or partisan politics. For Stetson, being a Republican,
like his former status as a Democrat in Georgia, was less a function of
support for limited government than belief in a certain kind of
government—one that favored Wall Street and industry, especially big and
international business. His Republicanism was informed by the views of
3
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Alexander Hamilton and Theodore Roosevelt, both of whom believed in a
key role for government. Such attitudes were common among both wealthy
Republicans and Democrats in the 1920s, Stetson’s first decade in New
York. Guaranty’s most prominent corporate lawyer, and Stetson’s friend,
was John W. Davis, the Democrats’ candidate for president in 1924. Stetson
was an even better friend of Georgia’s Democratic United States Senator
and fellow Mercer student Walter F. George, who suffered intense criticism
from President Franklin Roosevelt for his conservatism. FDR even tried to
unseat George in the 1938 Georgia Senate election. During Stetson’s life
Republicans supported policies that increased federal government power: a
protective tariff, the Federal Reserve, and the intervention of American
armed forces overseas in the Spanish colonies and in World War I. Hoover
set new records for federal action, sponsoring massive loans for American
industry through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and defending
the notorious Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930. This was consistent with
portions of the larger Republican tradition. On the other hand, the
Democrat elected to do something about the Depression, Theodore’s
cousin Franklin, famously promised a balanced budget and fiscal prudence
during the 1932 campaign.5
Ultimately, however, when it came to politics and political behavior,
Stetson was a pragmatist, not an ideologue. In business, he could work with
Averell Harriman the New Deal Democrat as well as with Harriman’s
Republican partner, Prescott Bush. He agreed with his bank’s decision to
issue $20 million in notes to the federal government’s Recon-struction
Finance Corporation, on the government’s recommendation, in order to
strengthen its capital structure. He supported some forms of increased
public action, such as a legal prohibition on loans to bank officers and

5
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directors and increased taxes to support projects to lower unemployment.
He wholeheartedly endorsed American involvement in World War I, a
foreign military action unprecedented in scope that required conscription,
federal control of economic production and prices, and increased income
taxes. He lobbied in Washington for government trade policies that
mandated an aggressive federal role in foreign affairs.6
Stetson’s banking challenge in the 1930s went much deeper than
simple party politics or the relative size of government. Was Wall Street to
blame? Was capitalism flawed? Was the practice of relationship banking
partly responsible? Not surprisingly, Stetson gave an unequivocal “No” to
such questions. The American public, however, was not so sure, and Stetson
was aware of this uncertainty. As a result, he believed it was up to bankers,
like himself, to justify his ideals through words and deeds despite the new
conditions.

Guaranty and the Crash
The stock market collapse began the process of dramatically shifting
the environment in which Stetson and Guaranty operated. On the
Thursday before the Crash Wall Street observers saw that the market was
“in distress,” as J. P. Morgan partner and Guaranty director Tom Lamont
put it in classic understatement. Top New York bankers met at Morgan’s
office on 23 October to discuss ways of propping up the market. Despite the
Federal Reserve, Morgan still considered itself the nation’s bank of last
resort. Guaranty president Bill Potter attended the meeting; along with
Albert Wiggin of Chase; Charles Mitchell of National City; and Lamont,
chairman of the “rescue team.” The banks pledged about $130 million to
buy stocks. Prices actually closed higher the next day, but it was too late.
Unlike in 1907, there was not enough private money to stem the tide, and
the following Monday and Tuesday the market crashed. The bankers’

6
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failure commenced a new era, one in which government would play a more
decisive role in managing the economy.7
For years most of the news was bad. The Dow Jones Industrial Average
sank from a high of 381 in September 1929 to below 42 in July 1932, a loss
of almost 90 percent. Average prices of industrials did not regain their 1929
levels until 1951. In late 1931, the Fed raised the discount rate by two
percent in two weeks, a one-time record change. Unemployment grew from
3.2 percent in 1929 to 24.9 percent in 1933. Between 1929 and 1933 real
income fell by more than 26 percent; current GDP fell from $103.6 billion
to $56.4 billion. The bank failure rate accelerated wildly, especially among
rural banks. One of the victims was Stetson’s old employer, the Exchange
National Bank in Fitzgerald. In 1932, massive withdrawals by customers
caused many bank failures. Between the late 1920s and the early 1930s the
number of American banks fell from over 25,000 to fewer than 15,000. Over
800 banks failed in September and October 1931 alone. Overall, bank assets
declined from $72 billion to $51 billion. By 1933, new corporate stock
issues had declined 98 percent from 1929.8
Guaranty suffered as well, but mildly compared to other institutions.
The bank’s resources held at about $2 billion during 1930, then fell sharply
to $1.5 billion in December 1931, where they remained through 1933.
Assets fluctuated between $1.4 and $2 billion for most of the remainder of
the 1930s. Only at the end of 1936, when assets approached $2.1 billion,
had the high-flying 1920s been eclipsed. Guaranty’s common stock price
also fell, from a gold-plated $1,000 in 1929 to $168 in June 1932, a loss of
more than eighty percent. The directors reduced dividends on the grounds
of diminished earning power, partly because of lower lending rates. The
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bank even closed on 4 March 1933, first because of the state Bank Holiday
declared in New York, and then two days later because of the national Bank
Holiday declared by President Roosevelt upon taking office.9
Thanks to its relatively strong financial position, Guaranty was among
the first institutions to receive its license to reopen after the federal Bank
Holiday. In 1932, amidst the banking catastrophe, a brokerage firm
included Guaranty among sixteen elite banks still worthy of an investor’s
confidence. This firm described the company as the largest of the New
York “Morgan banks,” which were “noted for their high standing and
conservative banking practices.” The brokers stressed that the cash and
government securities held by the bank were equal to fifty percent of
deposits, an extremely safe ratio. They also noted Guaranty had paid
dividends every year since 1892, the year after the bank was purchased by
the Mutual Life, even in years of national economic recession.10
On paper, Guaranty weathered the Depression well. On a deeper level
the core purposes and functions of the bank were challenged and then
transformed over the course of the 1930s. Perhaps most importantly,
because of the Depression the public and the government lost faith in the
pre–1929 system. In the wake of the anti-banker backlash were new federal
regulations, investigations, humiliation, and lawsuits. All these left Stetson
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and his colleagues in a brave new world, one that required new ways of
thinking and imposed new boundaries.
During the 1920s, Guaranty had greatly expanded its investment
banking activities. This was a common strategy among New York
commercial banks, including Chase and National City. Most notably, as
already discussed, Guaranty created the Guaranty Company, a wholly
owned subsidiary headed by Harold Stanley. The Guaranty Company
contributed to the growth of retail stock marketing in the United States by
opening sales offices across the country. In general, investment banking was
an exceptionally profitable line of business that related well to the bank’s
other corporate services. Stetson’s participation in the Coca-Cola sale and
his work with Harriman and Rionda suggest the large opportunities
presented by investment banking.11
At the time, the investment banking world was characterized by a strict
hierarchy. Smaller firms that dealt in securities developed their own niches,
such as municipal or retailer issues, but the top firms, such as J. P. Morgan,
managed and assembled syndicates for a wide range of businesses. An
uncooperative firm could be punished by being given a small allocation of a
desirable issue, or even drummed out of the opportunity. Competition
could have altered the composition of the institutional landscape, but some
of the more powerful firms, including Morgan, were so entrenched they
could not be unseated. This sort of oligopoly, of which the Morgandirected Guaranty was a part, irritated many consumers, political leaders,
and would-be competitors. Further, since neither the top firms nor
government supervised all issues, there was a substantial potential for
mismanagement. Fraud occurred, especially as a stock market mania created
a supply of questionable securities.12
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By 1929, commercial and investment banks shared the securities
business. Traditionally, commercial banks such as Guaranty made money by
taking deposits and making loans, taking a spread between the interest rate
they paid depositors and the interest rate they charged borrowers. They
might provide other services, such as trust work or services geared to
business, including international business. An investment bank, by contrast,
raised capital from investors on behalf of corporations and governments
that issued securities. The investment bank made money by charging fees to
the issuer and sometimes by holding the securities on its own books until
their prices rose, then selling and creating an even greater profit. The
investment bank might also sell part or all of the issue to other banks and to
the public. Deciding how big an issue to float, on what terms, and at what
rate of return could be extremely profitable, as the Coca-Cola sale
demonstrated.13
Of course, the difference between the two types of banks is an
oversimplification, because during the booming 1920s different kinds of
banks often worked together, had the same ownership, or performed both
commercial and investment functions. Again, Stetson’s relationships with
Guaranty, Coca-Cola, Harriman, and Cuban sugar demonstrate how the
arrangements could work. The important point is that before 1929, banks,
in particular banks like Stetson’s Guaranty, operated in a business and legal
environment in which the tools of financing were extremely flexible. Skilled
relationship bankers, including Stetson, could make a loan (commercial
banking) or underwrite a security (investment banking), or both. The line
between commercial and investment tasks was blurred, and after World
War I Guaranty was among the leading practitioners of both kinds of
banking. In fact, Stetson’s early career at Guaranty shows precisely how this
kind of pre-Depression banking worked at its fundamental levels. Acting on
both commercial and investment matters, Stetson could fulfill the functions
of “rainmaker” and relationship banker for Guaranty and its clients, in the
13
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process shaping what interests received capital and therefore helping to
determine the direction of the economy.

Backlash
The mingling of commercial and investment banking functions was
widely blamed for the Crash and its disastrous aftermath. Banks were seen
to have abused the trust of depositors and public investors. The federal
government under Roosevelt wanted Wall Street bankers to embrace
meaningful remedies, but most, including Stetson, opposed change. The
mood was perhaps best expressed in a spectacular Senate investigation
directed by attorney Ferdinand Pecora. Pecora was a perfect foil for the big
banks. A tough Italian immigrant from New York whose government salary
was a mere $250 a month, in the 1920s he had prosecuted other tough guys
while working in the United States Attorney’s office in Manhattan. The
hearings started in early 1933 and lasted over a year. Roosevelt encouraged
Pecora’s righteous indignation, having campaigned that as president he
would expose and punish “the ruthless manipulation of professional
gamblers and the corporate system.”14
For Wall Street banks, the Pecora hearings were a public relations
nightmare. They revealed to an irritated public that New York bankers had
immense power but had often refused any public accountability. The Pecora
hearings were openly hostile to banks and successfully painted the bankers
as self-serving and dishonest. Some bankers were forced to admit that their
actions had not been ethical and had even harmed the institutions that
employed them.15
Stetson knew or had worked with several of the prime targets of the
hearings. For example, Pecora disclosed that Chase President Albert
Wiggin, with whom Stetson collaborated on the Coca-Cola deal, had
anticipated price declines and dumped shares in his own bank in 1929,
14
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driving Chase shares downward. He made a fortune from it, using the same
foreign corporations that obtained discounted Coca-Cola stock ten years
earlier to hide the short-selling and avoid taxes. Thomas Lamont’s son
engaged in “wash sales” to avoid paying taxes by selling a stock in one tax
year only to buy it back in the next year. Despite great personal wealth, he
avoided income taxes in a manner not available to the average wage
earner.16
After some bankers complained about the circus-like atmosphere of the
hearings, Jack Morgan was embarrassed by Ringling Brothers sending over
a midget to sit on his lap. In one exchange, Morgan admitted to the
chairman of the Senate Committee that the honorable Senator would not
be allowed to open an account at J. P. Morgan, even in the amount of
$100,000. This was more than twice the amount an average American
worker could expect to earn in an entire lifetime. Yet according to Morgan,
his bank benefited the public by serving major corporations and their
executives, not just anyone, such as a United States Senator, with $100,000
to deposit. Then it emerged that Jack Morgan had not paid federal income
taxes from 1930 to 1933 and that not one of the twenty very wealthy
Morgan partners paid income taxes in 1932 and 1933.17
The real problem for Morgan and his Wall Street allies was not
legalistic arguments over tax liability. Instead, the Pecora hearings exposed
very real fraud, insider trading, excessive banking fees, special privileges to
friends, and monopoly in a vastly important business that had an enormous
impact on the public. Wall Street did not claim that its operations were
limited to private interests. Instead, Wall Street openly admitted its public
function. Thus, Morgan could not claim to be both beneficial to the public
through sophisticated investing and yet immune to any public scrutiny
when there was compelling evidence of unethical behavior in banking or the
securities markets. Blatant insider trading and deceptive stock manipulation
were rampant. One “friend” would call another to mention that such-andsuch a stock was available privately or should be quickly sold. In the end,
16
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many so-called Captains of Wall Street appeared ridiculous and dishonest,
the beneficiaries of inside deals and outright lies to the “suckers” on the
outside.18
Stetson did not testify at the Pecora Hearings (Guaranty’s president
Bill Potter did), but he and his bank certainly felt its backlash. This not only
took the form of hostility from the public, but also revolutionary federal
regulation. New laws included the Banking Act of 1933, or Glass-Steagall;
the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934; the Banking Act of 1935; and the
Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935. Together, they created
deposit insurance, separated commercial banks from their investment
affiliates, imposed regulation on the issue and marketing of securities,
disqualified certain persons from serving as bank directors, centralized
control over money through the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, and provided a framework for the regulation of public utility
holding companies. Like most of his Wall Street colleagues, Stetson
opposed much of the new legislation or at least wanted it written and
enforced in a way favorable to bankers. In particular, he criticized newly
adopted federal deposit insurance, paid for by banks, as something that
would create a disincentive for sound banking. Of course, the insurance was
intended to create an incentive for smaller depositors, the sort of persons
not customers at Stetson’s elite bank, to open banking accounts rather than
hoard assets. Critical attitudes by bankers such as Stetson were in turn
criticized by the press as selfish. As for the Securities Act of 1933, it
established a federally regulated procedure for issuing securities to the
public. The idea was to provide investors with truthful and complete
information about proposed issues. For the first time, a federal agency, the
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Securities and Exchange Commission, was charged with overseeing the
1933 Act and other crucial aspects of the investment process.19
Perhaps most important for Stetson and Guaranty was the GlassSteagall Act of 1933, which banned the mingling of commercial and
investment bank functions by requiring their separation. Not surprisingly,
Stetson and his bank vigorously opposed Glass-Steagall, as the legislation
aimed directly at limiting their most profitable business. After the law was
adopted, Guaranty had one year to choose whether it would operate in the
future as an investment or commercial bank. The effect of Glass-Steagall
cannot be underestimated. In fact, an entire generation of experienced
bankers, men such as Stetson who depended on ongoing relationships and
worked at commercial banks, suddenly had a large chunk of their livelihood
taken away. Given its number of depositors and its profitable trust and
business lending operations, Guaranty chose to become a commercial bank.
As a result, the company had to dispose of the securities subsidiary, the
Guaranty Company, which went into liquidation in June 1934. President
Potter hysterically complained that because the new Securities Acts entailed
“such great risks and such unpredictable responsibilities on issuing
corporations and their directors and upon dealers in securities, that the
amounts of sound investment securities will be so limited, and the risk in
dealing with them so great, that it will not be possible profitably to continue
the securities business under the present terms of the Securities Act.”
Thanks to the collapse of public confidence, Stetson and Guaranty entered
a more regulated era in banking.20
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Glass-Steagall also imposed limits on interest rates, held commercial
banks to certain types of investments, constrained their securities
underwriting to municipal notes and bonds, limited the geographic reach of
banks, and mandated deposit insurance. Investment banks, in contrast, were
allowed to underwrite public offerings of new securities, both equity and
debt issues. They could trade securities and finance of mergers and
acquisitions. But of course they were subject to the regulations of the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the new securities laws.21
Finally, the new regulatory environment mandated an exodus of
private bankers and the directors of other banks from Guaranty’s board.
The deadline for this purge was delayed until 1940, but even then
approximately one-fifth of the Guaranty’s directors fell within the ban.
They included some of its more important and long-standing members:
Averell Harriman, Robert Goelet, George Whitney, and Thomas Lamont.
Lamont’s departure, because it symbolized a variety of divorce from
Morgan, caused much gnashing of teeth. Early in 1940 Guaranty sought a
formal legal opinion from the Davis Polk law firm regarding Lamont’s
status. It agreed he could not remain. On 21 March 1940, Lamont wrote a
letter of resignation to Potter, expressing his “strong attachment” to the
company. He bought his first shares of Guaranty and became a director in
1910, even before he was a Morgan partner. He had served as chairman of
the executive committee since 1912, the year before J. P. Morgan Sr.’s
death. Potter’s reply revealed the depth of the Morgan link: “I personally
succeed in the new environment: “I haven’t the slightest criticism of Bill [Potter] or
Len [Conway]—they have done a wonderful job and that is the reason for our
strong position today but there are going to be new laws and changes which we
must meet and beat the rest of the Banks in operating under them. You are the
fellow that has the imagination and the ingenuity to aid tremendously in doing
that.” Charles H. Sabin to Eugene W. Stetson, 15 March 1933, Eugene W. Stetson
Papers. Sabin died a few months later.
21
Chernow, House of Morgan, 374–77; Geisst, Wall Street, 230–31. J. P. Morgan
& Co. chose to become a commercial bank, separating itself from its securities
business, Morgan Stanley. Chernow, House of Morgan, 385–87. In the ensuing
decades political support for the separation of investment and commercial banking
faded, leading eventually to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which
overturned Glass-Steagall’s prohibition of bank’s offering both investment and
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have a distinct sense of loss in parting with you as a director of this
company, for in the past twenty years [since the Mercantile Bank debacle] it
has been a great comfort to me to feel that I was free to call upon you for
advice on countless occasions.” By 1941 the board no longer contained the
large number of private bankers that had characterized it since the Morganled mergers of the early 1910s. Now the heads of large industrial, utility,
food, transportation, and emerging technology companies, such as Duke
Power, American Cynamid, Union Pacific, AT&T, Campbell Soup, the
Pennsylvania Railroad, A&P, Anaconda Copper, IBM, and General
Electric, filled the bank’s board seats. It was Stetson’s task to prosper in this
new environment.22

Litwin
There is a one particularly strong example of how the Crash and the
subsequent reaction against Wall Street banks directly affected Stetson. A
Depression-induced Congressional investigation, not completed until 1940,
looked into the reorganization and receivership of the Chicago, Milwaukee,
and St. Paul Railway. The final report, issued by Senators Burton K.
Wheeler and Harry S. Truman, presented a tale of conflict of interest,
excessive fees, inadequate representation of security holders, and a final
reorganization that virtually guaranteed the railroad’s failure.23
The investigation spawned a legal dispute, Litwin v. Allen,24 a landmark
in the American law of director responsibility. The case arose out of several
22
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decisions of Morgan and Guaranty from the late 1920s through the mid–
1930s. Guaranty directors, including Stetson, had approved loans to
companies owned by brothers Oris P. and Mantis J. Van Sweringen of
Cleveland. The Van Sweringens, who became notorious to the public as a
result of the Pecora investigation, used a holding company to acquire
control of several railroads, including the Missouri Pacific. The Van
Sweringen properties were heavily indebted to J. P. Morgan & Co. and
Guaranty. Because Morgan had substantial representation on Guaranty’s
board at the time of the loan decisions, the plaintiffs in Litwin alleged that
Morgan’s pressure caused Guaranty to approve bad investments in order to
prop up the faltering Van Sweringen interests. The plaintiffs in Litwin were
Guaranty shareholders who sued when the Van Sweringens defaulted. Both
Morgan and Guaranty, their shareholders that is, lost millions as a result of
the collapse.25
The plaintiffs filed the original complaint in New York state court
against more than seventy defendants in May 1937. Because he was a
member of the Guaranty board at the time of the transactions, Stetson was
one of the defendants. Also sued was Guaranty, as well as Bill Potter and
other Guaranty officers and directors. J. P. Morgan partners were among
the defendants: Lamont, Jack Morgan, and Russell Leffingwell, for example.
Coincidentally, apart from the Litwin matter, Stetson had been acquainted
with the Van Sweringens through Bob Woodruff and the Cleveland-based
White Motor Company. Obviously, it was a small financial world, perhaps
too small.26
A primary theme of Depression-era Congressional investigations, such
as the Pecora Hearings, was banking’s monopolistic character, particularly
the broad reach of the Morgan firm. The Litwin complaint adopted this
theme, focusing on Morgan’s influence at Guaranty. According to the
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plaintiffs, the Morgan firm engaged in a conspiracy to “waste, dissipate, and
improperly use [Guaranty’s] funds.” The plaintiffs alleged that Guaranty,
the Guaranty Company, and Morgan jointly floated securities of the
Alleghany Corporation, a holding company headed by the Van Sweringens.
The banks then purchased Missouri Pacific bonds from the Van Sweringens
for $10.5 million, $3 million of which came from Guaranty. The plaintiffs
claimed that Guaranty directors were negligent because, at the time, the
Van Sweringens were clearly in serious financial trouble and already unable
to repay existing loans. At its core, the complaint was that Guaranty,
because of its cozy relationships with Morgan and the Van Sweringens,
squandered bank assets.27
Guaranty and the other defendants vigorously denied any improper
influence. In fact, they understood that to admit wrongdoing for this sort of
transaction would be to concede that the fundamental character of Wall
Street financing was wrongful, because practically every big deal involved
influence and cooperation among banks. Their attorneys, including the
prominent Davis Polk firm, tried to portray the lawsuit as an attempt by
overly litigious persons, some of whom were not real shareholders, to cash
in on the Depression’s anti-banker sentiment. In fact, there is some
evidence that David Feiner, one of the plaintiffs, may have had experience
in making similar claims. At any rate, the defendants sought to dismiss a
number of shareholders from the case on the ground that they had not
legally owned shares in Guaranty. This wrangling produced a new
complaint in June 1938 that seemed to settle the standing of the plaintiffs to
bring the suit. In the end, the plaintiffs represented only thirty-six of
Guaranty’s 900,000 outstanding shares. The June 1938 complaint
essentially repeated earlier claims, arguing the Van Sweringen arrangement
“was for the accommodation and at the behest of the defendant J. P.
Morgan & Co. and was for its benefit and profit.”28
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In December 1940, Justice Bernard L. Shientag of the New York
Supreme Court in Manhattan issued a 119-page ruling that largely
vindicated Guaranty, Morgan, and their officers and directors, including
Stetson. Despite the plaintiffs’ sweeping claims of malfeasance, by the time
the case came to trial only four transactions were still under scrutiny: the
purchase of Alleghany Corporation common stock by Morgan partners in
January 1929; the October 1930, participation by Guaranty Trust and the
Guaranty Company in the purchase of $3 million of Missouri Pacific bonds
from the Alleghany Corporation, with an option to the seller to repurchase
them in six months; the participation by Guaranty Trust to the extent of
$11 million in a $39 million loan to certain Van Sweringen enterprises,
which was later defaulted on; and the auction of the collateral on this loan
in 1935. The court ruled in favor of the defendants on all issues except those
involving the Missouri Pacific bonds.29
As for the first issue, the stock purchase, the plaintiffs’ claim was that
officers and directors of the Guaranty Company and Guaranty, probably
including Stetson, were given an opportunity to purchase common stock of
the newly formed Alleghany Corporation. Alleghany was intended as a
holding company to provide funds for investment in railroad securities.
When Alleghany was organized, in early 1929, J. P. Morgan purchased a
large amount of its common and preferred stock and bonds. In turn,
Morgan entered into an agreement with the Guaranty Company that the
latter would undertake to sell the public a large number of the common
shares and all of the preferred shares. But Morgan retained many common
shares, intending to sell them, according to Morgan partner George
Whitney, “to men with whom we had had business relations, who we knew
were aware of all the implications of buying the common stock of a holding
company.”30
One of these men was Guaranty’s Potter, to whom Whitney offered
40,000 shares. Potter accepted 5,000 shares for himself and sold the rest to
Guaranty associates, probably including Stetson. The Litwin plaintiffs
complained because the common shares increased in value and were then
sold for a profit. As a result, they thought the 40,000 shares offered to
29
30
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Potter represented a proper business opportunity for Guaranty, not a
personal opportunity for Potter and other Guaranty personnel. Justice
Shientag, however, disagreed, holding that the Guaranty Company had no
business interest in obtaining the 40,000 shares. Nonetheless, the offer
confirmed the close connection between Guaranty and Morgan. According
to George Whitney, there was nothing unusual about a Morgan partner’s
friendly phone call to Guaranty’s president offering him, for personal gain,
almost $1 million in pre-public sale stock that Guaranty would later market
to the public for a substantial profit.31
The court also seemed to have little trouble disposing of the plaintiffs’
claims that a $39.5 million loan to the Van Sweringens in October 1930,
later defaulted upon, was negligence caused by Morgan’s self-dealing.
Guaranty participated in this loan to the extent of $11 million. The loan,
like the stock issue, showed the close cooperation between Morgan,
Guaranty, and other leading New York banks. The loan was part of a plan
to shore up a previous $30 million note to the Van Sweringen Corporation,
which was issued by the Guaranty Company. In October 1930 the security
offered by the Van Sweringens was no longer sufficient to support the note.
The Van Sweringens came to New York and met with Lamont, Harold
Stanley, Potter, and a few others and asked Guaranty and Morgan “as
parties interested in their affairs, to come to their relief by giving them a
loan.” Not surprisingly, the request disappointed the bankers. Yet Guaranty
and Morgan decided to consider a collateralized loan. They feared a Van
Sweringen collapse would have a huge ripple effect on the already suffering
equity markets. Further, as Lamont testified, in the fall of 1930 there was
still hope for a quick recovery: “Nobody knew that Central Europe was
going to blow up, nor that Great Britain was going off the gold standard
and that there was to be a general collapse.”32
In the end, the banks made a $39.5 million loan. Morgan contributed
$11 million, Guaranty $11 million, Chase National $5.5 million, National
City $4.5 million, First National Bank, actually George F. Baker personally,
$4.5 million, and Bankers Trust put in $3 million. The work was
accomplished hurriedly, within a matter of weeks. But, according to Justice
31
32
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Shientag, the Litwin plaintiffs did not establish either self-serving activity or
negligence by Guaranty or Morgan in constructing the loan. Morgan, in
particular, had no special interest in the original loan. As trustee, that was
Guaranty’s problem. The court even thought this suggested the partners at
“J. P. Morgan & Co. were influenced by the Trust Company, rather than it
by J. P. Morgan.”33
Further, in challenging the value of the security for the second loan,
the plaintiffs were in the awkward position of questioning the abilities of
men such as Guaranty directors Henry De Forest, former chairman of the
Southern Pacific Railroad, Albert Harris, vice president of the New York
Central, and Averell Harriman, a member of the executive committee of the
Union Pacific, to evaluate railroad property. The court ruled the defendants
took reasonable precaution and made no personal profits.34
The court took little time in ruling against the plaintiffs on a third
claim: when the loan went into default and the collateral was auctioned,
Morgan and Guaranty officers conspired with the Van Sweringens to allow
a new corporation controlled by the Van Sweringens to obtain the collateral
at a ridiculously low price. The court believed the collateral auction was
properly advertised and that the banks had no agreement or knowledge that
the Van Sweringens would offer any bid. The argument that “J. P. Morgan
& Co. should conspire with the Van Sweringens to the end of throwing
away a large amount of their own money in order to retain the good will
and secure the future business of persons known to be insolvent, is a
supposition passing the limits of probability.” The court also found there
was no evidence that Morgan influenced Guaranty or any other
sophisticated creditors about the auction.35
A fourth claim, concerning Guaranty’s purchase of Missouri Pacific
debentures, produced a different result: here the court believed the bankers
were at fault. On 16 October 1930, just prior to the $39 million dollar loan,
Guaranty’s board approved the purchase of Missouri Pacific debentures
from Alleghany, with an option allowing Alleghany to repurchase the bonds
at the original purchase price within six months. The deal required
33
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Guaranty to purchase $3 million in bonds and Morgan to purchase $4.5
million in bonds; the First National Bank would buy the remaining bonds
for $3 million. Although ostensibly an investment, the arrangement was
actually a loan. Legally, however, it could not be structured as such because
Alleghany had reached the limits of its corporate borrowing authority. Not
long after the “investment,” the Depression deepened, the Missouri Pacific
went under, and the unsecured bonds went into default. The bonds lost
more than ten percent of their value in the six months after the purchase,
and of course Alleghany did not repurchase them under its option. The
Litwin plaintiffs complained that the arrangement allowed Alleghany to
benefit from any rise in price in the six months option period while
Guaranty would suffer any losses. For Guaranty the deal was a “heads you
win, tails I lose” transaction.36
Justice Shientag concluded that the option arrangement was clearly
negligence: “What sound reason is there for a bank, desiring to make an
investment, short term or otherwise, to buy securities under an arrangement
whereby any appreciation will inure to the benefit of the seller and any loss
will be borne by the bank?” But Guaranty had a very telling answer, one
that summed up the logic of relationship banking: the deal was justified
simply because of the overall relationship with the customer. Guaranty
accepted a losing “investment” in order to accommodate a valuable longterm client. The court, however, did not think this was an adequate reason
in law and found Guaranty’s action “so improvident, so risky, so unusual
and unnecessary as to be contrary to fundamental conceptions of prudent
banking practice.” All of the directors who voted for it, including Harriman,
Lamont, Potter, and Stetson were personally liable for negligence. Yet the
court did not believe that, in making the mistake, there was any undue
influence by Morgan or that there was any bad faith or self-dealing.37
Justice Shientag appointed a referee to consider appropriate damages.
Initially, Guaranty offered $750,000 to settle the claim. Given that the loss
from the bond deal was allegedly more than $2 million, the plaintiffs
naturally felt the offer was inadequate. They seemed to want at least $1
million, which would mean each defendant’s individual share would be
36
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about $50,000. The defendants rejected this deal. Eventually, however, at a
hearing on 28 April 1941, the court approved a final undisclosed settlement
and entered judgment. The three-year old dispute was over. The bankers
wanted out, as by 1941 it must have seemed a troublesome relic of an
unpleasant era. Bill Potter and Lamont approved the settlement, as did
Stetson, who by this time was Guaranty’s president.38
Litwin illustrates a number of significant points about Stetson’s
experience as a Guaranty banker. The case certainly demonstrates the close
connections between Guaranty, the Guaranty Company, and Morgan.
Morgan felt comfortable involving Guaranty and Guaranty officers and
directors in investment opportunities and even expected them to use bank
resources to help provide bailouts in critical situations. It had clout, in the
persons of Lamont and George Whitney, on the Guaranty board. Lamont
and Potter moved together to “participate” in loans, purchase securities, and
make decisions related to the sale of collateral on defaulted loans. This kind
of closeness created enormous potential for conflicts of interest. Were the
interests of Guaranty officers, Morgan partners, Guaranty shareholders, and
clients of Guaranty and Morgan always the same? The mere appearance of
self-dealing, much less the sort of private profit taking as occurred here,
raised questions about the stewardship of clients’ and investors’ funds.
Perhaps most importantly, Litwin demonstrated key attributes of
relationship banking as practiced by Stetson and Guaranty. The Van
Sweringens were viewed as valuable clients. So valuable, in fact, that
Morgan, Guaranty, and other New York banks structured a $30 million
loan for them in short order despite obvious trouble signs. When sued by
disgruntled shareholders for the ensuing collapse, Guaranty openly
admitted that client relations were among the reasons it approved the
Missouri Pacific bond deal, a deceptive and costly end run around legal
lending limits. Thus, good relationship banking was such a dominant ethos
that it was viewed as a legal defense to short-term unfavorable banking
practices and results. On the whole, however, the Litwin result gave bankers
38
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wide discretion, confirming the basic preferences inherent in relationship
banking even after the Crash and its regulatory aftermath. Only extreme
favoritism—guaranteed loss, in fact, was punished. Legally, at least, there
was a future for relationship banking.

Perspectives
The Crash, hard times, and the new role for banks fashioned during
the 1930s transformed institutions, including Guaranty. Pecora, federal
laws, and even Litwin established that a newly vigilant government and a
less passive public would not tolerate the more blatant forms of cronyism.
The new rules sought to impose a particular balance between capital
markets and public welfare. The combination of regulatory and market
pressures felt by Guaranty in 1940 contrasted sharply with the freewheeling world of Wall Street in 1916, when Stetson came to New York.
Stetson was dismayed that the sort of conflicts of interest inherent in
relationship banking became a target for federal regulation. He believed his
personal variety of “honorable” relationship banking should be
distinguished from the kind of self-dealing that brought public scorn on
bankers. He thought the new sort of government oversight and involvement
in private business practices was doomed to constrict finance. Stetson
presumed dishonest bankers would get their due from bankers and
customers who would refuse to deal with them, or perhaps from the
criminal law of fraud or theft. He knew that even when there was no hard
evidence of improper actions, the mere suspicion of unethical practices
could destroy confidence in an individual or institution. This should be
enough to deter the worst offenses.
Stetson’s view underestimated the hardships of the Depression and
neglected the fact that the purpose of many of the new regulations was to
define wrongdoing and prevent it before it happened—especially in an
economy increasingly defined by arms-length transactions in which the
parties had little opportunity to educate themselves as to the trustworthiness
of sellers of goods or services. Few Americans, unlike the Van Sweringens,
Bob Woodruff, or Averell Harriman, had access to the information
controlled by Guaranty or Morgan. Relying on after-the-fact impressions of
proper “ethics” or even criminal prosecution did not prevent the kind of
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self-dealing that characterized important segments of Wall Street banking
in the 1920s. The new banking and securities laws reflected the public’s
sense that all financial institutions were capable of impropriety without
being detected and that only constant oversight from outside the industry,
not the market or traditional criminal law, could address the problem in a
proactive manner. In the final analysis, banking had too many “public”
dimensions. It was too important to tempt another catastrophe.
Stetson was undoubtedly familiar with this argument. But he adhered
to the principle that in banking integrity and trust were matters between
individuals and private institutions. He understood conflicts of interest
existed, but he believed a banker could and usually would refuse to exploit
them. He thought that although bankers were in a position to use the
information they worked with for personal gain, to have a conflict of
interest was not in and of itself evidence of wrongdoing. The obvious
limitation to this view is that there will always be disagreement about what
is improper and unethical among individuals. In Stetson’s day, for example,
it was neither illegal nor considered improper to use advance knowledge of
the excellence or worthlessness of a security for personal gain. The new
securities laws, however, defined this as illegal insider trading that
threatened the credibility and functioning of the market.
Did the passing of new laws change the way bankers such as Stetson
behaved, even as they disagreed with them? Neither Pecora, Congress, nor
Roosevelt thought law could eliminate all deceptive behavior. The goal of
banking regulation was much more modest: to create a climate that would
deter swindling and restore confidence in the investment markets.
Nonetheless, the new environment did in fact affect the behavior of even an
ethically-minded banker, such as Stetson. After 1933, if Stetson
recommended a security in a public offering, as he did to his sons during
World War II, it would be accompanied by the public prospectus. But
compliance came at a heavy personal cost. Stetson enjoyed banking because
of its relationships, as evidence by his friendships with Lamont, Woodruff,
Watson, Rionda, and Harriman. After the early 1930s, the conditions for
creating such relationships were fundamentally altered. The modern
banking landscaped emerged partly as a result of what happened in the
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1930s. Stetson was at the center of this change, and he and his bank felt its
consequences deeply.

10
Relationships
Even during the dark days of the Depression, Gene Stetson loved to
organize men’s business dinners. They were one of his favorite ways of
building relationships with corporate executives. The dinners were a time to
relax and to tell and hear some great stories. Stetson liked to hold the events
at elite places, and his colleagues at Guaranty, Charles Sabin and Bill Potter,
arranged for him to join an exclusive venue, the Links Club, an oasis in
Manhattan for corporate bosses.1
One night in 1939 Stetson hosted a men’s dinner at the Links in honor
of Sidney Weinberg, the senior partner of the investment firm Goldman
Sachs. Protestants did not generally socialize with their Jewish colleagues on
Wall Street. But Stetson enjoyed entertaining, and he recognized Weinberg
had done a lot for Goldman Sachs and for American business. Weinberg
joined Goldman Sachs in 1907 and became partner in 1927, a position he
held until his death in 1969. Weinberg was especially interested in linking
business and government, and he advised a number of American Presidents.
In 1933, he helped found the Business Council (Averell Harriman headed it
in the late 1930s), an organization which gave corporate executives an
opportunity to discuss and promote certain govern-ment policies. At the
time of Stetson’s dinner, Weinberg was about to take a leave of absence
from his firm to become assistant to the chairman of the War Production
Board. He was later named vice-chairman of that board and eventually
awarded the United States Medal of Merit for this service.2
1
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Stetson’s dinners might seem trivial, but they reflected his determined
persistence in developing relationships inside and outside the bank. Between
1916 and the 1950s, this focus on relationships helped Stetson advance from
vice president to president and then chairman of Guaranty. The emphasis
thus far in this study has been on Stetson’s major outside relationships, such
as with Coca-Cola, Cuban sugar, Tom Watson of IBM, and Averell
Harriman. Alone, however, these were not enough to propel Stetson to the
top of Guaranty. By describing the broader sweep of Stetson’s banking
relationships, his own career as well as the nature of New York banking
during his life becomes clearer.

Professional Director
In 1928, Guaranty Trust had twenty-four vice presidents, each of
whom competed for the highest positions in the bank. Eventually, Stetson
was a winner in this competition. He acted in ways that received the
approval of Bill Potter, and equally important, the Morgan men who had
great influence in the company. In part, this was demonstrated by Stet-son’s
election as a director of the Guaranty Company in 1927, as a director of
Guaranty Trust in early 1928, and as a director of the restructured and
larger Guaranty created by Guaranty’s merger with the National Bank of
Commerce in 1929.3
Equally impressive was Stetson’s ability to place himself on the boards
of client corporations. Even among the most successful of Wall Street
bankers Stetson’s performance in this regard was outstanding. Stetson not
only held wide-ranging and influential board memberships, but he used
them to cement banking relationships, to get leads for new business, to
enhance his social life, and to link clients to one another. In many cases, the
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connections happily served the interests of several parties, such as with
Coca-Cola and its supplier Air Reduction. In other instances, however, as
when Stetson served on the boards of both Coca-Cola and Canada Dry,
there were potential conflicts of interest.
Stetson’s career as a kind of professional director started at the very
beginning of his association with Guaranty. In 1919 he was already a
director of the Asia Banking Corporation, Bibb Manufacturing Company,
Italian Discount and Trust Company, the Morris Plan Company of New
York, and Pierce Oil Company. By the early 1920s he had added another
twelve corporate directorships, including Barnsdall Corporation; The CocaCola Company; Cuba Cane Sugar; European Textile Corporation; Fidelitas
Realty; Foreign Bond and Share Corporation; Guaranty Company;
Independent Warehouses, Inc. (of which he was also president); Mercantile
Bank of the Americas; Textile Banking Company; W. A. Harriman &
Company; and the Warehouse Finance Corporation. Ten years later, in the
early 1930s, Stetson sat on even more boards, including Automatic
Registering Machine; Aviation Corporation; New York Petroleum Royalty
Corporation; Niagara Shares Corporation; Selected Industries; Small Issues
Corporation; Canada Dry; White Motor Company; Vick Financial
Corporation; French-American Banking Corporation; United Stores
Corporation; Illinois Central Railroad; Tobacco Products Companies of
Delaware and New Jersey; United Drug Company; W. A. Harriman
Securities; Ward Baking Company; U.S. Industrial Alcohol; Pure Carbonic;
Southeastern Compress and Warehouse Company and Guaranty Trust.4
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Not only did Stetson serve on these boards for long periods, but he was
an extremely active director, typically serving on executive committees.
Given that executive committees often met on a weekly basis, this meant
Stetson spent a large amount of his time helping to run companies that were
Guaranty clients. These businesses were diverse, specializing in everything
from textiles and beverages to transportation and investments. Altogether,
for Stetson, his work as a director was the crucial institutional component of
relationship banking from the 1920s through the 1940s.5
A key aspect of this board work, and one that helps to explain his
popularity as a board member, was Stetson’s interest in advertising. A hint
of this has already been seen with Coca-Cola, especially in his valuation of
the drink maker’s trademark. Throughout his career Stetson viewed
advertising as a valuable source of corporate worth for any company,
especially in the new age of national brands and interstate retailers. As
lenders, Stetson argued that banks should evaluate the “intangible good-will
created through intelligent sales efforts applied to a product of
unquestioned merit.” In the 1920s, Stetson thought, there were plenty of
good examples: Coca-Cola, Proctor and Gamble, Beech-Nut, Aunt Jemima,
Old Dutch Cleanser, Victrola, and the cigarette industry generally.
Accordingly, companies built value in their trademarks by using advertising
to create confidence among consumers, which translated into instant
“character.” Like “character,” which Stetson believed was “the principal
collateral behind many loans and an important factor in all loans,” effective
advertising showed “that a firm’s product and its dealings with the buying
public have been honest and efficient, and gives other evidence that the
future conduct of a business will be on sound and ethical principles.”
Stetson further believed that even banks, usually stodgy about advertising,
should also seek the right kind of publicity. As he put it, progressive banks

2,000 shares of $100 par value stock. They paid dividends of $28,000 in 1924 and
1925. See Iola Wise Stetson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1932 WL 157 (B.T.A.
1932).
5
Ibid.
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“that have had that courage and vision are the institutions which are today
leading the financial world both in service rendered and in growth.”6

The Network
A reconstruction of Stetson’s actions as director in selected companies
helps demonstrate the intensely interconnected nature of his banking
practice. One example of the network effect was his association with Air
Reduction Company, a supplier of carbonation to soft drink companies,
among other products. Obviously Stetson’s knowledge and experience with
soft drink producers Coca-Cola and Canada Dry were useful to Air
Reduction. In fact, there is evidence that Stetson tried to engineer a merger
of one of the soft drink companies with Air Reduction, thereby combining
syrup, water, and fizz.
Air Reduction was organized in November 1916, the same month
Stetson moved to New York. The company’s products evolved from new
technology for separating oxygen from air. Purified oxygen was especially
useful after the development of the oxygen and acetylene welding torch, the
company’s core business. During the 1920s Air Reduction expanded into
carbon dioxide production, a necessary ingredient of the rapidly expanding
soft drinks industry. Carbon dioxide also happened to be a by-product of
the manufacture of ethyl alcohol, the primary product of U.S. Industrial
Alcohol. This fortuity of chemistry led to a joint venture between Air
Reduction and U.S. Industrial Alcohol and the formation of Pure Carbonic,
Inc., eventually an Air Reduction subsidiary. Stetson was elected to the
boards of all three companies: Air Reduction, U.S. Industrial Alcohol, and
Pure Carbonic. By 1941 Air Reduction consisted of five separate
corporations, each focused on different aspects of gas production. In the

6

Eugene W. Stetson, “‘Advertising Good-Will’ as a Bankable Asset,” The Red
Barrel 3 (May 1924): 3–5. Nine years later Stetson wrote a similar article praising
sound advertising, but from the standpoint of the banker-as-director. Eugene W.
Stetson, “Banker Sees Continuing Need of Advertising,” Printers’ Ink (23
November 1933): 43–45.
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1940s and 1950s Air Reduction further expanded, most notably into medical
gases and chemicals.7
From Stetson’s vantage one thing clearly led to another. He was
already a director with U.S. Industrial Alcohol and Pure Carbonic before he
went on the Air Reduction board in the late 1930s. By this time Stetson
knew Charles Munson, the president of Air Reduction, who was also a
Guaranty director. When Air Reduction obtained twenty percent of U.S.
Industrial Alcohol’s stock in the early 1930s, Munson also became president
of Industrial Alcohol. Most likely Stetson and his bank influenced these
converging corporate structures and benefited from them through selling
bank services. There were other official relationships with Guaranty. For
example, Guaranty acted as Air Reduction’s stock registrar. Stetson served
on the Air Reduction board until 1959.8
Both Air Reduction and U.S. Industrial were complex technologybased organizations that adjusted to changing conditions through growth
and product modification. Between the mid–1930s and the late 1950s Air
Reduction’s assets grew from about $40 million to more than $225 million.
Its predominantly unionized employees peaked at over 8,000 in the mid–
1940s, working in more than 178 plants in 33 states. The company’s
products included not only carbon dioxide and oxygen, but also acetylene,
hydrogen, nitrogen, neon, anesthetic gases, and medical and welding
equipment. By the late 1950s, the welding portion of the business remained
dominant, but a shift in emphasis, and growth, had been achieved by
producing chemicals used in paints, plastics, and other materials. There was

7

Air Reduction Co., Inc., Air Reduction Co., Inc.: Air Reduction Sales Company,
National Carbide Corporation, Wilson Welder and Metals Co., Inc., Pure Carbonic, Inc.,
The Ohio Chemical & Mfg. Co. (New York: Air Reduction Co., Inc., 1941). Since
Stetson’s time, Air Reduction’s successors have been merged into the Germanbased Linde Group. On the Linde Group, see “About BOC,” http://www.bocgases.com/about_us/index.asp In the 1960s, Air Reduction became Airco, which in
turn was acquired by the UK’s global gas giant Brin’s Oxygen Co., Ltd., or BOC, in
1978. BOC’s 2006 acquirer, The Linde Group, operates in 70 countries, has more
than 50,000 employees, and had recent annual revenues of 12.7 billion euros.
8
Air Reduction Company, Inc., Annual Report, 1945 (New York: Air Reduction
Co., Inc., 1946); Air Reduction Company, Inc., Annual Report, 1959 (New York: Air
Reduction Co., Inc., 1960).
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also international expansion to Canada and Cuba. Typical customers
included chemical manufacturers, steel makers, railroads, the military, and
metal working operations.9
Stetson was director with U.S. Industrial Alcohol and its successor,
U.S. Industrial Chemicals, from the 1930s to the 1950s. U.S. Industrial
Alcohol formed in New York in 1906 after Congress exempted denatured
alcohol, alcohol made unfit to drink, from high federal taxes. Congress
reasoned that denatured alcohol could be produced from agricultural
products, thus benefiting farmers, manufacturers who would use the
product, and consumers. Molasses, a sugar derivative, was the company’s
primary source for industrial-grade alcohol. U.S. Industrial Alcohol was yet
another company with which Stetson was identified that enjoyed substantial
profits during World War I. The company helped produce gas masks and
acetone, the latter for gun powder.10
Flexible product and management strategies were a hallmark of U.S.
Industrial in the four decades after World War I. During Prohibition its
products were marketed as automobile anti-freeze, solvents, and carbon
dioxide for soft drinks. At the end of Prohibition, the company partnered
with National Distillers Products Corporation and formed Penn-Maryland,
Inc., to manufacture gin, rum, whiskey and other alcoholic beverages.
Another use for carbon dioxide, dry ice, was exploited through new levels of
cooperation with Air Reduction in the early 1940s. The outbreak of World
War II meant a shortage of rubber, and the company manufactured alcohol
that was essential in the production of synthetic rubber. Medical supplies
and solvents for war production became a high priority. In 1943 the
growing diversity of operations produced a merger with its subsidiary, U.S.
Industrial Chemicals. By 1947 more than sixty percent of the company’s
sales were in diversified chemicals used to produce insecticides, foods, and
perfume. This was approximately double the sales of the late 1930s, when
most business derived from anti-freeze and ethyl alcohol. In the 1950s, the
company increasingly emphasized research and developed plastics. In

9

Ibid.
Harry C. Barnes, From Molasses to the Moon: The Story of the U.S. Industrial
Chemicals Co. (New York: U.S. Industrial Chemicals Co., 1975) 31–36.
10
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addition, the company manufactured a wide variety of basic chemicals,
eliminating the liquor and anti-freeze operations.11
The histories of Air Reduction, Pure Carbonic, and U.S. Industrial fit
common themes in Stetson’s banking. The companies experienced
increasing size and scope through merger, joint ventures, and national and
international expansion. The companies were necessarily responsive not
only to technology, but to shifting political events, such as Prohibition and
world war. They took advantage of Stetson’s relationships with other
businesses, especially Coca-Cola and Canada Dry. Clearly Stetson was able
to cross industrial boundaries and operate comfortably in very different
kinds of business settings. A resolution adopted by the Air Reduction board
at Stetson’s death described him as having “many natural gifts, among them
a fine mind, great ability, a never-failing wisdom, and sound judgment.”12
Another example of Stetson’s diverse directorships was Ward Baking
Company. Ward, a nationally prominent mass-consumption food company,
had several interesting parallels with Coca-Cola. Most importantly, image
and advertising were essential to its success. Instead of conceding that bread
is an ordinary product, Ward promoted itself as a high technology
producer. Founded by an Irish immigrant, Hugh Ward, the business began
in Pittsburgh. In 1903 Ward’s first large bakery, described by the company
as both safe and scientific, opened in the city. A desire to exploit mass
production techniques caused the company to build new plants in Chicago,
Cleveland, Boston, and Providence. In 1911 the Ward family moved to
New York and organized the Ward Baking Company. The company
constructed two new bakeries in Manhattan, with a capacity of more than
500,000 loaves per day. Company literature carefully crafted an image that
stressed the “modern” and “clean” baking process. Ward bread was even
delivered by “clean cut, healthy salesmen who were uniformed and gloved
11

Ibid., 41–132. In 1951, Air Reduction sold its stock in U.S. Industrial to
National Distillers Products Corporation, which led to a merger between National
Distillers and U.S. Industrial Chemicals. Ibid., 110–11. U.S. Industrial’s operations
were eventually absorbed into the international chemical company Millenium
Chemicals, Inc., which in turn was acquired by Texas-based Lyondell, one of the
world’s largest chemical companies. See “Lyondell,” http://www.lyondell.
com/Lyondell/.
12
Bond, Stetson, 160.
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in white.” In 1921 Ward operated 16 bakeries in the northeast and
Midwest, making almost 90 kinds of breads, rolls, and cakes. In 1924, the
“goodwill,” or trade name, value of the company, including its “Tip Top”
brand, was estimated at $11 million, a sum about half that of Coca-Cola just
a few years earlier.13
Stetson’s banking also took him into the emerging world of the chain
store, retail operations with outlets in multiple locations. He became a
member of the boards of several interrelated consumer product companies,
including United Cigar Stores, Tobacco Products Corporation, and United
Stores Corporation. These businesses were national operations, engaged in
the manufacture and retailing of tobacco, candy, and grocery products.
Unfortunately, United Cigar Stores suffered bankruptcy in the 1930s.
Stetson was likely placed on the boards of these businesses because United
Stores, eventually the controlling force over the others, was a Guaranty
client. In fact, each of the companies had a long history with Guaranty
executives, including Potter and Harold Stanley, and some of the bank’s
most elite clients, such as James B. Duke. Guaranty handled the
reorganization of United Cigar in the early 1930s and Stetson was a
member of the United Stores board from the 1930s to the 1950s.14
13

There is no general history of Ward, but see Ward Baking Company, The
Story of Our Research Products (New York: Ward Baking Company, 1921) 66–71;
Ralph Borsodi, The Distribution Age: A Study in the Economy of Modern Distribution
(New York: D. Appleton, 1927); “Chronology of the Ward Family and the Ward
Baking Company,” http://www.wardbakingcompany.com/library/docs/AIB_WardBakingCo_hist_2003.pdf.
14
Hirson v. United Stores Corp., 34 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1942);
United Cigar Stores Company of America, Reorganization of the United Stores
Company of America (New York: United Cigar Stores of America and Guaranty
Trust Company of New York, 1933); Robert F. Durden, Bold Entrepreneur: A Life of
James B. Duke (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2003) 52; New York Times, 29
August 1933. The connection between Tobacco Products, United Cigar, and
United Stores is complex, but represents another good example of the interlocking
business interests involving Guaranty, Stetson, and his clients. Tobacco Products
Corporation was formed in Virginia in 1912, partly with financing from Guaranty.
George J. Whelan, head of the United Cigar Stores Company, was a stock owner of
Tobacco Products. In 1919, Tobacco Products acquired Philip Morris & Co.,
which had been jointly owned by British and American interests, and reorganized
the company. During the early 1920s, James B. Duke, the tobacco tycoon and
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Stetson’s work with the United Cigar bankruptcy was typical banker
labor in the Depression-mired 1930s. He frequently sat on creditors’ committees for insolvent or at-risk debtors, such as that for the International
Combustion Engine Corporation, which he chaired in 1933. In that
instance, he was charged with developing plans that could salvage the
company and satisfy its security holders. He criticized one reorganization
plan because it failed to provide preferred shares backed by a first mortgage
to creditors, failed to identify a credible new management, and failed to
provide sufficient working capital for the company to get back on its feet. In
the 1932 United Cigar reorganization the task was similar—to develop a
refinancing plan that would satisfy creditors and allow the company to
resume business.15

former Guaranty director, was named to assist in a possible merger of Tobacco
Products Corporation with United Retail Stores Corporation, the latter of which
had stock control of the United Cigar Stores Company and which had been
controlled by Duke since 1901. At this time, Guaranty’s Harold Stanley was a
Tobacco Products director. In 1929, United Stores Corporation was formed to
control United Cigar Stores, Union Tobacco Company, and Tobacco Products
Corporation. Stetson was put on the boards of both United Stores and Tobacco
Products. Many of the brands sold by this new combination are still well-known:
Philip Morris, Beech-Nut, Gillette, and Life Savers. At the head of United Stores
were brothers George and Frederick Morrow, two food industry leaders. And
among Stetson’s fellow directors at United Stores was John Foster Dulles, at the
time a lawyer at Sullivan & Cromwell and later Secretary of State under President
Dwight Eisenhower. See “Tobacco Merger?”, Time 1 (30 July 1923): 21; “Two
Morrows,” Time 14 (2 September 1929): 57; New York Times, 20 August 1929;
“Philip Morris International: Our History,” http://www.philipmorrisinternational.
com/PMINTL/pages/eng/ourbus/Our_history.asp; “The ‘Power Elite’ Controls
Both Sides,” http://www.smokershistory.com/power.htm (relying on reports in New
York Times).
15
“Press Release, Guaranty Trust Company of New York,” 24 April 1933, J. P.
Morgan & Co., Inc. Papers; New York Times, 10 April 1933; United Cigar Stores of
America, Reorganization of the United Stores Company. A similar situation may have
been involved when Stetson briefly sat on the board of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel
Corporation in the late 1930s. New York Times, 28 January 1937. The first American
Ritz-Carlton opened in Boston to much fanfare in 1927, and others soon followed
in New York, Philadelphia, and a few other cities. All, however, except the Boston
hotel had closed by 1940.
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Stetson’s work for United Stores led to his most important position
with a retailer. He became a director and member of the executive
committee of the McCrory Stores Corporation in the 1940s and 1950s.
McCrory was an early leader in mass retailing. In 1882, John G. McCrory
borrowed $550 from an uncle and opened his first variety store near
Philadelphia. He followed the then new five-and-dime Woolworth model,
which meant mass display of goods, high volume sales, and an extensive
chain of stores. By 1901, McCrory operated twenty stores, and in 1915,
more than 120. With headquarters in New York, McCrory sold more than
$14 million of goods in 1922. He retired from the business in 1931, just
before the Depression and the company’s bankruptcy. At this point George
and Frederick Morrow of United Stores acquired McCrory and its
competitor, McLellan Stores, which was also in bankruptcy.16
The Morrow-United Stores-Guaranty connection eventually led to
Stetson’s being placed on the boards of both McCrory and McLellan.
Unfortunately, McCrory’s attempt to regain its former status proved
elusive. At the end of 1945, it held roughly $19 million in assets, primarily
in cash, inventory, and real estate. Twenty years earlier, by contrast, assets
exceeded $25 million and the company operated significantly more outlets.
There was only a qualified rebound after World War II. McCrory and
McLellan merged, and sales at McCrory picked up in the late 1940s,
growing from $71 million in 1945 to more than $98 million in 1950.
Although much was invested in constructing and refurbishing stores,
management seemed unwilling to make radical changes. It refused, for
example, to expand its business beyond “merchandise normally found in a
variety store,” which meant it did not carry appliances, furniture, or other

16

Isadore Barmash, For the Good of the Company: Work and Interplay in a Major
American Corporation (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1976) 24–25; McCrory Stores
Corporation, [Annual] Report (New York: McCrory Stores, 1925); McCrory Stores
Corporation, [Annual] Report (New York: McCrory Stores, 1945); McCrory Stores
Corporation, [Annual] Report (New York: McCrory Stores, 1950); In re McCrory
Stores, 14 F. Supp. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); “Riklis Family Corp.,”
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Riklis-Family-CorpCompany-History.html; New York Times, 27 June, 26 September 1941 (Reporting
Stetson elected director of McCrory and McLellan).
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more expensive but potentially profitable items that were gaining popularity
among consumers in the 1950s.17

Stetson and Lamont
Of course, Stetson’s expansive business network also included the
Morgan firm. Because of Morgan’s critical role with Guaranty before 1940,
Stetson’s career depended on impressing its partners. His able cultivation of
nationally and internationally important clients, including Harriman and
the Woodruffs, was especially worthy to this audience. In the 1920s,
Thomas Lamont, managing partner at Morgan and the leader on
Guaranty’s board, was well aware that there was increasing competition
among New York banks for elite business. This competition could only be
advanced by leadership at the highest level of the bank, the directors and
officers. Stetson was among the Guaranty officers most eager and willing to
accept this challenge.18
Stetson’s relationship with Lamont was always cordial. For example,
prior to a trip to Europe in 1929, Stetson asked Lamont a series of
questions about economic trends, apparently so that he might express a
standard Guaranty-Morgan perspective to European bankers. This was not
17

McCrory Stores Corporation, [Annual] Report (1925); McCrory Stores
Corporation, [Annual] Report (1945); McCrory Stores Corporation, [Annual] Report
(1950); In re McCrory Stores, 14 F. Supp. 739; Barmash, For the Good of the Company,
19, 25; Cumberland Stores Corp. v. McLellan Stores Co., 32 F. Supp. 840 (S.D.N.Y.
1940); New York Times, 27 June 1941; “Riklis Family Corp.,” http://www.
fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Riklis-Family-Corp-Company-History.
html. In the early 1960s, just after Stetson’s death, the companies were acquired by
Meshulam Riklis, who proceeded to take them through a series of ups and downs
over the next decades. Ultimately, Riklis led McCrory into bankruptcy in 1992 and
2001. All McCrory stores closed in the latter year. “Riklis Family Corp.,”
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in these bankruptcies, while Riklis concluded “a lifetime habit of stripping assets
from debt-laden companies—and leaving creditors in the lurch.” Nathan Vardi,
“The Check is Not in the Mail,” Forbes 170 (30 September 2002): 67.
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“Memo for Mr. Steele,” 1 November 1926; W. C. Potter to Thomas W.
Lamont, 21 February 1936, Thomas W. Lamont Collection, Baker Library
Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts.
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the first time Stetson discussed European issues with Lamont or other
Morgan partners. Yet the 1929 questions were especially revealing about
the connection between him, his bank, and Morgan. Stetson asked for
Lamont’s ideas on such wide-ranging issues as the “General feeling about
the American Bond Market and the possibility of its shortly being able to
absorb foreign loans,” “Federal Reserve policy and its possible effect on
American business and European Finance,” the “Continuous absorption by
the Stock Market of funds and what ultimate effect of this will be and if it is
likely to continue,” “American opinion…as to [the] final solving of the
[World War I] Reparation Question through the Young Plan,” “General
outlook of continuance of business prosperity in the States,” and the
“Future tariff trend and whether it is likely that the present increases in
tariff will be put into effect.”19
Lamont responded at length, anxious to use the opportunity to convey
his thoughts. Ironically, given that the stock market crash and the beginning
of the Great Depression were only weeks away, he informed Stetson,
“Considering the resources of our own country and the gradual return to
prosperous and settled business conditions in the rest of the world (except in
China and Russia) I see no reason to doubt the continued economic
progress of the United States.”20
By 1940, when Lamont resigned from the Guaranty board because of
New Deal banking laws, Stetson had achieved a solid working relationship
with the Morgan banker on matters most pertinent to Guaranty. He and
Lamont discussed the difficulty of obtaining good directors for the bank,
including fellow southerners. Lamont prodded Stetson in one recruitment
matter by suggesting, “The more relations that you can preserve with that
splendid old gentleman down there along the line of us fine, old Southern

19

Eugene W. Stetson to Thomas W. Lamont, 26 March 1924; R. F. Loree to
Thomas W. Lamont, 30 August 1929; Thomas W. Lamont to R. F. Loree, 17
September 1929, Thomas W. Lamont Collection.
20
Ibid. About the same time, Lamont argued to Guaranty’s board—which
included Stetson—that American banks had a duty to help in the economic
reconstruction of Europe after World War I. “Lamont Speech,” 21 May 1930,
Folder 148-3, Thomas W. Lamont Collection.

248

Relationship Banker

gentry befo’ de wah, the better.” When Lamont left Guaranty’s board,
Stetson expressed his “deep appreciation of what I term the great privilege
of sitting next to you during the bi-weekly meetings of the Executive
Committee for a period of many years when I was Secretary while you were
presiding as Chairman of this committee.” Stetson added that Lamont’s
“uniform courtesy and understanding” of Guaranty’s problems “have been a
real inspiration to me and I have been most grateful for the association and
highly appreciative of your friendship.”21

Financial Opportunities
Another key relationship that Stetson enjoyed was with the firm J. &
W. Seligman & Company. Stetson eventually became a director of two of
Seligman’s corporate subsidiaries, Tri-Continental and Selected Industries,
as well as a director in the Globe and Rutgers Fire Insurance Company, of
which Seligman acquired an interest in the 1930s. These relationships
evolved from his association with Albert and Frederick Strauss, Seligman
partners, both of whom were involved in Guaranty’s Cuban sugar
investments. During the investment boom of the 1920s, Seligman’s Francis
Randolph successfully convinced his partners that they should form an
investment company. Reflecting the prevailing optimism of the day, the
new company was called “Tri-Continental,” as it was supposed to invest on
three continents. Common and preferred shares in the Tri-Continental
investment trust sold out quickly when they were first offered in 1929.22
Tri-Continental survived the Depression through several strategies.
The company obtained almost half its operating expenses by investment
returns from subsidiaries and by providing research to other investment

21

“Note, Returned to Mr. Stetson with Mr. Lamont’s thanks,” 2 April 1937;
Eugene W. Stetson to Thomas W. Lamont, 1 April 1940; Thomas W. Lamont to
Eugene W. Stetson, 6 January 1939, 2 April 1940, Thomas W. Lamont Collection.
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Ross L. Muir and Carl J. White, Over the Long Term: The Story of J. & W.
Seligman & Co. (New York: J. & W. Seligman, 1964) 124, 134–37, 140. For
additional background on Seligman’s Tri-Continental, see Geisst, The Last
Partnerships, 62, 71–72; Maury Klein, Rainbow’s End: The Crash of 1929 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001) 166.
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companies. The company engaged in detailed economic research to a
degree that was novel in investment management. In fact, an emphasis on
research became the company’s hallmark. After the passage of GlassSteagall, Tri-Continental moved entirely to investment banking. TriContinental also obtained interests in several companies to which it sold
investment advice: Wedgewood Investing Corporation; Selected Industries,
Inc.; Capital Administration Company, Ltd.; and The Broad Street
Investing Co., Inc. In the late 1930s, Tri-Continental and Selected
Industries were developed as underwriting businesses. A further subsidiary,
Union Securities, owned by Tri-Continental and Selected Industries, was
formed in 1938 to advance underwriting work. The overall strategy was to
have subsidiaries with specific functions, all under the Seligman umbrella.
In 1940 these entities helped put together a successful bid for the huge
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock, which was fortuitously
accepted just one day before the German army launched its attack on
France.23
Stetson was a Tri-Continental director in the 1940s and 1950s. He was
also on the boards of Selected Industries in the 1940s and Globe and
Rutgers Fire Insurance in the 1950s. During these years Tri-Continental
and other Seligman affiliates restructured and centralized their research
organization in order to control operating costs and reduce conflicts of
interest. Seligman and its subsidiaries also expanded their mutual fund
business. The rebounding economy of the war period drove up the asset

23

Muir and White, Over the Long Term, 140–41, 143, 148–49; “Tricontinental
History,” http://www.tricontinental.com/public/general/history.html; New York
Times, 13 May 1931. In 1938, Time reported that Union Securities was the
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values of shares of Tri-Continental and Selected Industries. In the late
1940s and early 1950s Selected Industries and smaller subsidiaries were
merged into Tri-Continental, and the company’s interest in the Globe &
Rutgers Fire Insurance Company was sold.24
Stetson served on the boards of other investment companies. As
already discussed, this included W. A. Harriman Securities, Inc. during the
1930s. W. A. Harriman Securities was a closely held investment trust
formed by the partners of W. A. Harriman & Co. Another investment
company was Niagara Share Corporation. Apparently, there were at least
three Niagara Share Corporations in the 1930s: Niagara Share of Maryland,
and Niagara Share Corporations organized in Delaware and New York, the
latter presumably subsidiaries of the Maryland corporation. Stetson held a
directorship in at least one of these companies. All were products of the
1920s equity boom. The Maryland parent corporation held more than $33
million in assets in 1933, with the largest share of its investments in the
Niagara Hudson Power Corporation, the banking company Marine
Midland, and the Niagara Oil Corporation.25
Stetson’s relationship with other kinds of financial institutions, banks,
further demonstrates the incredibly expansive range of his financial activity.
Textile Banking Company, Inc., was founded in 1919 with Stetson as one of
the incorporators. He remained on the board and was chairman at the time
of his death in 1959. Stetson was also a board member of the important
Discount Corporation of New York. Formed in the late 1920s by New York
24
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banks, Discount Corporation bought and sold bankers’ acceptances, at the
time a new and evolving source of revenue for banks.26
Stetson also served as a director in international banking. Perhaps the
best example of this kind of directorship not previously discussed was his
work with the French-American Banking Corporation. The relationship
began in 1929 when Guaranty merged with New York’s National Bank of
Commerce and Stetson was elected to French-American’s board of
directors. French-American was originally a joint venture of the Banque
Nationale de Paris, the National Bank of Commerce, and the First National
Bank of Boston.27
In 1930, Stetson became chairman of French-American’s executive
committee, a position he held until 1957. Stetson worked closely with the
French bank both before and after the German occupation during World
War II. In recognition of this work, in 1952 Stetson was named “Chevalier”
in the National Order of the Legion of Honor by the French government.
The award was based on Stetson’s “contribution to the development of
Franco-American cooperation in the field of banking and business.” On
receiving the award, Stetson cited a need for “continued development of the
relations of the American business public with French financial and business
interests.”28
Altogether, Stetson’s activities as director for companies engaged in
finance and banking reveal his many connections on Wall Street and
beyond. Morgan, Seligman, and Harriman were among the powerful
interests with which he maintained long-term relationships. Often this work
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required managing an investment trust or other investment company, tasks
which demanded considerable expertise in the securities markets, including
the evaluation of companies and investments.

Faith, Philanthropy, and Social Life
Important adjuncts to Stetson’s business practice included philanthropy, religion, and community service. Philanthropic interests, in fact,
were a central part of the relationship banker ethos at Guaranty. For
Stetson, Christianity was a key foundation for this work. He drew deeply on
the religious belief and training that dated from his days as a boy in
Georgia. When Stetson moved to New York, he changed his church
affiliation from Methodist to Episcopal, the latter being the denomination
of choice among Wall Street bankers. Faithfully attending Sunday services,
Stetson was senior warden of St. James’ Episcopal Church, one of the most
prominent churches in New York, a church that business leaders attended.
As senior warden, the highest lay leadership position, he assisted clergy in
management details. He held this position for sixteen years. Stetson and his
wife made important financial contributions to several churches, in New
York and elsewhere, and he became active in the Episcopal Church
nationally.29 Through his friendship with Henry Knox Sherrill, the
presiding bishop and head of the national church, Stetson was among the
founders and directors of the Episcopal Church Foundation, a lay group
created in 1949 by twenty industrialists, financiers, and lawyers. Prescott
Bush was a fellow director, as was George E. Whitney, president of J. P.
Morgan & Co., Inc., and Edwin S. S. Sunderland of the Davis Polk law
firm.30
Stetson also raised substantial sums for non-religious charities, usually
medical or educational causes, often with other business leaders. He
believed that money was an important tool in accomplishing the larger
good. For example, in 1925 he participated in the Beekman Street Hospital
29
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fund drive, along with Charles Sabin of Guaranty, Thomas Watson, H. F.
Guggenheim, William V. Griffin of Time Inc., and Frank Altschul of the
investment firm Lazard Freres. Stetson belonged to the advisory committee
of the New York City Cancer Committee campaign in 1946. His colleagues
included Sidney Weinberg, president of Goldman, Sachs & Co.; Stanton
Griffis, chairman of the executive committee of Paramount Pictures; Julius
Ochs Adler, vice president and general manager of the New York Times; and
Douglass B. Simonson, vice president of National City Bank. Stetson was
also president of the Council for Heart Diseases in 1946.31
World War II provided a dramatic opportunity for philanthropic
leadership. He served as chairman of the New York Commerce and
Industry Committee of the Red Cross Campaigns between 1941 and 1943
and vice-chairman of the 1944 War Fund of Greater New York. This
commitment required considerable time and substantial contact with other
business and financial leaders. His bank contributed $250,000 to the Red
Cross War Fund in 1943 and 1944, and approximately 900 Guaranty
employees enrolled as Red Cross blood donors. On 16 January 1942,
Stetson announced a voluntary salary deduction plan for employee
purchases of United States Defense Bonds. The plan eventually reached 100
percent participation, with more than $1.1 million of bonds bought.32
Such actions were consistent with a broader ideal of civic-minded
citizens, including wealthy businessmen, donating money and time for
causes that furthered their social values. In Stetson’s time, these values most
often included religious faith, better health care, and improved education,
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especially higher education. As suggested by his New South efforts in
Georgia, Stetson had always linked business and the needs of the
community. Moreover, he belonged to a generation that was highly
influenced by the philanthropy of Andrew Carnegie, who published an
article promoting “The Gospel of Wealth” in 1889. Carnegie said the rich
should give away their wealth to be administered as a public trust. During
this period John D. Rockefeller established important philanthropic
enterprises, including founding two universities. Government also
encouraged giving to organizations, as personal and corporate income tax
exemption for personal charities was adopted in the 1920s and 1930s. The
emerging principles of philanthropy stressed the connection between
business leadership and giving, and Stetson’s efforts and gifts reflected that
trend.33
Mercer University in Georgia, where Stetson had been a student from
1897 to 1901, was a special object of Stetson’s philanthropy. In 1927 he
endowed a chair in economics in his father’s name and over the years made
other contributions to the university, some anonymously. Mercer awarded
him an honorary doctor of laws degree in 1933 and an alumni award for
meritorious service in 1953. In 1955 Stetson announced a challenge grant
for $500,000 to be split between Mercer and his wife Iola’s alma mater,
Wesleyan College, also located in Macon. After his death, Iola Stetson gave
money to Mercer to establish a new university library, named in her
husband’s honor. The library eventually outgrew the building, and the
University built a larger building to house the library next to the Stetson
building. Later, with his family’s consent, and in recognition of his support
and achievements, Mercer’s School of Business and Economics was named
after him.34
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Besides church work and philanthropy, Stetson participated in a wide
range of social activities, many of which had clear business and networking
benefits. For example, he was a governor of the Union Club, the oldest of
the major businessmen’s social clubs in New York. He joined the Jekyll
Island Club in coastal Georgia. Ironically, the groundwork for the Federal
Reserve Act of 1913 had been laid at discussions at Jekyll Island in 1910,
when Stetson was a young banker in Macon. Senator Nelson Aldrich of
Rhode Island and a small cadre of Wall Street financiers, including Paul
Warburg of Kuhn, Loeb, and Morgan’s Henry P. Davison drafted a plan
for the formation of a central bank during a meeting at the island’s
clubhouse. The state of Georgia purchased Jekyll from the club in 1947.35
Perhaps most importantly, through all of these activities Stetson was
able to develop and enhance friendships. Simple examples, involving
Guaranty board member and attorney John Davis, help show how Stetson
was able to turn business colleagues into friends. At celebratory dinners he
hosted for colleagues, Stetson had excellent opportunities to show off his
abilities as a good fellow. After one meal, Davis wrote Stetson that it “was a
fine dinner you pulled off last night and here are my thanks. I congratulate
you on the way in which you conducted the post prandial exercises.” Davis
was a former candidate for President of the United States and perhaps the
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outstanding appellate orator in the American bar, so he knew about effective
communication. His compliment also shows how far Stetson had overcome
his teenaged aversion to public speaking. On another occasion, Stetson
wrote Davis informing him of a recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court. The case involved the death of a New York shareholder of
a Utah corporation, and the Court seemed to permit estate taxes by both
New York and Utah. Stetson believed “this information will be of value to
you and your associates.” Stetson’s willingness to write a letter about a court
decision to Davis, who had argued more cases before the Supreme Court
than anyone in American history, suggests his genuine interest in the work
of a colleague as well as his ability to link friendship and work.36
Stetson also enjoyed more active forms of recreation, including golf,
tennis, and hunting, but these often had a business component as well. In
the summer of 1940, a golf match involving Stetson; Bill Potter; Palen
Conway; John Davis; Morris W. Kellogg, a Guaranty director; and
Cornelius Kelly, president of Anaconda Copper and a Guaranty director,
displayed the importance of connections outside the office. After it was
over, Stetson kidded Davis that “In view of the fact that Potter, Conway,
and Kellogg ruled you, Kelley and myself out from participating in any of
the bets and, furthermore, that I collected the fifty cents [wager] from you, I
am returning it this morning so that I will have a clear conscience.” He
added, “A clear conscience is only incidental to the great pleasure I had in
playing with you and friend Kelley and I am really glad that it rained
because I had an opportunity of listening to words of wisdom from both of
you on the present economic situation.” Davis replied in kind, noting that
since Stetson had “more money than [he knew] what to do with, I will keep
it; and if it burns a hole in my pocket I will give it up to my pastor.” For

36

John W. Davis to Eugene W. Stetson, 10 August 1942; 16 November 1943;
Eugene W. Stetson to John W. Davis, 6 August 1942, John William Davis Papers.
Ironically, when Stetson died in 1959 there was a legal dispute over whether a trust
he created should be evaluated under New York law or friendlier Connecticut law.
Stetson v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 104 A.2d 239 (Conn. Superior Court 1960).

Relationships

257

Stetson these kinds of exchanges were not without significance. They
represented the full integration of business, life, and finance.37

Home and the Business Culture
As the charitable work and social activities suggest, in some ways
Stetson never really took a vacation from banking, even in his personal life.
At the least, Stetson’s time at home also reflected norms of elite banking.
Stetson and his wife Iola raised a typically large family, with five children.
Naturally the family was affected by Stetson’s business and social contacts,
sometimes in very personal ways. Iola Stetson ran the Stetson household,
which by the 1930s meant managing the children and two homes, an
apartment on Manhattan’s upper East Side, which was more used during
winter months, and a large shorefront house at Greens Farms, Connecticut,
the “Gold Coast” of Fairfield County. The Stetsons lived at the Bretton
Hall Hotel at 85th Street and Broadway when they first came to New York
and later moved to 929 Park Avenue before choosing 117 East 72nd Street
for their in-town residence. Iola was a deeply devoted wife who allowed
Stetson to pursue his lofty professional ambitions. She was the ideal partner
for a Wall Street banker. The children attended exclusive private schools in
New York and elsewhere, and their father always expected high academic
and personal performance. Stetson, who purchased the Greens Farms
property just after World War I, was one of the pioneers in suburban living
along the Connecticut coast.38
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Fairfield County, Connecticut, evolved by the 1930s into a trendy spot
for “rural” life, from which top executives such as Stetson took trains to and
from New York. Stetson’s neighbors included Juan Trippe of Pan American
Airways, Charles Munson of Air Reduction, and Smith Richardson of
Vick’s. Executives, however, were not the only denizens of Fairfield
County. There were celebrities, such as Richard Rodgers, Henry Fonda,
and the conductor Leopold Stowkowski. By the standards of the wealthy,
the houses were not ostentatious, nor were the yacht clubs, little theaters,
and country clubs. Of course, this assumes a yacht or country club could
avoid ostentation. Nonetheless, the absence of showiness by those who
could afford it was the Fairfield hallmark.39
In August 1949, Life took a somewhat tongue-in-cheek approach to the
high-class style in Fairfield, illustrating the necessary accoutrements: a post
lantern, a cobbler’s bench coffee table, antique windowpanes with air
bubbles, a wood-sided station wagon, and the ubiquitous beagle. The
magazine praised the commuter communities for taking an interest in local
affairs and the arts. A series of photographs almost portrayed the Stetson
home. In fact the magazine did show Stetson’s grandchildren playing on the
nearby Richardson beach, where the sand had been imported. With
associates, Stetson commuted to New York via a special club car, also
featured in the article. This was a private car bought and managed for its
members, who each paid $140 a year for the privileges of air conditioning
and being able to play poker. At one of these games, Stetson won with a
royal flush, an event recorded for posterity by a photograph and later
framed and hung on the wall in his Manhattan apartment. Even in daily
routine Stetson’s private and professional lives were closely intertwined.40
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Southern Ties
Throughout his career Stetson specialized in relationships with
businesses from the American South. He always had great expectations for
southern economic development. A good expression of this optimism after
he came to New York was an article he wrote for William Randolph
Hearst’s Atlanta Sunday American in January 1927. The title, “Why Times
are Good in Georgia,” might have startled many readers, given a lingering
agricultural depression that affected most Georgians. The piece was full of
the sort of New South boosterism Stetson learned in younger days: the need
for agricultural diversity, not just cotton; the desirability of manufacturing;
and the need for sound banking institutions to facilitate growth. Indeed, the
article appeared just after Stetson’s visit to inspect the facilities of a new
industry in the region, electric utilities.41
According to Stetson, times were good in his home state because
agriculture was throwing off the shackles of cotton. Stetson used statistics to
drive home the point. Peanuts, tobacco, corn, and other crops now
outpaced the white fiber. Textiles were also gaining, as Georgia had
recently passed Rhode Island in its number of spindles. Moreover, the
state’s cities were growing, as shown by both population and construction.
Stetson shrugged off the recent closure of some eighty-six banks as not
really significant, given the small size of those banks. Overall, he thought,
Georgia banking was in good shape. Perhaps most importantly, the
downturn in cotton prices would have its inevitable, and positive, economic
effect. It would drive farmers, and perhaps the economy more generally, to
seek more diverse and more consistently profitable means of making a
living. The evidence for this transformation was the real reason why “times
are good in Georgia.”42
Paradoxically, in Stetson’s case loyalty to the South was enhanced not
simply by visions of material wealth, but by the personal memory of
Confederate veterans, such as his father. This memory, as well as his great
admiration for General Lee, influenced him to become a leader in the
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Robert E. Lee Memorial Foundation, which sought to preserve Lee’s
birthplace at Stratford, Virginia. In 1929 he was appointed treasurer of its
national foundation, whose members included then-Governor Franklin D.
Roosevelt of New York. A successful campaign resulted in the restoration of
Stratford and its opening to the public.43
In New York Stetson took every opportunity to use his southern
connections for business purposes. This included membership in the city’s
Southern Society. He attended many events organized by this group and in
1934 was elected its president. The Southern Society consisted of over
1,200 businessmen. Further, when young men from the South, particularly
Georgia natives, looked to start careers on Wall Street, Stetson often
worked to place them in good positions, including at Guaranty.44
Among the many important examples of Stetson’s efforts for southern
business was his work with North Carolinian Smith Richardson, whose
family developed the wildly successfully Vick’s VapoRub in the 1880s.
Vick’s VapoRub formed the product core of the Vick Chemical Company,
which manufactured a variety of health remedies. By the 1920s Vick
Chemical was publicly traded and had expanded sales outside the United
States. Richardson became the company’s president in 1919. Vick’s success
naturally led to more complex financial needs, the kind of needs best met by
New York banks. In the 1920s a number of banks aggressively sought Vick’s
business, including Guaranty. The banks bombarded Richardson with
appealing offers of financial support. In 1926 Richardson decided that he
could “no longer operate the Vick Chemical Company efficiently without
the services of [Guaranty],” so he opened an account there. J. J. Sample
communicated Guaranty’s welcome to Richardson, telling him to “consider
the Guaranty Trust Company as headquarters whenever you are here and
to use us in a personal way or otherwise whenever you feel disposed to do
so.”45
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Richardson met Stetson while shopping for banks. For management
reasons Richardson moved to New Jersey in 1926, providing a golden
opportunity for a personal relationship. As with other important clients,
Stetson did not let the chance slip. He invited Richardson to lunch and golf
almost immediately after he came to New Jersey: “I am a poor golfer but
would like to take a day off with you some time soon and have game.”
Eventually they played and within a few years were on a first name basis.
Richardson asked Stetson about advice on a New York apartment and
schools for his children. He planned to move into the city for the winter,
and to “sit around and watch how you financiers do it for a few years before
I retire the old horse and let him run around the pasture.” As always,
Stetson’s banking was about more than just financial strategy.46
The friendship soon led to Stetson’s placement on the board of the
Vick Financial Corporation, an investment trust created in 1929. The
purpose of the company was to create a sophisticated means of dealing with
the large cash reserves of the Vick businesses. Bankers and investment
experts, including Stetson, served as directors in order to accomplish this
end. Stetson assumed a central role from the beginning. He attended weekly
finance committee meetings and was chairman of the executive committee.47
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Of course, the timing was not good for winning investments. By early
1930 Vick Financial Corporation’s governance was restructured by
disbanding the finance committee and creating a new management with
Stetson as its salaried chairman. Although this showed Vick’s confidence in
Stetson, the stock market was falling. By 1932, the company suspended all
fees and salaries to directors. In 1933 the executive committee simplified the
portfolio into common stocks. In early 1934 Stetson resigned his position
because the new federal banking act prohibited a bank director from serving
on an investment trust board. Vick Financial was dissolved in 1936 and
reorganized with an emphasis on profit from insurance as the Reinsurance
Corporation of New York.48
Stetson’s relationship with Richardson also included the consolidation
and separation of several large retail and pharmaceutical companies. In 1928
Sterling Products, Inc. and United Drug Company, famous for its chain of
Rexall Drug Stores, merged to form the unhappily-named Drug, Inc. In
1930 Vick was added to the Drug, Inc., empire, as were the Bristol-Myers
and Life Savers corporations, although Vick maintained its separate
corporate status and management. However, as with the formation of the
Vick Financial Corporation, the timing was poor and the complex
behemoth did poorly as the Depression deepened. In 1933 Drug, Inc. was
broken up, producing an independent Vick and United Drug. Guaranty and
Stetson derived considerable business from these restructurings. Stetson
even became a director with the new United Drug—a holding company
with retail and manufacturing segments.49
To Gene Stetson, banking before, during, and after the Depression
was about relationships. Sometimes relationships meant social connections,
regional heritage, or philanthropy. But first and foremost they meant
connections with large banks, the leaders of investment firms, and
corporations. The key opportunity for a banker such as Stetson was to serve
as corporate director, which allowed full use of his financial knowledge,
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negotiating skills, salesmanship, and leadership abilities. In fact, practically
all of Stetson’s business, personal, religious, and philanthropic relationships
were somehow linked to his identity as a Guaranty banker and corporate
director. Guaranty clients connected Stetson with both the huge resources
of the bank as well as with other institutions that could be useful to banking
practice. These relationships, in turn, led to national and international
banking opportunities. Because of his success in managing these
relationships, they also led to the presidency of Guaranty Trust.

11
At the Top
Stetson’s ability to work with other companies always depended on
Guaranty and its resources. Fortunately, reconstituted leadership after the
Mercantile Bank problem set the stage for Guaranty’s strong rebound.
Especially important to this rebound was that as early as 1926 discussions
began about a possible merger between Guaranty and the National Bank of
Commerce. Guaranty’s Morgan directors encouraged the move. The Bank
of Commerce had a long history with the firm, including solid ties with J. P.
Morgan Sr. Originally, the Bank of Commerce grew out of President
Andrew Jackson’s opposition to the Second Bank of the United States. The
demise of that institution and the ensuing economic downturn resulted in
special New York legislation for chartering banks, under which the Bank of
Commerce was created in 1839. From the beginning, the bank had large
aspirations and influential supporters. James Kent, one of the outstanding
lawyers and judges of the era, drafted its corporate documents. With almost
$2 million in assets and a location in Wall Street, the Bank of Commerce
immediately took a leading place in the economic life of the city, investing
in and lending money to both government and business. The Bank of
Commerce became a national bank in 1864 and was a prominent source of
funds for the United States government during the Civil War.1
By 1900 the institution had fallen so much under Morgan’s sway that it
was called “J. Pierpont Morgan’s bank.” Morgan joined Commerce’s board
of directors in the 1870s and later became a vice president. In 1903, its

1

Thomas W. Lamont to George Baker, 19 December 1926, Thomas W.
Lamont Collection, Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School,
Boston, Massachusetts; Guaranty Trust Company of New York, One Hundred Years
of Banking Service (New York: Guaranty Trust Company of New York, 1939) 5–7,
18, 44; “Press Release, Guaranty Trust Company of New York,” 2 January 1939, J.
P. Morgan & Co., Inc. Papers, JPMorgan Chase Archives, New York, New York.

At the Top

265

assets exceeded $165 million, more than twice Guaranty’s at the time.
Given the Morgan interest in foreign finance, the bank expanded its
activities in that direction, becoming a noted shipper of gold to Central and
South America. The bank established offices in London, Paris, and Berlin.
Moreover, as one of the first member banks in the Federal Reserve System,
it was prominent in financing the Allied war effort, buying over $1.2 billion
of government securities. In the 1920s, it added to an already extensive
securities work.2
The merger talks between Commerce and Guaranty reflected Morgan’s heavy input (even without Pierpont) and a struggle for supremacy.
Guaranty’s Potter fought any surrender in administrative control. James S.
Alexander, head of Commerce, also wanted power. But it was the Morgan
partners who determined the outcome, and they favored Guaranty. Thomas
Lamont’s papers contain numerous references to the deal, including
trenchant comparisons of potential executives. Lamont gave many of the
Bank of Commerce’s vice presidents low marks. In a cutting memorandum,
he described specific individuals as “Lazy, honest, good friends—declining
56”; “Honorable, lawyer, can’t do his work”; “Way over his head—fell
down—retained because couldn’t afford to lose anyone”; “Boot licker—
mediocre ability”; and “Able but doing all he can. Can’t go ahead.” Lamont
sold the merger to important Commerce shareholders, including George
Baker, to whom he wrote, “I should think it would be a fine thing to house
your holdings in an institution as sound as both institutions now are and
with the increased earning capacity which the Guaranty would furnish.” J.
P. Morgan Jr., another Commerce shareholder, supported the deal, as did
the super rich Thomas F. Ryan, who owned a substantial block of shares in
both companies. Myron Taylor, close friend of Baker and leader of the
Morgan-financed United States Steel Corporation, and Henry De Forest,
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chairman of the Southern Pacific Railroad, prepared a report for the banks’
boards that endorsed the union.3
When the merger took place on 6 May 1929, Guaranty had clearly
won the struggle for control. Not only did the new bank carry the Guaranty
name, but Bill Potter became its president. Thomas Lamont was chosen as
chairman of the executive committee, a position he held at Guaranty, while
Commerce’s Alexander had to settle for a short term as chairman of the
board. Physically, the merger produced few changes. The main offices of
both banks were already adjacent. Together they made up nearly the whole
block bounded by Broadway, Liberty, Nassau, and Cedar Streets. The
revised Guaranty was an instant powerhouse. Assets jumped from $850
million in December 1927 to an astonishing $2 billion just two years later,
making it the third largest bank in the United States. Deposits grew from
about $700 million to more than $1.2 billion, while the aggregate of capital
funds was larger than of any other American bank. Clearly Guaranty resided
in the front ranks of American finance.4
The merger had a huge impact on Stetson. He had already made a
mark as an up-and-coming vice president. His ability to develop business, to
serve effectively on outside corporate boards, and to impress Morgan
insiders, including Lamont, led to his elevation in 1927 and 1928 to the
boards of the Guaranty Company and Guaranty itself. The Commerce
merger made his vice-presidency and the Guaranty directorship
substantially more valuable, partly because there was a reduction in both
vice presidents and the size of Guaranty’s board. Another factor in Stetson’s
favor was Potter’s retirement from the presidency in 1934 and his
3
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replacement by W. Palen Conway. Conway had worked for the Guaranty
since 1911, beginning in the Bond Department. He became a vice president
during the 1916 expansion and a member of the board in 1924. As part of
the openings caused by Potter’s resignation, Stetson was elected to
Guaranty’s executive committee, a place where he could convene weekly
with the highest forces in the company, including Lamont. By this time, at
age 53, Stetson was clearly the heir apparent to the presidency. His salary in
1935 exceeded $85,000, third highest in the company, below those of only
Potter and Conway—it was also more than the salary of President of the
United States.5
As a top-level leader, Stetson had many opportunities to promote his
vision of relationship banking at Guaranty. One example is particularly
revealing. In 1936 Potter inaugurated a series of meetings with higher-level
staff, in which executives and officers gave talks. Stetson spoke on “Business
Development and Work of the Districts,” a topic that showed his
understanding of salesmanship, the regional nature of the bank’s operations,
and his thoughts about the company’s organizational structure. The key
portions of Stetson’s remarks focused on the advantages of having the
bank’s commercial operations divided into seven geographical divisions.
The purpose of this arrangement was to “make a little team of officers and
assistants definitely responsible for all commercial banking matters in a
given region and to assure customers in that region that their needs will be
looked after by a group always available, frequently traveling the territory,
5
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and experienced in the special problems of that section.” New business was
the responsibility of officers within the divisions, and officers were assigned
to a district with which they were most familiar.6
Yet, according to Stetson, efficient organization was only the beginning. Given that the goal was to maximize new business through expertise
with client needs, personnel quality was most important. Stetson thought
new business could only come from satisfied customers, recommendations
from satisfied customers, and direct solicitation. He recognized that the best
New York banks had similar strategies, so the “greatest variable among
them is the tone, skill, character and personality of their representatives.” As
a result, Guaranty’s success depended on the “dignity, wisdom, personality
and energy” of individuals, “from the Chairman down.” Altogether,
Stetson’s definition of successful banking practice meant financial
knowledge, dynamic personality, individual initiative, and positive image
that could be used to develop lasting relationships with clients. In essence,
this was the ideal of relationship banking Stetson practiced at Guaranty.7

Guaranty’s President
Between 1941 and 1947 the histories of Guaranty and Stetson were
more closely intertwined than at any previous time. In January 1941, Bill
Potter retired as chairman and “Len” Conway moved from president to
chairman, leaving the presidency open. In retiring, Potter explained that he
“wished to give way to younger men.” While Stetson was popular and
clearly in line for the top job, apparently the board hesitated to elect him
president. Whatever the cause, to force the issue Stetson went to Robert
Lehman of Lehman Brothers, who he had known since the 1920s, and
obtained an offer to become one of the senior partners there. Faced with
the prospect of loosing Stetson, the Guaranty board offered him the
president’s job.8
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In twenty-five years Stetson’s career had come full circle, from the
presidency of the Citizens National Bank in Macon to the presidency of
Guaranty. In 1941, Guaranty was among the largest financial institutions in
the world. The main office remained at 140 Broadway, as it had been since
1913, in the heart of the New York’s financial district. It employed almost
4,000 people in New York, London, Paris, Brussels, Liverpool, Havre, and
Antwerp. The company owned several affiliates, including the Guaranty
Executor and Trustee Company, Ltd., a London-based trustee business,
and the Guaranty Safe Deposit Company in New York. The bank
maintained relationships with more than 8,000 correspondent banks across
the globe. Guaranty’s stock, with more than 900,000 shares outstanding,
was owned by 24,000 individual and institutional shareholders and had a
trading value of several hundred million dollars. Its primary borrowers
included some of the nation’s most important corporations, including the
New York Central, Southern Pacific, and Southern railroads; American
Tobacco; Anaconda Copper; General Motors Acceptance Corporation; and
Cities Service Corporation.9
Although Stetson succeeded in the demanding context of Morgan
influence, the problems of the early 1920s, and the new regulatory world of
the 1930s, in 1941 the bank was beginning a new era. World War II was
underway in Europe and Asia, and the United States became a combatant
eleven months after Stetson was elected Guaranty’s president. An
unanswered question was whether Stetson’s leadership and values could
benefit Guaranty and the government’s military efforts under wartime
conditions. Under the circumstances the bank was expected to advance both
private and public interests. An additional characteristic of the new era was
that the board that chose Stetson was composed of clients, not a phalanx of
fellow New York bankers. This reflected Depression-era federal laws
regulating bank boards as well as the growing power of industrial
corporations relative to financial institutions. Stetson was the first president
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of Guaranty since World War I chosen without the vote of a J. P. Morgan
& Co. partner.
The Second World War was the most important external force in
Stetson’s presidency. The growth of government spending during the war
revolutionized the economy in ways unimaginable even at the height of the
New Deal. On 11 March 1941, only weeks after Stetson became Guaranty’s
president, Congress approved $7 billion for production and shipment of war
materials to help Great Britain and other nations fight the Nazi threat.
Congress approved another $6 billion in October 1941. Japan’s attack on
Pearl Harbor and Germany’s declaration of war against the United States in
December 1941 thrust the nation into a massive global conflict. Worldwide
military action increased the federal budget from less than $10 billion in
1940 to almost $100 billion in 1945. Approximately $80 billion was for war
expenditures. In 1944 and 1945 the federal government spent more money
than it did in the entire period from 1789 to 1940.10
The effect of these events on Guaranty was generally positive,
although in unusual ways. Big banks, despite being the objects of hatred
during the Depression years, were expected to wholeheartedly support the
war and its gigantic financial demands. Under Stetson, Guaranty met this
public duty. While Stetson was president, bank assets rose from just under
$2.6 billion in December 1941 to roughly $3.8 billion in 1944–1945. A huge
portion of the growth was in the form of United States government
securities, a reflection of the bank’s preeminent role in wartime financing.
Despite increased corporate and income taxes (the top rate for high earners
such as Stetson increased to about 90 percent in 1944) only about forty-five
percent of the money the government needed to run the war came from
taxes. The rest had to be raised by borrowing, a task the government partly
placed on banks. Stetson’s Guaranty was a major player in this job. At the
end of 1939, the bank owned less than $740 million in federal securities. By
1946 it owned $2.69 billion. Given that another $62 million in assets was
either Federal Reserve Bank stock or state and local government securities,
10
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in 1944 almost two-thirds of the bank’s resources were tied to public
agencies. By contrast, less than five percent of the bank’s assets were
invested in public agencies at the end of World War I. The war’s radical
effects also appeared in the jump in deposits, from $2 billion in late 1939 to
$3.4 billion in late 1944, almost all of which was related to war-caused
savings and investment.11
Stetson’s presidency also put a premium on helping corporate clients
meet the new military conditions. For Stetson personally, this included
continued activity on corporate boards, as many of his companies were
directly involved in war-related business. For example, in 1941, on the
recommendation of former Guaranty director Averell Harriman, Stetson
became chairman of the executive committee of the debt-plagued Illinois
Central. President Roosevelt appointed Harriman to administer the LendLease program in Great Britain, and Harriman wanted Stetson to replace
him at Illinois Central, a vital source of military transportation. Stetson was
also a member of the boards of Air Reduction, Bibb Manufacturing, CocaCola, General Shareholdings, Tri-Continental, U.S. Industrial Chemicals,
and a subsidiary of the Illinois Central, the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley
Railroad Company. In most cases he was also on the corporations’ executive
committees, and he was chairman of the executive committees of the Gulf
Atlantic Warehouse Company, McCrory Stores Corporation, and the
French-American Banking Corporation. At the time, no other Guaranty
officer was remotely as active in outside corporate governance: Potter was a
director in six companies; Conway in one. Twenty-eight officers held about
seventy outside directorships, and Stetson alone held about twenty percent
of these positions. Equally significant was the variety of Stetson’s corporate
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connections. He worked for companies involved in chemicals, textiles,
railroads, food, general retail, and finance.12
The war deeply affected Guaranty’s day-to-day operations. A large
number of employees left for military service, and this required substantial
hiring, especially of women. The change represented a shock to the bank’s
overwhelmingly male culture. Under Stetson’s presidency the company
promised employees who went into military service that they would retain
their positions, or ones equivalent in status and pay with seniority, upon
return. Departing servicemen received one month’s salary while the bank
continued to pay for their life insurance. In 1943 the bank paid $25 to each
Guaranty employee in the Armed Forces. Guaranty, along with other large
banks in New York, created a bonus plan which increased salaries to help
lower paid employees address rapidly increasing costs of living. At the end
of 1942, eleven officers and 798 employees were in the armed forces—
thirty-eight percent of the pre-war male work force. By war’s end, thirtyfive employees had been killed.13
War finance occupied the employees who remained. Under Stetson
Guaranty was heavily involved in financing companies that held war
production contracts. In addition, it participated in subscription drives for
Victory Loans, beginning in 1942. By the end of 1945, Guaranty was
responsible for Victory Loan subscriptions of more than $7.24 billion. It
marketed these securities through advertisements at its own expense and
offered loans to customers who would purchase them. Further, the bank
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maintained accounts for the Army and Navy in London amounting to more
than $34 million. It participated in a $100 million loan to the Dutch
government in 1944, immediately after part of The Netherlands was
liberated. The bank also served as disbursing agent for shipbuilders acting
under government contracts.14
War under Stetson even brought military preparation. Management
knew about the potential costs of an air strike, as German bombs destroyed
the London branch during the Battle of Britain in 1940. Employee
volunteers agreed to patrol the streets outside the bank’s Manhattan
locations in the event of a similar raid. They held practice drills and
designated evacuation points. Blackout curtains covered windows and steel
wire netting was installed to reduce the danger of debris from falling glass.
The bank’s roof provided space for an exercise on how to defuse bombs.
Key employees received first aid training on the effects of gas and “the
psychology of panic.” The bank also established a special war-ready
“Control Room” and acquired equipment for a possible attack, including
fire extinguishers, hoses, gas masks, and sand. The purchase of long handle
shovels was made on the assumption that they might be useful in
extinguishing incendiaries in or near the bank.15
Although Guaranty experienced growth during these years, it was an
atypical kind of growth. Earnings increased from about $14 million in 1941
to more than $16.6 million in 1943. Yet this was largely due to interest on
government securities or the financing of war industries—the former being
most important. Between 1941 and 1942 government securities held by the
bank increased phenomenally, from $1 billion to $1.7 billion. Official
reports to shareholders stressed that this was unnatural and expressed
concern that because of the low interest rates paid by the government that
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banks, and not individuals, were being asked to provide too much war
financing, despite successful public bond drives and high taxes.16
Stetson took on additional war-related responsibilities while acting as
president. As already noted, he was active in raising funds for the Red
Cross. He also served for one year as chairman of the Clearing House
Committee of the New York Clearing House Association. This
organization, founded in 1853, determined the process for clearing checks
in New York banks. Over $190 billion in checks were processed the year
before Stetson became chairman. Stetson was also elected to the advisory
board for the New York Ordnance District, which helped coordinate the
production of ordnance in the New York-New Jersey area. In 1943 he was
elected president of the New York City group of the New York State
Banking Association.17

Chairman and “Retirement”
On 19 January 1944, Stetson stepped down as president and was
elected chairman of the board of directors. Why he served as president for
only three years is not clear. Among the presidents since 1915, Palen
Conway, his predecessor, had served for seven years, Bill Potter for
thirteen, and Charles Sabin had been president for more than six years—
until the Mercantile Bank disaster. Most likely, Stetson, at sixty-two, was
easing into retirement, as he knew it was traditional for a former president
to serve as chairman of the board and retirement was required at sixty-five.
Stetson had nothing against this expectation and, in fact, strongly supported
the idea of new leadership. Guaranty’s board replaced him with J. Luther
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Cleveland, a long-time vice president. Bill Potter remained as chairman of
the executive committee until his retirement in 1946.18
A particularly important fact about Guaranty’s leadership from the late
1910s through the mid–1940s was its incredible continuity. Stetson, Potter,
Conway, and Cleveland each had been at the company for more than
twenty years in 1944. Stetson, Conway, and Potter began serving on the
executive committee in the mid–1930s. Stability, in fact, characterized the
entire officer ranks of the Guaranty after the early 1920s. Stetson and
others, however, realized that this could be a double-edged sword, with
positive and negative consequences. Experience was good, but so were new
ideas and people. As Stetson put it in 1944, he, Potter, and Conway hoped
to “mould a new regime into the policies of an old regime.” When the need
to replace old with new was not followed in the 1950s, it provided the
leading impetus for a merger with J. P. Morgan.19
Between 1944 and 1947, when Stetson was chairman, Guaranty faced
difficult postwar challenges. The transition to peace, as in 1919–1921, was
not easy. In 1946 bank resources dropped from $3.81 billion to $2.89
billion, almost all of which was related to decreases in United States
government obligations in the form of United States War Loan Deposit
Accounts. In December 1947, bank assets stood at $2.84 billion,
approximately where they had been in 1940. Deposits hovered around $2.4
billion, a number that would not change much for years. How to raise assets
and revenues proved perplexing. Operating costs, particularly those related
18
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to employees, showed a steady rise, partly because the bank supplemented
incomes with cost of living allowances as a result of war-driven inflation.
Salaries and wages increased fifty-four percent between 1943 and 1947. The
good news was that there was little likelihood of a repeat of the Mercantile
Bank disaster. Annual reports to stockholders illustrated the bank’s solid
position. Undivided profits climbed from $31.3 million in late 1943 to $61.6
million in late 1946, declining slightly to $60.6 million in 1947. Demand for
corporate financing in the United States improved, and although
destruction caused by the war in Europe and Asia unsettled international
business, by 1946 there were increased opportunities overseas.20
The growing salaries of Guaranty employees reflected a long-standing
policy of providing liberal benefits. Stetson always thought that quality
personnel were the most important factor in the bank’s success. The bank’s
pension plan was expanded in 1940 to enroll almost ninety-eight percent of
eligible employees. In 1947 a new pension plan eliminated previously
required employee contributions. The company even reduced the workweek
for hourly workers from forty-four in 1938 to forty in 1940 and 37.5 in
1951. During the 1940s and early 1950s, Guaranty provided substantial
bonuses. By 1948, virtually all staff members were insured by group life
insurance policies, while health insurance, covering physician bills, was
available at least as early as 1951. Employees also earned two to three weeks
of paid vacation each year and they were reimbursed for courses taken at the
American Institute of Banking. Workers rejected an attempt to unionize the
bank in the early 1950s.21
Yet, as in earlier years, Guaranty imposed notable restrictions on
employees, many of which were intended to maintain the bank’s elite
reputation. Workers could not leave the building without permission,
except for lunch, and they could not discuss company business with non20
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employees. Employees could not hold a margin account with a broker,
borrow or loan money from other staff members, or promise to pay another
person’s debt. They were discouraged from obtaining personal loans if there
was any doubt about repayment. If there was a possibility of defaulting on a
personal loan, it needed to be reported to a superior. They could not serve
as a director, officer, or partner in another company, engage in any outside
business, or be a trustee or executor without the permission of the company.
Unless approved or in other limited circumstances, any outside income they
earned belonged to Guaranty. There were express limitations on
solicitations, telephone use, smoking, “loud talking,” use of the company’s
name or supplies, and personal mail. The bank had a formal policy against
employing married women, and expected women who became engaged to
resign.22
In April 1946 Stetson wrote Conway and Cleveland that he wished to
retire as chairman in early 1947, just after his sixty-fifth birthday. Although
the executive committee and the board of directors requested that he
remain through 1947, he did not want to stay. After almost fifty years in
banking, he sought a change of pace, and to “become associated in a closer
advisory capacity with several corporations in which my family own stock or
in which I am at present a Director.” The most important of these
connections was Illinois Central, of which he was already executive
committee chairman. As a result, Stetson’s exit was facilitated by his lifetime
of building relationships. He did not leave his position in order to retire
fully from business. Instead, he left to become more closely involved with
corporations he had worked with while associated with Guaranty. Tellingly,
in the official 1947 roster of Guaranty directors, he listed his occupation as
“Chairman of the Executive Committee, Illinois Central Railroad.” Stetson
considered his departure a significant shift in leadership, the end of the
“Potter, Conway and Stetson regime,” as he described it to the Wall Street
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Journal. Still, he continued on the board and the executive committee and
maintained an office at the bank.23
A wide range of issues engaged Stetson’s attention at the end of his
term as chairman. Although he was uncertain about greater earnings,
perhaps reflecting his experiences after World War I, they continued to
climb, reaching more than $18 million in 1946. In 1946 and 1947 Guaranty
approved an increase in capital stock in the form of a one-for-nine dividend
distribution. Apparently there was pressure to issue more shares because of
an assumption that the price of Guaranty was too high. Stetson opposed
this, reasoning that Guaranty stock should be expensive and viewed as an
investment, not an opportunity for speculation. This reflected the older idea
of Guaranty as an upper-crust Morgan bank. He also thought the number
of shareholders, 24,000, was satisfactory, especially considering that more
than 23,000 held less than 100 shares each.24
At the 1947 shareholders’ meeting, Stetson’s last as chairman, a new
executive compensation plan, linked to earnings levels, proved controversial.
Stetson supported it, as did the rest of the board. While Stetson presided
over the meeting, two disgruntled shareholders led a persistent series of
comments and interruptions. One offered to amend the compensation plan
by making it contingent on a minimum level of earnings, which Stetson and
the board rejected. The shareholder then offered to “disqualify” Stetson
from the limitations of the proposal. This prompted Stetson to reply, to
“roars of laughter,” that “You will never disqualify me from anything.” He
explained he was retiring after thirty years and would not benefit from the
bonus program. Shareholders approved Stetson’s version of the bonus plan
and also rejected an attempt to further increase the company’s
capitalization.25
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In January 1947 a cover story featuring the retiring chairman appeared
in Forbes. The piece captured his mindset well, including his reasons for
leaving full-time banking. According to the article, Stetson wanted to spend
his time with Illinois Central. As for banking, he thought it was “pretty well
stabilized and I look forward to something that presents more of a
challenge.” Recalling his early days as a note-issuing national banker, he
thought the Federal Reserve System now “cushioned monetary shocks until
banking does not feel them as severely as it once did.” But industry and
transportation were “still subject to the full jounce of recurring cycles.”
Clearly Stetson perceived that the role of the banker in the late 1940s was
circumscribed by regulation. Railroads, not banks, now seemed to be the
“pivotal area” in the economy. There was vitality to transportation,
including changing technologies, competition, and the challenges of labor
that seemed lacking in banking. Stetson thought the time was the right to
leave his former occupation and “enter a field that affords plenty of
excitement.”26
How should Stetson’s terms as president and chairman be evaluated?
Guaranty grew to unprecedented size between 1941 and 1947. Through
1944 bank assets reached record levels and profits rose accordingly.
Moreover, Guaranty continued its long-standing tradition of national and
international relationship banking, even though thanks to Depression-era
laws this no longer included investment banking. During Stetson’s tenure
the bank made a substantial contribution to the war effort in terms of public
finance and in providing banking services to private industry geared to war
production. Guaranty also displayed a high degree of concern for its
employees, including those in the military. Further, Stetson provided
leadership in many charitable organizations that worked to limit the
hardships of the war—a continuation of the kind of civic activity that could
be traced as far back as his days as a young banker in Georgia.
Yet the end of Stetson’s tenure brought unsettling questions. As he
recognized, his decision to “retire” to railroading suggested banking had
entered a less appealing phase. Beginning in 1946, Stetson’s last year as
26
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chairman, assets fell sharply, inflation was a concern, and there were fears
another depression might be imminent. More importantly, the bank’s future
role relative to its corporate clients after the shocks of the 1930s and world
war was unclear, partly because Guaranty could not simply resume the
functions of the 1920s. Stetson sensed the drift and believed that given his
age a key part of his responsibility was to assist in handing over the
challenge to younger leadership. Eventually, in the late 1950s, he would
fulfill that role more decisively and in so doing once again change
Guaranty’s future.

Southern Power
An outstanding example of Stetson’s transition from full time banking
after 1947 was his role in founding the Southern Company, a major
producer and distributor of electric power in the Deep South. The
Southern Company, which became one of the largest utility companies in
the United States, resulted largely from regional pride. Stetson’s
contribution came about because of an acquaintance with Thomas Martin, a
senior officer at Alabama Power, once a part of the huge Commonwealth &
Southern electric utility system.
Martin was a dynamic Alabamian, a lawyer by training who joined his
father’s law firm and became legal counsel to the fledgling Alabama Power
Company in the early years of the twentieth century. This work led to
Martin’s election as president of Alabama Power in 1920. The 1920s
became the golden age of electric utility holding companies, as the young
industry passed through a consolidation phase. By 1932, more than seventysix percent of the nation’s electricity was controlled by sixteen holding
companies. Despite achieving economies of scale, abuses within tiers of
holding companies became common. Precarious financial structures,
excessive valuation, and deceptive fees among related companies harmed
consumers and risked capital. The dangers of the holding company became
apparent in the late 1920s and during the Depression. Between 1929 and
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1936 fifty-three holding companies, with par values approaching $2 billion,
passed into bankruptcy or receivership.27
Commonwealth & Southern, formed in 1929, was a holding company
that included Alabama Power among its group of southern and Midwestern
utilities. Thomas Martin was brought to Commonwealth & Southern after
a hostile takeover of Martin’s own holding company. Martin accepted
Commonwealth & Southern’s presidency, but only briefly. He was soon
disappointed in the job and in 1932 returned to Alabama Power. During the
Depression, Commonwealth & Southern, like the entire electric industry,
experienced fundamental shocks. Martin’s eventual successor at
Commonwealth was soon-to-be Republican presidential candidate Wendell
Willkie, another lawyer who came from a smaller utility that was
incorporated within Commonwealth & Southern in 1929.28
Under the Roosevelt administration, electric utilities—and especially
electric holding companies, became classed with Wall Street banks as
Enemies of the People. Not only had their poor financial management
contributed to the collapse of the stock market, but they often refused to
provide service in rural areas and charged what were believed to be excessive
prices where they did serve. In quick order, new federal laws, including the
Tennessee Valley Authority and rural electrification, took aim at investorowned utilities. The holding company form itself was attacked through the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, which made the ultimate
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demise of holding companies, including Commonwealth & Southern,
inevitable.29
In 1935, the Public Utility Holding Company Act placed utility holding companies under the jurisdiction of the newly-formed Securities and
Exchange Commission. The Commission exercised its utility authority
cautiously, beginning formal reorganization proceedings of holding companies under the Act in 1940. Even then it went slowly, given concern over
the outbreak of war: electricity would be needed for war production. Stated
simply, the Holding Company Act intended to eliminate complex holding
company structures. Henceforth, only holding companies that could prove
real efficiencies in electric service were permitted. The law also imposed
reporting requirements. Finally, it took aim at another common object of
New Deal legislation. Bankers and directors of banks, including Stetson,
were prohibited from becoming directors of utility holding companies.30
Because Commonwealth & Southern operated in two regions without
interconnecting lines, the Holding Company Act required that it be dissolved. As a result, beginning in 1946 Commonwealth & Southern asked
permission from the SEC to create a new electric holding company, which
would control only its properties in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Florida, and Mississippi. The company informed the SEC that regional
restructuring offered an opportunity to raise much needed capital. The
proceedings dragged on for several months, as there was important
opposition. The state of Georgia, for example, asked that Georgia Power be
left out of the arrangement so Georgians could own it. Finally, on 1 August
1947, the SEC approved a newly-created a Southern Company to hold the
properties of the Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Gulf Power
Companies. Three weeks later, Justin R. Whiting, president of
Commonwealth & Southern, announced the official organization of The
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Southern Company, with Eugene A. Yates as president. Thomas Martin, as
president of Alabama Power, was a member of its first board.31
Stetson entered the picture when Martin asked him to help shape the
new company’s direction. The precise issue that brought Stetson to
Southern was reminiscent of power struggles over the role of New York
investors at Coca-Cola in the early 1920s. Commonwealth & Southern’s
leadership disagreed as to whether the new holding company, The Southern
Company, would be dominated by New York interests or controlled in the
region where it sold electricity. Initially, the dispute focused on the location
of company offices and sources of financial advice and support. The new
holding company’s original by-laws kept the main office in New York.
Justin Whiting wanted the company to maintain its headquarters there and
for it to continue to employ the same New York-based support services
company used by Commonwealth & Southern. However, Southern’s
president Yates and Martin disagreed. They believed success depended on
management presence in the South, in the service area, and they wanted
more directors from the region, men who had business interests directly
served by the company.32
Martin required heavyweight financial support if his strategy was to
succeed, and he looked to Stetson. Martin bluntly told Stetson that he and
Yates “felt we would be a much stronger company if we could have less
domination from a New York group, and that we should have a large
number of directors from the South.” Yates put the reasons for the southern
strategy succinctly: “All the investments of The Southern Company are in
the South. The efforts of its officers and staff are in the South. The efforts
of its officers and staff will be directed solely toward the successful
operation and development of these four southern utilities…. The Southern
Company will be an important factor in the future development of this
region.” Martin asked Stetson to come to their aid as advisor, perhaps
eventually taking a more formal role. Predictably, given his pro-southern
record, Stetson responded favorably. He fully approved the idea that
31
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Southern “should detach [itself] from the dominating influence of the New
York office” of Commonwealth & Southern. As a result, Yates, Martin, and
Stetson agreed on “a Southern destiny for the company.” In fact, Stetson
indicated he would not have anything to do with the new operation unless it
fully disconnected itself from the financial and operating location of
Commonwealth & Southern.33
Martin sought out Stetson because he trusted him and because of
Stetson’s extensive connections in the money world. Most important among
these connections were the principal holders of Commonwealth &
Southern stock. Stetson’s task was to convince owners and other influential
persons he knew to support Martin and Yates’s strategy. As a result, he
became a leader for the southern faction. To assist this, he had some of the
utility experts at Guaranty study the financial end of the idea and prepare a
report. He discussed the matter with Bob Woodruff, whose opinion would
naturally carry great weight, and John Sibley, Woodruff’s Atlanta lawyer
and a member of the Georgia Power board. In quick order Stetson
effectively carried out his behind-the-scenes assignment, convincing leading
parties that links to the old Commonwealth & Southern should be
severed.34
Stetson also played a critical role in advancing both regulatory and
ownership issues for the new Southern Company. This was a slow and
tedious process, because each stage required the approval of interests at
Commonwealth & Southern and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
State utility regulators had to be appeased as well. In early 1948 Stetson
spoke with Yates about the sale of the South Carolina Power Company by
Commonwealth & Southern, which was required by the SEC. He discussed
the matter in New York with potentially large investors in The Southern
Company. Another important problem was how to structure the utility’s
ownership. In a February 1948 letter to Sibley, he suggested that perhaps
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southern ownership could be maximized by waiting to buy the company’s
stock when it hit the open market.35
In 1948 and 1949 Stetson spent time traveling in the South, attending
dinners, and talking to the right people about the future of The Southern
Company. Sibley thanked Stetson for his performance at one gathering,
stating that he “handled the situation beautifully and I think everyone
present was convinced that it would be to the interest of all if your
suggestions [regarding southern control] materialize.” Sibley agreed “that
your basic conception of the Southern Company is correct and that you are
proceeding along sound lines.” Martin arranged for Stetson to visit Alabama
Power properties and to speak to Birmingham businessmen.36
Instead of taking an antagonistic position with government, Stetson
and the others agreed it was essential to maintain smooth relations with
both federal and state regulators. Yates and Sibley, for example, wrote
Stetson encouraging positive dealings with the federal government. This
included not only the Securities and Exchange Commission, but also the
Tennessee Valley Authority. Both Sibley and Yates believed The Southern
Company could arrange favorable distribution agreements with federal
producers. Stetson visited Georgia regulators himself, largely to assure them
that the company’s intent was to create a southern-based company that
would benefit the state. The chairman of the Georgia Public Service
Commission was impressed, writing Sibley, “I heartily agree with your
entire program and hope there will be no difficulty in your being able to
successfully follow it.”37
The crucial moment came in late 1949, when the necessary legal
approvals had been obtained and it was time for Commonwealth &
Southern to distribute its Southern shares. Here, perhaps, is where Stetson’s
impact was greatest. He believed roughly 200,000 persons would purchase

35

Eugene W. Stetson to John A. Sibley, 2 February 1948, John A. Sibley Papers.
John A. Sibley to Eugene W. Stetson, 25 October 1948; Thomas W. Martin
to Eugene W. Stetson, 9 December 1948, John A. Sibley Papers.
37
John A. Sibley to Eugene W. Stetson, 3 November 1948; E. A. Yates to
Eugene W. Stetson, 17 November 1948; Matt L. McWhorter to John A. Sibley, 22
September 1949; Eugene W. Stetson to John A. Sibley, 26 September 1949, John A.
Sibley Papers.
36

286

Relationship Banker

Southern stock. As he wrote Sibley, recognizing the “possibility of having
an undesirable group secure proxies to control the policies of The Southern
Company when its stock is distributed, some of the northern as well as the
southern officials of the various companies [of Commonwealth & Southern]
have asked me to sit in the center of the picture so as to help secure a
control of the policies of the four operating companies in order to have
what might be termed definitely a southern control of policies.” As a result,
Stetson agreed to be a designated proxy holder and to “vote for a majority
group of Southerners to have control of the policies of the operating
companies as well as The Southern Company.”38
Stetson’s purpose was both profit and regional development: a
southern-controlled company “would have the opportunity of conferring,
from time to time, with the regulatory bodies as well as with the consumers,
with a definite purpose in mind; namely, to see that the rates were equitable
and fair; to see that dividends were not exorbitant, and any surplus earnings
should go for expansion and development purposes in the territory in which
the companies were operating.” More personally, Stetson remarked that the
plan was part of his own long-term efforts for the region’s commercial,
industrial, and agricultural development.39
When the stock was issued, Stetson and the southerners prevailed.
Their accomplishment had an enormous impact. In 1947 only three of
Southern’s eleven directors were from the South. By the early 1950s,
southerners dominated the board. The company’s headquarters moved to
Atlanta. Likewise, support services would not be provided from New York.
A subsidiary owned by the four operating utilities, Southern Services, Inc.,
was formed with headquarters in Birmingham. Banking was partly provided
by Guaranty, but Sibley’s Trust Company of Georgia and Atlanta’s Citizens
and Southern Bank also received the utility’s business. Sibley, among others,
38
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recognized Stetson’s crucial role in this transfer of valuable property into
southern hands. In December 1949 he thanked Stetson for “splendid
leadership” and for “establishing sound policies.” He had “never seen a
company get off to a better start, especially with the regulatory bodies,
which is all important now.”40
The Public Utility Holding Company Act prohibited Stetson, as a
banker, from becoming a director of The Southern Company. The law did
not, however, prevent his other efforts on its behalf after it swung into
operation. He continued to supply financial advice through the 1950s.
When Stetson died in 1959, the Southern board passed a resolution stating
its “deep appreciation of the great service which he rendered as our financial
advisor in the successful inauguration and direction of the Company from
the beginning of its active life in 1947.” According to the resolution, Stetson
advanced the broader financial success of all four operating companies
through consultation and negotiation. His actions revealed a special ability
to persuade others. Almost certainly the strongly worded praise was written
by the man at Southern who knew Stetson from the beginning, Thomas
Martin.41
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The connection with Martin also linked Stetson to the Alabama
Research Institute, a research-for-business organization Martin founded in
1941. Martin invited Stetson to become a trustee and member of its
advisory committee. Martin’s idea was to provide a center for work in
chemistry, engineering, and other fields that would prove beneficial to
southern industry. The project was slow to get off the ground, but after its
reformation as the Southern Research Institute in 1945, real work began.
Martin knew it was essential to attract influential supporters and one of the
men he turned to was Stetson. Given Stetson’s life-long interest in southern
business development, the Institute was a cause he could easily support.
During the 1940s and 1950s, while he was associated with the institute, it
conducted research in textile technology, chemistry, medicine, and
aerospace engineering.42
Stetson’s experience with The Southern Company and the Southern
Research Institute between 1947 and 1959 reflect several larger themes.
First, his experience fit well with the kind of southern economic
development he had supported since his New South days in Macon. By the
1940s, electricity was vital to the growth of the region, and Stetson believed
local control of that resource was essential. Second, it reinforced his
established business ties, including with Coca-Cola. Among his closest allies
in creating The Southern Company were John Sibley and Robert
Woodruff. Sibley was Woodruff’s friend and lawyer, but he was also
president of the Trust Company of Georgia, Ernest Woodruff’s old bank,
and Stetson’s partner in the Coca-Cola deal with the Candlers. Third, the
experience showed Stetson’s special ability to link a complex financial
strategy, southern control over the company, with the personal and political
appeals required for success. Once again, “banking” took on a complex, and
personal, meaning. The interlocking threads of Stetson’s business career
came together in his work for The Southern Company. Perhaps this was
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best symbolized when Stetson’s Guaranty, working with Woodruff’s Trust
Company, distributed the initial Southern Company dividends with help
from computers and punch cards from Tom Watson’s IBM. Stetson was the
critical link in this business chain.43
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12
Banking for the Railroad
In the 1950s, Tommy Lyons, Gene Stetson’s driver, would take Stetson and
his grandchildren in the Plymouth “woody,” the wooden door station
wagon Stetson loved, from Stetson’s Greens Farms home to the station at
Croton-on-Hudson. There Stetson picked up the 20th Century Limited,
which ran from New York to Chicago. Stetson enjoyed riding the train to
Illinois Central board meetings. The company’s offices were located near a
street in the center of the city, “Stetson Avenue,” which the City of Chicago
named after him in 1955. While Stetson could have taken an airplane, that
would have been a bit treasonous, and at any rate he much preferred the
train. He could relax, read Illinois Central papers, have dinner, and then get
some undisturbed sleep listening to the sounds of the train wheels running
the rails. He could wake up the next morning and have breakfast in the
dining car. Then, he would be off to his meeting, returning the next
evening by the same route. Stetson appreciated both the glamour and the
practical strengths of railroads.1
As an economic and political phenomenon, railroads are unrivalled in
American history. Almost single-handedly they changed the way the nation
lived. Railroads opened up new lands for agriculture and mining, stimulated
the development of financial markets, and pioneered the corporate form of
business. The last decades of the nineteenth century, when Stetson was a
boy, were a great age of railroad construction. In 1860, the United States
had a little over 30,000 miles of track. Fifty years later, in 1910, it had more
than 240,000. After the Civil War, railroads were the force that bound
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together the states and made them literally “united.” They served every
town of any size.2
Railroads required huge amounts of capital, which naturally meant
high finance. Cornelius Vanderbilt, the “Commodore,” who started his
business life with schooners and steamships before there were railroads,
decided to get into railroading when in his late 60s. He bought and
consolidated various lines into the New York Central. Polite society in the
Gilded Age considered Vanderbilt rough and vulgar, but at the time of his
death in 1877 he was the richest man in the United States. Vanderbilt’s only
son, William, inherited $100 million, including control of the New York
Central. In 1879, when William wanted to sell some of his Central shares, J.
Pierpont Morgan helped dispose of them. More importantly, Morgan
retained the new buyers’ proxies and thereby secured a place on the
company’s board of directors, a tactic he had used in other deals. In the late
nineteenth century, Morgan specialized in the financing, consolidation, and
reorganization of railroads. He frequently placed himself or a Morgan
partner on railroad boards. Morgan’s ambitious aim was no less than to
rationalize the chaotic industry, thereby clearing the way for greater profit.3
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During the 1880s and 1890s Morgan used the voting trust to this end,
a strategy that came to be called “Morganization.” By 1900, hundreds of
American railroads were consolidated by voting trusts into six systems
controlled by either J. P. Morgan or Kuhn, Loeb. These trusts became the
object of political attacks from both the Populist Party of the 1890s and
later progressives. Their existence was linked to the banks’ “Money Trust”
that also came under public scrutiny. Technically, a trust is a legal entity
that holds property to be managed, protected, and distributed to others. But
in the nineteenth century it also became a device to unify corporate power,
enhance banker control, and create monopolies.4
Railroads, like banks, raised important issues of public policy, and not
simply because of the trust device. As “common carriers,” railroads were
never viewed as entirely private businesses. Legally, they had duties to serve
the public in ways that a manufacturing company did not. Further, railroads
typically operated under special government charters and had often received
massive grants of public land in order to create incentives for construction.
For these reasons and because of the public’s dependence on railroads,
railroad practices were hot political issues during most of Stetson’s life.
When a railroad shareholders’ trust concentrated power in the hands of one
party, potentially against the interests of other parties, such as the public
and freight shippers, the public perceived that the trust would run the
railroads for the benefit of the trust alone. Naturally, this drove political
efforts to regulate rates, services, and the railroad’s monopolistic
characteristics.5
No wonder that a rising young banker such as Stetson was attracted to
railroads. Anyone his age would have been familiar with the sounds, sights,
and smells of the steam engine. Stetson had even enjoyed the luxury of a
4
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long train trip in the 1890s, before he went to college. As early as 1906,
when he was still in his twenties, Stetson was a board member of a small
Georgia lumber railroad. When he came to Guaranty a big portion of his
credit work was to review the value of corporate securities, which to a large
extent meant railroad stocks and bonds. Some of this effort involved travel
by rail to inspect railroad property. Having responsibility over railroad
financing was not easy. Competition could be rigorous, and a great many
railroad companies were structured badly or managed poorly. Failures were
frequent. During the downturn of the 1890s, almost 70,000 miles of track
had been foreclosed on by creditors, including that owned by the Union
Pacific, Baltimore & Ohio, and Northern Pacific.6
Moreover, to a banker the significance of railroads far surpassed the
financial condition of the lines themselves. In Stetson’s time railroads were
necessary, at the very heart of American business development. A loan to a
manufacturing company, for example, could depend on its access to rail
transportation. As a result, bankers like Stetson knew a lot about the
demand for rail transportation and its growth or contraction. Bankers
became important business partners to railroads. As Stetson traveled for
Guaranty he made important contacts among railroads and was able to
display this bankers’ expertise. These contacts, in turn, soon led to
invitations to serve on the boards of lines, including most notably the
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railroad (The Katy). The railroads’ attraction to
Stetson, as in other fields, was linked to his understanding and sympathy for
their business. One Guaranty client, W. Averell Harriman, a member of
one of the great railroad families in American history, became the critical
link between Stetson and the Illinois Central.7
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Harriman’s Proxy
In 1916, when Stetson arrived in New York, Averell Harriman’s family
owned a good portion of the Union Pacific, the Southern Pacific, and the
Illinois Central. Harriman, who was about ten years younger than Stetson,
had the exceedingly good fortune to be the son of one of wealthiest men in
American history, the railroad baron Edward H. Harriman. The senior
Harriman’s financing wizardry and management of western routes built the
family fortune, which included a $70 million bequest to Averell when he
was still a teenager. Immediately after Yale the young Harriman became a
vice president of the Union Pacific and director of the Illinois Central. The
Union Pacific owned a large block of Illinois Central stock, so there was a
close relationship between the two lines. By the 1930s, Harriman’s official
positions reflected this connection: he was chairman of the board of the
Union Pacific and chairman of the executive committee of the Illinois
Central. During his lifetime, Harriman’s wide-ranging business interests
also included the Merchant Shipbuilding Company; Aviation Corporation;
Brown Brothers Harriman; and the development of Sun Valley, Idaho, as a
resort.8
Harriman moved increasingly into politics. In 1932 he supported
Democrat Franklin Roosevelt for President. Harriman was opposed to
President Hoover’s trade barriers and wanted a voice in Roosevelt’s plan to
tighten regulation of the securities industry. As a partner in the private bank
Brown Brothers Harriman, he had a large stake in Wall Street’s future.
Harriman’s political career started in earnest after he was named President
Roosevelt’s “Expeditor” in evaluating and delivering arms and war materiel
to the British under the Lend-Lease Act in 1941. He gradually grew into a
leading American politician. He served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union
during World War II, United States Secretary of Commerce (1946–1948),
United States coordinator of the Marshall Plan (1948–1953), Governor of
New York (1955–1959), Presidential candidate (1952 and 1956), and

8

See Rudy Abramson, Spanning the Century: The Life of Averell Harriman, 1891–
1986 (New York: W. Morrow, 1992).
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representative of President Lyndon Johnson to the Paris peace talks with
North Vietnam (1968–1969). He died in 1986 at the age of ninety-four.9
Harriman needed trusted lieutenants to watch his economic interests
while he pursued a political career. One of these lieutenants was Gene
Stetson. As early as 1919, Stetson was in regular contact with Harriman. His
family and its business interests maintained large accounts with Guaranty.
Part of Stetson’s job at the bank was to develop and manage the Harriman
fortune, and Stetson frequently solicited Harriman for more Guaranty
work. In September 1919 he asked Harriman to consider using Guaranty as
a depository for his Merchant Shipbuilding Company. In January 1920, he
asked Harriman to promote Guaranty as a potential trustee for the United
States Railroad Administration, which had taken over the country’s
railroads during World War I. Several months later, Stetson, learning that
Harriman was a director of a Philadelphia bank, requested that he call the
president of the bank and propose that Guaranty handle the bank’s New
York account. By the late 1920s some of Harriman and Stetson’s
correspondence concerned the Illinois Central. Stetson, ever his bank’s
booster, informed Harriman that “should there be an opportunity to have
the Illinois Central give us a larger and more active account, we will greatly
appreciate it.”10
Over the years the business and personal relationships deepened. As
already discussed, Stetson served as director in W. A. Harriman Securities,
and his wife, Iola, invested in that company. Stetson sat on other boards
connected to Harriman interests, such as Aviation Corporation. Stetson’s
son, Eugene Jr., attended Yale and in 1933 was elected to Skull and Bones,
Harriman’s senior society. Eugene Jr.’s election prompted a friendly
exchange of letters between Harriman and the senior Stetson. Eugene Jr.
eventually worked for Brown Brothers Harriman. In 1935, Stetson invited
Harriman to join Georgia’s Jekyll Island Club. Stetson also solicited a
donation from Harriman to help a charitable group purchase and restore
9

Ibid.
Eugene W. Stetson to W. Averell Harriman, 5 September 1919; 22 January,
13 October 1920; 4 May 1929; 2 June, 23 November 1931; Matthew W. Murray to
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Robert E. Lee’s birthplace in Virginia. Much like his dealings with Bob
Woodruff, Tom Watson, Thomas Lamont, Smith Richardson, and Manuel
Rionda, Stetson’s actions reflected the core values and tactics of relationship
banking.11
Yet the most compelling evidence of the relationship was Stetson’s
appointment to Illinois Central’s board on 23 February 1932. At the time
Harriman was chairman of Illinois Central’s executive committee. The
historical ties between Guaranty, the Harriman family, and the railroad
were partly demonstrated by the fact that two other Guaranty directors,
Henry W. De Forest and Robert W. Goelet, were also Illinois Central
directors. Stetson seems to have initiated conversations with Harriman
about becoming a director. He told Harriman he would be interested in the
appointment and would resign his directorship with the Missouri, Kansas &
Texas Railroad. Harriman was receptive. He discussed Stetson’s
appointment with Lawrence A. Downs, president of the railroad. Downs,
who had earlier served as president of the Illinois Central-controlled
Central of Georgia Railroad, met with Stetson and was impressed. Once
again, the network mattered. As Stetson put it, the Georgia connection
meant “his friends and my friends down there were mutual. Also one of the
biggest shippers down there was a big manufacturing company, a big cotton
mill [Bibb Manufacturing Company], [and Stetson] was a director in that,
and so it brought us a community of interest.”12

11

Eugene W. Stetson to W. Averell Harriman, 4 May 1929; 13 June 1933; 20
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As a director Stetson tried to make the most of Harriman’s status as a
FDR Democrat. In early 1934 the federal Public Works Administration
ruled Guaranty would not be a suitable trustee for $35 million in bonds on
equipment the Illinois Central wanted to use as collateral for a government
loan. Part of the reason was that Harriman and Stetson were directors of
the Illinois Central. Stetson complained to Harriman that he could not
“conceive of any possible conflict that might arise” and he criticized the
government’s suggestion that “securing trust business from transportation
companies through directors would in itself tend to create unfair
competition.” He asked Harriman to discuss the matter with Secretary of
the Interior Harold Ickes. Moreover, Stetson sent Harriman
recommendations for commissioners on the newly created Securities and
Exchange Commission. When Congress was considering the Securities Act
of 1933, Stetson tried to arrange a meeting between Harriman and a United
States senator so that Harriman could express his views about securities
regulation.13

The Main Line of Mid-America
Stetson was aware of the Illinois Central’s historic significance.
Arguably, no other line was so important to American commerce and
economic development. The railroad facilitated both the settling of the
West and the joining of North and South. The company was chartered in
1851 as the first land-grant railroad, under an act sponsored by Illinois
Senator Stephen A. Douglas, of Lincoln-Douglas debate fame. His political
foe, Abraham Lincoln, was an occasional Illinois Central, or “IC,” attorney.
Another famous American figure, Mark Twain, piloted Illinois Central
steamboats on the Mississippi River from 1859 to 1861.14
By 1856, the company’s road stretched across the Illinois prairies from
the frontier town of Chicago to the Ohio River at Cairo, Illinois, making it
13

Eugene W. Stetson to W. Averell Harriman, 8 May 1933; 13 February 1934;
14 October 1937; W. Averell Harriman to Eugene W. Stetson, 22 December 1938,
W. Averell Harriman Papers.
14
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the longest railroad in the world. Illinois Central service contributed greatly
to an economic boom in the state. Chicago grew from a mere 28,000
residents in 1850 to more than 80,000 in 1855. During the Civil War, the
railroad transported thousands of Union troops to the South. The Army
moved over thirty percent of its men and supplies on the Illinois Central.
After the war, officers and engineers from both sides worked for the IC.
The company began an aggressive expansion policy, hiring Andrew
Carnegie to build a bridge across the Mississippi River at Dubuque, Iowa, in
1869, and then a line clear to the Missouri River at Sioux City, Iowa. In the
1870s IC wanted to commence business in the South, linking Chicago with
New Orleans. Agreements with southern lines, by the early 1880s, increased
the company’s service from Cairo across west Kentucky and Tennessee
through the heart of Mississippi to Louisiana. Unfortunately, however, the
track north of Cairo was “standard” gauge while the track to the south was
“wide” gauge. In one of the amazing feats of railroad history, on 29 July
1881, beginning at dawn and finishing at three that afternoon, more than
3,000 men converted the entire 548-mile southern line to New Orleans to
standard gauge. In 1889, Illinois Central opened the four-mile-long Cairo
Bridge over the Ohio River at a cost of almost $3 million.15
The Illinois Central has been so influential that some of its history has
entered into national folklore and popular entertainment. In 1900, a train
wreck in Mississippi had one fatality, an engineer named John Luther Jones,
nicknamed “Casey.” The famous story of Casey Jones’s fateful run on
Illinois Central’s Cannonball is the subject of the well-known song by
Wallace Saunders, written in 1909, and it even produced a short-lived (and
much less popular) television series in the late 1950s. Among the more
notable IC trains was The City of New Orleans, which ran from Chicago to
New Orleans. This also became the inspiration for a song, by Steve
Goodman, which was recorded by Arlo Guthrie in the early 1970s.16

15
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High Speed Finance
The great late nineteenth expansion produced high expectations for
the company’s future. For many years this optimism was fully justified. In
1905 the Illinois Central controlled more than 4,000 miles of track, had a
capital stock value of almost $100 million, and gross receipts of almost $50
million a year. The federal government assumed control of all railroads as a
war measure from late 1917 until early 1920, but after this brief interlude,
Illinois Central commenced a new period of prosperity. During the 1920s
gross revenues exceeded $160 million a year. The company paid annual
dividends on its common and preferred stock, while the price of its common
soared from $85 a share in 1920 to more than $153 in 1929. The good
performance stimulated a massive improvements program on which the
company spent more than $300 million. It purchased new engines and
rolling stock, built new terminals, replaced steam with electric service for
suburban trains in Chicago, and acquired new lines in the South. Yet the
improvements were not paid for by earnings. Instead, the company issued
more than $18 million in preferred stock and increased its bonded debt with
the expectation that good times would continue. By 1930, the outstanding
funded debt had increased from $257 million to $359 million. Annual
interest charges were $15.8 million.17
Debt would not have posed a problem if the company’s revenues
remained stable, but conditions in the early 1930s exploded assumptions
about continued prosperity. Signs of impending doom appeared in the late
1920s, with a decline of passenger to freight revenues caused by the rise of
the automobile and highway construction and a leveling off in all revenues.
The nationwide economic downturn beginning in late 1929 raised the most
pressing threats. The company’s common stock fluctuated wildly in 1930
between $65 and $136 a share only to collapse to a low of just over $9 in
1931. It bottomed out at just under $5 a share in 1932, a loss of almost
ninety-seven percent of its 1929 value. Put another way, IC market value
17
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plummeted from approximately $700 million to roughly $3 million. There
was no likelihood of quick recovery. The territory served by IC swarmed
with the unemployed. Agricultural and mineral prices, including for corn,
coal, and cotton, crashed. Illinois Central lost half its annual revenue
between 1929 and 1932, and with the massive debt looming, began to run a
multimillion-dollar annual deficit. In October 1931, the IC board ordered
that payments of common and preferred dividends cease, something that
had not happened since the 1850s.18
Stetson became a director under these extreme conditions. In 1932, the
company faced annual deficits, a huge and complex debt of approximately
$379 million, and an interest charge on the debt of more than $16.4 million
a year with only $89 million in total annual revenues. The prospects for
bankruptcy were high, particularly because there seemed no hope of paying
the principal on the bonded debt when it became due. Initially, Stetson
played an important but not central role in the company’s response to the
crisis, as Harriman was still the key board member. Nonetheless, Stetson
encouraged the radical economizing measures adopted by the company in
the early and mid–1930s, which included stopping dividend payments,
reducing operating expenses, cuts in employee pay, and laying off of more
than half of IC’s employees.19
For relief, the railroad could not turn to the usual sources of capital, as
these funds dried up with the Depression. Who would invest in the doomed
company? Even Harriman was unable to persuade friends at the investment
bank Kuhn, Loeb to prop up IC. Stetson and other board members also
recognized that operating expense reductions could not solve the debt
burden. As a result, Harriman and company president Lawrence A. Downs
turned to the federal government. They were able to meet the company’s
debts by obtaining an initial round of federal loans for almost $5 million
through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Railroad Finance
Corporation, President Herbert Hoover’s antidotes to the failure of private
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lending. Illinois Central was just one among many large corporations that
sought and received federal money in order to survive.20
As Stetson gained experience on the IC board, the company’s recovery
from the Depression, like the nation’s, was slow and painful. Through the
1930s its property—stations, tracks, and equipment, declined in value. In
1933 the company borrowed an additional $7.1 million from the Railroad
Finance Corporation and revenues fell further from 1932. Although income
increased slightly in 1934, there was still a deficit of almost $3 million.
Revenues increased once again in 1935, but so did expenses, and the
company ended the year almost $10 million in the red, a record loss.21
Beginning in 1936, IC emerged from the period of deficits, but for
several years its profits were small, particularly relative to the continuing
debt obligations, which still exceeded $15 million annually. Stetson, in fact,
described 1937 as “the second crisis of the Illinois Central.” It was necessary
to let 4,000 employees go and return to the federal government for another
$10 million loan to pay maturing securities. Altogether, IC borrowed about
$35 million from the government’s corporate finance programs between
1932 and 1937. The company borrowed another $10 million from the New
Deal’s Public Works Administration. Stetson concluded there would have
been a receivership in 1937 if a three-year, six percent note issued to
stockholders had not been paid by a government loan. Stetson also believed
depression conditions persisted to 1940 despite the fact that the company
did not have a deficit between 1936 and 1940.22

Conducting a Railroad
During the late 1930s Stetson began to assume a leading role on the IC
board. One reason was a dramatic shift in the board’s composition. Decades
earlier, reflecting the dominance of New York financial interests, the
headquarters were moved from Chicago to New York. In 1938, on
20
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Harriman’s suggestion, the IC board ordered an increase in the number of
directors, removal of the board’s headquarters and meeting place back to
Chicago, and most importantly, “filling the vacancies so created, as well as
other vacancies, with Directors residing on the company’s line of railroad.”
Part of Harriman’s motivation was to attract local business leaders who
might help in case of receivership. A committee composed of Harriman,
President Downs, and Stetson implemented the plan. Stetson later recalled
that the move eschewed gradual change. It forced the immediate resignation
of elderly New Yorkers who did not wish to travel to Chicago. During 1938
and 1939 the new places on the board went to big shippers on company’s
line: Robert E. Wood, chairman of Sears, Roebuck & Company; John W.
Rath of Iowa’s Rath meat packing company; A. D. Geoghegan, president of
Wesson Oil & Snowdrift Company in New Orleans; and William R. King,
president of the Memphis-based William R. Moore Dry Goods Company.23
Another important factor in Stetson’s increased standing was that
because Harriman was spending more time with politics, Stetson became
the heir apparent to protecting the Harriman holdings. Later, Stetson
himself recalled that by late 1939 he was “pinch-hitting” for Harriman on
financial issues, an apt metaphor for the former manager of the Mercer
University baseball team. Although his board position was still part-time
(Stetson was only a few months away from being elected president of
Guaranty), he was thoroughly engaged with the problems and possibilities
of the railroad and welcomed the leadership opportunities that came with
increased status.24
Stetson already had a clear vision of how the company should try to
escape its problems. The overarching challenge facing Illinois Central was
its enormous and complex debt. That debt had to be reduced and
restructured. Also, the company had to reinvest in its widely scattered
physical assets. According to Stetson, debt reduction and facilities
improvements were necessary to create the kind of investor confidence the
company’s business health required. He vigorously promoted these ideas
among the officers and directors. At a director’s meeting in late 1940, for
23
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example, he bluntly told a new director that receivership had been narrowly
avoided in 1937 and that he “hoped that as a new member of the board that
he would pull just as hard as he could for new business for us and that we
didn’t want to have a new member come on and [then] shortly have to go
back” because the company went bankrupt. Short-term palliatives to attract
investment, such as paying dividends, were out of the question, because the
goal was “to save the railroad for the future benefit of the bondholders and
both classes of stockholders, as well as for the benefit of the public.”25
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 propelled
Stetson to IC’s forefront. Once again, Harriman was the catalyst. Harriman
became FDR’s special representative to Great Britain and then ambassador
to the Soviet Union. He resigned as chairman of IC’s executive committee
and Stetson assumed his place in February 1942. Stetson would hold that
position for the next seventeen years. The move elevated Stetson to the
pinnacle of his business career. For the next five years he was either
president or chairman of Guaranty and chairman of the IC board’s
executive committee. His official charge with IC required that he exercise
“general supervision over the business, affairs, and property of the
company.”26
At this point, the railroad’s economic fortunes were rapidly improving.
IC profits rose to more than $10 million in 1941, the best return since 1929.
Stetson wanted to make the most of the situation, which in his mind meant
debt repayment and facilities improvement. In early 1942, Stetson believed
[T]he Illinois Central should take all steps to map out a program
to have an objective to profit as best it could by reason of the
circumstances of increased traffic, both freight and passenger, with
the idea of using that money to finally save this railroad and bring it
back to a first-class railroad.
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Feeling that very strongly, I mapped out in conjunction with the
administrative officers, a general program. That program really
started in 1939, in a limited way, to purchase [IC] bonds. That
program, however, was predicated on a definite idea of, No. 1, to
rehabilitate this property. This property had run down
considerably…and it needed rehabilitation to handle this increased
traffic, as well as for safety purposes.
I wanted to see the working capital built up. We knew that we
could not buy during the War many materials that were necessary,
so we had to do a lot of makeshift work in keeping this roadbed up.
We were unable to buy as much equipment as we would have liked
to have had. Also, there were being located on [IC’s service territory]
new projects, Government projects, as well as private industry, going
to the Mississippi Valley for strategic purposes, getting away from
the Atlantic Seaboard.
I felt very strongly that if we had mapped out a definite policy,
with a definite objective, conserving our cash, which of course means
building up working capital, that we could rehabilitate the road, that
we could have a bond purchase program which would lead to an
ultimate result whereby we could reduce our interest charges to
something under $10,000,000 [per year].

The IC board and officers endorsed Stetson’s plan.27
Implementing the strategy, however, was complicated. Several
financing devices were used to reduce and restructure the debt, which was
composed of about thirty mortgages and other debt indentures, as well as
notes held by the federal government. Stetson’s job, because of his wideranging connections in the investment community, was to write the letters,
make the phone calls, and button-hole the persons who were necessary to
achieve the company’s goals. In short, he was to make the most of
relationships in order to help his client.28
27
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In the early 1940s a most pressing concern was that a huge portion of
the debt, over $188 million, would mature between 1950 and 1955, and
most of this, about $134 million, was non-callable and due before 1954. If
the bonds had been issued in “callable” form, the company could have paid
a premium to redeem them, replacing them with a new issue costing less in
interest payments. Not only was the short time frame daunting, the
company’s poor financial record limited refinancing options. Initial
attempts, in 1945 and 1946, to lure some bondholders to exchange their
bonds for later maturing securities failed because of high prices and lack of
interest. As a result, the most consistent tactic through the 1940s was to use
the increased revenues of the war years to repurchase IC bonds on the open
market. Another concern was the need to repay $35 million owed the
government, for which the company required several time extensions. It
finally paid this debt in 1943. The government assisted the company’s bond
buying by allowing some of the debt to be used to purchase outstanding
bonds.29
In 1946 a crucial corner had been turned. Because of growing investor
confidence, the company used the bond exchange device and offers to
purchase non-callable bonds with greater success. A key means of increasing
investor confidence was constant contact with the nation’s most significant
sources of financing. This was yet another demonstration of Stetson’s use of
networks. Stetson sought and obtained the expert advice of Kuhn, Loeb;
Guaranty; the United States Secretary of Commerce; the head of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation; the Interstate Commerce
Commission; and legal counsel. The strategy’s success allowed the company
in 1949 to create a consolidated mortgage on all of its property and finance
it through an exchange for bonds that would mature in the 1970s.
Altogether, Stetson’s policy reduced the company’s debt by more than $114
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million, which in turn lowered annual interest payments by more than $5
million per year.30
An important aspect of Stetson’s plan was that it took place during a
time of huge demands on railroads. In contrast to the surplus capacity of the
1930s, the war brought crowded troop trains and massive shipments of war
materiel. Between 1943 and 1945 the company carried more than 150
million passengers. Freight shipments rose phenomenally. For example, the
company transported about 273,000 tons of crude petroleum in 1938; in
1943 it shipped more than 7.5 million tons. This new business caused
revenues and profits to increase sharply. In 1944 the company’s operating
income neared $260 million, a far cry from the less than $115 million
earned in 1940. Net income surpassed $24 million in both 1942 and 1943.
But the effects of more traffic were not all favorable. Giant increases in
passenger and freight severely burdened IC equipment and war priorities
meant replacements were not always available. The war and its aftermath
required substantial outlays for railroad maintenance. Perhaps the largest
single repair project was the bridge over the Ohio River at Cairo, which
cost more than $6 million.31

Battling Directors
Stetson’s refinancing plan was executed in a context of changing
careers and leadership. In 1946 he turned sixty-five and retired from
Guaranty as chairman the following January. In fact, by mid–1946 Stetson
was essentially a full-time officer of the railroad and his IC salary was raised
from $17,000 to $35,000. One telling example of his power in the company
at this time was his contribution to the choice of a new president. When
President John L. Bevens died, Harriman and the board of directors
delegated the job of nominating a new president to Stetson. Stetson
interviewed each of the eager candidates and asked the same question: “If
you couldn’t be the President, who would you support?” All the candidates
named Wayne Johnston. Based on that, Stetson picked Johnston, who
30
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became IC president in 1945.32
Another factor was Harriman himself, who by 1946 was nearing the
end of his ambassadorial service. Despite his absence, Harriman remained a
force because of his Union Pacific’s ownership of IC stock. Anticipating his
return, Stetson wrote Harriman in May 1946 that he was welcome to
assume the position of chairman of the board or chairman of the executive
committee of Illinois Central, or both, when he came back to the United
States. When it became clear that Harriman had no intention of taking
control, Stetson indicated his desire to become chairman of the board. The
request was not simply a matter of shuffling titles. Under the corporate bylaws, the chairman of the board was the railroad’s chief executive officer and
superior to the president. When President Bevens died it had been
suggested that Stetson become chairman of IC’s board, but he rejected the
idea because he was still chairman of Guaranty. In 1946, however, with his
departure from the bank imminent, Stetson wanted the job. He planned to
submit his proposal to become chairman at the IC board meeting on 23 July
1946. Prior to the meeting Stetson solicited the support of Harriman,
Johnston, and influential board member Robert Wood. He believed he
secured the approval of all three.33
At the 23 July meeting Stetson informed the directors that his
retirement from the bank would be effective on 15 January 1947. As a
result, he could give more time to Illinois Central. Stetson stated that his
willingness to give more time to the railroad meant his title should be
changed to chairman of the board. That would accurately reflect the new
and larger role he intended to assume. Stetson also believed that because he
was willing to give up his $100,000 a year salary with Guaranty, the IC
should henceforth pay him $50,000 a year. He informed the board that he
had already discussed the matter with Harriman and Wayne Johnston and
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that they approved. He left the boardroom in order to allow the directors to
debate the proposal freely.34
At this point Stetson’s plan encountered a major obstacle—General
Robert E. Wood. Wood was a former military quartermaster who
abandoned the army for the more profitable world of retail sales. Sixtyseven years old in 1946, Wood graduated from West Point in 1900, served
in the Philippine War, and directed the Panama Railroad Company during
the construction of the Panama Canal. He was acting Quartermaster
General of the Army during World War I. After the war, Wood saw an
opportunity to transform the mail-order business by building a chain of
retail stores, and because of this insightful policy he rose through the ranks
at Sears, Roebuck, serving as president from 1928 to 1939 and chairman of
the board from 1939 to 1954. Perhaps ironically, although initially a
supporter of Franklin Roosevelt, Wood opposed United States entry into
World War II and the Lend-Lease program that fellow IC director
Harriman helped administer. By the mid–1940s Wood wanted General
Douglas MacArthur to be President, and eventually he was a whole-hearted
supporter of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s anti-communist witch-hunt.35
After Stetson left the directors’ meeting, Wood took charge. He asked
the three members of the board who were also officers of the company,
including Wayne Johnston, to step out of the room. Wood and fellow
executive committee member and Chicago meat packing executive Thomas
E. Wilson then announced their opposition to Stetson’s proposal. They
agreed, however, that Stetson should be paid $50,000 and retained as
chairman of the executive committee. The remainder of the men present
agreed. When Wood and Wilson informed Stetson of the decision, he was
surprised and disappointed.36
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Stetson, however, did not give up after just one try. Demonstrating the
IC’s true center of power, several days after the meeting Wood wrote
Harriman a long letter about the situation. He sent Stetson a copy only a
couple of weeks later. Wood admitted that Stetson approached him about
the chairmanship and that he had led Stetson to believe he supported the
idea. Wood told Harriman that he changed his mind before the 23 July
meeting and decided to express his objection to the board. For some reason,
however, he did not bother to tell Stetson. Wood assured Harriman that his
opposition was not personal. Stetson was a “mutual friend” and all of the
board members were “fond of Gene.” On the other hand,
It was the unanimous opinion of the Board that it would be bad
policy to appoint as Chairman of the Board a New York City banker,
who resided in New York and was associated with New York, that
this would probably nullify the effect of bringing the headquarters of
the road to Chicago [in 1938]…. Then, too, we felt that it might have
a bad effect on the organization, that the officers of the road and the
working force would not feel the same when the titular head of the
road was in New York.
Oddly, Wood did not perceive it was unlikely that Harriman, a New Yorkbased financier, would be impressed by a criticism of New York banks.37
There seems to have been more to Wood’s opposition. Wood reported
that Stetson was told the board did not want him to be chairman but that it
would agree to the salary increase and him staying as chairman of the
executive committee. Wood claimed Stetson reacted sharply, saying that if
he did not become chairman of the board he would terminate his
connection with IC. According to Wood, after Wood suggested that a
resolution be delayed until October, Stetson demanded an immediate
decision. Wood and the board told Stetson that he could continue as
chairman of the executive committee with an increase in salary to $50,000,
an offer that would remain open until October. Certainly Wood’s account
attempted to put Stetson in a bad light. Wood took the opportunity to make
his broader conclusion perfectly clear:
37
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Frankly, I was surprised and upset at Gene’s attitude. I think it
would be a mistake to make him Chairman of the Board or for that
matter any New York man Chairman. I think the road can get along
very well without a Chairman for the time being. I think the fiscal
affairs of the road can be worked out by the Board even if Gene
prefers to step out. We could put Steven Hord [a partner at Brown
Brothers Harriman] on the Executive Committee and he could get us
any fiscal advice that might be necessary. If Gene chooses to stay as
chairman of the Executive Committee, I shall be glad to see him stay,
though I personally have differed with him twice on fiscal policies. I
felt that he was too slow in buying up the bonds when we had the
opportunity of buying them at a considerable discount…. [And] I was
opposed to the recent proposal by which the fiscal structure of the
road would be refinanced [through exchanging bonds].
In essence, Wood had no difficulty jettisoning Stetson, primarily because he
represented New York bankers, whom Wood disliked on principle, but also
because in Wood’s judgment Stetson made mistakes in handling IC’s debt
problems.38
Several weeks later Stetson responded to Wood in a letter, which,
predictably, he sent to Harriman first. The letter showed Stetson had not
lasted more than forty years in corporate tussles by shrinking from
challenges. First, Stetson blasted Wood for letting him believe, from May
until the 23 July meeting, that he would support Stetson’s bid to become
board chairman. He was peeved that a supposed friend had failed to explain
why he changed his mind. Stetson then attacked Wood’s representation to
Harriman that the board unanimously opposed Stetson’s proposal by
pointing out that four men on the fourteen-member Board were excluded
from the room and four were absent, leaving a minority of six to make the
“unanimous” decision. Stetson contended that a majority of the board, if
voting, would have supported his offer. More personally, Stetson
complained that Wood had “expressed to me and to others many times [his]
general antipathy to New York bankers and it is too bad you have let your
natural prejudice, coupled with your impulsiveness and I might add that
38

Ibid.

Banking for the Railroad

311

very forceful desire of yours to put your point over, influence the proper
affairs of the Illinois Central Railroad.” Ironically, considering Stetson first
sent the draft of his letter to Harriman, he complained that Wood had sent
his letter to Harriman and mailed a copy to Stetson two weeks later.39
Stetson tried to address some of the substantive issues related to his bid
to become chairman. He maintained the change in title would “make a good
bit of difference to my being able to help the railroad in many directions,” a
reference to obtaining financial and business assistance. Further, he did not
intend to assume responsibilities for the physical operation of the railroad
and only desired an advisory relationship with the president, who he
thought was doing a good job. Stetson defended his past financial policies,
adding that the bond purchase program was based on experts’ sound advice.
In the end, however, he wanted compromise. He told Wood that the
railroad faced a host of post-war problems—labor, inflation, government
regulators, and competition, and that as a result he was willing to continue
his current position: “[T]he question of a title was not fundamental
[but]…results for the railroad’s stockholders were fundamental.” As far as
corporate leadership was concerned, the president should be the chief
administrative and operating officer of the road. The chairman of the
executive committee should act for the committee and the board when the
committee was not in session. Stetson thought this means of governing was
either already incorporated in the company by-laws or could be developed
by a new agreement.40
Ultimately, and from the usual source, Stetson obtained the power he
wanted. From Paris, Harriman sent his brother Roland a draft response to
Wood. He asked Roland to “go over it with Gene” first. Harriman’s letter
supported Stetson unequivocally. As a director of the IC for more than
thirty years, he felt “strongly” that IC was “very fortunate” to have Stetson
as chairman: “He is a man of broad financial experience and has sound
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judgment. In addition, he knows our territory well.… I am satisfied that we
must have a man of Stetson’s broad experience to concentrate on its
problems or else the company may well find itself in a difficult position.”
Harriman discounted Wood’s concern that Stetson, as chairman of the
board, would somehow conflict with the president. The ambassador
portrayed Wood’s New York banker argument as Midwestern paranoia:
I cannot take seriously the suggestion that the fact that a man has
been a New York banker excludes him from the position of Chairman of the Board. The question is whether Stetson has the capacities, which I am satisfied he has. In my opinion, his standing, character and background will add prestige to the company. After all, he
was a small town Georgian who from personal experience knows the
psychology of much of our territory. The fact that he has “made
good” in the banking world is not a handicap. I was the one responsible for moving the Board of Directors from New York to Chicago.
I cannot, therefore, be accused of trying to jeopardize the value of
this move.
Harriman urged Wood to support Stetson for chairman. 41
The Wood-Stetson conflict did not result in Stetson becoming
chairman of the board. Nonetheless, it did solidify his position at IC’s
highest level. Stetson emerged from the conflict as the unofficial leader of
the board, title or no title. He had the full backing of Harriman and
President Johnston. Apparently Wood had been a thorn in the side for
some years, but despite this incident Stetson and Wood tended to agree on
the company’s broad needs. That agreement formed the basis for renewed
unity. The episode must have seemed ironic to Stetson, given that he spent
the first thirty-five years of his life in the small town world of middle
Georgia, a venue far removed from Wood’s hated New York. At any rate,
the long-term effect of the contest was that Stetson was able to make the
transition in 1946–1947 from banker to full-time railroad executive with
only a few bumps along the way.
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With a good boardroom fight behind him, Stetson looked forward to
his new relationship with Illinois Central. In the cover story published in
Forbes in January 1947, he suggested that for an executive there was real
excitement in transportation. He cited, for example, the factor of organized
labor, which flexed its muscles in the late 1940s. Stetson hoped “labor
leaders and management will come to their senses before over-drastic
measures are resorted to by Congress.” Congress, did, in fact, impose new
restrictions on unions with the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Of equal concern
was the public, which seemed ignorant about the needs of the railroads.
Competition from airlines, trucks, and cars as well as extensive government
regulation offered severe challenges. Despite his Republican affiliation,
Stetson expected sound economic leadership from President Harry S.
Truman as well as Harriman, who was now Secretary of Commerce.
Stetson’s personal efforts would “be directed towards the establishment of a
four-way equilibrium between labor, management, the various
instrumentalities of government and the public—comprising at one and the
same time both owners and customers.”42
Illinois Central continued to experience good times in the years
immediately after World War II. Gross revenues in 1946 were $211 million
and increased to $295 million in 1951. In addition to being able to use these
revenues to reduce the company’s debt, large amounts, over $148 million,
were spent to improve IC’s road and equipment. Much of this work was
necessary because of the heavy use and impossibility of repair during the
war, increased competition for freight and passengers, and the gradual
retirement of steam-driven locomotives. In 1945, the railroad’s net income
stood at $11 million, in 1947 it was $15 million, and in 1950 $12.5 million.
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By this time, the railroad had earned a profit every year since 1936. Even
success, however, led to another big challenge for Stetson and Illinois
Central. 43

43
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Business Judgment
The morning of 25 April 1950, dawned as a typical early spring day in
Manhattan—cloudy, cool, and with rain in the forecast. Although a new
baseball season was underway, Gene Stetson, a devoted fan with box seats
provided by the bank, was not thinking about the New York Yankees, the
New York Giants, or the Brooklyn Dodgers. Those teams were in the midst
of a golden age in which a New York club would be in the World Series for
ten straight years, winning nine championships.1
Instead, Stetson descended in the elevator of his apartment at 117 East
nd
72 Street and strode out to a waiting Cadillac limousine. The car was one
Illinois Central perk he particularly enjoyed. The limousine took him down
FDR Drive and on to the Federal Court Building on Washington Street in
Brooklyn. In the back of the car, Stetson may have read The New York
Herald Tribune, his favorite newspaper. Or, perhaps he reviewed pertinent
court papers. That day he was the key witness in a trial which would
evaluate his life-long banking principles. Alexander Guttmann, a Wall
Street broker and shareholder in the Illinois Central Railroad, had sued the
company, claiming that since 1937 the railroad had unlawfully failed to pay
almost $12 million in dividends to preferred shareholders.2
Stetson was a passionate defender of the railroad’s management during
the trying times of the 1930s and 1940s. As the company’s lawyers were well
aware, that passion would be necessary in a trial. In fact, as chairman of the
executive committee, Stetson was the person most responsible for the policy
that Guttmann complained about. The lawsuit proved to be an extended
judgment on Stetson’s, and the railroad’s, assumption about the
interrelationship between corporate finance and the roles and

1
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responsibilities of corporate directors. More broadly, it provided yet
another test of Stetson’s vision of relationship banking.
Surprising as it may seem, mounting profits during the 1940s actually
had an unsettling effect on IC shareholders. The reason was that no
dividends had been paid since 1931. The failure to pay dividends depressed
the trading price of IC stock. Following Stetson’s policy, the company’s
position was that repayment and debt restructuring, as well as improvement
of the road’s physical condition, had to come before dividends. Of course,
shareholders were not without means of applying pressure. Beginning in
1942, some retained attorneys and threatened to sue IC. Their claims rested
on the supposed terms of the preferred shares as well as the idea that the
company’s profitability made the directors’ failure to pay dividends
unlawful. Shareholder criticisms got louder as profits grew. At the annual
meeting in 1946 a shareholder moved to require the board to resume
dividends if earnings permitted. The board, however, controlled enough
proxies to defeat the proposal. Similar issues surfaced at the 1947 meeting,
but the board again refused to declare dividends.3
The dissatisfaction climaxed with the beginning of the Guttmann
lawsuit in 1948. As the case unfolded it became a classic contest between
managers, directors, and shareholders in which the law was charged with
sorting out the relative rights of each. The case also addressed the role of
banks and bankers in corporate governance, a recurring problem in
relationship banking. The precise legal question was whether Stetson was
correct in assuming that directors had the right to deny dividends to
preferred shareholders, even in years of profitability. In the lawsuit, Stetson
aggressively defended IC policy, which involved some of the most
prominent figures in American law.
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The Complaint
The lawsuit officially commenced on 6 July 1948, when Alexander
Guttmann filed a complaint on behalf of all Illinois Central preferred
shareholders in Brooklyn federal district court. He owned two hundred
shares, which he had purchased in 1944 and 1945. The company issued just
over 185,000 shares of preferred stock in the early 1920s in order to finance
the electrification of its Chicago commuter line. Guttmann offered several
arguments in favor of his claim. First, he maintained that the company
wrongfully failed to pay dividends between 1937 and 1947 based on the
terms of the preferred stock certificates. The language of the certificates,
according to Guttmann, gave him an absolute right to semi-annual
dividends if there were sufficient net earnings to pay them. As a back-up
argument, he contended that even if the payment of dividends was not
mandatory, the board of directors unlawfully abused its discretion by not
paying preferred dividends in years in which there was a net profit.
According to Guttmann, the annual amount that should have been paid
preferred shareholders since 1937 was just over $1.1 million per year,
making the total claim roughly $12 million, plus interest.4
Of course, by 1948 Stetson was no stranger to legal disputes arising out
of his work as an officer or director. As already discussed, almost ten years
earlier he, along with other Guaranty directors, had been a defendant in the
high profile Litwin v. Allen shareholder lawsuit. That case had largely, but
not entirely, vindicated the actions of Guaranty’s board relative to the illfated financing of the Van Sweringen brothers.5
Guttmann’s claim raised some of the same issues as Litwin, but it also
had clear differences. Like the Litwin plaintiffs, Guttmann challenged the
actions of directors, partly on the basis that they had been negligent. Instead
of condemning a bad loan, however, he criticized the board’s refusal to pay
preferred shareholder dividends. This was significant, because the law made
4
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all claims of director wrongdoing difficult to pursue, but it made efforts to
extract dividends especially burdensome. To be sure, IC’s directors were
obligated to act in good faith with the degree of care that a reasonably
prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances and in the belief
that their actions were in the best interests of the corporation. Further, any
fraud, conflict of interest, or other illegality in performing their duties as
directors would be a basis for liability or for overturning director action.
The law recognized the complexity of corporate decisions, including
decisions to declare dividends. In fact, the law sought to avoid excessive
second-guessing. As a result, it shielded directors from liability when they
acted without self-interest, with sufficient information, and when they
reasonably believed the effects of their business judgment were in the best
interests of the corporation. Director action, such as the IC board’s decision
to deny preferred dividends, could not be made the basis for liability if it
was the product of ordinary mistakes. This “business judgment rule”
presumed the appropriateness of a board’s decision.6
Guttmann’s lawyers, the Nemerov & Shapiro firm, whose offices were
just across Broadway from Stetson’s Guaranty, were aware of the high legal
barriers to challenging directors’ decisions. In an effort to deflate the
presumption of legality they stressed that by 1948 IC had earned a profit
every year for more than ten years. They also argued that the board was
merely a Union Pacific tool—meaning a pawn of Averell Harriman.
Supposedly Harriman was most interested in increasing the value of his IC
common shares. As a consequence, preferred shareholders like Guttmann
were wrongly denied dividends. The plaintiffs also tried to avoid the
director discretion rule by alleging that the terms of the preferred stock
certificates gave them a right to payment in all years in which there was net
income: 1936 through 1948. The language in the stock certificates provided
that preferred stockholders “shall be entitled to receive out of the surplus or
net profits of the Company, in each fiscal year, dividends at such rate or
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rates, not exceeding seven per cent, per annum, as shall be determined by
the Board of Directors.”7
In contrast, IC’s attorneys saw that their strength lay in the argument
that a corporate board normally has wide discretion, especially in the
declaration of dividends. The company used its regular New York lawyers,
one of the nation’s leading corporate firms, Davis Polk Wardwell
Sunderland & Kiendl, to make the case. Theodore Kiendl, who had argued
important cases before the United States Supreme Court, and S. Hazard
Gillespie Jr., were the partners in charge of the defense. Their strategy
relied on mounds of evidence showing the details of Stetson’s financial
policy. They planned to emphasize the railroad’s precarious condition in the
1930s and 1940s. Of course, IC’s lawyers also denied that the preferred
stock certificates gave any special rights to dividends, and they tried
mightily to keep the court’s focus on the good works of the directors in
seeking to bring the company back to physical and financial health.8

The Trial
The trial commenced before Judge Clarence G. Galston, without a
jury. Galston, an elderly Hoover appointee, was likely to scrutinize a
shareholder suit carefully. The strategy marked out by Guttmann in his pretrial filings, which emphasized contract rights and used the alleged abuse of
discretion by the board as a backup argument, was executed rather weakly at
trial. His counsel, Mortimer A. Shapiro, called only one witness, an
accountant, whose primary purpose was to show that the company had the
resources to pay preferred dividends from 1937 to 1947 from net income.
The dull testimony did not last long. Kiendl cross-examined the accountant
in an extremely aggressive manner, repeatedly forcing statements that the
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accountant was working on a contingency basis, that he began to consider
the financial history of the IC only during the past few months, and that he
had scant experience with railroad accounting. Kiendl relished the
accountant’s admission that the one larger railroad for which he had done
work was now bankrupt. Altogether, it was clear that Guttmann had no
evidence to support his case other than the stock certificate itself and the
fact that the company had earned profits since 1936.9
In contrast, IC put on a detailed and careful presentation that lasted
several days. It emphasized the real problems of the railroad and the
directors and officers’ determined efforts to manage those problems.
Stetson was the first and most important witness. The reasons for putting
him up front were clear. He was a senior executive, almost seventy years
old, with a distinguished appearance whose vast experience in finance and
railroading would be extremely persuasive. Moreover, it was his policy of
debt repayment, maintenance, and postponing dividends that was under
attack, so from the company’s perspective there simply was no one more
suited to defend the IC than the chairman of the executive committee.
Perhaps he insisted on the role. Finally, there was the intangible benefit of
Stetson’s direct and effective speaking style and forthright manner, which
would almost certainly have a positive effect on the court. This was
Stetson’s golden opportunity to communicate the reasons for IC’s decisionmaking.
Gillespie began by establishing Stetson’s long service with IC and
Guaranty. Stetson discussed his Georgia origins and his broader experience
with railroad finance. He made the court aware of the connection between
Harriman, Guaranty, and Stetson’s appointment to the IC board. Stetson’s
short and to-the-point responses conveyed a strong impression of expertise.
For example, he remarked that his many years in banking “gave me an
acquaintanceship throughout the United States in practically every
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important city in the United States.” Stetson stated that the relationship
between Harriman, the president of the railroad, and the board members
was excellent. They united in seeking the company’s health. Gillespie also
asked Stetson about his annual compensation for IC, which had risen to
$50,000 by 1947. Although this was a large income, Gillespie used the
information to show that Stetson had actually traded a $100,000 a year
salary with Guaranty for this lower amount out of devotion to IC. In short,
the initial stages of Stetson’s testimony did an excellent job of portraying
Stetson as a business figure worth respect, a man with unusual experience
who was not interested in excessive self-aggrandizement or quick fixes to
serious business problems.10
Getting to the heart of the case, Gillespie asked Stetson about the
railroad’s debt and the directors’ efforts to address the problem. Stetson
rattled off the pertinent figures. He described desperate negotiations with
government lenders in the 1930s and the large interest payments facing the
company. He made it clear that prior to 1941 the overriding issue for the
board was the need to save the railroad for bondholders, shareholders, and
the public. Under the circumstances, paying dividends to preferred
shareholders was a luxury the company could not afford. After 1941, even
with significant increases in revenue, Stetson recalled that the railroad
needed to build up working capital for construction and maintenance as well
as to concentrate on paying IC’s large debt.11
Besides outlining the debt repayment policy, Stetson’s testimony
provided concrete evidence of the issues that motivated the board to
proceed with caution during and after World War II. These included the
government’s exceptional demands pursuant to its enormous loans; the
bond purchasing program’s high costs; investors’ hesitance about the future
of the IC because of its debt; a large tax payment to the state of Illinois; the
construction of a new terminal in New Orleans; and expensive repairs to the
Cairo, Illinois, bridge. Stetson and his fellow board members also feared
renewed depression after World War II. All of them were old enough to
remember the economic problems of 1919–1921. In fact, Stetson indicated
that that this fear was only eliminated by the outbreak of “cold war” in
10
11
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1948. The anticipated good times emanating from the threat of communism
was one of the motivating factors in causing the company to renew
preferred dividend payments that year. Only continued success in lowering
debt and increasing working capital caused Stetson’s eventual support for
dividends for common shareholders, which were approved just prior to the
trial, in January 1950.12
Finally, in response to Guttmann’s claims of undue Union Pacific
influence, Stetson testified that IC’s board always acted with the best
possible advice and was free from outside control. As for the good advice, it
came from leading bankers in Chicago and New York, investors, lawyers,
and the company’s most important government contacts. Stetson also relied
on railroad finance experts at Guaranty. He emphasized the IC acted on this
expert advice and that the company consistently enjoyed approval from the
government. The latter point was especially calculated to impress a federal
judge. As for the plaintiff’s claim that the board was under the thumb of the
Union Pacific and Harriman, Stetson replied:
Mr. Averell Harriman is a great friend of mine. His brother, Mr.
Roland Harriman, who is now chairman of the board of the Union
Pacific Railroad, is a great friend of mine. I see Mr. Roland Harriman
occasionally. I am going to his home this evening on a Red Cross
matter to try and help raise some money for him. We are great
friends, but there has never been, directly or indirectly, any effort on
the part of the Union Pacific Railroad or any of its officials to
dominate, to control, to direct or in any way influence any activity on
the part of any official or director of the Illinois Central during my
connection with it.
Given the practical difficulty of responding to that kind of personal
testimony, Guttmann voluntarily removed the issue of Union Pacific
control from the case.13
Stetson’s cross-examination proved to be the trial’s climax. From the
plaintiff’s perspective, it was critical to show that the board abused its
discretion by not paying dividends, and Stetson would have to help provide
12
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evidence for that contention. Given this goal, the cross examination failed.
Shapiro certainly demonstrated that IC’s financial position improved
through the 1930s and 1940s, that it was not absolutely necessary that
bonds maturing the 1950s be bought back in the 1940s, and that funds were
available to pay the preferred shareholders. All this Stetson and the
company conceded. But these facts fell substantially short of the degree of
negligence or abuse required. The cross-examination actually gave Stetson
more opportunities to explain the directors’ reasonableness while reducing
the plaintiff’s case to quibbles. For example, prior to the trial Shapiro
uncovered evidence of the earlier rift between General Wood and Stetson,
but his evidence seemed to suggest that the men only differed on details,
and Stetson was able to testify as to the board’s solidarity: “General Wood
is one of the most brilliant individuals in business that I know but General
Wood is a merchant, he is a salesman and a brilliant one at that, as shown
by the Sears Roebuck statements and one of the finest directors that we
have ever had because he is constantly bringing up matters with the
board.”14
The cross-examination also gave Stetson an opportunity to express his
real feelings about Guttmann’s claim, sometimes in strong language. He
said that recent increases in the preferred shares’ market prices, particularly
because most preferred shareholders had bought their shares in the
depressed market of the 1930s and early 1940s, should be enough reward.
He believed shareholders had to rely on the directors to make correct
decisions and that the debt retirement program would have been harmed if
the directors issued dividends prematurely. Even Shapiro admitted that the
board had done an excellent job—except in its decision to deny dividends.
In the end, Shapiro’s most successful point, although entirely irrelevant to
the legal issues, was demonstrating that Stetson bought two hundred shares
of IC common stock in late 1949, just weeks before the board declared the
first dividend on common shares since the Depression. The purchase had
been publicly reported and Stetson readily admitted it, but the implication
of self-dealing stung. Ironically, Stetson had little personal interest in IC
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shares. Before buying the common shares his only ownership in IC was ten
shares of preferred stock, which he purchased in 1932.15
The defense then trotted out other witnesses, each of whom supported
and added to Stetson’s basic contentions. The company’s chief accountant,
an IC employee for more than forty-seven years, testified as to the poor
condition of the company in the 1930s and gradual improvement under the
board’s policies. The company’s general counsel, employed by the company
almost fifty-two years, repeated the same information from the standpoint
of the legal department. Long-time directors were called to demonstrate the
company’s contention that it was on the brink of bankruptcy in the 1930s
and to expound on the principle that “no company can go broke by paying
its debts.” Gillespie and Kiendl examined a partner from the investment
firm of Kuhn, Loeb, who repeated the refrain that the company was in
danger of bankruptcy in the 1930s. The IC’s chief engineer, an employee
for almost forty years, testified about the awful condition of the road and
IC’s inability to maintain it at an optimal level because of inadequate funds.
Finally, the defense offered Wayne Johnston, the current president, who
had been with the railroad since 1919. Johnston focused on the great need
for equipment, facilities, and maintenance. Altogether, the defense
consumed four days, in which the court had ample opportunity to reflect on
the enormous experience of its leaders and the massive problems of one of
the nation’s largest railroads.16
On 26 May, four weeks after the trial, Judge Galston issued an opinion
dismissing Guttmann’s complaint. He agreed with the defense’s theory of
the case and was impressed by the large volume of testimony documenting
the railroad’s problems. In fact, half of the opinion repeated the company’s
perspective, with several direct references to Stetson’s testimony. Even
before proceeding to its legal analysis, the court concluded that the board’s
15
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fiscal policy “seems neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. The directors were
all men of affairs, experienced in business, railroading and finance.” The
high level of expertise utilized in governing the company, which included
advice from the federal government, appears to have been especially
persuasive to Judge Galston.17
The court’s legal analysis was also in favor of IC. It found no authority
to support the plaintiff’s contention that the stock certificate required the
payment of dividends in years in which there was net income. Holding that
Illinois law governed the dispute, the court found that Illinois law did not
provide a clear answer. As a result, the court looked to New York law and to
federal law in holding that only in very unusual circumstances, such as when
the language of the securities clearly required the payment of dividends,
would payment be necessary. Otherwise, directors had the power to issue
dividends limited only by bad faith, arbitrariness, or abuse of discretion.
The plaintiff’s defeat on the mandatory or discretionary issue led the court
to consider whether there had been an abuse of discretion in denying the
preferred dividends. Here the IC’s trial strategy paid off handsomely. Judge
Galston suggested it was not even a close question, considering the national
economy during the 1930s and early 1940s, the company’s status as a
common carrier with an obligation to provide public service, the experience
of the company’s leaders, and the expert advice obtained. Stetson and the
rest of the leadership acted in their best judgment.18

The Appeal
Perhaps because of the large amount of money at stake and the likely
contingent nature of the plaintiff’s legal fees, an appeal followed. For this
proceeding, held in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Guttmann brought in an additional attorney, Lloyd Garrison, a
superstar advocate from the New York firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton
& Garrison. Garrison, the great-grandson of abolitionist William Lloyd
Garrison, was a prominent Wall Street lawyer. Earlier, he had participated
in the formation of the National Labor Relations Board and was dean of the

17
18

Guttmann, 91 F. Supp. at 286–92.
Ibid., at 293–98.
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University of Wisconsin Law School. Shortly after the Guttmann appeal,
Garrison represented playwright Arthur Miller and poet Langston Hughes
when they were called to testify in Congress before the communist-hunting
Senator Joseph McCarthy. Garrison’s presence vastly increased the
plaintiff’s credibility, especially when he skillfully shifted the legal focus.
The appeal concentrated on a new issue: whether the trial court had been
correct in assuming that since preferred shares were non-cumulative, that is,
dividends did not cumulate when not paid, the dividends were lost forever if
not declared in a given year. Garrison argued that non-cumulative dividends
were not lost unless there were no profits, which was not true for IC, or if
earnings were spent on capital improvements, which Garrison also
contended was not true. Simply stated, Guttmann’s new argument was that
for the years 1942 through 1947 he was entitled to dividends because of the
special rights of IC’s non-cumulative preferred shareholders.19
Although the revised strategy was good lawyering, IC’s counsel was up
to the challenge. Kiendl and Gillespie brought in their own superstar, John
W. Davis, Stetson’s long-time friend and fellow Guaranty director, to help
prepare a response. In the early 1950s Davis was perhaps the best-known
lawyer in the United States. He was soon to become lead counsel for South
Carolina in the Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.
Davis’s response to Garrison was to hit hard, as in the trial, on the legal
principle that directors have wide discretion to declare dividends and that
the carefully presented facts at trial showed IC’s directors acted prudently.
The defense team also took advantage of the plaintiff’s shifting legal
theories, pointing out that Guttmann’s earlier claims of domination by the
Union Pacific had magically disappeared, as had any claims to dividends for
the years 1937–1941. The plaintiffs’ appeal, as a result, was nothing more
than a frantic search for a winning argument. Finally, IC argued that the

19
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trial court was correct in deciding that when a dividend is not declared on
non-cumulative shares the right to such a dividend can never be revived.20
The Second Circuit appeared to have little trouble rejecting
Guttmann’s argument. It affirmed the judgment of the trial court on 31
May 1951. The panel that heard the appeal included some of the most
esteemed judges in the United States: Learned Hand, Jerome N. Frank, and
Harrie B. Chase. Hand was nearing the end of a long and distinguished
career as perhaps the highest-regarded federal court of appeals judge in the
country. Frank, a former corporate lawyer, had been special counsel to the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the 1930s, chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission under Roosevelt, and was an
internationally known legal theorist. Hand was also Garrison’s good friend,
but his opinion quickly disposed of Garrison’s argument. First, there could
be no question that IC directors acted “well within their discretion in
withholding declarations of dividends on the non-cumulative stock up to
1948.” The only remaining issue was whether preferred shareholders
became entitled to dividends for the years 1942 to 1947, or more precisely,
whether the directors had the power to issue dividends for previous years to
non-cumulative preferred shareholders. After conceding that Illinois law did
not provide a clear answer, Hand looked to federal cases and determined
that non-cumulative meant non-cumulative. The IC directors lacked the
power to declare dividends for past years. Ultimately, Hand viewed the
dispute as a simple matter of contract. Accordingly, fairness was not
relevant: “[T]he preferred stockholders are not—like sailors or idiots or
infants—wards of the judiciary. As courts on occasions have quoted or
paraphrased ancient poets, it may not be inappropriate to paraphrase a
modern poet, and to say that ‘a contract is a contract is a contract’.”21
20
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Guttmann had one option remaining, the United States Supreme
Court, and he tried that. At this stage the difficulty facing his lawyers was
that the Supreme Court demanded more than simply an argument that the
appeals court decision was wrong. Because the Court possessed the power
to choose whether it would hear the case, Garrison and Shapiro had to show
that the claim raised a significant issue. Obviously a board of directors’
discretion to declare dividends did not rise to the level of something the
Supreme Court would normally consider. That involved state law and was
heavily shaped by facts, two matters other courts could deal with better than
the nine men in Washington. Again finding it necessary to try and shift the
focus of the case, Garrison made the ingenious argument that the Supreme
Court should care about the case because it raised an important issue under
the Court’s 1938 decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. There the Court held
that a federal court should apply state law in cases where federal jurisdiction
was based on the fact that the parties in the case were citizens of different
states. Garrison contended that, in violation of Erie, Judge Hand wrongly
relied on a federal case, not state law, in ruling on the non-cumulative
dividends issue and that at the very least the Supreme Court should clarify
whether that was proper. Of course, Garrison also argued that Hand
misinterpreted federal law to bar the payment of dividends.22
In response, Davis and Kiendl took their cue from Judge Hand’s
opinion and argued the Supreme Court should refuse to hear the case. The
dispute was ultimately about the meaning of a shareholder’s contract
between the preferred shareholders and the company. They knew the
Supreme Court would never be interested in something so mundane as
contract language. Finally, IC’s lawyers responded to the Erie claim by
arguing that the appeals court’s decision did not contradict the principle
that state law should govern: the contract’s language determined the
outcome, and further, no state law supported Garrison’s views about past
payment of dividends to non-cumulative preferred shareholders.
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Apparently, the Supreme Court agreed. On 5 November 1951, it denied
Guttmann’s petition without explanation. The long legal test of Stetson’s
assumptions about Illinois Central financing was over.23

Getting Credit
The successful conclusion of the Guttmann suit was not merely a
victory in a narrow legal struggle between the company and a shareholder.
It officially ended a long era in the railroad’s financial history, giving a
formal seal of approval to the manner in which Stetson and the company
handled the serious challenges of the 1930s and 1940s. Some celebrating
began, and much of the credit for better times was bestowed on Stetson.
During the company’s centennial, in 1951, President Johnston gave a
speech on the railroad’s history to the Newcomen Society. In Stetson’s
presence, Johnston described the debt reduction campaign’s success and its
principal architect:
It gives me great satisfaction this evening to acknowledge the
special indebtedness of the company to the Chairman of our
Executive Committee, Eugene W. Stetson. For several years past, he
has devoted a large part of his time, thought, and effort to working
out, with infinite patience and discerning judgment, step by step, the
multitudinous details of [the] refunding, consolidation, and debt
reduction program….The much-improved financial position in
which the Illinois Central finds itself today is a tribute more eloquent
and impressive than any words of mine can possibly express to the
sagacious leadership of Eugene W. Stetson.24
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Of course, the new era brought its own problems: dieselization;
changing agricultural conditions; and intense competition from airlines,
trucks, and automobiles. These service-oriented issues seemed to place
finance in the background, but Stetson still found ways to contribute. For
example, he sent his friend Thomas Watson at IBM a memo about cost
savings to the railroad’s accounting department that derived from IBM
punch card machines, a technology Stetson encouraged for IC. More
importantly, the continuing thinness of the company’s profit margins
caused the board to persist with Stetson’s conservative financial perspective
through the 1950s. Particularly burdensome were government requirements
that the railroad maintain money-losing passenger service, which cost IC
millions each year. Because of lagging revenue, net income dropped from
$29 million in 1950 to $11 million in 1960, and the railroad reduced
dividend payments in 1958.25
Stetson presided over the executive committee of the IC until his death
in July 1959. At that time, the board recognized his legacy in a resolution
which proclaimed that Stetson’s “able leadership was especially significant
in planning and carrying forward the consolidation and refunding program,
with unprecedented reductions in debt and carrying charge, which placed
the Illinois Central Railroad on the sound financial position which it enjoys
today.” Memories of Stetson at IC lasted well beyond his passing. In 1965,
Wayne Johnston vividly recalled Stetson’s leadership, which put the longterm interests of the railroad, its owners, and the public it served first.
Perhaps remembering the Guttmann lawsuit, he repeated the former
chairman’s admonition that business leadership was not about “running a

25
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popularity contest.… We have to do what is right, no matter how difficult it
will be to do it.”26
Stetson’s twenty-seven year career with Illinois Central sheds further
light on his conception of relationship banking. First, Stetson believed that
a railroad corporation should keep its debt to a reasonable minimum, plow
profits back into physical improvements, and assume that contingencies
could become serious liabilities. These beliefs relied on the values that one
might expect from a “conservative” banker, a representative of the investing
community. In Stetson’s view, a railroad, partly because of its public
responsibilities, should appeal to long-term investors. With Illinois Central
this was clear not only from the focus on debt repayment, but also from
Stetson’s reliance on the advice of leading financial entities. For Stetson, the
crucial players included investment banks in New York and the federal
government, the latter of which was perhaps the most important creditor of
the railroad in the 1930s and early 1940s as well as its most important
customer during World War II. Stetson believed a company could not
surmount financial problems without the cooperation of its creditors.27
In execution, Stetson’s policies were fundamentally pragmatic. As with
his other business experiences, political ideology took a back seat. For
example, despite his own political conservatism, which included opposition
to much of the New Deal’s financial legislation, his actions with Illinois
Central did not presuppose a sharp dividing line between the government
and railroad business. In the 1930s and 1940s he had no qualms about the
IC taking New Deal government assistance, which all IC executives,
including Stetson, agreed saved the railroad when private investors proved
skittish. The amount borrowed from the federal government, more than
$45 million, was more than the net profit of the company for the entire
decade of the 1930s. It is also clear that Stetson understood the importance
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of business input from government regulators, as evidenced by his dealings
with Harriman. Thus, when Stetson was concerned about what he viewed as
the high cost of labor, he looked to federal legislation to resolve the
problem. Ultimately, in relationship banking there was no sharp dividing
line between the public and private sectors.28
Stetson’s pragmatism and flexibility also reflected his understanding of
the role of the banker as corporate director. With IC, he focused on the
long-term needs of larger shareholders. This stands in stark contrast with
the stereotyped buccaneering financial practices of nineteenth century
railroad barons. Stetson’s policy meant denying dividends to the lesser
owners who eventually sued the IC, even when money was available to pay
the dividends. Stetson assumed, and the Guttmann judges agreed, that in a
large publicly-traded corporation directors could take a strong stand against
the short-term interests of shareholders, particularly speculative investors.
Stetson thought his job was to establish a “four-way equilibrium between
labor, management, the various instrumentalities of government and the
public—comprising at one and the same time both owners and customers.”
This was an expression of the railroad corporation as quasi-public entity, an
institution that had obligations beyond its owners, obligations that it was up
to the directors to meet. Of course, Stetson’s position was affected by his
status as a Harriman protégé, who controlled the largest block of IC stock
and who had no interest in short term fixes. The position was also shaped
by his belief in the broad public responsibilities of all corporations and their
leaders.29
Stetson was proud of the contribution he could make to IC as a banker,
even a New York banker. In part this was because he was aware of the
hostility toward Wall Street on the IC board and in the country at large.
28
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The Guttmann lawsuit typified the kind of attacks on financial decisionmakers that followed the Depression. Yet Stetson deplored the Wall Street
stereotype, as his confrontation with fellow director Robert Wood
demonstrated, and he tried to prove its inaccuracy. He envisioned the good
banker as someone who could do right by helping the worthy business.
But what was business worthiness? In the late 1940s Stetson defined
this ideal by describing the “Four Business Freedoms”—his variation of
FDR’s famous “Four Freedoms”: service and sacrifice; thrift; pay as you go;
and the right to work. Along with the anti-union sentiment of the last
“freedom,” the emphasis was on honesty, public service, caution, and
performance. Stetson seemed most interested in supporting business and
banking policies that benefited both the corporation and its customers, with
the assumption that a corporation should operate in a manner that would
allow it to continue indefinitely. According to Stetson, a business was not
simply a device to enrich shareholders or reward management. Instead, a
business was an entity that had deeper productive value, value that should
be extracted in a manner to benefit the public at large.30
Stetson also held fiercely to the principle that directors, particularly
banker directors, should take an active role in a company’s success. They
should not be rubber stamps for corporate managers, and in fact should be
the managers’ superiors. Some directors might be mere stand-ins for the
company’s officers, collecting their per diem pay and keeping their mouths
shut. Stetson rejected that kind of behavior. At Illinois Central he even tried
to become the chairman of IC’s board, a position normally reserved for the
company president. Similarly, Stetson was a salesman, and he demanded
that other directors demonstrate their loyalty through direct efforts to
produce revenue for the corporation.31
Stetson’s activities with IC also reveal important personal
characteristics. First, although he came to the railroad because of the

30

Bond, Stetson, 126, 130.
On the general problem of management domination, see Mace, Directors, 83–
85. Stetson’s continuing salesmanship was revealed in many ways, such as his
placement of the article “Distribution and the Main Line of Mid-America,” a
discussion of the role of the company’s contribution to the economy, in Coca-Cola’s
official publication, The Red Barrel, in 1951.
31

334

Relationship Banker

Guaranty-Harriman connection, his forceful and persuasive personality as
well as his ideas established real independence. During the late 1930s and
1940s Stetson delivered the goods as a chairman who was able to unify the
board and exert compelling leadership when bankruptcy was imminent. He
clearly commanded respect on the board and among the company officers.
There was no better demonstration of this personal strength than the fact
that he was the key witness in the Guttmann case.
Second, Stetson’s personality required that he be at the center of
things. This was the same sort of ambition that had been apparent from the
day he left Macon to accept the sink-or-swim vice-presidency at Guaranty.
It was still alive thirty years later in his plan to become chairman of IC’s
board as a kind of “retirement.” He simply informed the railroad’s president
that he wanted to be chairman with a $50,000 salary and then expected that
accomplishing that goal would be nearly automatic. Nonetheless, Stetson’s
outspoken ambition was tempered with realism, a spirit of compromise, and
a desire to do what was best for interests other than his own. When he was
successfully opposed for the chairman position by Robert Wood, he settled
for an enhanced status at IC without the title, which allowed him to
continue his financial program.
Gene Stetson was a leader in American railroad finance during difficult
times. His pragmatic policies of economy, simplification of debt structure,
willingness to seek governmental assistance, and opposition to what he
considered the unreasonable demands of shareholders helped Illinois
Central emerge from the Depression and World War II with increased
value. It was a genuine accomplishment at a time when positive results were
rare among railroads. Perhaps most importantly, the connection to IC was
also an extended demonstration of relationship banking. It precisely
reflected the mix of skills and behaviors that characterized Stetson’s work:
financial knowledge, personal connections, a willingness to listen to the
expertise of others, ambition, an understanding of a corporation’s public
responsibilities, and beliefs about the broad obligations of the corporate
director.

14
The Last Deal
In 1958, Gene Stetson invited Henry Alexander, head of J. P. Morgan, to
his home on East 72nd Street. Stetson initiated the private meeting to
explore the possibility of a merger between Guaranty and Morgan.
According to Stetson, Guaranty had a leadership problem, a problem that
had disturbed him for some time. At first, Alexander was not interested in
merging his relatively small but highly prestigious bank. In fact, just a few
years earlier, he emphatically told New York real estate developer William
Zeckendorf: “Morgan will never merge.” In the 1950s, however, big bank
mergers were changing the industry. In 1954, Chemical Bank merged with
Corn Exchange Bank, and the next year Chase National merged with the
Bank of Manhattan.1
During the first meeting with Alexander, Stetson undoubtedly sat
across from the Morgan banker in the high back chair he loved so much. He
would have angled his body, as was his habit, so that he faced Alexander
from his left. Would Alexander be interested in a Guaranty-Morgan merger
if he could became top man at the fourth largest bank in America?
Despite the early hesitance, Alexander eventually changed his mind.
Stetson played an essential role in this change and also in selling the merger
to Morgan and Guaranty by effectively bringing together the different
1
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parties. By 1958 Stetson had been thinking merger for years. According to
his daughter Josephine, in pushing the deal he “seemed to have the ability
to talk to the Morgan people, to the Guaranty people, and to work out an
equitable coming together…. He did have the finesse, he did have the
ability to listen to other people and to try to work out the problems to suit
them all.” As a culmination of long-standing relationships, the last deal was
an appropriate finale. The Morgan-Guaranty plan was officially announced
on 17 December 1958, six months before Stetson died. At the time, Henry
Alexander stated simply that the principal reason for the merger was to
create “a great new bank, strong in resources, operating principally in the
field of commerce, business and industry.”2

Guaranty’s Malaise
While Guaranty made money, retained blue-chip clients, and was a
leader in utilizing technology, by the late 1950s its once dynamic
momentum had stalled. At the end of 1947, Stetson’s last year as chairman,
assets were about $2.8 billion and deposits $2.4 billion. Four years later,
assets had climbed to $3.1 billion and deposits were $2.7 billion. In
December 1958, however, assets remained at just over $3 billion and
deposits amounted to $2.6 billion. After accounting for inflation, this meant
assets and deposits had actually declined during the preceding ten years, the
longest period without meaningful growth since 1891. Symbolic of the
lackluster conditions, in 1953 the bank dropped plans to build a new main
office because of cost, opting instead to refurbish the existing quarters at
140 Broadway.3
2
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Banking historian Ron Chernow explains Guaranty’s relative decline as
the result of reluctant leadership, describing the institution in the late 1950s
as “fat, sleepy, [and] dowdy.” He singles out J. Luther Cleveland as a cause.
Cleveland became chairman of the board on Stetson’s retirement in 1947
and still held that position when Stetson began his discussions with
Alexander eleven years later. Cleveland had been chairman longer than
anyone in the bank’s history, and apparently it was too long. Chernow
describes Cleveland as curt and humorless; an autocrat who drove away
good employees. He was aloof and unusually unpopular among the bank’s
staff. Unlike Stetson, Cleveland was not invited to sit on many corporate
boards. Instead, Cleveland’s version of relationship banking meant periodic
telephone calls to the bank’s ten most important clients. Supposedly, a list
of those ten clients was the only piece of paper on his desk.4
Cleveland, in his late 60s when Stetson initiated merger talks, was
outdated and overly conservative. His failures were apparently of recent
origin and consisted primarily of lost opportunities. They seem to have
reflected an inability to comprehend new possibilities offered by the postwar environment and rested on the fact that the bank, after all, was still
profitable and wealthy. Cleveland’s career had many of same attributes as
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Stetson’s—an outsider who made good. A small-town Texan, he entered
banking as an assistant cashier with a national bank in Muskogee,
Oklahoma, before World War I. Cleveland landed a job with Guaranty in
1923, after military service in France. He worked his way up to vice
president in 1928 and then president in 1944, replacing Stetson. Coming
from the Southwest, his specialties were oil and public utilities. In New
York he became a highly-regarded expert in financing those industries and
in developing new practices. At some point, however, the innovation
stopped. At one low moment in his leadership the Ford Motor Company
was so appalled at losses in its pension plan that it pulled the account. More
significantly, in the 1950s Cleveland defended traditional “wholesale”
banking and strongly rejected trends to branch banking and broader appeals
to retail customers. He also opposed increasing Guaranty’s capital. Such
attitudes had the predictable effect of precluding growth.5
Equally revealing, Cleveland refused to consider change in asset and
liability management, which was rapidly becoming a new force in banking.
A Guaranty vice president, Ralph Leach, wanted Guaranty to borrow
Federal Reserve Funds from smaller regional banks and use the money to
expand its asset base. Leach, who had worked at the New York Federal
Reserve and continued to advise the Fed after going to the private sector,
went on to become treasurer and chairman of the merged Morgan
Guaranty and the chief proponent of using borrowed capital to increase
lending. Leach was also an advocate of fixed-interest negotiable certificates
of deposit as a way of attracting and building corporate accounts. In the
early 1960s certificates of deposit, or CDs, became a way for banks holding
large amounts of cash to pay interest to corporate depositors. At the time it
was illegal for banks to pay interest on checking accounts. The concept of
cash management, however, made companies increasingly aware of the free
money windfall they traditionally gave banks under the old rules of

5
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relationship banking. Naturally they looked for ways to earn a return on
their cash, and CDs provided one answer.6
The result of Guaranty’s lethargy was that Stetson and other board
members decided Cleveland had to be pushed out, as he was unwilling to
step down on his own. The situation must have been uncomfortable, as
Stetson had known Cleveland for more than thirty years. He clearly held a
very good opinion of him in the 1940s and had supported his elevation to
the presidency and to chairman. In 1947, in fact, Stetson described
Cleveland as a “double-barreled” person who was both a money maker and
a conservator. By 1958 he apparently felt some obligation to remedy the
situation he helped create. In general, Stetson had little patience for
incompetence, so perhaps he was even angered by the prospect of continued
decline at an institution once considered among the pioneers on Wall
Street. Others felt the same way. At the 1956 shareholders’ meeting, one
disgruntled shareholder openly complained about the bank’s fall from third
in assets among American banks to seventh.7

The Solution
Despite his retirement as chairman and increased work with Illinois
Central, during the 1950s Stetson did not abandon lower Broadway. He
maintained an office at the bank and was a member of both the Guaranty
board and its executive committee. When Stetson and a few other board
members began looking to merger as a solution to the leadership problem,
J. P. Morgan had special appeal as a partner, especially to Stetson. From the
days of Thomas Lamont, Charles Sabin, Bill Potter, and Jack Morgan he
could remember the deep and profitable ties between the companies. The
Morgan possibility would be a homecoming of sorts, almost taking the bank
back to the days before Depression-era laws severed many of their
connections.8
6
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But Morgan was not the only option. In considering a merger Stetson’s
southern connections led him to Harold Helm and Baxter Jackson of the
retail-oriented Chemical Corn Exchange Bank. Helm and Jackson were part
of a southern executive team that dominated Chemical from the 1920s to
the 1960s. Jackson was also part of a Dixie-based social, political, and
economic network that included Bob Woodruff, Senator Walter F. George
of Georgia, and Governor Max Gardner of North Carolina, all of whom
were Stetson associates. Chemical served many southern textile and business
interests, including West Point, Milliken, and Mount Vernon. Instead of
Guaranty, however, in early 1959 Chemical Bank, under Helm’s leadership,
merged with the “wholesale” Trust Company of New York and became the
Chemical Bank New York Trust Company. When the discussions with
Chemical led nowhere, Stetson focused on Morgan.9
Not all of the impetus for the merger came from Guaranty. Morgan
itself was transformed by the upheavals of the 1930s and 1940s, and not
positively. In the early forties, it abandoned the partnership form of
organization and became an incorporated business, an earth-shattering shift
for the tradition-based bank. Further, Morgan’s assets were hit hard by the
Depression. They fell to a meager $39 million in 1939. Death also took its
toll. Jack Morgan died in 1943, and Thomas Lamont, managing partner and
long time chairman of Guaranty’s executive committee, passed away in
1948.10
By 1958 Morgan’s once dominant role in the national banking system
was over. The expansion of government as a controller of money and the
ability of wealthy corporations to by-pass commercial banks changed the
9
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game. Morgan had even opted for the commercial bank role in the
aftermath of Glass-Steagall. The growth of competition in capital markets
also reduced Morgan’s former power. As a consequence, during the 1950s
there was growing pressure for a merger that would reinvigorate the bank
with larger lending limits and economies of scale. The larger question was
whether Morgan could retain, or more accurately, revive, its standing as a
leading national and international bank. Conveniently, Morgan’s president,
Henry S. Alexander, already had Guaranty ties. Before going to Morgan he
was an attorney at Davis Polk, the firm that represented both Guaranty and
Morgan and which for many years placed John Davis on Guaranty’s board.
Alexander’s initial hesitance to merge with Guaranty is not difficult to
understand. Morgan may have been the most respected name in banking,
but it was a small bank, and the wrong sort of merger could weaken the
position of Morgan executives and shareholders. It would have been foolish,
in fact, not to consider that a merger with the much bigger Guaranty could
result in Morgan’s subordination.11
Stetson certainly had this concern in mind when he initiated
negotiations with Alexander. The regional factor also helped smooth over
tensions, as Alexander, like Stetson, was a southerner. He grew up and went
to college in Tennessee before going to law school at Yale. Like Stetson, he
had made the most of the southern elite’s social skills. He used his
background to disarm Yankee associates, while his abilities as a salesman,
lawyer, and negotiator engendered confidence in the Guaranty deal.
Ultimately Stetson and Alexander worked out a deal in which the Morgan
leadership essentially won control over Guaranty’s assets. When the news
got out that Morgan was merging with a bank four times its size, the press
rightly said it was “Jonah swallowing the whale.”12
Neither Stetson nor Alexander had a difficult time clearing the
merger’s draft over the first hurdle—their respective boards of directors.
The Morgan and Guaranty boards voted to approve the merger on 17
December 1958. Stetson’s task was made easier because few Guaranty board
members had a stake in maintaining the status quo and some, like Stetson,
11

Chernow, House of Morgan, 467, 472, 480, 486; “Morgan’s Men,” Time 33 (13
February 1939): 64, 66; “The Big Banker,” Time 74 (2 November 1959): 82–86, 88.
12
Chernow, House of Morgan, 534; “The Big Banker.”

342

Relationship Banker

were anxious to bring in new leadership. The Guaranty board consisted of
twenty-two men, only four of whom had long service —Cleveland, Stetson,
George Allen, and George Roosevelt. Even a partial list of the directors
reveals how much the board had been altered since the days of banker
domination in the 1920s. They included William Bolenius of AT&T, John
Dorrance of Campbell Soup, Walter Franklin of the Pennsylvania Railroad,
Thomas Perkins of American Cyanamid, Charles Munson of Air Reduction,
Carrol Shanks of Prudential Insurance, Kenneth Towe of the Duke
Endowment, Clyde Weed of Anaconda Company, and Robert Woodruff of
Coca-Cola. Dale Sharp, younger and more attuned to the employees than
Cleveland, had been elected Guaranty’s president in 1957 and was also a
director.13
Among these men, no one had greater reason to be dissatisfied with the
current state of affairs than Stetson, the only company insider on the board
other than Cleveland and Sharp. Stetson’s support for the merger would
have carried great weight. He was good personal friends with Charles
Munson and Robert Woodruff. Stetson’s motivations also won approval
from AT&T’s Bolenius. In 1958 Bolenius wrote Stetson about the need for
more junior leadership at Guaranty’s vice president level. He believed “it
would seem a grave indictment of the current administration of the bank
that candidates’ names are not already in hand.” The problem was with
Cleveland, who seemed “pretty uncertain as to which names he wants to
promote.” Cleveland was unwilling to step down and provide leadership for
the future, much to Bolenius’s disappointment: “We do not want to leave
him in the position where he can say that he must remain for a longer
period because the organization is not experienced enough to carry on.”14

The Plan
In February 1959 the banks’ directors agreed to a final merger plan
that reflected Stetson and Alexander’s agreement. Both boards immediately
13
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submitted the plan for shareholder approval. The special advantages to
Morgan were clear. Despite Guaranty’s supplying the bulk of the cash,
Morgan obtained means to control the future executive committee and
board. In addition, Morgan would be merged into Guaranty, meaning the
new corporation would operate under the more liberal Guaranty state
charter granted in 1864. It also got top billing in the all-important new
name: “Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York.”15
Not surprisingly, given that from Guaranty’s standpoint the need for
new executive talent was the merger’s driving force, the new leadership was
heavily tilted toward Morgan. Shareholders were told that Dale Sharp,
Guaranty’s president, would become the new president of Morgan
Guaranty. This soothed Guaranty’s corporate ego, but it had little impact
on the real location of power. Instead, Morgan’s president, Alexander,
became chairman of the board and chief executive officer, and thus the real
head of the company. Guaranty’s Cleveland was allotted the chairmanship
of a weak executive committee. Even there Morgan power was ensured: H.
P. Davison and Thomas S. Lamont, executives at Morgan and the sons of
well-known Morgan partners, would be the executive committee’s vicechairmen.16
Further details of the leadership structure confirmed Morgan control.
The chairman (Alexander) and vice-chairmen (Davison and Lamont) could
call special shareholder meetings. The chairman of the executive committee
(Cleveland) could not. The right to preside at shareholder meetings was
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arranged in the following order: chairman (Alexander); vice-chairmen
(Davison and Lamont); and in the unlikely event the first three were not
present, president (Sharp). The executive committee had to include the
chairman of the board (Alexander), the vice-chairmen of board (Davison
and Lamont), the chairman of the executive committee (Cleveland), and the
president (Sharp), thus ensuring a Morgan majority among the committee’s
leadership. The chairman of the board (Alexander) was designated the chief
executive officer, with the right to preside over board meetings. The vicechairmen (Lamont and Davison) received essentially the same power in
Alexander’s absence. Thus, Cleveland, although chairman of the executive
committee, could only preside at general board meetings when Alexander,
Lamont, and Davison were absent. Predictably, Cleveland retired from the
executive committee in 1960 and left the board altogether in 1961.17
Guaranty’s shareholders learned nothing about the internal leadership
disputes that motivated the merger. Instead, the official word was that
merger would “enhance our capacity to serve the growing financial needs of
business by combining the skills and resources of the two institutions.”
Total resources would exceed $4 billion, making Morgan Guaranty the
fourth largest bank in the United States. Moreover, the new bank would
“have one of the highest ratios of capital funds to deposit liabilities of any
bank in the country and thus will possess outstanding strength from the
depositor’s point of view and a solid basis for further growth.” Precisely why
this could not be achieved with the existing structure was never formally
explained.18
The First Boston Corporation provided a strongly favorable opinion
letter for the proposed new bank in December 1958. It promised the deal
“will result in the creation of a large, strongly capitalized, and well managed
banking organization, better qualified than either of the present banks to
17
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provide broad national and international banking and fiduciary services.”
The merger would involve an exchange of six million outstanding Guaranty
shares for six million Morgan Guaranty shares. Morgan’s 350,000
outstanding shares would be exchanged for 1.54 million Morgan Guaranty
shares. Guaranty stockholders would therefore own approximately eighty
percent of the new Morgan Guaranty. Further, the merger was certain to
create the third largest bank in New York, albeit a somewhat distant third
behind Chase Manhattan and First National City. The leap in size
mattered, First Boston noted, because it meant the new bank could lawfully
lend more than $50 million to a single corporate borrower. Before the deal,
Morgan could not lend more than $8.7 million, while Guaranty could lend
just over $42.1 million. First Boston also favorably compared the potential
of the proposed bank with its large New York competitors, including Chase
Manhattan, First National City, Manufacturers Trust, Chemical Corn
Exchange, and Bankers Trust.19
The most revealing statement of the banks’ merger goals was a confidential memorandum prepared by the companies for the Superintendent of
New York Banks. Under New York law Morgan and Guaranty needed to
demonstrate that the merger was in the public interest. This meant showing
how the merger would benefit both customers and stockholders and would
not lessen competition. Although written in the form of a brief supporting
the proposal, the memorandum gave the Superintendent of Banks plenty of
straightforward information about the merger’s justifications.20
Demonstrating the fiscal soundness of the new institution would be
easy. The ratio of capital funds as a percentage of deposits, for example,
would be the highest of comparable New York City banks. In fact, the ratio
would be the highest among the thirty largest banks in the United States. It
was also rather obvious that new and broader services would be available.
Morgan would now have branches in midtown Manhattan and add 400
correspondent banks to Guaranty’s 2,400 correspondent banks around the
19
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world, stock transfer activities would be improved, economies of scale
produced, and the purchase of labor saving technology more easily
accomplished.21
The memorandum to the Superintendent of Banks also discussed the
problems that led to the merger. From Morgan’s standpoint, its relatively
low resources, combined with state law limiting an unsecured loan to ten
percent of its capital, meant that it simply could not participate in
substantial commercial lending. Morgan told the Superintendent that
although a good client recently sought a $19 million loan, the lending limit
meant Morgan could not satisfy the request. But the desire to increase
lending limits affected both Morgan and Guaranty. Continued increases in
loan demand, coupled with the fact that sixty-two of the hundred largest
industrial companies were Morgan customers and eighty-three were
Guaranty customers, constricted the banks’ prospects. What hurt most was
that “the great corporations which are clients of either or both the merging
banks have outstripped in their growth both Guaranty Trust and Morgan.”
Since 1947, assets of the top one hundred industrial companies grew 151
percent and gross national product grew by almost ninety percent, yet the
combined assets of Morgan and Guaranty increased by an embarrassing
nine percent. Deposits grew by only a little more than five percent.22
The memorandum also addressed Guaranty’s pressing personnel
issues. It argued Guaranty would benefit greatly from improved management. The memorandum placed this need in a larger context, quoting a
paper from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia that “the biggest
problem and most glaring weakness of bank management today is the
matter of successor management,” largely because of a widespread failure to
prepare younger executives after World War II. Guaranty had recently
suffered from “death and resignation,” and more experienced men were
needed to improve the bank’s services. Regarding Guaranty, the reference
to “death and resignation” applied specifically to former presidents Bill
Potter, who retired from the Guaranty board in 1956 and died in 1957,
Palen Conway, who retired in 1948, and to Stetson, who retired as
chairman in 1947. Each of these men was between 75 and 80 years old in
21
22
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the mid–1950s. Assuming replacements could not be found through lateral
hiring, merger was the best option. In contrast, despite its lack of cash,
Morgan boasted that it was in a position to provide new management. The
elder Morgan officers, now “senior in status,…have trained a younger group
of executives who are assuming major responsibilities in the bank.” Twentyone Morgan men would join the existing fifty-one officers in Guaranty’s
main office, effectively transforming the leadership cadre.23
The memorandum also considered whether the merger would have an
adverse effect on competition. Naturally, it maintained it would not,
arguing partly that banking was already heavily regulated as to opening
branches, interest rates on loans and deposits, loan amounts, acceptable
types of investments, and credit standards. Instead, only the nature of
service was left to the market, and within the resources of a bank, “size
alone is not a factor that militates against the ability of a bank to compete.”
In terms of asset concentration, the new bank would possess 1.6% of the
total deposits of American commercial banks. This was actually a sharp
decline from 1940, when together they controlled 4.8% of deposits. Among
banks with deposits over $1 billion, Morgan Guaranty would have a
combined 5.9% of the assets. This was compared with a whopping 19.8%
combined share in 1940.24

Larger Forces
As this last point suggested, there were significant changes happening
in banking nationally that helped motivate the merger. For example, among
Federal Reserve banks, New York’s share of bank assets declined
dramatically from 32.2 percent in 1940 to 19.1 percent in 1958. Deposits,
loans, and capital accounts in New York Federal Reserve banks fell after
1945. In contrast, accounts held outside New York Federal Reserve banks
grew by about a third between 1945 and 1958. Morgan and Guaranty used
New York’s declining position to argue to regulators that the merger would
not hinder banking competition. Further, between 1946 and 1957, long23
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term debt, retained profits, and stock provided much more money for
corporations than bank loans. Insurance companies, savings and loan
associations, college endowments, and fraternal orders were increasingly
important sources of money for business.25
This meant becoming bigger was necessary if the banks meant to
maintain relationships with America’s largest corporations. Of course both
banks had long attracted and retained the richest and largest business clients
in the world. Developing this kind of wholesale banking was precisely the
aim of older relationship bankers, including Stetson and Luther Cleveland.
Businesses held more than ninety percent of the deposits in both banks.
Over half the deposits of each bank came from customers with more than
$1 million. Three-quarters of their customers had deposited at least
$250,000. This was at a time when the median income of an American
family was less than $7,000 a year. Of the 750 largest companies listed by
Fortune, Morgan claimed 240 as clients and Guaranty 379. Given the
limited pool of customers, the competition for them through claims of
better banking “service,” meaning relationships, was intense. In effect, as
Stetson undoubtedly understood, the opportunity to create and develop
banking relationships with wealthy clients in the post-war environment was
the real economic force driving the merger. As the banks stated to the
regulators:
It is opportunities for the rendition of this service which all large
banks sedulously cultivate in seeking to establish a relationship with
important depositors such as the 750 largest corporations just
mentioned. Most of the large corporations with a nation-wide base
receive between 200 and 400 personal calls a year from banks in all
sections of the country, each offering its services in as much variety as
possible. Morgan, for example, estimates that it makes about 4,000
calls a year on corporations outside New York City. Guaranty Trust
with its larger staff provides even a more extensive coverage. Fifteen
or more of the larger New York City banks do the same. The
Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh banks are just as active,
while such banks as those of San Francisco, Seattle, St. Louis,
25
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Cleveland, Detroit, Atlanta and Dallas cover the country rather
thoroughly but less often. An automobile company estimates that it
gets from 350 to 400 bank calls a year; and any one of the leading 500
corporations or larger banks will receive up to five or six visits of
solicitation per week from various banks.
The result was a degree of competition unknown twenty years earlier. A
specific example of the trend was the experience of one large corporation,
which simultaneously maintained loan relationships with eighteen banks
scattered from New York to Chicago, Los Angeles, Atlanta and places in
between. To Stetson and Alexander this meant competition was cutting the
relationship-based foundation of their banks from beneath them. A bank
that could not provide expected services to the target clients could not hope
to survive in the changing environment. Consolidation, they thought, was
an answer to this competition. 26
A more detailed picture of Guaranty’s leading clients suggests the
connection between relationship banking, competition, client base, and the
merger. They were located, literally, on every populated continent of the
globe, although most were in North America. The number of clients was
not large, numbering less than 2,750. Approximately 1,000 were individuals
in the United States. The remainder included domestic corporations (839),
domestic banks (183), foreign banks (216), foreign corporations (224), and
foreign individuals (244). Corporate deposits greatly predominated over
individual deposits. The largest depositors were a “Who’s Who” of
American enterprise, representing precisely the kind of client the merger
was supposed to serve. These customers testified to Guaranty and Stetson’s
pursuit of the most elite businesses and their success in cultivating
relationships with its clients over the preceding decades. In stark contrast,
Guaranty’s own employees were not permitted to have accounts, and the
tradition had been to pay their wages in cash.27
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Passing
Guaranty and Morgan’s shareholders, as well as the Superintendent of
New York banks, easily approved the merger. On 24 April 1959, Morgan
was formally merged into Guaranty Trust. At the time, Stetson had just left
for Europe, where he met with Guaranty and Morgan representatives to
discuss the new bank. On his return, however, he had little time to enjoy the
fruits of his labor, which over the long run would be substantial. Within a
few years, the bank was doing more corporate lending than its next five
competitors combined. Stetson died of a cerebral hemorrhage on 20 July
1959, after serving as a Morgan Guaranty director for less than three
months.28
The key participants recognized Stetson’s critical importance in
shaping the new bank. The Morgan Guaranty board resolved that he:
“[P]layed a major role in bringing about the merger of J. P. Morgan and
Company, Incorporated, and Guaranty Trust Company of New York…[B]y
his wise counsel and his own admirable example of cooperation, he did
much to insure a successful blending of the two institutions.” More
precisely, the merger reflected Stetson and Alexander’s goals. It replaced
Cleveland with Alexander, a result both Alexander and Stetson agreed on.
In addition to distributing the most important offices to Morgan, twelve
directors from each company came together to form a new board of twentyfour. Although this suggested equality, given the ratio of hard assets it was
actually another concession to Morgan’s superior leadership. This also was
among Stetson’s key interests. As for Guaranty’s present or former senior
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officers, only Stetson, the well-liked Dale Sharp, and Cleveland (briefly),
became directors of the new company.29
Stetson’s contribution was so important that he received a $1 million
investment banking fee. The payment came at a time when the annual
salary for a top New York banker was much less than that amount. In fact,
such investment banking fees did not yet exist. Certainly fees were not paid
to an individual or to an insider like Stetson. Only later did rainmakers in
the mergers and acquisitions departments of investment banking firms earn
similarly large compensation for themselves.30
The Morgan-Guaranty merger cannot be fully explained without
considering Gene Stetson. Most important is that his actions were the
logical outgrowth of more than forty years of banking relationships and a
particular understanding of the evolving role of the elite commercial bank.
Morgan’s history intertwined closely with Guaranty’s past and in 1958
Stetson was the strongest remaining link in a chain that stretched back to
Pierpont Morgan. The Guaranty-Morgan merger was Stetson’s last great
effort to advance his vision of relationship banking. This is the primary
reason why he believed new leadership was imperative. Stetson knew
relationship banking needed new direction, and the fact that the merger was
part of a trend that helped push banking into a radically different era helped
make it especially appealing. After all, Stetson experienced more than his
fair share of change in the long period from post-Reconstruction Georgia to
the Space Age.31
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The history of Guaranty Trust and Stetson’s role in that history reveal
several overarching characteristics of American commercial banking
between the late nineteenth century and 1959. A few themes stand out in
evaluating Guaranty Trust. First is the relentless commitment to growth.
Much of this growth was related to three interrelated factors: connections
with external financial institutions, particularly the Mutual Life and J. P.
Morgan; territorial expansion, especially international operations; and a
willingness to merge with other banks, especially before the Depression.
Acquisition by the Mutual Life Insurance Company in 1891 transformed
Guaranty into a major bank. It infused capital and attracted personnel with
broad connections in New York finance. Beginning in the 1890s the
company also entered international banking, a field which it helped define.
Equally important, at Morgan’s direction it embarked on a series of
mergers that, in 1910, 1912, and 1929 expanded Guaranty into one of the
largest banks in the United States and the largest trust company in the
world. Morgan placed one of its partners, Lamont, as head of the bank’s
executive committee in 1912 and exercised even greater control over the
company after the Mercantile Bank of the Americas debacle of the early
1920s. Morgan benefited from a friendly relationship with Guaranty
because risks on its own loans could be shared and because certain kinds of
specialized business not handled by Morgan, such as trust accounts, could
be performed by Guaranty. The 1959 merger between Morgan and
Guaranty was simply the last step in this long trend of cooperation. To be
sure, the merger was a response to different conditions, including the
decline of commercial banks’ ability to provide corporate finance, but it fell
within the general pattern of the inexorable need to expand and join with
other financial institutions in order to provide business services, including
international services.
Another theme in Guaranty’s history was its intimate connection to
leading private and public institutions. The bank maintained relationships
with many of the most important corporations and wealthy individuals in
the world. This success was the result of a number of factors, including the
enormous range of sophisticated financial services it provided, its ownership
by leading persons and institutions in the banking world, and an aggressive
culture of relationship banking. The bank had to sell its services to a
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relatively small class of sophisticated consumers and attempt to provide an
expanding range of domestic and international services. Individual and
corporate customers, particularly those with global ambitions, expected as
much.
Also revealing was the bank’s relationship with government. Bank leaders complained about some forms of regulation, whether it was Hughes’s
New York insurance investigation in 1905, the federal seizure of the
railroads in World War I, or the federal regulation of banking in the 1930s.
The separation of commercial and investment banking and the forced
divorce from Morgan by 1940 were especially dramatic. Nevertheless, the
bank always adapted to and in fact usually benefited from government
actions. Guaranty’s 1864 charter was a valuable asset assiduously protected
in the acquisitions and mergers of 1891, 1929, and 1959. American
involvement in World War I proved a massive boon to the bank, as did the
business stimulated by total war from 1941–1945. During the 1940s a huge
portion of the bank’s portfolio resided in government securities. Regulators
never stood in the way of its mergers, and government almost always
encouraged its international work, even when it meant providing services to
communists.
A third outstanding theme in Guaranty’s history was the bank’s ability
to deal with economic and institutional change. There were few periods of
easy calm between 1864 and 1959. Those that stand out, such as the 1880s
and the 1950s, were years of decline that eventually produced revolutionary
mergers. The bank did best when it made connections with other powerful
financial institutions, provided services that those institutions could or
would not provide, and reacted with innovation to special opportunities in
the rapidly changing global financial environment. The development of
international banking before 1900, stability in the crisis of 1907, the
response to the needs of Europeans in 1914–1918, the problems of the
Mercantile Bank in the early 1920s, the creation of the Guaranty Company
to venture into the retail securities business in the 1920s, the trials of the
Depression, the legal restructuring of financial services in the 1930s, and
the return of a different kind of prosperity in the 1940s all offered chances
for the bank to stand out, and in most cases it did.
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The reconstruction of Gene Stetson’s career between 1916 and 1959
adds a human element to this broader history. His work provides a case
study in elite twentieth century relationship banking, Guaranty’s defining
characteristic. Stetson was offered an opportunity at Guaranty in 1916
because even as the president of a small national bank in Georgia he was a
proven go-getter, a salesman for bank services who could sit on corporate
boards, arrange a wide class of financial deals, accurately analyze the
business health of a company, link the work of banks to the public good,
and be personally and socially impressive while doing so. He performed
essentially the same kind of work at Guaranty, only on a larger and more
complex stage. Stetson shaped Guaranty’s history because he accepted the
values and purposes of relationship banking, viewing the role of the banker
as largely a matter of building good relationships inside the bank, with the
larger financial community, with government, and with the kinds of large
corporations and wealthy individuals the bank sought as customers. A great
deal of this relationship building was a matter of obtaining the confidence of
the men within these constituencies—a skill that combined knowledge,
personality, and willingness to be forceful or conciliatory as conditions
demanded.
Within the bank, Stetson’s rise to Guaranty’s board in 1928, his
election to its executive committee in 1934, the presidency in 1941, and as
chairman of the board in 1944, suggest the extent of his success. One cannot
overestimate the importance of his winning the confidence of Charles
Sabin, Bill Potter, and Thomas Lamont, the three men most responsible for
governance at Guaranty between 1916 and the 1940s. Sabin hired Stetson
and provided him with his first opportunities. Lamont, the Morgan partner,
was a dominating presence on the board from 1912 until federal law forced
him to leave in 1940. Potter, described by the New York Times on his death
in 1957 as “one of the world’s most powerful bankers and industrialists”
between the 1920s and 1940s, came to the fore in the Mercantile crisis, was
president when Stetson went on the board, and was still an advisor to the
company when Stetson resigned as board chairman. Stetson also developed
effective relationships with key directors, such as attorney John Davis, and
he recruited allies, such as Bob Woodruff, to the board. A breakdown in
leadership in the 1950s, while Luther Cleveland was chairman, caused
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Stetson, once a Cleveland supporter, to look to Henry Alexander and
Morgan to provide a new direction.
Probably a great deal of this internal achievement would not have
mattered much if Stetson had not been able to excel at his role as a
relationship banker. His record in the 1940s as a director of more
corporations than any other Guaranty officer shows how eagerly he
accepted this task as well as how effective he was in convincing executives
that he was worth having on their boards. Stetson frequently took a
leadership role as director, serving as chairman and executive or finance
committee member. The process of building profitable enterprises excited
him as a young man and kept him active into the 1950s. Stetson believed
deeply in the power of institutions to improve lives, and never drew bright
lines between public and private responsibilities. In the end, the creation of
Morgan Guaranty provided a fitting conclusion to Stetson’s career, strongly
reflecting his faith in banking’s broad capacity to contribute to business and
to American life.
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